fix(egress): keep loopback grantable under an exact operator origin

A Nightscout self-host on host networking with
NIGHTSCOUT_PRIVATE_ORIGINS=http://localhost:1337 worked before and must
keep working unchanged; an operator who lists an exact loopback origin
with its port has made the same deliberate decision as one who lists a
LAN origin. The never-grantable floor is now the unspecified address,
link-local and the metadata endpoint only. Loopback (127/8, ::1,
localhost) is grantable when listed exactly, still resolved and pinned
at connect time with redirects forbidden, and still refused when not
listed.

::1 is answered before the embedded-IPv4 unwrap, which read it as the
IPv4-compatible spelling of 0.0.0.1 and refused it as unspecified. The
pinned Nightscout transport test runs the real floor again. Each refused
range keeps its own test; loopback moves to the grantable-when-listed
set with a test that an unlisted loopback is still refused, and a
Nightscout grant of http://localhost:1337 is asserted to parse.

Refs #947

.env.example

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY="REPLACE-WITH-OUTPUT-OF-openssl-rand-hex-32"
 # Webhook (Gotify, Home Assistant, n8n) and ntfy targets on your own network,
 # comma-separated exact origins, e.g. "https://gotify.example.com,http://ntfy.lan:8080".
 # A target resolving to a private address is otherwise refused at send time.
-# Loopback, link-local and metadata addresses stay refused even when listed.
+# Link-local, metadata and unspecified addresses stay refused even when listed.
 # See docs/self-hosting/notifications.md.
 # NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS=""
 

.env.production.example

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY="<openssl rand -hex 32>"
 # path). A target that resolves to a private address is otherwise refused at
 # send time; the test button reports it as private_origin_not_approved. A
 # listed origin is still dialled through the pinned resolver with redirects
-# forbidden; loopback, link-local and metadata addresses stay refused even
+# forbidden; link-local, metadata and unspecified addresses stay refused even
 # when listed, and a malformed entry is logged once and grants nothing.
 # See docs/self-hosting/notifications.md.
 # NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS=""

docker-compose.yml

@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@ x-healthlog-env: &healthlog_env
   # Webhook (Gotify, Home Assistant, n8n) and ntfy targets on your own
   # network, comma-separated exact origins (e.g. "https://gotify.example.com,
   # http://ntfy.lan:8080"). Without it a target that resolves to a private
-  # address is refused at send time as an SSRF target. Loopback, link-local
-  # and metadata addresses stay refused even when listed. See
+  # address is refused at send time as an SSRF target. Link-local, metadata
+  # and unspecified addresses stay refused even when listed. See
   # docs/self-hosting/notifications.md.
   NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS: "${NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS:-}"
   # Open-Meteo endpoints for the environment/weather correlation. Default to

docs/integrations/nightscout.md

@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ Each entry is an exact normalized `scheme://host:port` trust unit:
   rejected;
 - approving one hostname does not approve subdomains, sibling hosts, or a
   different port; and
-- loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`, `localhost`), the unspecified address,
-  link-local and the cloud-metadata range cannot be listed, and a listed
-  name that resolves there is refused at connect time — the grant opens
-  your network, never the container or the host it runs on; and
+- the unspecified address, link-local and the cloud-metadata range cannot
+  be listed, and a listed name that resolves there is refused at connect
+  time; loopback (`http://localhost:1337`, `http://127.0.0.1:1337`) stays a
+  valid grant for a host-networking deployment, exactly as before; and
 - any malformed non-empty entry fails evaluation instead of silently
   weakening the configured policy.
 

docs/self-hosting/notifications.md

@@ -235,14 +235,14 @@ Each entry is one `scheme://host[:port]`, the same grammar as
   a range grant would let a DNS rebinding to any address in the range pass
   the pin, so an operator with several relays lists several origins;
 - listing a host does not list its sub-hosts or sibling ports;
-- loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`, `localhost`), the unspecified address,
-  link-local and the cloud-metadata range (`169.254.0.0/16`, `fe80::/10`)
-  cannot be granted: a literal entry is logged once and ignored, and a
-  listed name that resolves there is refused at dial time. On a
-  host-network deployment, list the LAN address of the relay instead of
-  `localhost`;
-- RFC1918, IPv6 unique-local and CGNAT (a Tailscale address or MagicDNS
-  name) are what the list is for;
+- the unspecified address (`0.0.0.0`, `::`), link-local and the
+  cloud-metadata range (`169.254.0.0/16`, `fe80::/10`) cannot be granted: a
+  literal entry is logged once and ignored, and a listed name that resolves
+  there is refused at dial time;
+- RFC1918, IPv6 unique-local, CGNAT (a Tailscale address or MagicDNS name)
+  and, on a host-network deployment, loopback (`http://127.0.0.1:8080`,
+  `http://localhost:8080`, `::1`) are what the list is for — an exact
+  loopback origin with its port is as deliberate a decision as a LAN one;
 - a malformed entry is logged once at first use and grants nothing; the
   valid entries beside it keep working.
 
@@ -261,11 +261,13 @@ What is refused where, so you know which lever to pull:
 | `gotify.lan`, `gotify.home.arpa`, a Docker service name     | refused at send   | works                                          |
 | `gotify.local` (mDNS)                                       | refused at save   | allowed, if the container resolves mDNS        |
 | Literal `192.168.x.x`, `10.x.x.x`, `100.64.x.x`, `fd00::/8` | refused at save   | works                                          |
-| `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `169.254.169.254`, `::1`          | refused at save   | still refused (`private_origin_not_grantable`) |
+| `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `::1` (host networking)           | refused at save   | works                                          |
+| `0.0.0.0`, `169.254.169.254`, `fe80::…`                     | refused at save   | still refused (`private_origin_not_grantable`) |
 
 A private target that is not listed is refused when the card is saved
 (`422`, `meta.errorCode` = `private_origin_not_approved`, the message
-names the variable) or, for a DNS name the save cannot classify, when the
+names the variable; a link-local, metadata or unspecified target answers
+`private_origin_not_grantable` instead, because no grant can open it) or, for a DNS name the save cannot classify, when the
 test button or a reminder dials it. The resolved address is never shown
 to the user. Telegram, email and Web Push are not affected: their hosts
 are not user-supplied.

messages/de.json

@@ -5991,7 +5991,7 @@
         "not_configured": "Nicht konfiguriert",
         "url_not_public": "URL ist kein öffentlicher Endpunkt",
         "private_origin_not_approved": "Ziel im privaten Netz. Der Betreiber muss diesen Origin in NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS eintragen",
-        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Diese Adresse ist Loopback, Link-local oder eine Metadaten-Adresse; keine Betreiber-Freigabe kann sie öffnen. Bitte die LAN-Adresse des Relays verwenden",
+        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Diese Adresse ist Link-local, eine Metadaten- oder eine unspezifizierte Adresse; keine Betreiber-Freigabe kann sie öffnen. Bitte die Adresse verwenden, auf der das Relay lauscht",
         "url_invalid": "URL ist ungültig",
         "redirected": "Endpunkt leitet weiter — URL prüfen",
         "endpoint_not_found": "Endpunkt unter der URL nicht gefunden",

messages/en.json

@@ -5991,7 +5991,7 @@
         "not_configured": "Not configured",
         "url_not_public": "URL is not a public endpoint",
         "private_origin_not_approved": "Private network target. The operator has to list this origin in NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS",
-        "private_origin_not_grantable": "This address is loopback, link-local or a metadata address; no operator grant can open it. Use the relay's LAN address",
+        "private_origin_not_grantable": "This address is link-local, a metadata or an unspecified address; no operator grant can open it. Use the address the relay listens on",
         "url_invalid": "URL is invalid",
         "redirected": "Endpoint redirects — check the URL",
         "endpoint_not_found": "Endpoint not found at the URL",

messages/es.json

@@ -5991,7 +5991,7 @@
         "not_configured": "No configurado",
         "url_not_public": "La URL no es un endpoint público",
         "private_origin_not_approved": "Destino en una red privada. El operador debe añadir este origen a NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS",
-        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Esta dirección es loopback, de enlace local o de metadatos; ninguna autorización del operador puede abrirla. Usa la dirección LAN del relay",
+        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Esta dirección es de enlace local, de metadatos o no especificada; ninguna autorización del operador puede abrirla. Usa la dirección en la que escucha el relay",
         "url_invalid": "La URL no es válida",
         "redirected": "El endpoint redirige — comprueba la URL",
         "endpoint_not_found": "No se encontró el endpoint en la URL",

messages/fr.json

@@ -5991,7 +5991,7 @@
         "not_configured": "Non configuré",
         "url_not_public": "L’URL n’est pas un point de terminaison public",
         "private_origin_not_approved": "Cible sur un réseau privé. L’opérateur doit ajouter cette origine à NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS",
-        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Cette adresse est une adresse de bouclage, de lien local ou de métadonnées ; aucune autorisation de l’opérateur ne peut l’ouvrir. Utilisez l’adresse LAN du relais",
+        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Cette adresse est une adresse de lien local, de métadonnées ou non spécifiée ; aucune autorisation de l’opérateur ne peut l’ouvrir. Utilisez l’adresse sur laquelle le relais écoute",
         "url_invalid": "L’URL n’est pas valide",
         "redirected": "Le point de terminaison redirige — vérifiez l’URL",
         "endpoint_not_found": "Point de terminaison introuvable à l’URL",

messages/it.json

@@ -5991,7 +5991,7 @@
         "not_configured": "Non configurato",
         "url_not_public": "L’URL non è un endpoint pubblico",
         "private_origin_not_approved": "Destinazione su una rete privata. L’operatore deve aggiungere questa origine a NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS",
-        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Questo indirizzo è di loopback, link-local o dei metadati; nessuna autorizzazione dell’operatore può aprirlo. Usa l’indirizzo LAN del relay",
+        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Questo indirizzo è link-local, dei metadati o non specificato; nessuna autorizzazione dell’operatore può aprirlo. Usa l’indirizzo su cui il relay è in ascolto",
         "url_invalid": "L’URL non è valido",
         "redirected": "L’endpoint reindirizza — controlla l’URL",
         "endpoint_not_found": "Endpoint non trovato all’URL",

messages/ko.json

@@ -5991,7 +5991,7 @@
         "not_configured": "설정되지 않았어요",
         "url_not_public": "URL이 공개 엔드포인트가 아니에요",
         "private_origin_not_approved": "비공개 네트워크 대상이에요. 운영자가 NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS에 이 출처를 등록해야 해요",
-        "private_origin_not_grantable": "이 주소는 루프백, 링크 로컬 또는 메타데이터 주소예요. 운영자 등록으로도 열 수 없으니 릴레이의 LAN 주소를 사용해 주세요",
+        "private_origin_not_grantable": "이 주소는 링크 로컬, 메타데이터 또는 미지정 주소예요. 운영자 등록으로도 열 수 없으니 릴레이가 실제로 수신하는 주소를 사용해 주세요",
         "url_invalid": "URL이 올바르지 않아요",
         "redirected": "엔드포인트가 리디렉션돼요 — URL을 확인해 주세요",
         "endpoint_not_found": "해당 URL에 엔드포인트가 없어요",

messages/pl.json

@@ -5991,7 +5991,7 @@
         "not_configured": "Nieskonfigurowano",
         "url_not_public": "Adres URL nie jest publicznym punktem końcowym",
         "private_origin_not_approved": "Cel w sieci prywatnej. Operator musi dodać to źródło do NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS",
-        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Ten adres to loopback, link-local lub adres metadanych; żadna zgoda operatora nie może go otworzyć. Użyj adresu LAN przekaźnika",
+        "private_origin_not_grantable": "Ten adres to link-local, adres metadanych lub nieokreślony; żadna zgoda operatora nie może go otworzyć. Użyj adresu, na którym nasłuchuje przekaźnik",
         "url_invalid": "Adres URL jest nieprawidłowy",
         "redirected": "Punkt końcowy przekierowuje — sprawdź adres URL",
         "endpoint_not_found": "Nie znaleziono punktu końcowego pod adresem URL",

scripts/env-manifest.json

@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
       "variables": [
         {
           "name": "NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS",
-          "purpose": "Comma-separated exact origins (scheme://host[:port], no path, no wildcard, no CIDR), e.g. \"https://gotify.example.com,http://ntfy.lan:8080\". Loopback, link-local and metadata addresses stay refused even when listed; a malformed entry is logged once and grants nothing."
+          "purpose": "Comma-separated exact origins (scheme://host[:port], no path, no wildcard, no CIDR), e.g. \"https://gotify.example.com,http://ntfy.lan:8080\". Link-local, metadata and unspecified addresses stay refused even when listed; a malformed entry is logged once and grants nothing."
         }
       ]
     },

src/app/api/settings/__tests__/private-origin-routes.test.ts

@@ -179,25 +179,47 @@ describe("PUT /api/settings/webhook — private targets", () => {
     expect(json.meta).toBeUndefined();
   });
 
-  it("answers a loopback target with the not-grantable code, listed or not (M1)", async () => {
+  it("saves a listed loopback target and refuses an unlisted one with the listable code", async () => {
+    // Host networking: an exact loopback origin with its port is a grant like
+    // any other. Unlisted, it is refused with the code that says "list it",
+    // because listing it does open it.
+    process.env.NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS = "http://localhost:8080";
+
+    const refused = await put("webhook", {
+      url: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/message",
+      enabled: true,
+    });
+    expect(refused.status).toBe(422);
+    await expect(refused.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
+      meta: { errorCode: "private_origin_not_approved" },
+    });
+
+    const saved = await put("webhook", {
+      url: "http://localhost:8080/message",
+      enabled: true,
+    });
+    expect(saved.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(prisma.notificationChannel.upsert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("answers a metadata or unspecified target with the not-grantable code, listed or not (M1)", async () => {
     // This used to pin a dead end: the route said "list it", the parser
     // dropped the listing, and the next save said "list it" again. A target
     // no grant can open gets its own code and a message that says so.
     vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
     process.env.NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS =
-      "http://127.0.0.1:8080, http://localhost:8080";
+      "http://169.254.169.254, http://0.0.0.0:8080";
 
     for (const url of [
-      "http://127.0.0.1:8080/message",
-      "http://localhost:8080/message",
       "http://169.254.169.254/latest",
-      "http://[::1]:8080/message",
+      "http://0.0.0.0:8080/message",
+      "http://[fe80::1]:8080/message",
     ]) {
       const response = await put("webhook", { url, enabled: true });
       expect(response.status).toBe(422);
       const json = await response.json();
       expect(json.meta).toEqual({ errorCode: "private_origin_not_grantable" });
-      expect(json.error).toMatch(/LAN address/);
+      expect(json.error).toMatch(/no operator grant can open/);
       expect(json.error).not.toContain("NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS");
       expect(json.details.issues.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
     }
@@ -321,7 +343,7 @@ describe("POST /api/settings/{webhook,ntfy}/test — the refusal names itself",
       expect(response.status).toBe(422);
       const json = await response.json();
       expect(json.meta).toEqual({ errorCode: "private_origin_not_grantable" });
-      expect(json.error).toMatch(/LAN address/);
+      expect(json.error).toMatch(/no operator grant can open/);
       expect(json.error).not.toContain("NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS");
     },
   );

src/app/api/settings/ntfy/route.ts

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ const ntfySettingsSchema = ntfySettingsSchemaWith(isAllowedNotificationTarget);
 const PRIVATE_ORIGIN_REFUSAL =
   "This server is on a private network. The operator has to list its exact origin (scheme://host:port) in NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS before HealthLog can send to it.";
 const NOT_GRANTABLE_REFUSAL =
-  "This server is loopback, link-local or a metadata address, which no operator grant can open. Use the relay's LAN address instead.";
+  "This server is a link-local, metadata or unspecified address, which no operator grant can open. Use the address the relay actually listens on.";
 
 /**
  * Refusal for an enable attempt on a channel the operator switched off

src/app/api/settings/ntfy/test/route.ts

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async () => {
       });
       return apiError(
         result.errorCode === "private_origin_not_grantable"
-          ? "The server is loopback, link-local or a metadata address, which no operator grant can open. Use the relay's LAN address instead."
+          ? "The server is a link-local, metadata or unspecified address, which no operator grant can open. Use the address the relay actually listens on."
           : "The server is on a private network the operator has not approved. List its exact origin (scheme://host:port) in NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS on the server.",
         422,
         { errorCode: result.errorCode },

src/app/api/settings/webhook/route.ts

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ const webhookSettingsSchema = webhookSettingsSchemaWith(
 const PRIVATE_ORIGIN_REFUSAL =
   "This address is on a private network. The operator has to list its exact origin (scheme://host:port) in NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS before HealthLog can send to it.";
 const NOT_GRANTABLE_REFUSAL =
-  "This address is loopback, link-local or a metadata address, which no operator grant can open. Use the relay's LAN address instead.";
+  "This address is a link-local, metadata or unspecified address, which no operator grant can open. Use the address the relay actually listens on.";
 
 /**
  * Generic-webhook channel config (v1.17.1).

src/app/api/settings/webhook/test/route.ts

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async () => {
       });
       return apiError(
         result.errorCode === "private_origin_not_grantable"
-          ? "The target is loopback, link-local or a metadata address, which no operator grant can open. Use the relay's LAN address instead."
+          ? "The target is a link-local, metadata or unspecified address, which no operator grant can open. Use the address the relay actually listens on."
           : "The target is on a private network the operator has not approved. List its exact origin (scheme://host:port) in NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS on the server.",
         422,
         { errorCode: result.errorCode },

src/lib/__tests__/private-origin-policy.test.ts

@@ -51,21 +51,29 @@ describe("canonicalOrigin", () => {
   });
 
   it.each([
-    ["IPv4 loopback", "http://127.0.0.1:8080"],
-    ["IPv4 loopback, non-canonical", "http://127.10.20.30"],
     ["IPv4 unspecified", "http://0.0.0.0:8080"],
     ["link-local / metadata", "http://169.254.169.254"],
-    ["IPv6 loopback", "http://[::1]:8080"],
     ["IPv6 unspecified", "http://[::]:8080"],
     ["IPv6 link-local", "http://[fe80::1]:8080"],
-    ["IPv4-mapped loopback", "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080"],
     ["IPv4-mapped metadata", "http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]"],
-    ["localhost", "http://localhost:8080"],
-    ["a *.localhost name", "http://gotify.localhost"],
   ])("refuses %s as a grant", (_label, value) => {
     expect(canonicalOrigin(value)).toBeNull();
   });
 
+  it("keeps loopback grantable: an exact loopback origin is a deliberate host-networking decision", () => {
+    expect(canonicalOrigin("http://127.0.0.1:8080")).toBe(
+      "http://127.0.0.1:8080",
+    );
+    expect(canonicalOrigin("http://127.10.20.30")).toBe("http://127.10.20.30");
+    expect(canonicalOrigin("http://[::1]:8080")).toBe("http://[::1]:8080");
+    expect(canonicalOrigin("http://localhost:1337")).toBe(
+      "http://localhost:1337",
+    );
+    expect(canonicalOrigin("http://gotify.localhost")).toBe(
+      "http://gotify.localhost",
+    );
+  });
+
   it("keeps mDNS and other reserved-looking names grantable when listed exactly", () => {
     // The input-time floor refuses `.local` and `.internal` unlisted; an
     // operator naming the exact origin is the override, and a loopback or
@@ -120,16 +128,16 @@ describe("parsePrivateOrigins", () => {
     const onInvalid = vi.fn();
     expect(
       parsePrivateOrigins(
-        "https://gotify.lan, https://*.lan, http://127.0.0.1:8080, not an origin",
+        "https://gotify.lan, https://*.lan, http://169.254.169.254, not an origin",
         onInvalid,
       ),
     ).toEqual(new Set(["https://gotify.lan"]));
     expect(onInvalid.mock.calls.map(([entry]) => entry)).toEqual([
       "https://*.lan",
-      "http://127.0.0.1:8080",
+      "http://169.254.169.254",
       "not an origin",
     ]);
-    expect(onInvalid.mock.calls[1][1]).toMatch(/loopback.*cannot be granted/);
+    expect(onInvalid.mock.calls[1][1]).toMatch(/link-local.*cannot be granted/);
     expect(onInvalid.mock.calls[0][1]).toMatch(/one exact http\(s\) origin/);
   });
 
@@ -204,13 +212,41 @@ describe("evaluateOriginGrant", () => {
     });
   });
 
+  it("approves a listed loopback origin and refuses an unlisted one", () => {
+    const loopbackGrants = new Set([
+      "http://localhost:1337",
+      "http://[::1]:8080",
+    ]);
+    expect(
+      evaluateOriginGrant("http://localhost:1337", loopbackGrants),
+    ).toEqual({
+      allowed: true,
+      canonicalOrigin: "http://localhost:1337",
+      privateOriginApproved: true,
+      reasonCode: null,
+    });
+    expect(
+      evaluateOriginGrant("http://[::1]:8080", loopbackGrants),
+    ).toMatchObject({ allowed: true, privateOriginApproved: true });
+    for (const origin of [
+      "http://localhost:1338",
+      "http://127.0.0.1:1337",
+      "http://[::1]:8081",
+    ]) {
+      expect(evaluateOriginGrant(origin, loopbackGrants)).toEqual({
+        allowed: false,
+        canonicalOrigin: origin,
+        privateOriginApproved: false,
+        reasonCode: PRIVATE_ORIGIN_NOT_APPROVED_CODE,
+      });
+    }
+  });
+
   it.each([
-    ["IPv4 loopback", "http://127.0.0.1:8080"],
-    ["localhost", "http://localhost:8080"],
-    ["a *.localhost name", "http://gotify.localhost"],
     ["link-local / metadata", "http://169.254.169.254"],
-    ["IPv6 loopback", "http://[::1]:8080"],
     ["unspecified", "http://0.0.0.0:8080"],
+    ["IPv6 link-local", "http://[fe80::1]:8080"],
+    ["IPv6 unspecified", "http://[::]:8080"],
   ])(
     "answers %s with the not-grantable code, not a request to list it (M1)",
     (_label, origin) => {
@@ -236,10 +272,12 @@ describe("redactGrantEntry / describeGrantRejection", () => {
   });
 
   it("names the never-grantable class apart from a grammar error", () => {
-    expect(describeGrantRejection("http://localhost:1337")).toMatch(
-      /loopback.*LAN address/,
+    expect(describeGrantRejection("http://169.254.169.254")).toMatch(
+      /link-local.*cannot be granted/,
+    );
+    expect(describeGrantRejection("http://[fe80::1]:1337")).toMatch(
+      /link-local/,
     );
-    expect(describeGrantRejection("http://[::1]:1337")).toMatch(/loopback/);
     expect(describeGrantRejection("https://*.lan")).toMatch(/exact http/);
     expect(describeGrantRejection("http://10.0.0.4/path")).toMatch(
       /exact http/,

src/lib/__tests__/safe-fetch-dispatcher.test.ts

@@ -246,6 +246,11 @@ describe("pinnedPublicDispatcher", () => {
 describe("isOperatorGrantableIp", () => {
   it("keeps the private ranges an operator may deliberately list", () => {
     expect(isOperatorGrantableIp("10.0.0.5")).toBe(true);
+    // Loopback is grantable: a host-networking deployment lists it exactly.
+    expect(isOperatorGrantableIp("127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isOperatorGrantableIp("127.255.0.1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isOperatorGrantableIp("::1")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isOperatorGrantableIp("::ffff:127.0.0.1")).toBe(true);
     expect(isOperatorGrantableIp("172.16.0.9")).toBe(true);
     expect(isOperatorGrantableIp("192.168.1.20")).toBe(true);
     expect(isOperatorGrantableIp("100.64.0.7")).toBe(true);
@@ -259,17 +264,14 @@ describe("isOperatorGrantableIp", () => {
   });
 
   it.each([
-    ["IPv4 loopback", "127.0.0.1"],
-    ["IPv4 loopback, high octet", "127.255.0.1"],
     ["IPv4 unspecified", "0.0.0.0"],
     ["IPv4 link-local / metadata", "169.254.169.254"],
-    ["IPv6 loopback", "::1"],
     ["IPv6 unspecified", "::"],
     ["IPv6 link-local", "fe80::1"],
-    ["IPv4-mapped loopback", "::ffff:127.0.0.1"],
     ["IPv4-mapped metadata", "::ffff:169.254.169.254"],
+    ["IPv4-mapped unspecified", "::ffff:0.0.0.0"],
     ["6to4 metadata", "2002:a9fe:a9fe::"],
-    ["NAT64 loopback", "64:ff9b::7f00:1"],
+    ["NAT64 metadata", "64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe"],
     ["not an address", "gotify.lan"],
     ["empty", ""],
   ])("never grants %s, listed or not", (_label, ip) => {
@@ -297,10 +299,9 @@ describe("pinnedOperatorApprovedDispatcher", () => {
   }
 
   it.each([
-    ["loopback", { address: "127.0.0.1", family: 4 }],
     ["link-local / metadata", { address: "169.254.169.254", family: 4 }],
     ["unspecified", { address: "0.0.0.0", family: 4 }],
-    ["IPv6 loopback", { address: "::1", family: 6 }],
+    ["IPv6 unspecified", { address: "::", family: 6 }],
     ["IPv6 link-local", { address: "fe80::1", family: 6 }],
     ["IPv4-mapped metadata", { address: "::ffff:169.254.169.254", family: 6 }],
   ])(
@@ -348,11 +349,11 @@ describe("pinnedOperatorApprovedDispatcher", () => {
     expect(errorCodes(caught)).not.toContain("ENOTFOUND");
   }, 20_000);
 
-  it("drops the loopback answer from a mixed set and dials only the private one", async () => {
-    // A real server on loopback proves the point: the listed name resolves to
-    // loopback AND to an unroutable private address; the pinned lookup must
-    // hand undici only the private survivor, so the loopback server never
-    // sees a request and the dial fails at the socket, not at the resolver.
+  it("drops the metadata answer from a mixed set and dials the loopback one", async () => {
+    // A real server on loopback proves both halves: the listed name resolves
+    // to the metadata endpoint AND to loopback; the pinned lookup drops the
+    // metadata answer and hands undici the loopback survivor, which is
+    // grantable, so the server receives exactly one request.
     let requests = 0;
     const server = http.createServer((_req, res) => {
       requests += 1;
@@ -365,24 +366,18 @@ describe("pinnedOperatorApprovedDispatcher", () => {
     const port = (server.address() as AddressInfo).port;
     try {
       resolveTo([
+        { address: "169.254.169.254", family: 4 },
         { address: "127.0.0.1", family: 4 },
-        { address: "10.255.255.1", family: 4 },
       ]);
 
       const dispatcher = getPinnedOperatorApprovedDispatcher();
-      let caught: unknown;
-      try {
-        await undiciFetch(`http://gotify-listed.example.test:${port}/message`, {
-          dispatcher,
-          signal: AbortSignal.timeout(500),
-        });
-      } catch (error) {
-        caught = error;
-      }
+      const res = await undiciFetch(
+        `http://gotify-listed.example.test:${port}/message`,
+        { dispatcher, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000) },
+      );
 
-      expect(caught).toBeDefined();
-      expect(errorCodes(caught)).not.toContain("ENOTFOUND");
-      expect(requests).toBe(0);
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(requests).toBe(1);
     } finally {
       await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.close(() => resolve()));
     }

src/lib/nightscout/__tests__/client-pinned.test.ts

@@ -5,11 +5,9 @@
  * an operator-approved private origin reaches the pinned Undici connector.
  * This test keeps the Nightscout client, SafeFetch, dispatcher, socket, and
  * HTTP server real. Only DNS is deterministic: the approved test hostname is
- * resolved to the loopback server from inside the connector. Because the
- * operator-approved dispatcher refuses a loopback answer by policy (the grant
- * opens the operator's network, never the container), the grantable-address
- * predicate is stubbed to admit loopback for this harness only; the policy
- * itself is proven in `safe-fetch-dispatcher.test.ts`.
+ * resolved to the loopback server from inside the connector. Loopback is a
+ * grantable answer under the operator-approved policy (a host-networking
+ * deployment lists it), so the floor runs for real here.
  */
 import dns from "node:dns";
 import http from "node:http";
@@ -24,16 +22,6 @@ import {
   vi,
 } from "vitest";
 
-vi.mock("@/lib/validations/notifications", async (importOriginal) => {
-  const actual =
-    await importOriginal<typeof import("@/lib/validations/notifications")>();
-  return {
-    ...actual,
-    isOperatorGrantableIp: (ip: string) =>
-      ip === "127.0.0.1" || actual.isOperatorGrantableIp(ip),
-  };
-});
-
 import { _resetPinnedDispatcherForTests } from "@/lib/safe-fetch-dispatcher";
 
 import { fetchSgvEntries } from "../client";

src/lib/notifications/__tests__/egress-policy.test.ts

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ describe("configuredNotificationPrivateOrigins", () => {
   it("logs a malformed entry once, skips it, and keeps the valid ones", () => {
     const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
     process.env.NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS =
-      "https://gotify.lan, https://*.lan, http://127.0.0.1:8080";
+      "https://gotify.lan, https://*.lan, http://169.254.169.254";
 
     expect(configuredNotificationPrivateOrigins()).toEqual(
       new Set(["https://gotify.lan"]),
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ describe("configuredNotificationPrivateOrigins", () => {
     const lines = warn.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0]));
     expect(lines[0]).toContain("NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS");
     expect(lines[0]).toContain("https://*.lan");
-    expect(lines[1]).toContain("http://127.0.0.1:8080");
-    expect(lines[1]).toMatch(/loopback.*cannot be granted/);
+    expect(lines[1]).toContain("http://169.254.169.254");
+    expect(lines[1]).toMatch(/link-local.*cannot be granted/);
   });
 
   it("warns without echoing a query, fragment or userinfo (M3)", () => {
@@ -152,20 +152,36 @@ describe("evaluateNotificationTarget", () => {
     });
   });
 
-  it("keeps the raw-string floor: an octal loopback spelling is refused as never grantable", () => {
+  it("keeps the raw-string floor: an octal loopback spelling is refused, not parsed", () => {
     expect(
       evaluateNotificationTarget("http://0177.0.0.1/message"),
     ).toMatchObject({
       allowed: false,
-      reasonCode: "private_origin_not_grantable",
+      reasonCode: "private_origin_not_approved",
     });
   });
 
+  it("approves a listed loopback target and refuses an unlisted one", () => {
+    process.env.NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS = "http://localhost:8080";
+    expect(
+      evaluateNotificationTarget("http://localhost:8080/message"),
+    ).toMatchObject({ allowed: true, privateOriginApproved: true });
+    for (const url of [
+      "http://127.0.0.1:8080/message",
+      "http://localhost:9090/message",
+      "http://[::1]:8080/message",
+    ]) {
+      expect(evaluateNotificationTarget(url)).toMatchObject({
+        allowed: false,
+        reasonCode: "private_origin_not_approved",
+      });
+    }
+  });
+
   it.each([
-    ["loopback", "http://127.0.0.1:8080/message"],
-    ["localhost", "http://localhost:8080/message"],
     ["metadata", "http://169.254.169.254/latest"],
-    ["IPv6 loopback", "http://[::1]:8080/message"],
+    ["unspecified", "http://0.0.0.0:8080/message"],
+    ["IPv6 link-local", "http://[fe80::1]:8080/message"],
   ])("answers a %s target with the not-grantable code (M1)", (_l, url) => {
     process.env.NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS = "https://gotify.example.com";
     expect(evaluateNotificationTarget(url)).toMatchObject({

src/lib/notifications/egress-policy.ts

@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ import { annotate, getEvent } from "@/lib/logging/context";
  *   NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS="https://gotify.example.com,http://ntfy.lan:8080"
  *
  * A listed origin is still dialled through the pinned resolver with redirects
- * forbidden; loopback, link-local and the metadata range stay refused even
- * when listed. Nothing not listed widens, and there is no `=true`, CIDR,
+ * forbidden; link-local, the metadata range and the unspecified address stay
+ * refused even when listed (loopback is grantable when listed exactly). Nothing not listed widens, and there is no `=true`, CIDR,
  * wildcard or suffix form. The grant lives in the server environment only —
  * no request field and no settings toggle can confer it.
  *

src/lib/notifications/senders/__tests__/ntfy.test.ts

@@ -218,9 +218,9 @@ describe("sendViaNtfy", () => {
     );
   });
 
-  it("reports the not-grantable code for a loopback target, without dialling (M1)", async () => {
+  it("reports the not-grantable code for a metadata target, without dialling (M1)", async () => {
     const result = await sendViaNtfy(
-      { serverUrl: "http://localhost:8080", topic: "health" },
+      { serverUrl: "http://169.254.169.254", topic: "health" },
       payload(),
     );
 

src/lib/notifications/senders/__tests__/webhook.test.ts

@@ -266,9 +266,9 @@ describe("sendViaWebhook", () => {
     });
   });
 
-  it("reports the not-grantable code for a loopback target, without dialling (M1)", async () => {
+  it("reports the not-grantable code for a metadata target, without dialling (M1)", async () => {
     const result = await sendViaWebhook(
-      { url: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/message" },
+      { url: "http://169.254.169.254/latest" },
       payload(),
     );
 

src/lib/openapi/routes/settings.ts

@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ export const settingsPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
         ...stdResponses,
         "422": {
           description:
-            "Body matched neither accepted shape, or `enabled` is true while the stored config has no server URL and topic; or the server URL is on a private network the operator has not listed in `NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS` (`meta.errorCode` = `private_origin_not_approved`), or it is a loopback, link-local or metadata address that no grant can open (`private_origin_not_grantable`). Nothing was stored.",
+            "Body matched neither accepted shape, or `enabled` is true while the stored config has no server URL and topic; or the server URL is on a private network the operator has not listed in `NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS` (`meta.errorCode` = `private_origin_not_approved`), or it is a link-local, metadata or unspecified address that no grant can open (`private_origin_not_grantable`). Nothing was stored.",
           content: { "application/json": { schema: errorEnvelope } },
         },
       },
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ export const settingsPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
         ...stdResponses,
         "422": {
           description:
-            "Body matched neither accepted shape, or `enabled` is true while no webhook URL is stored; or the URL is on a private network the operator has not listed in `NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS` (`meta.errorCode` = `private_origin_not_approved`), or it is a loopback, link-local or metadata address that no grant can open (`private_origin_not_grantable`). Nothing was stored.",
+            "Body matched neither accepted shape, or `enabled` is true while no webhook URL is stored; or the URL is on a private network the operator has not listed in `NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS` (`meta.errorCode` = `private_origin_not_approved`), or it is a link-local, metadata or unspecified address that no grant can open (`private_origin_not_grantable`). Nothing was stored.",
           content: { "application/json": { schema: errorEnvelope } },
         },
       },
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ export const settingsPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
         ...stdResponses,
         "422": {
           description:
-            "The saved server is on a private network the operator has not approved (`meta.errorCode` = `private_origin_not_approved`), or is a loopback, link-local or metadata address that no grant can open (`private_origin_not_grantable`). The resolved address is never echoed.",
+            "The saved server is on a private network the operator has not approved (`meta.errorCode` = `private_origin_not_approved`), or is a link-local, metadata or unspecified address that no grant can open (`private_origin_not_grantable`). The resolved address is never echoed.",
           content: { "application/json": { schema: errorEnvelope } },
         },
       },
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ export const settingsPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
         ...stdResponses,
         "422": {
           description:
-            "The saved URL is on a private network the operator has not approved (`meta.errorCode` = `private_origin_not_approved`), or is a loopback, link-local or metadata address that no grant can open (`private_origin_not_grantable`). The resolved address is never echoed.",
+            "The saved URL is on a private network the operator has not approved (`meta.errorCode` = `private_origin_not_approved`), or is a link-local, metadata or unspecified address that no grant can open (`private_origin_not_grantable`). The resolved address is never echoed.",
           content: { "application/json": { schema: errorEnvelope } },
         },
       },

src/lib/private-origin-policy.ts

@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ import {
 export const PRIVATE_ORIGIN_NOT_APPROVED_CODE =
   "private_origin_not_approved" as const;
 /**
- * The target is loopback, unspecified, link-local or the metadata range: no
- * grant can ever open it, so telling the user to ask the operator would send
- * them in a circle. On host networking the LAN address is the answer.
+ * The target is the unspecified address, link-local or the metadata range:
+ * no grant can ever open it, so telling the user to ask the operator would
+ * send them in a circle.
  */
 export const PRIVATE_ORIGIN_NOT_GRANTABLE_CODE =
   "private_origin_not_grantable" as const;
@@ -34,15 +34,14 @@ export type OriginReason =
   | typeof INVALID_ORIGIN;
 
 /**
- * A hostname no grant may name: `localhost` / `*.localhost` (loopback by
- * definition, RFC 6761) or a literal address outside the grantable ranges.
- * DNS names are not judged here — a name that resolves into those ranges is
- * dropped at dial time by the pinned dispatcher.
+ * A hostname no grant may name: a literal address outside the grantable
+ * ranges (unspecified, link-local, metadata). Loopback and `localhost` are
+ * grantable when listed exactly — a host-networking deployment lists them —
+ * and DNS names are not judged here: a name that resolves into a refused
+ * range is dropped at dial time by the pinned dispatcher.
  */
 export function isNeverGrantableHost(hostname: string): boolean {
-  const lower = hostname.toLowerCase();
-  if (lower === "localhost" || lower.endsWith(".localhost")) return true;
-  const literal = lower.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
+  const literal = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
   return isIP(literal) !== 0 && !isOperatorGrantableIp(literal);
 }
 
@@ -68,7 +67,7 @@ export function describeGrantRejection(entry: string): string {
       (url.protocol === "http:" || url.protocol === "https:") &&
       isNeverGrantableHost(url.hostname)
     ) {
-      return "loopback, link-local and metadata addresses cannot be granted; on host networking list the LAN address of the relay instead";
+      return "the unspecified address, link-local and metadata addresses cannot be granted; list the address the relay actually listens on";
     }
   } catch {
     // fall through to the grammar sentence
@@ -88,10 +87,11 @@ export interface OriginVerdict {
  *
  * Credentials, paths, queries, and fragments are deliberately forbidden: the
  * operator grants a complete canonical scheme/host/port trust unit, never a
- * suffix, wildcard, capability URL, or prefix. A literal address in loopback,
- * the unspecified range, link-local or the metadata range is refused too —
+ * suffix, wildcard, capability URL, or prefix. A literal address in the
+ * unspecified range, link-local or the metadata range is refused too —
  * `isOperatorGrantableIp` says why — and the pinned dispatcher applies the
- * same floor when a listed DNS name resolves there.
+ * same floor when a listed DNS name resolves there. Loopback is grantable
+ * when listed exactly: an operator on host networking lists it on purpose.
  */
 export function canonicalOrigin(value: string): string | null {
   try {
@@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ export function canonicalOrigin(value: string): string | null {
     if (url.username || url.password) return null;
     if (url.pathname !== "/" || url.search || url.hash) return null;
     if (!url.hostname || url.hostname.includes("*")) return null;
-    // Loopback, unspecified, link-local and metadata literals, and
-    // `localhost` / `*.localhost`, are refused at parse time. Other
-    // reserved-looking names (`.local` mDNS, `.internal`, `.lan`) stay
-    // grantable: an explicitly listed origin is what the list is for, and
-    // the dial-time floor still drops a loopback or metadata answer.
+    // Unspecified, link-local and metadata literals are refused at parse
+    // time. Loopback, `localhost` and reserved-looking names (`.local` mDNS,
+    // `.internal`, `.lan`) stay grantable: an explicitly listed origin is
+    // what the list is for, and the dial-time floor still drops a metadata
+    // or link-local answer.
     if (isNeverGrantableHost(url.hostname)) return null;
     return url.origin;
   } catch {

src/lib/safe-fetch-dispatcher.ts

@@ -71,9 +71,10 @@ function pinnedLookupWithPolicy(
       return;
     }
     // The operator-approved policy is not "anything that parses": a listed
-    // name that resolves to loopback, link-local or the metadata range is
-    // refused here exactly as an unlisted one would be. The grant opens the
-    // operator's own network, never the container or the cloud host.
+    // name that resolves to link-local, the metadata range or the
+    // unspecified address is refused here exactly as an unlisted one would
+    // be. The grant opens the operator's own network (loopback included, on
+    // host networking), never the cloud host's metadata endpoint.
     const allowed = addresses.filter((address) =>
       policy === "public"
         ? isPublicIp(address.address)
@@ -176,8 +177,8 @@ export function getPinnedPublicDispatcher(): Agent {
  * the complete canonical scheme/host/port trust grant. Resolution is still
  * performed once inside Undici's connector and the vetted answer set is
  * pinned to the socket, so a later DNS answer cannot replace the destination.
- * Loopback, unspecified, link-local and metadata answers are dropped
- * regardless of the grant (`isOperatorGrantableIp`).
+ * Unspecified, link-local and metadata answers are dropped regardless of the
+ * grant (`isOperatorGrantableIp`).
  */
 export function getPinnedOperatorApprovedDispatcher(): Agent {
   cachedOperatorApproved ??= createPinnedDispatcher("operator-approved");

src/lib/validations/__tests__/nightscout.test.ts

@@ -121,11 +121,28 @@ describe("Nightscout exact-origin policy", () => {
     });
   });
 
-  it("names the entry and the reason when a loopback grant is listed, without its token (M2)", () => {
+  it("keeps a loopback Nightscout grant working exactly as before", () => {
+    // A host-networking self-host lists http://localhost:1337; the shared
+    // floor must not turn that into a failed sync on upgrade.
+    expect(parseNightscoutPrivateOrigins("http://localhost:1337")).toEqual(
+      new Set(["http://localhost:1337"]),
+    );
+    expect(
+      evaluateNightscoutOrigin(
+        "http://localhost:1337",
+        parseNightscoutPrivateOrigins("http://localhost:1337"),
+      ),
+    ).toMatchObject({ allowed: true, privateOriginApproved: true });
+    expect(
+      parseNightscoutPrivateOrigins("http://127.0.0.1:1337, http://[::1]:1337"),
+    ).toEqual(new Set(["http://127.0.0.1:1337", "http://[::1]:1337"]));
+  });
+
+  it("names the entry and the reason when a metadata grant is listed, without its token (M2)", () => {
     let caught: unknown;
     try {
       parseNightscoutPrivateOrigins(
-        "https://cgm.lan, http://localhost:1337/?token=SECRET123",
+        "https://cgm.lan, http://169.254.169.254:1337/?token=SECRET123",
       );
     } catch (err) {
       caught = err;
@@ -134,9 +151,9 @@ describe("Nightscout exact-origin policy", () => {
     const message = (caught as Error).message;
     expect((caught as Error).name).toBe("NightscoutOriginConfigError");
     expect(message).toContain(
-      'NIGHTSCOUT_PRIVATE_ORIGINS entry "http://localhost:1337/"',
+      'NIGHTSCOUT_PRIVATE_ORIGINS entry "http://169.254.169.254:1337/"',
     );
-    expect(message).toMatch(/loopback.*LAN address/);
+    expect(message).toMatch(/link-local.*cannot be granted/);
     expect(message).not.toContain("SECRET123");
     expect(message).not.toContain("token=");
   });

src/lib/validations/nightscout.ts

@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ export const NIGHTSCOUT_INVALID_ORIGIN_REASON = INVALID_ORIGIN;
  * Thrown when `NIGHTSCOUT_PRIVATE_ORIGINS` holds an entry that is not a
  * grant. The message names the entry (scheme and host only) and the reason,
  * so the sync ledger and the connect form show the operator what to edit
- * instead of a bare "invalid entry". Loopback and `localhost` entries
- * became invalid with the shared address floor (#947); a host-networking
- * deployment lists the LAN address instead.
+ * instead of a bare "invalid entry". Loopback and `localhost` entries stay
+ * valid grants exactly as before #947; the shared floor refuses only the
+ * unspecified address, link-local and the metadata range.
  */
 export class NightscoutOriginConfigError extends Error {
   constructor(redactedEntry: string, reason: string) {

src/lib/validations/notifications.ts

@@ -234,14 +234,14 @@ export function isPublicIp(ip: string): boolean {
  * `NIGHTSCOUT_PRIVATE_ORIGINS`).
  *
  * A grant exists so a relay on the operator's own network can be reached, so
- * RFC1918, CGNAT (a Tailscale address) and IPv6 unique-local stay grantable.
- * Four ranges are refused even when the operator lists a name that resolves
- * there, because no notification relay lives on them and each one is a
- * different admin surface: loopback is the app itself inside the container
- * (and on host networking, every admin port of the host), the unspecified
- * address is a resolver misfire, link-local is the cloud-metadata endpoint.
- * The transition formats (`::ffff:`, 6to4, NAT64) are unwrapped first so an
- * IPv6 spelling of loopback does not slip past the IPv4 verdict.
+ * RFC1918, CGNAT (a Tailscale address), IPv6 unique-local and loopback stay
+ * grantable: an operator on host networking who lists an exact loopback
+ * origin with its port has made the same deliberate decision as one who
+ * lists a LAN origin. Two classes are refused even when the operator lists a
+ * name that resolves there, because no relay lives on them: the unspecified
+ * address is a resolver misfire, and link-local is the cloud-metadata
+ * endpoint. The transition formats (`::ffff:`, 6to4, NAT64) are unwrapped
+ * first so an IPv6 spelling of those does not slip past the IPv4 verdict.
  */
 export function isOperatorGrantableIp(ip: string): boolean {
   if (!ip) return false;
@@ -258,12 +258,14 @@ export function isOperatorGrantableIp(ip: string): boolean {
     const bytes = parseIpv6Bytes(lower);
     if (!bytes) return false;
 
-    // Unspecified, loopback and link-local IPv6. Unique-local (fc00::/7)
-    // deliberately stays out of this list: it is the IPv6 analogue of
-    // RFC1918 and exactly what an operator lists.
+    // Unspecified and link-local IPv6. Unique-local (fc00::/7) and loopback
+    // (::1) deliberately stay out of this list: they are what an operator
+    // on a private or host network lists. `::1` is answered before the
+    // embedded-IPv4 unwrap, which would otherwise read it as the
+    // IPv4-compatible spelling of 0.0.0.1 and refuse it as unspecified.
     if (bytesEqual(bytes, 0, Array(16).fill(0))) return false;
     if (bytesEqual(bytes, 0, Array(15).fill(0)) && bytes[15] === 1) {
-      return false;
+      return true;
     }
     if (bytes[0] === 0xfe && (bytes[1] & 0xc0) === 0x80) return false;
 
@@ -275,10 +277,9 @@ export function isOperatorGrantableIp(ip: string): boolean {
   return false;
 }
 
-/** 127/8, 0/8 and 169.254/16: the ranges no operator grant may open. */
+/** 0/8 and 169.254/16: the ranges no operator grant may open. */
 function isNeverGrantableIpv4(ip: [number, number, number, number]): boolean {
   const [a, b] = ip;
-  if (a === 127) return true;
   if (a === 0) return true;
   if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;
   return false;