The TrueNAS page now walks through the catalog install field by field, how
to generate the two secrets, where TrueNAS keeps the key and why that is not
a backup, a dump and restore from the postgres container shell, and updates
with forward-only migrations. The listing is marked as pending review, and
the install-via-YAML values stay for the time until it is live.
The deploy notes list what needs a matching truenas/apps pull request in the
same release cycle: a new or stricter required variable, a port or health
check change, a Postgres major or extension, and any other compose-shape
change.
/api/health gives the database two seconds and answers 503 past that.
With three retries, a pool saturated for a minute after the start period
could mark the container unhealthy and take it out of the proxy's
routing. The compose healthcheck and the image's HEALTHCHECK now allow
five misses (two and a half minutes) and end wget after four seconds,
inside Docker's five, so a stalled request is one clean miss. A test
holds both to these bounds and to each other.
The getting-started requirements now say a host needs 3 GB of RAM, 4 GB
recommended, and drop the advice to lower APP_MEMORY_LIMIT to 1g on a
2 GB host. The compose and .env example comments say the same.
At boot the app reads its cgroup memory limit (v2, then v1) and logs one
line when it is below MEMORY_FLOOR_MB. The support report adds the
container limit and a note below the floor, and Admin > System status
shows "below the supported floor" next to the existing low-heap flag.
The app keeps running either way.
Twenty of the twenty-three soft-delete models were never purged: a deleted
lab result, visit, allergy or cycle stayed in the database, in every backup
and in every key rotation for as long as the instance ran.
soft-delete-retention.ts holds one entry per model that has a deletedAt
column, derived from the schema by a guard with a counter-check. The sync
domains and the document vault keep their purges; every other model is
purged by a new nightly soft-delete-purge job after the sync feed's
75-day horizon, per account under the restore lock and in bounded batches.
A cycle start folded into a live cycle stays while that cycle does, and a
removed coach fact stays for the coach message retention, since stored
trails are withheld against it.
The pressure report re-armed only after the heap fell under 70 % and
half an hour passed, so a heap that climbed to its limit soon after an
85 % report died with only that older report on record. A 95 % tier
now writes the same report at once, whatever the cooldown, and re-arms
under 85 %.
The image sets NODE_OPTIONS so Node writes its diagnostic report to
stderr when the heap runs out, with environment variables and network
interfaces excluded. The heap-diagnostics and scaling docs say how to
keep the flags when overriding NODE_OPTIONS.
Heap figures share one megabytes helper with the support report.
An account whose only strong credential is a primary passkey was refused
auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled on every action behind requireFreshMfa, so it
could not create, edit, hand over or delete a managed profile or manage its
guardians, although a passkey sign-in or re-proof already stamps the
session the gate reads.
requireFreshMfa now defaults to the any-possession proof source: a passkey
makes the gate reachable, and a passkey re-proof through the dialog clears
it. The refusal offers passkey in meta.methods, never the password.
hasSecondFactorEnrolled keeps its narrow meaning on purpose. It decides
whether the conditional gates apply at all (account deletion, the data
reset, the password change, the export, offering manage access, the
recent-proof branches and the native Bearer rules), so none of those
change, and password sign-in still challenges only TOTP and security keys.
The MFA-management routes keep the second-factor source. The decision and
its limits are written beside FreshFactorProofSource.
Copy, the OpenAPI description and the sharing and key-rotation docs say
"second factor or passkey" where this gate applies.
Refs #959
Every visible delivery now carries a url. A managed-record delivery to a
guardian and a discreet one open "/", which names no event and no record;
only the silent intake sync push stays without one. The tap-target test walks
every event type across own, guardian and discreet delivery and the channels
that carry the absolute url. Document the forward-auth exemption for the
quick-answer route.
Every raw-SQL clock read against a timestamp column without a zone now
writes NOW() AT TIME ZONE 'UTC', so passkey and login challenges, rate
limits, provider pauses, coach usage stamps, tombstone and measurement
windows no longer pass through the session time zone even where the
per-connection pin cannot apply. The regression-window bounds stay naive
UTC timestamps instead of being turned into timestamptz. A structural
guard keeps bare NOW() / CURRENT_TIMESTAMP out of raw SQL outside a short
list of timestamptz targets. The integration test sets the database
default to Europe/Berlin and drives challenge claims, session expiry, the
native sign-in handoff freshness check and the rate-limit window through
the app's client, plus the challenge claim through an unpinned client.
Self-hosting docs describe the pin for an existing or shared Postgres.
The statement timeout and, since v1.42, work_mem reach Postgres as the
libpq options startup parameter, which PgBouncer refuses unless it is in
ignore_startup_parameters. A host behind it could drop the string by
setting the timeout to 0; work_mem is now always sent, so that no longer
worked. DATABASE_SESSION_OPTIONS_DISABLED sends no session settings,
documented in the example env, the env manifest, the compose whitelist
and the scaling guide.
Fetch the Open-Meteo air-quality feed (CAMS, domains=auto) with the weather:
17 hourly variables folded into local days by fixed rules (means and maxima
only with 18 of 24 hours, ozone as the highest 8-hour running mean, UV only
with the midday hours), a value the feed did not cover stored as null, never
as zero. Requests are cut into 90-day chunks, newest first, and chunks before
mid 2022 ask for the eight pollutant and index variables only. An air-quality
failure never costs the weather row; the day stays unfetched and the nightly
gap fill (up to 90 days per account, newest first) asks for it again.
Every Open-Meteo request asks an instance-wide budget kept in Postgres first
(500 a minute, 4000 an hour, 8000 a day, weighted by the hosted pricing
rule). A refused request is not sent and the run ends as done with
budget_blocked. OPENMETEO_AIR_QUALITY_URL and ENVIRONMENT_AIR_QUALITY_DISABLED
are honoured; the account switch lives on PATCH /api/environment/preferences.
The home, each dated location period and each stored day keep their coarse
location sealed as one value under healthlog/environment-location/v1. The
writers write the sealed value only, the readers open it and fall back to the
readable columns for rows the free-text encryption backfill has not reached,
and the backfill now seals all three and clears the readable columns. The
backup carries the location readable in a portable file and sealed in a
disaster-recovery file; a restore seals either under the receiving key.
Three correlation channels join the environment family (PM2.5, the ozone
8-hour high, the day's highest pollen count), read through the averaged
same-day window and left empty while air quality is off. The Coach and MCP
gain get_environment: module-gated, clamped to the lookback limit, no
coordinate or place name anywhere, with provenance and the attribution
lines. The settings section gets the switch, the coverage and the newest
day's values; the dashboard shows a quiet chip on a day with high pollen,
a warm night or very poor air. Copernicus and Open-Meteo are credited next
to the values.
Getting started names the APP_MEMORY_LIMIT default and how to lower it
on a 2 GB host; the scaling guide says that web and worker share one
pool in the bundled single-container setup. The rollup comment names
migration 0372, which carries the hourly-mean statistic.
At a first start there is no recorded key yet, so an operator facing a
refusal they are certain is false has no row to delete. With
ENCRYPTION_KEY_CHECK=warn (default enforce) the check still runs and logs
its full outcome, /api/health names a mismatch as a warning field without
failing, requests are served, and no key is recorded unless every key id
passes.
The variable is on the compose whitelist, in both example files, the env
manifest, the Unraid and Portainer templates and the published-env guard.
The log block, the mismatch page and the self-hosting pages offer it as the
last resort after the three real fixes, and say that it disables a safety
check.
The boot key check recorded whatever key was configured whenever its probe
found nothing to try. It only read string columns, so an install whose
ciphertext sat in Bytes columns (notes, documents, ECG, symptoms) read as
empty; a probe that ran out of time did the same; and rows written by a
process that served under a wrong key could open on the next boot and get
that key recorded as the right one.
The probe now reads every registered column, string and Bytes, in all four
stored layouts, and tries the oldest values first, ordered by the row's
updatedAt (else createdAt, else primary key). A key is recorded only when
the oldest value that opens is preceded by at most one that does not, or
when no column holds a single value under the key id. A time-out, an
unreadable table, oversized values or mixed results are inconclusive: the
process serves, records nothing and checks again at the next start.
When the first insert loses a race, the stored record is read back and must
open under this process's key, else the outcome is a mismatch.
A rotation that walked every column without errors removes the record of
each previous key id that no longer holds any value. The refusal log block
and the self-hosting pages explain how to reset the check for a key id.
A server that issues Secure session cookies cannot sign anyone in on a
plain http:// page: the browser drops the cookie. The login request was
still verified, the MFA ticket minted and then claimed, and the next
attempt answered "Invalid or expired challenge".
The web client now sends an optional clientTransport on the browser
sign-in requests (password login, passkey start, both MFA completions).
When the server issues Secure cookies and the page is plain http on a
non-loopback host, the request is refused with 409
auth.session.insecure_transport before the password is checked, a
ticket is minted or claimed, a code is spent, or a passkey challenge is
issued. A request without the field is never refused. The SSO start
takes client_proto/client_host and sends such a page back to the login
page instead of to the provider.
GET /api/auth/registration-status publishes sessionCookieSecure, and the
login page shows the reason with both fixes and disables the sign-in
controls before anything is sent; on localhost it shows a note only.
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE keeps its meaning; the header heuristic log line
stays.
Every configured key id now has a canary in encryption_key_canaries,
checked at boot. A key that cannot open its canary, or existing data
written before the canary existed, puts the process in a refusal state:
every API route answers 503 encryption.key_mismatch, /api/health reports
reason encryption_key_mismatch, the pages render one explanation, and
neither the queue producer nor the worker starts. The process stays up
so the reason is visible instead of hiding in a crash loop.
The admin Encryption page gains a "Back up your encryption key" step:
key id and fingerprint (never the key), where the key lives per
platform, a check of a pasted copy that is compared and discarded, and
a confirmation bound to the active key id and fingerprint. The overview
gets a tile and admins get a dashboard banner while it is due.
HEALTHLOG_PLATFORM picks the platform the step opens on. Adds the
TrueNAS self-hosting page and key backup sections in the docs.
With TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 behind a proxy that sends only X-Real-IP, every
client address resolves to nothing and all anonymous sign-ins share one
rate-limit bucket, with nothing in the log to say why. The first request
that carries a forwarding header the setting does not let HealthLog read
now logs one warning naming the header and the setting to change.
X-Real-IP stood in for a missing X-Forwarded-For at any hop count. It is a
single address, so it is now read only with TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=1; with two
or more hops the chain the count describes is X-Forwarded-For.
The upload, import and native batch routes that bypass the proxy now carry
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy and Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy like every
other response, and so do the proxy's early exits.
The env examples described an unset TRUST_PROXY_HOPS as right for a
directly exposed host; unset means one hop, and that host wants 0.
The client-IP resolver read X-Real-IP on every path: with
TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0, which means no proxy in front and no forwarding header
to believe, and on the path where the X-Forwarded-For chain was shorter
than the declared hops, which means the proxies were bypassed. A caller
sending a new X-Real-IP with each request got a new per-IP rate-limit
bucket each time.
X-Real-IP now gets the trust X-Forwarded-For gets: it is read only when at
least one proxy hop is declared and the request carries no X-Forwarded-For.
A short chain resolves to no address. The reverse-proxy guide no longer
suggests TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 for a proxy that sets X-Real-IP; such a proxy
takes 1.
Two requests left the server without anything being connected: the
HaveIBeenPwned range query on every password set (registration, change,
admin reset) and the daily GitHub releases request behind the About page
and the admin version tile. Neither could be turned off, which made
"nothing leaves" untrue for an instance that wanted it to be.
PASSWORD_BREACH_CHECK_DISABLED and UPDATE_CHECK_DISABLED (1, true, yes or
on) stop each request. Both stay on by default. The breach check keeps
its fail-open contract: switched off, a password is simply not looked up.
The update route answers status "unknown" with reason "disabled" and
the admin tile says the check is off. The password routes reach the
check only through the switch, and a test holds that import line.
Both are on the compose whitelist, in the env manifest under a new
"Outbound requests" group with IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED, and documented in
both env examples and the getting-started guide.
docker-compose.yml forwards its whitelist as "${NAME:-}", so a variable
the operator never set reaches the process as the empty string. Reads
written as a nullish fallback kept that string: the weather client built
an empty base URL and every geocode failed with ERR_INVALID_URL, and the
IP geo lookup requested a relative path.
Reads with a fallback now go through src/lib/env.ts (envValue, envOr,
envFlag), which treats empty and whitespace as unset. IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED
accepts 1, true, yes and on instead of only "1". A structural test refuses
a ?? fallback written directly against process.env anywhere in src/, and
the compose whitelist guard counts the helper's call shape as a read.
A person stores one connection per system (base address, Papra
organization id, API token encrypted at rest) and can search it by
document name with tag and date filters, then import picked documents
one per request through the same ingest path as an upload: source-key
answer before any download, content dedup, deleted stays deleted, quota,
provenance, and the person's own AI reading setting. An import can link
the document to the visit, condition or vaccination it was picked for.
The operator lists the instances in DOCUMENT_SOURCE_ORIGINS; unset, the
feature is off. Only listed origins are contacted, through safeFetch with
the origin pinned, redirects refused, timeouts and byte caps. The routes
are cookie-only and owner-only. The token is registered for rotation,
removed by Delete all data, and not carried in backups.
A 502 from a channel test reports the user's relay or mail setup, not a fault on this server, yet the status alone raised every press to an error-level event. The event builder gains a ceiling for the status-derived level, and the test routes cap it at warn on the 502 path. The 500 for an unnamed failure stays at error, and explicit elevations are unaffected.
The notifications guide notes that a reverse proxy which replaces 5xx pages hides the detail, so the card falls back to Test failed.
Refs #947
A notification target on a private network has been reachable since the
operator allowlist for private origins arrived; the hint under the URL
field and the guide still said the address had to be public.
The outbound payload was documented nowhere. The webhook section now shows the generic body and the Gotify body as the Test button sends them, what each field carries, and how to point the webhook at Gotify: a URL ending in /message, the application token in an X-Gotify-Key header, and the Gotify format.
Refs #947
A Nightscout self-host on host networking with
NIGHTSCOUT_PRIVATE_ORIGINS=http://localhost:1337 worked before and must
keep working unchanged; an operator who lists an exact loopback origin
with its port has made the same deliberate decision as one who lists a
LAN origin. The never-grantable floor is now the unspecified address,
link-local and the metadata endpoint only. Loopback (127/8, ::1,
localhost) is grantable when listed exactly, still resolved and pinned
at connect time with redirects forbidden, and still refused when not
listed.
::1 is answered before the embedded-IPv4 unwrap, which read it as the
IPv4-compatible spelling of 0.0.0.1 and refused it as unspecified. The
pinned Nightscout transport test runs the real floor again. Each refused
range keeps its own test; loopback moves to the grantable-when-listed
set with a test that an unlisted loopback is still refused, and a
Nightscout grant of http://localhost:1337 is asserted to parse.
Refs #947
A loopback, link-local or metadata target answered
private_origin_not_approved with a message telling the user to have the
operator list it, and the parser refuses such an entry forever: a dead
end the route test even pinned. Those targets now answer
private_origin_not_grantable (catalogued, on all four routes, translated
in seven locales) with a message that says no grant can open them and
to use the relay's LAN address. Both senders carry the reason into the
outcome so the test button forwards the same code.
The malformed-entry warning printed the entry verbatim, which is where
a pasted token or userinfo sits; the parser now hands callers scheme
and host only, plus the reason in words. The Nightscout list throws a
named error with that redacted entry and reason, and the connect route
answers it as a 422 with the message instead of a bare 500, so a
self-host that listed http://localhost:1337 reads what to change.
The two settings cards translate a coded save refusal like the test
button does; the docs and the changelog name the sub-host and sibling-
port narrowing; the dispatcher floor tests assert the policy marker so
a real NXDOMAIN cannot pass for a refusal.
Refs #947
Marc-André Bombeck