The narrow-chart rule lived in HealthChart's body and grew it past its
size baseline. The overlays hook, which already sizes the room beside
the plot, now takes the chart's width, keeps no room on a narrow chart
and marks each target zone whose label sits inside it; the x axis
helper works out its own tick layout. The tiered series unit test mocks
the lookup for readings older than the rollups and covers the head the
read puts in front of them.
A range longer than a year reads its series from the week or month
rollups, which are kept for the last five years. When the rollups held
any rows the read returned them alone, so on a record that goes back
further the All range started where the rollups start: a weight history
from 2015 charted from late 2021. The readings older than the first
rollup day are folded live at the tier's grain and lead the series; the
head ends where the first tier bucket begins, so no month is counted
twice. One indexed lookup when there are none.
1.46 moved the average's and the target zones' labels beside the plot,
in a right margin sized to the longest label. On a phone that margin
took about a third of the plot's width, and the legend, wrapping into
the narrower space, took more of its height: a pulse chart drew at
160 x 66 px instead of 232 x 108. Below 520 px the labels sit inside
the plot again, the average's at the top left as before and a zone's
at the top right of its band, and the plot keeps no room beside it.
The x ticks assumed an 80 px date label. A 90-day chart's month starts
sit about 78 px apart on a phone, so the month grid never fit and the
axis showed one date. The label width now comes from a date in the
reader's format (10/01/2026 draws at 58 px). A yearly grid is labelled
with the year alone, narrow enough for one tick a year, and with the
year it marks when its point falls in the December before.
The y axis shows the decimals its tick step needs: 57, 58, 59 bpm
instead of 57.0, 58.0, 59.0.
The forwarder ran every tool as docker exec -i with its own standard
input piped through, also for pg_dump, which reads none. With -i and an
input already at its end the docker client may close the stream before
all output has arrived; one CI run saw the second of three nightly dumps
fail where every local run and the two runs before passed. Attach stdin
only for a file fed to pg_restore, and put the run's error into the
assertion so a failure says why.
realisedFamily probed for the closest two slots up to range.to only, so
the answer moved with the range. A Saturday + Sunday plan started the
weekend before the autumn DST change, read around its Saturday dose: the
±24 h range ends at 06:00 UTC on the Sunday, whose 08:00 slot is at 07:00
UTC after the change. Cut off, the closest slots were six days apart
(weekly); the wide re-mint saw the 25 h gap (daily). The two passes
disagreed, no band survived, and the dose was filed as unscheduled, so a
second backdated dose within a minute came back as the first one (200).
Probe the same reach on both sides of the range's middle.
The list ended 24 hours after local midnight. On the 25-hour day of an
autumn DST change that left the last hour out, so a dose due then could
not be offered from it; on the 23-hour spring day it reached into the
next day. Take the day's bounds from getUserTodayBounds, as the dashboard
tile does. Anchor the health-status test's history to local noon: now
minus whole days is still today on the long day.
Node's recursive mkdir retries ENOENT/EEXIST forever below /proc on Linux,
inside one native call, so neither a timer nor a test timeout runs again.
A DB_BACKUP_DIR or GEOLITE2_DIR pointing there froze the process; the
database-backup integration file, which uses such a path for its
unwritable case, never finished on a Linux runner. Walk from the nearest
existing parent with plain mkdir instead.
The new backup, dump and deletion files were unknown to the duration
sequencer and gathered in one shard, which ran past its job timeout
while the other three finished in under fifteen minutes.
With the deletion grace window on, the confirm dialog still asked to
delete the account permanently and its button said so, while the body
promised fourteen days and an admin undo. The title and the button now
match the window, and the success message that names the erase date stays
long enough to read before the sign-in page.
The new account-copy explainer under the Backups heading ran to 99-113
characters in German, Spanish, French, Italian, Polish and Portuguese and
wrapped to a second line at desktop width, so that page's header sat
20 px taller than every other settings and admin page. The German run of
the settings/admin header measurement failed on it. The Korean text was
two sentences in a one-sentence slot.
Each is now one sentence that fits the 1280 px column; English and Dutch
already did and stay as they are.
The kit's check compared keyed SHA-256 digests of the pasted value and the
configured key, which code scanning still reads as a fast hash of a
password. It now compares the scrypt fingerprints in constant time.
API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY can be a phrase, and its fingerprint is shown on the
admin page and written into dump manifests in the bucket; a fast hash
there lets a guessed phrase be checked offline. Text secrets now use a
scrypt fingerprint; the random encryption keys keep theirs. The kit's
check of a pasted token key compares keyed digests that never leave the
process.
The list reads ordered schedules by their window and id, but the detail,
create, update, compliance, dose-history, GLP-1 and efficacy reads took
them in whatever order Postgres found them, so two schedules created in
the same millisecond could swap places between two answers. Every read
now uses MEDICATION_SCHEDULE_ORDER, and the guard checks every
schedules include, not only the list reads.
The capability gate's check for an account pending deletion added a
point read of users to every request that resolves AI capabilities, one
statement over the budget on /api/auth/me, the dashboard snapshot and the
batch ingest. The usage-level read already loads the record's row once
per request; it now carries the deletion lock too.
The fixes above grew six files over 800 lines and three long functions, added
casts in tests and one error code the catalogue did not list. The claimable
profile check moves into its own module, the guardian count is reused by the
revoke path, the lifecycle fallback lives beside the lifecycle rules, the
key-needs list is its own component, the coach sweep wraps its filters with
ownedByActiveAccount, comments are tightened, and the test fixtures are typed
instead of cast. The enumeration guard reads a write keyed by one handed id
(id: runId, id: job.data.jobId) as scoped, so those need no marker.
account.deletion.no_guardian joins the catalogue; two baselines go down.
A background AI run's deadline is armed in model time plus a fixed margin.
Time spent waiting in the document reader's queue, and the read itself, came
out of that margin, so a person's lab scan or document read could be timed
out by the reaper because other work held the reader. When the reader grants
the slot it now moves the run's deadline by the wait plus the most the read
may take, and gives back the unused part when the read ends, never past the
job's own expiry and only while the run is running. The interactive queue
wait stays within the margin, which covers the run until the slot is
granted.
The per-account free-text encryption backfill seals what is already stored
and changes nothing the record holds, which is why its module is exempt from
the frozen-account rule; the new pending-deletion gate dropped its per-user
jobs anyway. A queue can now say it acts for pending accounts
(actsForPendingAccounts), and this one does.
Also types the ingest route test's token fixture to the row it now reads,
and drops an unused variable from the deletion grace test.
The guard asked whether a file that reads the lab table mentions the gate
anywhere, so one ungated read in a file with a gated one passed, and
whenModuleOn for any module counted as the labs gate. It now walks the syntax
tree: each read must sit in a function that asks the labs module, or in a
private helper whose every caller in the file does, or be listed by file and
function with its reason. whenModuleOn counts only with "labs".
DEPLOY_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_TIMESTAMP had been changed to mean signed requests
only, so an operator who set it for a sender that adds a timestamp but cannot
sign would have had every deploy notification refused after the upgrade. It
means the secret header plus a fresh timestamp again. Signature-only, the
setting that stops a replay, is DEPLOY_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE, on the
compose whitelist, in the env manifest and examples, and in the deploy
guide.
Forwarding headers were believed from any connection on a private address.
Behind Docker Desktop, OrbStack and docker-proxy every connection to a
published port arrives from the gateway, a private address, so a caller
reaching the port directly could again choose the client address that rate
limits, the audit log and sign-in notices record. TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS
(comma-separated CIDRs) now names the proxies: when set, only those peers may
report a client address. The private-range default stays when it is unset,
the boot log states the rule in force in one line, and the reverse-proxy
guide says what to set for a proxy on the same host, on a Docker network, or
on a public address (which, unlisted, puts all clients in one bucket).
An invalid TRUST_PROXY_HOPS threw on every request that resolved the client
address, so every route answered 500, the health probe included. It now
resolves no address, warns once, and is named at boot.
The cross-site write check let through any request that carried an
Authorization header, while the caller is resolved from the session cookie
before any header. A browser attaches Basic or Negotiate credentials on its
own once a proxy or host asked for them, so a cookie-authenticated write from
a sibling subdomain could pass. Only Authorization: Bearer is exempt now, and
only when no session cookie rides along; a request carrying both is checked
as the cookie request it resolves to.
The share-link passphrase POST under /api/c/ is exempt by path: its
credential is the token in the path and the passphrase in the body, and from
the shared view's no-referrer page a browser without Sec-Fetch-Site sends
Origin: null, which was refused.
A cookie named healthlog_session can be set by any host under the same
registrable domain, so a page on a sibling subdomain could plant a session of
its choosing in a visitor's browser. Wherever the session cookie is Secure it
is now issued as __Host-healthlog_session, which a browser accepts only from
this exact host. Plain-HTTP installs, which cannot hold a __Host- cookie,
keep the old name.
Nobody is signed out: the old name is still read after the new one, a
session found under it is re-issued under the new name and the old cookie
expired, and a browser holding the new cookie is never answered from the old
one. Every reader and writer goes through one module, which the proxy, the
native-caller check, the native handoff and the OIDC callback use; the
session-surface guard follows the new reader.
A read a person started now runs as interactive work of their account, and
the document jobs as background work of theirs, so the reader's queue can
order and cap them. When the reader is busy or stopped before it answered,
a lab scan, label read or document read fails with aiRuns.readerBusy (503,
nothing read or charged) instead of a misleading unreadable-file error, and
the index and summary jobs throw so the queue runs them again rather than
recording an outcome about the document.
Three defects in the bounded document reader.
Image uploads were decoded into their thumbnails in the server process. A
header check is all that stood between a decoder and an allocation the file
chooses, and the GIF check showed how that fails. The image is now decoded in
the same child process PDFs run in, under its memory ceiling and time limit;
the header check stays in front of it.
The reader's one slot went to whoever asked first, and a waiting item waited
without end, so a few heavy PDFs from one account held everyone's lab scans
behind them. The slot now goes to a read a person is waiting on before
background work, to accounts in turn, to a few waiting items per account, and
an item that waits past its lane's deadline is answered busy, which callers
treat as retryable.
Any child that ended without an answer counted as a document past its limits,
so a kernel kill caused by the container's overall memory marked a good PDF
as permanently failed. Only a bound the reader measured (the sampled memory,
the time limit, the child's heap cap) is final now; any other end is run once
more and then answered interrupted, which the thumbnail job retries within its
ordinary attempts.
Both resolve a Bearer token outside resolveBearerToken and checked only
revoked and expiry. The deletion revokes every token in its own transaction,
so only a token issued in that same instant could get through, but the rule
should hold everywhere a token is resolved: both now refuse an account
pending deletion.
A restore of the copy a data wipe took replaces the record with that copy,
so anything added after the wipe is gone, and the wipe ended integration
connections, sharing in both directions, Guardian roles and share links,
none of which are in a copy. Neither the person's confirmation nor the
admin's restore dialog said so. Both do now, in every locale.
The dumps now live under database/<host of APP_URL>/, so the rule check reads
a sample key in that folder: a rule scoped to this instance's folder counts,
one scoped to another instance's does not.
Off-host dumps were named by their time alone. Two instances sharing a bucket
(nothing forbids it, and it was safe for the account objects) overwrote each
other's dump at the same second of the same default schedule, and
latest --from-bucket restored whichever instance's dump was newest. Each
instance now uploads under database/<host of APP_URL>/, the object key (and so
the encryption's associated data) carries it, and the restore takes only this
instance's dumps: it refuses another's and names the instances it found,
unless --instance=<host> or the dump's full key says which one on purpose.
A restore killed outright (out of memory, docker kill) left its .restore- or
.download- directory, a whole database decrypted, in the backups directory,
where nothing removed it. A restore now removes them before it starts and on
SIGINT and SIGTERM, and the nightly retention sweeps any older than twelve
hours.
A drill that stopped on its time budget before the first object recorded
ok with zero accounts checked, and the readiness tile said passed. Such a
run now records its time and counts and no verdict, so the last pass or
failure stands, and readiness calls it attention (nothing_checked) in every
locale.
The upsert that keeps a pass and a failure apart was stubbed in the drill's
tests and tested nowhere; it now has an integration test read back through
the readiness rule. The drill test that claimed to keep a failed verdict
when keeping it fails is named for what it checks.
Restoring the copy a data wipe took withdrew every held data_wiped purge of
the account. With two wipes in one window, restoring the first copy also
withdrew the second wipe's purge, and the off-host copies of what the person
entered between the wipes, and wiped, stayed until the bucket's rule removed
them. Only the request written after this copy and before the next one goes
now. The withdrawal had no test; it has one against Postgres.
A lifecycle read that timed out once was cached as unknown for ten minutes,
which kept every key an off-host object ever needed in the recovery kit: the
kit turned due, the admins were pushed attention, and the next good read
pushed recovered. A failed read now stands on the last answer the bucket gave,
for up to a day.
The notes said the other migrations only add columns and one concurrent
index. 0487 drops four app_settings columns the previous image reads on
nearly every request, and 0488 builds its index on users without
CONCURRENTLY. The rollback step now names the columns to hand back, and the
notes say what v1.45 does with accounts pending deletion and held wipe
purges, and how to settle them before going back.
Any error counting pending migrations (a connect or statement timeout, a
database still starting up) exited the step with "no dump before migrating",
and the migration that ran a second later went ahead without its way back.
An unknown count now takes the dump; a database that cannot be reached at
all then fails the dump, and the boot stops naming the switch that skips it.
Pre-migration dumps were kept by count alone, so an install that updates
rarely kept its last two, and every account deleted since, indefinitely,
while the docs and the backups card stated the nightly retention as the
retention of deleted accounts. A pre-migration dump older than the oldest
nightly dump kept now goes, except the newest one, the way back from the
latest update, which stays until the next update. The card, the disaster
recovery guide and its variable table say so.
The recovery kit, "Keys the backups still need" and safeToDropRetiredKeys
read only the stored copies and the off-host account objects. After a
rotation the page called the old key safe to drop while every dump taken
before it, the pre-migration dumps that are the way back from an update
among them, could only be restored with that key: db-restore refuses a dump
whose active key is missing.
A dump now counts for the key its rows were written under, the manifest's
active key: a dump on this server while it is kept (read from the manifests),
an off-host one until the bucket's rule for database/ expires it, or
indefinitely when that rule cannot be read. The nightly run records the key
on its ledger row (migration 0489, database_backup_runs.active_key_id). The
encryption view and the kit list the dumps per key, in every locale, and the
rotation and backup runbooks say so.
The enumeration guard read any query that named userId as scoped, including
an orderBy tiebreak, so the nightly recovery, strain and stress score jobs
grouped every account's measurements, wrote scores into frozen records and
spent cap slots on them. It also looked only at findMany and groupBy under
lib/jobs.
The guard now reads a scope from a query's filter only (orderBy, by,
distinct, select and include are dropped first), covers count, aggregate,
updateMany, deleteMany and executeRaw, and walks the boot discoveries and
sweeps that live beside their domain: the rollup and mood rollup discovery,
the Fitbit jobs, the cumulative record rederivation, the intake slot dedup,
the inventory expiry and the climb backfill. What it then found is filtered
(the score cohorts through excludePendingOwners, which filters before the
cap; Fitbit sync, backfill and sleep repair; coach proposal lapsing and
reminder nagging; expired coach reminders; snooze clearing; inventory
expiry) or says why it needn't be (retention and expiry sweeps over rows,
writes scoped by id).
Jobs queued before a deletion ran anyway, since handlers act on the userId
they carry without asking again. The binding of every queue now completes a
job whose payload names an account pending deletion without loading its
handler (pending-deletion-gate). The silent medication intake push, which
does not go through the dispatcher, refuses a pending account itself.
Marc-André Bombeck