Getting started names the APP_MEMORY_LIMIT default and how to lower it
on a 2 GB host; the scaling guide says that web and worker share one
pool in the bundled single-container setup. The rollup comment names
migration 0372, which carries the hourly-mean statistic.
At a first start there is no recorded key yet, so an operator facing a
refusal they are certain is false has no row to delete. With
ENCRYPTION_KEY_CHECK=warn (default enforce) the check still runs and logs
its full outcome, /api/health names a mismatch as a warning field without
failing, requests are served, and no key is recorded unless every key id
passes.
The variable is on the compose whitelist, in both example files, the env
manifest, the Unraid and Portainer templates and the published-env guard.
The log block, the mismatch page and the self-hosting pages offer it as the
last resort after the three real fixes, and say that it disables a safety
check.
The boot key check recorded whatever key was configured whenever its probe
found nothing to try. It only read string columns, so an install whose
ciphertext sat in Bytes columns (notes, documents, ECG, symptoms) read as
empty; a probe that ran out of time did the same; and rows written by a
process that served under a wrong key could open on the next boot and get
that key recorded as the right one.
The probe now reads every registered column, string and Bytes, in all four
stored layouts, and tries the oldest values first, ordered by the row's
updatedAt (else createdAt, else primary key). A key is recorded only when
the oldest value that opens is preceded by at most one that does not, or
when no column holds a single value under the key id. A time-out, an
unreadable table, oversized values or mixed results are inconclusive: the
process serves, records nothing and checks again at the next start.
When the first insert loses a race, the stored record is read back and must
open under this process's key, else the outcome is a mismatch.
A rotation that walked every column without errors removes the record of
each previous key id that no longer holds any value. The refusal log block
and the self-hosting pages explain how to reset the check for a key id.
A server that issues Secure session cookies cannot sign anyone in on a
plain http:// page: the browser drops the cookie. The login request was
still verified, the MFA ticket minted and then claimed, and the next
attempt answered "Invalid or expired challenge".
The web client now sends an optional clientTransport on the browser
sign-in requests (password login, passkey start, both MFA completions).
When the server issues Secure cookies and the page is plain http on a
non-loopback host, the request is refused with 409
auth.session.insecure_transport before the password is checked, a
ticket is minted or claimed, a code is spent, or a passkey challenge is
issued. A request without the field is never refused. The SSO start
takes client_proto/client_host and sends such a page back to the login
page instead of to the provider.
GET /api/auth/registration-status publishes sessionCookieSecure, and the
login page shows the reason with both fixes and disables the sign-in
controls before anything is sent; on localhost it shows a note only.
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE keeps its meaning; the header heuristic log line
stays.
Every configured key id now has a canary in encryption_key_canaries,
checked at boot. A key that cannot open its canary, or existing data
written before the canary existed, puts the process in a refusal state:
every API route answers 503 encryption.key_mismatch, /api/health reports
reason encryption_key_mismatch, the pages render one explanation, and
neither the queue producer nor the worker starts. The process stays up
so the reason is visible instead of hiding in a crash loop.
The admin Encryption page gains a "Back up your encryption key" step:
key id and fingerprint (never the key), where the key lives per
platform, a check of a pasted copy that is compared and discarded, and
a confirmation bound to the active key id and fingerprint. The overview
gets a tile and admins get a dashboard banner while it is due.
HEALTHLOG_PLATFORM picks the platform the step opens on. Adds the
TrueNAS self-hosting page and key backup sections in the docs.
With TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 behind a proxy that sends only X-Real-IP, every
client address resolves to nothing and all anonymous sign-ins share one
rate-limit bucket, with nothing in the log to say why. The first request
that carries a forwarding header the setting does not let HealthLog read
now logs one warning naming the header and the setting to change.
X-Real-IP stood in for a missing X-Forwarded-For at any hop count. It is a
single address, so it is now read only with TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=1; with two
or more hops the chain the count describes is X-Forwarded-For.
The upload, import and native batch routes that bypass the proxy now carry
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy and Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy like every
other response, and so do the proxy's early exits.
The env examples described an unset TRUST_PROXY_HOPS as right for a
directly exposed host; unset means one hop, and that host wants 0.
The client-IP resolver read X-Real-IP on every path: with
TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0, which means no proxy in front and no forwarding header
to believe, and on the path where the X-Forwarded-For chain was shorter
than the declared hops, which means the proxies were bypassed. A caller
sending a new X-Real-IP with each request got a new per-IP rate-limit
bucket each time.
X-Real-IP now gets the trust X-Forwarded-For gets: it is read only when at
least one proxy hop is declared and the request carries no X-Forwarded-For.
A short chain resolves to no address. The reverse-proxy guide no longer
suggests TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 for a proxy that sets X-Real-IP; such a proxy
takes 1.
Two requests left the server without anything being connected: the
HaveIBeenPwned range query on every password set (registration, change,
admin reset) and the daily GitHub releases request behind the About page
and the admin version tile. Neither could be turned off, which made
"nothing leaves" untrue for an instance that wanted it to be.
PASSWORD_BREACH_CHECK_DISABLED and UPDATE_CHECK_DISABLED (1, true, yes or
on) stop each request. Both stay on by default. The breach check keeps
its fail-open contract: switched off, a password is simply not looked up.
The update route answers status "unknown" with reason "disabled" and
the admin tile says the check is off. The password routes reach the
check only through the switch, and a test holds that import line.
Both are on the compose whitelist, in the env manifest under a new
"Outbound requests" group with IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED, and documented in
both env examples and the getting-started guide.
docker-compose.yml forwards its whitelist as "${NAME:-}", so a variable
the operator never set reaches the process as the empty string. Reads
written as a nullish fallback kept that string: the weather client built
an empty base URL and every geocode failed with ERR_INVALID_URL, and the
IP geo lookup requested a relative path.
Reads with a fallback now go through src/lib/env.ts (envValue, envOr,
envFlag), which treats empty and whitespace as unset. IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED
accepts 1, true, yes and on instead of only "1". A structural test refuses
a ?? fallback written directly against process.env anywhere in src/, and
the compose whitelist guard counts the helper's call shape as a read.
A person stores one connection per system (base address, Papra
organization id, API token encrypted at rest) and can search it by
document name with tag and date filters, then import picked documents
one per request through the same ingest path as an upload: source-key
answer before any download, content dedup, deleted stays deleted, quota,
provenance, and the person's own AI reading setting. An import can link
the document to the visit, condition or vaccination it was picked for.
The operator lists the instances in DOCUMENT_SOURCE_ORIGINS; unset, the
feature is off. Only listed origins are contacted, through safeFetch with
the origin pinned, redirects refused, timeouts and byte caps. The routes
are cookie-only and owner-only. The token is registered for rotation,
removed by Delete all data, and not carried in backups.
A 502 from a channel test reports the user's relay or mail setup, not a fault on this server, yet the status alone raised every press to an error-level event. The event builder gains a ceiling for the status-derived level, and the test routes cap it at warn on the 502 path. The 500 for an unnamed failure stays at error, and explicit elevations are unaffected.
The notifications guide notes that a reverse proxy which replaces 5xx pages hides the detail, so the card falls back to Test failed.
Refs #947
A notification target on a private network has been reachable since the
operator allowlist for private origins arrived; the hint under the URL
field and the guide still said the address had to be public.
The outbound payload was documented nowhere. The webhook section now shows the generic body and the Gotify body as the Test button sends them, what each field carries, and how to point the webhook at Gotify: a URL ending in /message, the application token in an X-Gotify-Key header, and the Gotify format.
Refs #947
A Nightscout self-host on host networking with
NIGHTSCOUT_PRIVATE_ORIGINS=http://localhost:1337 worked before and must
keep working unchanged; an operator who lists an exact loopback origin
with its port has made the same deliberate decision as one who lists a
LAN origin. The never-grantable floor is now the unspecified address,
link-local and the metadata endpoint only. Loopback (127/8, ::1,
localhost) is grantable when listed exactly, still resolved and pinned
at connect time with redirects forbidden, and still refused when not
listed.
::1 is answered before the embedded-IPv4 unwrap, which read it as the
IPv4-compatible spelling of 0.0.0.1 and refused it as unspecified. The
pinned Nightscout transport test runs the real floor again. Each refused
range keeps its own test; loopback moves to the grantable-when-listed
set with a test that an unlisted loopback is still refused, and a
Nightscout grant of http://localhost:1337 is asserted to parse.
Refs #947
A loopback, link-local or metadata target answered
private_origin_not_approved with a message telling the user to have the
operator list it, and the parser refuses such an entry forever: a dead
end the route test even pinned. Those targets now answer
private_origin_not_grantable (catalogued, on all four routes, translated
in seven locales) with a message that says no grant can open them and
to use the relay's LAN address. Both senders carry the reason into the
outcome so the test button forwards the same code.
The malformed-entry warning printed the entry verbatim, which is where
a pasted token or userinfo sits; the parser now hands callers scheme
and host only, plus the reason in words. The Nightscout list throws a
named error with that redacted entry and reason, and the connect route
answers it as a 422 with the message instead of a bare 500, so a
self-host that listed http://localhost:1337 reads what to change.
The two settings cards translate a coded save refusal like the test
button does; the docs and the changelog name the sub-host and sibling-
port narrowing; the dispatcher floor tests assert the policy marker so
a real NXDOMAIN cannot pass for a refusal.
Refs #947
The mark named its action unconditionally, so a job that had already
named its own (the low-stock underflow branch) or a settings route
whose test then failed at the relay lost that name on the wide event.
Set the action only when the event has none, and always land the
channel and origin meta pair, through a small hasAction() on the
builder. Note the parse-time floor on the Nightscout page, which shares
the grammar.
Refs #947
Put the variable on the compose environment whitelist (without it a
value in .env never reaches the process), on both example files, and in
the env manifest so check-env reports it. The self-hosting notifications
page gains a section on notification targets on a private network: the
exact-origin grammar, what stays refused even when listed, and a table
of which target is refused where so an operator knows which lever to
pull.
Refs #947
The write-level row listed "a vaccination dose and the booster reminder it
suggests" three paragraphs under a section table that puts the vaccination
record in Health background. Read together, that tells a self-hoster a
health-background WRITE grant can plan a booster — which the route beside it
now refuses, because the reminder it mints lives under Readings. The row lists
the dose alone, and the exceptions paragraph, which is where a reader looks for
exactly this, carries the two-section case and says the dose logs either way.
With it, the small things the same pass turned up:
The cycle-insights fixture asserted a property it could not show. Its docblock
claims the cycle-native answer survives the fence, and it seeded no symptom at
all, so `symptomPatterns` was empty in every leg and a regression that emptied
it along with the foreign columns would have passed green. One catalogue
symptom on the luteal days, asserted on the owner leg and on the cycle-only
one.
The immunization rows matched on a bare `role="button"`, which passes vacuously
the day the card becomes a real button and fails for the wrong reason if
anything else in the subtree grows one. They carry the same stable marker the
visit card took.
`/api/cycle/calendar` reads the same wrist-temperature channel the crosstab
does and is deliberately not fenced, and it was the only one of the pair with
nothing saying why: no value from it reaches the response.
The encrypted export's new 403 documented the switch refusal and not the
narrow-scope one it answers first, unlike the two settings operations beside
it. Both sheets say at the top that their Save and Delete are gated at the
caller, so a third mount reads the constraint before it violates it. And one
docblock line ran past the wrap.
Measured against the route declarations on this tree:
The health-background section names allergies, family history and the profile
facts, and omits visits, the practices behind them and the vaccination record —
all three of which `scope.ts` puts in that section, so a grant is narrower on
the page than it is in the product.
"Aggregate surfaces appear only on a whole-record grant" is true and
incomplete: a whole-record grant does not open them equally either. The daily
digest and the dashboard's snapshot answer at read, the health score, the
dashboard's summary and the insights need manage.
The write level lists seven creates against twelve WRITE declarations. A visit,
a practice, a vaccination dose and the booster reminder it suggests were
missing, and the guide said nothing about the creates that need manage inside a
section a write grant can otherwise add to, or about the vault taking no
delegated write at any level.
"Exports, the health-record archive" sat under what a delegate cannot reach,
while `POST /api/export/health-record` answers at manage on a whole-record
grant and its own comment says why. The row is about the full exports and the
encrypted archive; the doctor report is named as the exception it is.
The sharing-denial guard's docblock carried the same class of stale claim — 116
fenced modules, 26 never published — and that gap is closed on this tree. The
caveat becomes an assertion: a new leg recomputes the fenced modules from the
route sources and requires every one to be published, and it names no number,
because a hard-coded figure is what turned the paragraph into a false statement
about the contract. It fails when a published path is withheld from it.
Six WEB_PUSH_* names and NEXT_PUBLIC_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY sat behind the three
real VAPID_* variables in the env fallback. None was ever on the compose
environment: whitelist and none appeared in .env.example, .env.production.example
or the env manifest, so under the bundled stack a value set under any of them
could not reach the process. Remove them and the self-hosting note that
advertised them.
The note predates the whitelist fix that landed alongside the restore
permission change; keep the manual-edit instruction as a version note
for older compose files.
- geolite2: quote the real commented compose mount (./geolite2 to
/opt/geolite2, the GEOLITE2_DIR default, so no env var is needed for
the default path)
- getting-started: healthcheck probes /api/health, not /api/version;
the environment module reaches archive-api and geocoding-api
.open-meteo.com, relevant for egress allowlists
- mcp: the module is opt-in and off by default, but no longer the only
such module
- reverse-proxy: the Coach stream is SSE over plain HTTP, not
WebSockets; note that TRUST_PROXY_HOPS is not on the bundled compose
whitelist and must be added by hand
- scaling: /api/health healthcheck; worker liveness is in-memory and
invisible across a web/worker split; pool sizing now goes through
getConnectionBudget with DB_CONNECTION_LIMIT as the compose knob and
a 2-connection pg-boss share
- sso: the native SSO handoff shipped, OIDC_ONLY works with app builds
that carry it
- unraid: geo databases are baked in only when the build had a licence
key, or mounted; replaceable either way
Before the multi-minute unpack starts, compare the archive's declared
uncompressed export.xml size against the V8 heap limit. The streaming
parse keeps resident state span-bounded, so the model is generous —
a fixed 192 MiB base plus 1/64 of the XML size; the 8 GiB extraction
cap needs ~320 MiB, which any default heap clears. The check only
refuses the truly impossible (an operator-pinned tiny heap against a
huge export) and does so with an actionable failureReason naming
NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size, instead of an OOM-killed worker
and a job stuck in a running state (#775).
Document the memory model, the insufficient_memory refusal, and the
interrupted-import reconcile in the self-hosting scaling guide.
Cover the new MAXMIND_LICENSE_KEY route in the self-hosting guide as the
first of the three ways to get the offline databases (fetch, mount, bake),
and note that the monthly runtime refresh keeps a keyed host current on its
own. Add the variable to both env examples and to the env-check manifest so
the optional group lists it.
Refs #659
The resolver queried the online provider first and read the mounted
GeoLite2 databases only when that missed. Every document describing the
feature said the opposite, including the self-hosting runbook and the
admin notification that tells an operator their login IPs are leaving
the server. So an operator who mounted the databases in order to stop
that egress kept all of it, and nothing said so: the location resolved,
the admin overview filled in, and the only difference was where the
address had been.
Now the local databases answer and the provider only ever sees an
address they could not place. A host with the City database mounted and
a hit makes no request at all — including when the ASN database is
absent, because reaching out for a carrier string would send the address
off the host anyway, which is the thing the mount was for.
IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED=1 remains the full off-switch: it disables the
online step only, so an offline hit still resolves and an offline miss
returns nothing rather than going online.
The wide-event warning on the fallback path named ipwho.is even when the
operator had pointed IP_GEO_LOOKUP_URL somewhere else; it now names the
host the runtime actually queries. The admin notification copy needed no
change — it fires only when the databases are absent, and then every
lookup does go online.
The two cases in geo-asn.test.ts that pinned the old order are the
watched red for this change.
The operator page still said every grant is read-only, one release after
the write level shipped, and the table of what a grant cannot reach
predates both the manage level and managed profiles.
Rewritten against the frozen behaviour: the eight sections a grant can be
narrowed to and what each opens, the three levels and what each adds, the
step-up that is unconditional on a managed profile and conditional on an
ordinary invitation, and what a guardian may keep for a record that has no
login of its own. The AI row is corrected rather than dropped: a manage
grant reads insights that already exist, and no level causes an outbound
provider call.
Every claim on that page was read out of the code before it was written
down. The one about backups was cut instead, because it was not.
The revoke dialog tells an owner that "who entered what" stays answerable for
N days, and the activity list prints the same number under its heading. The
query behind that list had no date filter: on an instance whose retention was
shortened it showed rows the sentence said were already gone, and the number
was a caption over an unbounded read rather than its limit. It is the filter
now, resolved once so the bound and the sentence cannot drift apart.
The list also stopped at a hundred rows and said nothing about it, which is the
more dangerous of the two silences — an owner who scrolls to the bottom reads
the oldest visible line as the beginning, and a busy household reaches the cap
in a fraction of the window. The response says which of the two limits it hit,
and the view states it only when it did: a caveat that is always on is one
people learn to skip.
The self-hosting page said an empty list means nobody opened the record. It
means nobody did so within the window. Corrected, with the row cap named
alongside it.
The credits page named CC BY-SA 4.0 alone. MaxMind stopped distributing
GeoLite2 under that licence by itself: the databases ship under the
GeoLite End User License Agreement, which incorporates CC BY-SA 4.0 by
reference and controls wherever the two disagree. Name both, in that
order, and link the EULA. The attribution string was already there and
is unchanged; the e2e page check now asserts both licences rather than
the one that no longer stands alone.
Reconcile the self-hosting guide with the same wording, point it at the
current EULA URL, and say why the `/about` page must stay reachable — it
is where an operator's own attribution lives.
Correct the project licence line while on the page: it still claimed
AGPL-3.0, which the page's own footer contradicts. The trunk has been
PolyForm Noncommercial 1.0.0 since v1.15.19.
An operator page for the feature, written in the register the
reproductive-health page established: say the narrow true thing rather
than the reassuring one.
What the person given access can reach, and the table of what they cannot
— credentials, sessions, tokens, connected services, notification
channels, exports, share links, the sharing itself, and the AI surfaces.
The AI row gets its own paragraph because it is the one that looks
arbitrary: server-managed processing runs under the consent the record's
owner gave for their own use.
Revocation is described honestly. It lands on the next request rather
than the next login, it puts a browser that was inside the record back
into its own account, and it cannot take back what was already seen. The
product can close the door; it cannot reach through it, and the page says
so rather than implying otherwise.
The activity view's window is described as the operator's setting, not as
365 — an instance that shortens the audit retention shortens this view,
and an empty list means nothing was recorded within the window rather
than that nothing ever happened.
The three trust facts stay where they were: the operator could always
read the database, encryption at rest is instance-keyed rather than
per-user, and AI processing stays under the owner's own consent.
The data-protection note is deliberately absent — its stance is a
maintainer decision, and the page reads complete without it.
The resolver is online-first, so mounting the databases fills the ASN
and carrier but does not by itself keep login IPs on the host. Point at
the IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED section that does.
The runtime has always read GEOLITE2_DIR, but the variable was absent
from the compose `environment:` whitelist, from both env examples, and
from the docs. A variable that is not on that whitelist never reaches
the container even when the operator's `.env` sets it, so the override
existed in code and was unreachable from the documented path.
Put it on the whitelist, document it in both examples and the manifest,
and add `docs/self-hosting/geolite2.md`: fetch the databases with a free
MaxMind account, mount the directory read-only, point the variable at
it. The compose file carries the bind-mount line commented out beside
the app service.
The admin notification told the reader to set MAXMIND_LICENSE_KEY in
this repository's Actions secrets — something nobody running the
published image can do, about a fallback that sends their sign-in
addresses to a third party. It now names the mount, names the online
provider it is actually querying, and links the runbook. Six locales.
It also no longer claims the carrier column stays empty; the online
tier has filled the carrier from the ISP field since v1.25.8.
A blank GEOLITE2_DIR now resolves to the default instead of the process
working directory: compose substitutes an unset variable to the empty
string, which is not nullish.
Refs #659
The defect is about rows that survive, so a mocked client proves nothing. The
new integration test seeds a row into every table in the schema, driven by
information_schema and pg_constraint rather than a fixture, runs the wipe and
asks the database what is left. A table added later is seeded and asserted
without anyone remembering to.
It holds all four halves: nothing in the wipe list survives, everything in the
exemption list does, everything reached only by a database cascade is gone,
and the account row comes back reset but able to sign in. A second file pins
the allergy and checkup-reminder deletes actually removing their row.
The reproductive-health note gains a Deletion section. It taught people to
reason carefully about a host being imaged and never said what pressing
delete does; now it says which of the three deletions removes the row and
which only hides it.
The cookie was the Session row's cuid. cuid is built for collision-
resistant identity across distributed writers, not for unguessability —
it encodes a millisecond timestamp and a process-local counter and never
touches a CSPRNG. A session cookie is a bearer credential and has to be
unguessable, so it now carries 32 random bytes and only the HMAC of that
value is stored, matching how api_tokens and refresh_tokens already hold
their secrets.
Compatibility is passive, and deliberately so. A backfill cannot help:
the cookie already sitting in a browser is the cuid, and nothing we
generate server-side can be pushed into it — backfilling would sign
everyone out at deploy. Upgrading a row in place on first use loses to
the parallel requests a single page load fires: each mints its own
secret, one write wins, and the losers cannot re-emit the winner's
secret because only a hash is stored, so the browser can end up holding
a value the row does not honour. Instead, rows minted before the column
keep a NULL token_hash and stay resolvable by id, and are denied the
sliding-expiry extension so they drain within the 30-day session
lifetime. Every login from this release forward is on a secret at once,
and an id stops authenticating the moment its row holds one.
Note for operators: API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY now also keys session cookies, so
rotating it signs browser sessions out as well as invalidating tokens.
It is already Core-required, so no deployment gains a new prerequisite.
Four structural guards freeze the invariants the change rests on: the set of
files that can resolve a Bearer token to a user, the single deliberate
any-valid-token posture, the mint sites with their scope sets, and the rule
that a declared scope is an exported constant rather than a literal.
Thirteen behavioural cases run against a real Postgres and the real resolver.
Four of them go red on the pre-fix tree — a narrow token reading the
full-backup export and the labs surface, and an MCP token on a REST read.
The rest pin the flows that must NOT change: the per-medication ingest pair
still works, the token without the per-medication grant is still refused, a
wildcard token still reaches the export and the batch ingest, an MCP token
still resolves on /mcp with its write scope intact, a declared fhir:read
still opens the FHIR face and nothing else, cookie sessions are unaffected,
and requireAdmin still refuses a wildcard Bearer.
The workout-batch case that asserted narrow tokens are admitted claimed the
iOS sync depended on it. It does not: workouts:ingest has no mint site
anywhere, and iOS holds a ["*"] token. Replaced with a case that asserts both
halves of the real contract.
Documentation updated for the enforcement rule and the retired mint.
Marc-André Bombeck