Wire the previously-unused mfaEnforced flag into a real policy. An admin can
require a second factor instance-wide (an AppSettings toggle in the General
section) or per user (a toggle in user management); the effective requirement is
the OR of the two. When required and the account has no active factor — no
confirmed TOTP, no registered security key, and no primary passkey — the user is
walled behind a forced-enrollment interstitial after sign-in, with only the
security settings and sign-out reachable until a factor is enrolled.
The gate is surfaced like the onboarding gate: a hint cookie the proxy reads
without a DB round-trip, recomputed from the database on every sign-in and on
/api/auth/me so a tampered cookie self-corrects. Nobody is locked out — the
enrollment surface stays reachable, and toggling the policy off (or the
disable-mfa CLI) is the operator's recovery path.
Add an opt-in "remember this device" at the second-factor step. On opt-in
a random token is minted, set in an httpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie,
and only its HMAC hash is stored in a new TrustedDevice table. A later sign-in
from the same browser still requires the password (factor 1); a matching,
unexpired trusted device lets the login skip factor 2 only.
The token is never accepted for step-up — a trusted-device login does not stamp
mfaVerifiedAt — so a stolen device cookie cannot reach a destructive action.
Trusted devices are listed and revocable from the security surface, are revoked
wholesale when the second factor is removed or the user signs out everywhere,
and cascade away on account deletion. A recovery-code login never trusts the
browser. Migration 0204 adds the table (and the instance-wide mfa_required
policy column that the enforcement work reads).
Record the very first device a user is ever seen on silently. The
new-device sign-in alert only carries meaning once there is an
established device to contrast against, so an empty device ledger
establishes the baseline without firing a notification; alerts begin
with the second distinct device. Registration's silent first-device
behaviour is unchanged.
Also extend the destructive-action step-up to treat a registered
security key as an active second factor, matching requireFreshMfa, so a
key-only account cannot delete or reset without a fresh factor.
Stamp each passkey's last-used time on a successful assertion and return
it from the list, add a rename endpoint, and add a dismissible
add-a-passkey nudge for accounts that have none. Share the relying-party
configuration with the second-factor path.
When a password is accepted for an account with a second factor, the
login response carries a single-use ticket instead of a session. The
login page now renders a second step: a TOTP or recovery code, or a
WebAuthn security-key assertion scoped to the account's registered keys.
A WebAuthn-only account (no TOTP) is recognised at the password step and
offered the security-key path.
The security-key verify endpoints validate the open ticket, verify the
assertion against the user's second-factor credentials, and only then
mint the session through the shared login tail, so no session exists
before the factor passes. The login page also arms passkey conditional-UI
autofill on the username field.
Introduce a dedicated /settings/security section that gathers every
account-protection control in one place: TOTP enrolment (QR plus manual
secret, confirm, recovery codes shown once with copy and download),
WebAuthn security keys as a second factor (register, list with last-used,
rename, step-up-gated removal), recovery-code count and regeneration, and
primary passkey management.
The second-factor WebAuthn path keeps its own credential store, separate
from primary passkeys, and uses non-resident keys so an account can hold
many. Relying-party resolution is shared with the passkey path. A status
endpoint backs the hub; the step-up gate now recognises a registered
security key as an active second factor so a WebAuthn-only account can
still reach the gated actions.
Drop the in-app bug-report surface end to end: the user submission page,
the feedback intake and admin inbox, the optional GitHub-issue
escalation, the operator config, and the dedicated achievement badges.
- delete the /bugreport page and the bugreport / feedback / admin-feedback API routes
- drop the Feedback model, its enums, and the AppSettings GitHub-issue and enable columns (migration 0205)
- remove the admin Feedback section, the Bug Report integration card, and the system-status row
- drop the bug-report nav entry and the app-settings provider that only carried its flag
- remove the bug-hunter achievement badges and their metric
- prune the related i18n keys across every locale and the encrypted-column and key-rotation registries
Add the user-facing account-security surface in Settings:
- Active sessions (closes#64): GET /api/auth/me/sessions lists each browser
login with a coarse device label, masked IP, resolved location, the sliding
last-active stamp, and the current-session marker. DELETE the collection
signs out everywhere else (keeps the current session, revokes other sessions
and native refresh tokens, leaves API tokens alone); DELETE one revokes a
single session, scoped to the owner so a foreign id 404s.
- A sliding last-active stamp on the session, written throttled and
fire-and-forget off the request-resolution path.
- Security activity: GET /api/auth/me/security-activity, the shared read over
the audit log filtered to sign-ins, second-factor changes, password changes,
session revocations, exports, and deletions, with masked IPs.
OpenAPI regenerated for the new endpoints.
On a completed sign-in (password, second-factor, or passkey) from a device or
location not seen before, send one notification through the dispatcher cascade,
honouring the user's per-channel preferences via a new SECURITY_ALERT event
type. Dedupe on a one-way, per-user fingerprint: a SHA-256 over the userId, the
coarse User-Agent family, and a country/ASN-level geo signal, stored in the new
user_known_devices ledger (migration 0203). The first sighting of a fingerprint
alerts and records; later sightings only bump last-seen and stay silent. The
raw User-Agent and IP are never persisted — only the salted hash and a coarse
label. Registration records its device silently so a fresh account does not
alert on its own first session. The whole path is fire-and-forget and never
blocks or fails a sign-in.
Check a newly chosen password against HaveIBeenPwned through the k-anonymity
range API: only the first five hex characters of the SHA-1 digest leave the
host, the suffix is matched locally, and Add-Padding hides the bucket size.
A confirmed match is rejected so a fresh credential is never a known-breached
one; the check fails open, so an unreachable HIBP never blocks the operation.
Covers registration, password change, and admin reset. Existing passwords are
never retroactively blocked at login.
Also lands the six-locale strings for the password-breach notice and the
account-security surfaces that follow.
Account deletion and the keep-account data reset now demand a recent
second-factor re-verification for accounts that have a second factor
active; single-factor accounts are unaffected and keep the typed-
confirmation-only contract. The gate runs through requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled,
which is cookie-only by construction — a Bearer transport for an MFA-enrolled
account cannot satisfy step-up and surfaces the auth.stepup.required envelope
so the UI can launch a re-verification flow.
Add an optional admin-triggered key rotation on pg-boss that re-encrypts
the whole encrypted-column corpus to the active key, reusing the same
column registry as the command-line tool (which stays the canonical path).
POST /api/admin/encryption/rotate enqueues a singleton run and is gated by
cookie-only admin plus a fresh second factor. The run is idempotent
(rows already on the active key are skipped), active-key-only, and never
adds or drops a key — the env key map stays operator-owned, so a key drop
remains a deliberate redeploy. It fails closed per row and reports totals
into the audit trail the status view reads.
Add a read-only admin Encryption section that surfaces what the rotation
tooling computes: per encrypted-column rows-per-key-id, legacy-key row
counts, and overall rotation progress, plus a 'safe to drop the legacy
key' state once every column sits on the active key. GET
/api/admin/encryption/status drives it and returns only key ids and
counts — never key material. A shared scan over the canonical encrypted-
column registry backs both this view and the rotation run. Cookie-only
admin.
Add an opt-in to download the full backup as an encrypted archive instead
of a plaintext JSON file. The user supplies a passphrase over the request;
the server derives a 256-bit key with Argon2id and seals the export bytes
with AES-256-GCM into a self-describing HLX1 archive (magic, version, KDF
params, salt, iv, tag, ciphertext), mirroring the off-host backup envelope.
POST /api/export/encrypted returns the binary archive and is step-up gated
for accounts with a second factor; single-factor accounts use a normal
session. The passphrase is never stored and never logged, and there is no
server-side recovery — the UI states this. A standalone decryptor
(scripts/decrypt-export.ts) opens the archive with the passphrase outside
the app. The plaintext full-backup route now shares one payload builder so
both variants emit the same restore-compatible shape.
Reject any challenge that is not a login challenge before minting a session,
cap the disable and confirm request bodies through safeJson, and correct the
recovery-code scan comment to match its early-return-on-match behaviour.
When a password is accepted for an account with a confirmed TOTP factor, the
login route no longer mints a session or token. It creates a single-use,
~5-minute MfaChallenge (the opaque ticket is stored only as a hash) and
returns HTTP 200 with data:null, error:null and meta.mfaRequired + mfaTicket +
methods. The client completes the login at POST /api/auth/mfa/verify with the
ticket + a TOTP or recovery code, receiving the exact same token bundle the
password path issues, with the session stamped second-factor-verified.
- The ticket is claimed once, atomically, only after the factor verifies, so
two concurrent submissions can mint at most one session; no session ever
exists before factor two.
- Wrong codes increment the ticket attempt counter and burn it at the cap
(throttle, not an account lock); the anonymous verify surface is also
rate-limited per IP.
- meta.mfaRequired is returned only after a valid password and the
invalid-credentials response is identical regardless of MFA state, so an
attacker without the password cannot enumerate MFA.
- The session/token tail is extracted to login-response.ts and shared by both
the password path and the verify path, keeping the transport contract
identical. OpenAPI registers the verify endpoint, the MFA management
endpoints, and the mfaRequired login variant.
Add the TOTP enroll/confirm/disable surface and Argon2id-hashed recovery
codes as the v1.23 second factor.
- totp.ts wraps otpauth (zero-dep) pinned to the interop floor (SHA-1, 6
digits, 30 s) with a +/-1 drift window. Replay protection persists the last
accepted time-step per account (User.totpLastStep, migration
0202_v123_totp_laststep) and rejects any step that is not strictly newer,
so a captured code dies the instant it is accepted once.
- recovery-codes.ts issues ten single-use, high-entropy codes, Argon2id-
hashed at rest, shown once; regeneration replaces the entire prior set in a
transaction and verification burns the matched code with a guarded update.
- The TOTP secret is stored AES-256-GCM encrypted (already registered in the
encrypted-columns registry + rotation script); decrypt is fail-closed.
- Routes: setup (pending secret), confirm (activate + issue recovery codes),
disable (step-up + current factor), recovery-codes/regenerate (step-up).
Setup/confirm are cookie-only; disable/regenerate add requireFreshMfa.
- scripts/disable-mfa.ts is the operator escape hatch for a locked-out
self-hoster, audited, run via pnpm dlx tsx.
Add requireFreshMfa(maxAgeSeconds) and requireCookieAuth alongside
requireAdmin. Both resolve through getSession() only, so a Bearer token can
never satisfy them — the same structural boundary requireAdmin relies on, not
a softenable runtime check. requireFreshMfa passes only for a cookie session
whose Session.mfaVerifiedAt is within the window and whose user has an active
second factor; otherwise it throws StepUpRequiredError (401 +
meta.errorCode "auth.stepup.required") so the client can launch a
re-verification flow.
createSession now accepts an optional mfaVerifiedAt stamp so a session minted
behind a completed second factor records its freshness.
Wrap GET /api/measurements/:id through shapeMeasurementNotes like the list,
create, and update paths already do, so the encrypted note column is decrypted
into notes and the raw ciphertext is stripped from the response. Harden the
rotation-coverage guard to require both the field literal and the model
delegate, so a same-named encrypted column whose table is not rotated is caught.
Lay the account-security and data-sovereignty substrate for v1.23. No
user-facing behaviour yet — schema, crypto registry, redaction, and the
note-encryption data path only.
Schema + migrations:
- 0199 — User totp_secret_encrypted / totp_confirmed_at / mfa_enforced /
passkey_upgrade_nudge_dismissed; Session mfa_verified_at / last_active_at;
Passkey last_used_at. All additive, nullable / defaulted.
- 0200 — mfa_challenges (single-use step-up ticket; only the ticket hash is
stored, so no session or token is ever minted before the second factor),
mfa_recovery_codes (Argon2id at rest), webauthn_mfa_credentials (second-factor
keys, kept separate from passkeys, which remain the passwordless-primary set).
- 0201 — mood_entries.note_encrypted + measurements.notes_encrypted (BYTEA),
matching the existing free-text encrypted-note convention.
Free-text health notes:
- New writes encrypt the mood / measurement note into the *_encrypted column and
null the legacy plaintext column; reads prefer the ciphertext and fall back to
plaintext only for not-yet-migrated rows, via a single read/write helper.
- A boot-time job migrates existing plaintext rows in an idempotent,
transactional, fail-closed pass (encrypt, then null the plaintext, per row in
one transaction; safe to re-run; a row with content is never left both-null).
- The legacy plaintext columns are kept this release and dropped in a follow-up
once the backfill reports zero remaining rows — the same boundary the
key-rotation playbook uses before dropping a legacy key.
Crypto coverage:
- Register the three new encrypted columns and wire them into the key-rotation
script so a rotation never orphans them.
- Extend the observability and log redaction denylists so TOTP secrets, MFA /
recovery / backup codes, and export passphrases never reach a wide event.
Standardise the labs marker subtitle to text-xs across both the compact list
and the card grid, and build the localized name->slug lookup map once per
locale instead of re-scanning the catalog seeds per group on every render.
Add relative to the mobile section strips in the settings and admin shells so
the active chip's offsetLeft is measured from the strip, giving an exact
horizontal scroll target.
Drop the orphaned insights.sleep.headlineCaption and headlineCaptionSuffix
keys from all six locales; nothing references them after the sleep headline
removal.
Hide the copy button on insecure-context (plain-HTTP) self-hosts where the
Clipboard API is undefined: a new SSR-safe useClipboardSupported() detector
mirrors the speech-synthesis hook so the button is absent rather than
error-toasting on tap.
Stop the per-message action row compressing below the 44px touch floor on
narrow phones: the icon buttons keep their tap size (shrink-0 + min-w-11) and
the row wraps instead of shrinking the up-to-six targets to ~30px.
Surface an icon-only action row below each message, sharing the row with
the hover timestamp: muted until the bubble is hovered or focused on
pointer devices, and always visible on touch where there is no hover.
User turns get Copy; assistant turns get Copy, Read-aloud, a thumbs-up /
thumbs-down feedback pair (wired to the existing per-message feedback
endpoint), and Try-again. Copy strips inline chart tokens from assistant
prose so they are never pasted. Try-again resubmits the user turn that
produced the reply as a fresh turn, leaving the composer untouched.
Read-aloud only set the utterance language and let the browser fall back
to its default voice, which on most systems is a legacy compact engine
that reads robotically. Enumerate the installed voices, rank them for the
active locale (prefer enhanced/premium, Siri, Microsoft Natural/Online,
Google, and an exact lang-region match; penalise known compact engines),
and assign the winner with a natural rate and pitch. The voice list loads
asynchronously, so subscribe to voiceschanged and re-rank lazily; when no
voice beats the legacy default, fall back gracefully to prior behaviour.
The history search rendered as a thin, short strip that read as an
afterthought. Give it the app's standard full-width input height and
padding so it matches the standalone conversations page and looks
intentional.
Shorten the composer placeholder across all locales to a short, inviting
one-liner and clip the placeholder pseudo-element so a longer hint can
never wrap to a second line inside the single-row composer on a narrow
phone. The textarea value still wraps and auto-grows for real typing.
Surface a short, factual subtitle under every catalog-linked lab marker on
the Labs page, mirroring the descriptive line the Insights overview carries
under its metric headings. The text states what each biomarker measures,
sourced from the seed catalog via a new labs.catalog.desc.<slug> i18n map in
all six locales.
A reading's analyte resolves back to its catalog slug by a case- and
whitespace-insensitive match against the localised catalog name; free-text
markers with no catalog match carry no subtitle rather than a fabricated one.
Rendered in both the compact list view and the card/tile view.
Fixed-pixel chart bands ate roughly half the screen when a small phone
was rotated to landscape. Swap the brittle heights for viewport-relative
clamps so the chart envelope holds its previous size on desktop and
portrait but shrinks toward a floor on short landscape viewports. Covers
the overview trends-row slot and the mood distribution, weekday, and
time-of-day charts (with matching skeleton heights). Chart series and
styling are untouched; only the container heights flex.
The Sleep view led with an average-per-night headline card that repeated
the same figure and label already shown in the average-sleep tile within
the sleep-rhythm grid row below it. Remove the leading card and let the
tile carry the readout; the stage-distribution bar and duration trend
chart stay in place.
The long single-word labels (de "Benachrichtigungen") clipped their last
character at the tile edge on a 320 px phone. Trim the grid gutters and the
tile padding/gap to hand each label more horizontal room, and cap the bottom
sheet at max-w-md, so the label wraps cleanly onto a second line instead of
running off the tile. Tile height stays uniform.
The Theme sub-trigger inherited the shared sub-trigger padding (py-1.5,
no min-height) while every sibling row carries min-h-11 py-2, so the
Theme row sat a few pixels shorter and the menu read as unevenly spaced.
Match the item height on this instance only, leaving other dropdowns'
sub-triggers untouched.
Code-review and design follow-ups before the v1.22 cut. No behaviour change
beyond the items below.
Coach / insights:
- Coach SSE route: a non-provider error raised inside the open producer (e.g. a
DB failure persisting the reply) now records on the wide event and forwards to
GlitchTip instead of masquerading as a provider outage; it still surfaces an
error frame since the stream is open.
- Lab ↔ outcome correlations: hedge faint-tier pairs ("a faint hint, if
anything … too small to lean on") so the narrated confidence never outruns the
effect, matching the daily engine.
- Reminder sweep: mint the plan-review reminder and clear the plan's reviewDate
in one transaction so a half-applied write can't duplicate the reminder.
- Fold the two raw provider-fallback runners onto one shared chain walker.
Design / accessibility:
- Lift sub-44px tap targets to the 44px mobile floor (suggested-action card,
Coach bubble affordances), brighten the resting timestamp clock for non-text
contrast, and route the lab chart height through the shared constant.
- Replace ad-hoc arbitrary type sizes with the scale token and static size-11
icon buttons with the named icon-lg variant.
- Settings: add the missing About card-header descriptions, normalise the
low-stock numeric widths, and relax the notification-status rows from nested
cards to a divided list.
Housekeeping:
- Drop three unused exported types (and the now-orphaned source const), re-stamp
v1.21.5 comments to v1.22, and register the live-judge eval harness as a knip
entry so the script-only module resolves.
Marc-André Bombeck