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Lay the account-security and data-sovereignty substrate for v1.23. No user-facing behaviour yet — schema, crypto registry, redaction, and the note-encryption data path only. Schema + migrations: - 0199 — User totp_secret_encrypted / totp_confirmed_at / mfa_enforced / passkey_upgrade_nudge_dismissed; Session mfa_verified_at / last_active_at; Passkey last_used_at. All additive, nullable / defaulted. - 0200 — mfa_challenges (single-use step-up ticket; only the ticket hash is stored, so no session or token is ever minted before the second factor), mfa_recovery_codes (Argon2id at rest), webauthn_mfa_credentials (second-factor keys, kept separate from passkeys, which remain the passwordless-primary set). - 0201 — mood_entries.note_encrypted + measurements.notes_encrypted (BYTEA), matching the existing free-text encrypted-note convention. Free-text health notes: - New writes encrypt the mood / measurement note into the *_encrypted column and null the legacy plaintext column; reads prefer the ciphertext and fall back to plaintext only for not-yet-migrated rows, via a single read/write helper. - A boot-time job migrates existing plaintext rows in an idempotent, transactional, fail-closed pass (encrypt, then null the plaintext, per row in one transaction; safe to re-run; a row with content is never left both-null). - The legacy plaintext columns are kept this release and dropped in a follow-up once the backfill reports zero remaining rows — the same boundary the key-rotation playbook uses before dropping a legacy key. Crypto coverage: - Register the three new encrypted columns and wire them into the key-rotation script so a rotation never orphans them. - Extend the observability and log redaction denylists so TOTP secrets, MFA / recovery / backup codes, and export passphrases never reach a wide event.
125 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
125 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* v1.23 — free-text health-note encryption backfill (real Postgres).
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*
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* Seeds legacy plaintext rows (note in the plaintext column, ciphertext null),
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* runs the per-user backfill, and asserts:
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* - the plaintext is encrypted into `*Encrypted` and the plaintext column is
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* nulled, in one transaction (no row left both-null when it had content);
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* - the ciphertext decrypts back to the original (no data loss);
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* - a note-less row is untouched;
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* - a second run is a no-op (idempotent).
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*/
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { readNote } from "@/lib/crypto/note-cipher";
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import { runNoteEncryptionBackfillForUser } from "@/lib/jobs/note-encryption-backfill";
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import { getPrismaClient, truncateAllTables } from "./setup";
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const TEST_USER_ID = "user-note-backfill";
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beforeEach(async () => {
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await truncateAllTables(getPrismaClient());
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await getPrismaClient().user.create({
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data: {
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id: TEST_USER_ID,
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username: "note-backfill",
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email: "note-backfill@example.test",
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timezone: "Europe/Berlin",
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},
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});
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});
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describe("note-encryption backfill (real Postgres)", () => {
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it("migrates legacy plaintext notes to ciphertext and nulls the plaintext", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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// Legacy rows: plaintext present, ciphertext null (the pre-v1.23 shape).
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const withNote = await prisma.measurement.create({
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data: {
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userId: TEST_USER_ID,
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type: "WEIGHT",
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value: 80,
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unit: "kg",
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measuredAt: new Date("2026-05-16T08:00:00.000Z"),
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notes: "felt dizzy after",
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},
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});
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const noNote = await prisma.measurement.create({
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data: {
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userId: TEST_USER_ID,
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type: "WEIGHT",
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value: 81,
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unit: "kg",
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measuredAt: new Date("2026-05-17T08:00:00.000Z"),
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notes: null,
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},
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});
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const mood = await prisma.moodEntry.create({
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data: {
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userId: TEST_USER_ID,
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date: "2026-05-16",
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tz: "Europe/Berlin",
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mood: "OKAY",
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score: 3,
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moodLoggedAt: new Date("2026-05-16T08:00:00.000Z"),
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note: "rough night",
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},
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});
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const summary = await runNoteEncryptionBackfillForUser(TEST_USER_ID);
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expect(summary.measurementsMigrated).toBe(1);
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expect(summary.moodEntriesMigrated).toBe(1);
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const m = await prisma.measurement.findUnique({
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where: { id: withNote.id },
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});
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expect(m?.notes).toBeNull();
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expect(m?.notesEncrypted).not.toBeNull();
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expect(readNote(m?.notesEncrypted ?? null, null)).toBe("felt dizzy after");
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const untouched = await prisma.measurement.findUnique({
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where: { id: noNote.id },
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});
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expect(untouched?.notes).toBeNull();
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expect(untouched?.notesEncrypted).toBeNull();
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const x = await prisma.moodEntry.findUnique({ where: { id: mood.id } });
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expect(x?.note).toBeNull();
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expect(readNote(x?.noteEncrypted ?? null, null)).toBe("rough night");
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});
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it("is idempotent: a second run migrates zero rows and preserves the data", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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const row = await prisma.measurement.create({
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data: {
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userId: TEST_USER_ID,
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type: "WEIGHT",
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value: 80,
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unit: "kg",
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measuredAt: new Date("2026-05-16T08:00:00.000Z"),
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notes: "side effect note",
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},
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});
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await runNoteEncryptionBackfillForUser(TEST_USER_ID);
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const first = await prisma.measurement.findUnique({
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where: { id: row.id },
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});
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const firstCipher = Buffer.from(first?.notesEncrypted ?? new Uint8Array());
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const second = await runNoteEncryptionBackfillForUser(TEST_USER_ID);
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expect(second.measurementsMigrated).toBe(0);
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const after = await prisma.measurement.findUnique({
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where: { id: row.id },
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});
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// Same ciphertext, plaintext still null, note still recoverable.
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expect(Buffer.from(after?.notesEncrypted ?? new Uint8Array())).toEqual(
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firstCipher,
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);
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expect(after?.notes).toBeNull();
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expect(readNote(after?.notesEncrypted ?? null, null)).toBe(
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"side effect note",
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);
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});
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});
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