The suite only passed on one worker: four specs shared the scope
delegate's cookie jar and moved the same session's record selector, so
at CI's two workers they moved the epoch under each other and the
failures were the harness racing itself.
- one login per switching spec, which is a separate session row and
therefore a separate selector; the login bucket is cleared between
them because the ceiling is five and setup now signs in eight times
- each such spec runs in exactly one project, since a second project
drives the same row from two browsers
- clear what the browser suite WRITES, so it can be run twice: the
write journey saves a minute-rounded reading and collided with itself
- wait for adoption after leaving a record, retry a lost switch the way
a person would, and budget the cross-tab hold for machine load
Every one of the three observed nothing and passed anyway.
- AC-04 held /api/auth/me so the record read goes first: /me is unfenced
and adoptable, so the client silently re-adopted before ever sending a
stale assertion
- AC-06 installs its intercept before the request and holds a FENCED
read; /api/auth/me is an actor surface and echoes no context at all
- AC-07 moves to its own spec and a project with the service worker
enabled, and reads the claim off the cache: with workers blocked the
data cache is never populated and its positive control could not pass
- restore the shared session after each test, and start from a known
record, so these cannot fail the specs that run beside them
data-slot rides {...rest} onto DateField's hidden ISO input, so the
invitation spec asserted visibility on an element that can never be
visible and typed into nothing. Use the primitive's data-testid, which
lands on the overlay a person edits, and assert the mirror took the
value.
The batch path had no unique-violation handling at all, so one duplicate
anywhere in the transaction answered 500 — indistinguishable from a
server fault, and what every client retries against. The single path
narrowed with instanceof, the form prisma-errors.ts exists to replace.
A shared cache is one reverse proxy away, and without Vary the first one
to appear would key a delegated record response on URL alone and hand it
to the next request under a different context. Appends rather than
replaces, so a route that already varies keeps what it had.
- the idempotency arm refuses only a wrongly-asserted context; an admin
route behind unfenced requireAdmin still serves a headerless request
- the epoch trigger does not fire on a statement that names record_epoch
without moving the selector; the source guard is what covers that
- keep the record entries until /api/auth/me has answered: clearing the
cache under a mounted observer made the held tab refetch at once
- exclude the account cell from the cancellation, and swallow a repeat
trigger, so a burst of 409s cannot kill the request that ends the hold
- read the account payload network-only; the default staleTime would
have returned the very context the browser was told is wrong
A selector pointed at a record whose grant has lapsed reports the same
disagreement on every /api/auth/me, so routing it to the hydration gate
rendered a permanent spinner with no controls. Expiry reaches this state
on its own: revocation clears the selector inside its transaction and
expiry does not.
- treat an unprovable context as a refusal, which paints the door with
the button back to one's own record
- check the refusal ahead of the hydration gate, so neither trigger can
render behind a spinner again
A browser-issued <img src>, <iframe src> or <a href download> cannot
carry the record-session assertion, so the fence refused all three on
any session that had been inside a shared record — permanently, since
none of them will ever send a header.
- add a structural guard: no client file may name a record-fenced route
in a src=, href= or window.location sink
- fetch the thumbnail, the inline preview and the download through the
app transport and hand the DOM an object URL, revoked on unmount
- make the two API probes in the managed-profiles browser spec assert
the same context the app beside them asserts
- give every acceptance case a stable id and assert the mapping from a
runnable artifact, recording which cases execute in the ordinary gate
and which await the browser stage
- add the browser spec for the cases no cooperative layer can reach:
peers reconciling to an exact context, an aborted switch response, a
closed initiator, a delayed response, and the offline disk layers
- attach the asserted context to every same-origin request inside the
three fetch entries, so no call site classifies itself
- discard a response whose echoed context contradicts the adopted one;
serve one that carries no echo, which is what keeps the public poll
and every actor surface working
- adopt from /api/auth/me and the switch response, and from nothing else
- send the epoch on every switch and retry once after reconciling
- hold and reconcile on the 409 instead of leaving the record
- evaluate the fence in the wrapper above findCached, so a stale request
neither replays a body, learns a cell exists, nor inserts a claim
- return the refusal rather than throwing: one route composes the
wrapper outside apiHandler, where a throw escapes the envelope
- read the claim and the session's own context on one session lookup
- both record resolvers check the fence after authentication and before
the carrier, off the one session row that also decides the scope
- POST /api/account/switch takes an optional expectedEpoch and writes
conditionally, so concurrent switchers resolve to one outcome
- GET /api/auth/me publishes the context a browser bootstraps from
- every response that resolved a record scope echoes it back
- regenerate the API contract
- add an import-free contract module both bundles can name, holding the
header names, the parse and the verdict
- add the server fence: header read, wide-event stamp, and the refusal
- add RecordSessionChangedError as a third sibling on the existing
sharing-error arm, so the 409 needs no new serialisation branch
- add sessions.record_epoch, owned by a BEFORE UPDATE trigger so the
ON DELETE SET NULL path and raw SQL writes cannot skip it
- normalise pre-existing rows so epoch zero means never switched
- project the epoch off the row getSession already loads
- Wait for a validated account scope before warming record reads
- Abort scoped preloads and discard handoffs across record transitions
- Cover malformed scope reloads and fresh own-record recovery
- Time out stalled provider sends without unhandled late rejections\n- Record a transient timeout outcome for cascade fallback\n- Cover timeout fallback with unit and integration tests
- Exclude and erase egress claims with recipient-side lookup support\n- Serialize data wipes with managed-profile Guardian authorization\n- Cover last-Guardian and queued-claim wipe races
- Commit a final authorization claim under the lifecycle lock\n- Keep provider calls and retry outcomes outside database transactions\n- Retain authorization claims with notification delivery diagnostics
Marc-André Bombeck