A Nightscout self-host on host networking with
NIGHTSCOUT_PRIVATE_ORIGINS=http://localhost:1337 worked before and must
keep working unchanged; an operator who lists an exact loopback origin
with its port has made the same deliberate decision as one who lists a
LAN origin. The never-grantable floor is now the unspecified address,
link-local and the metadata endpoint only. Loopback (127/8, ::1,
localhost) is grantable when listed exactly, still resolved and pinned
at connect time with redirects forbidden, and still refused when not
listed.
::1 is answered before the embedded-IPv4 unwrap, which read it as the
IPv4-compatible spelling of 0.0.0.1 and refused it as unspecified. The
pinned Nightscout transport test runs the real floor again. Each refused
range keeps its own test; loopback moves to the grantable-when-listed
set with a test that an unlisted loopback is still refused, and a
Nightscout grant of http://localhost:1337 is asserted to parse.
Refs #947
A loopback, link-local or metadata target answered
private_origin_not_approved with a message telling the user to have the
operator list it, and the parser refuses such an entry forever: a dead
end the route test even pinned. Those targets now answer
private_origin_not_grantable (catalogued, on all four routes, translated
in seven locales) with a message that says no grant can open them and
to use the relay's LAN address. Both senders carry the reason into the
outcome so the test button forwards the same code.
The malformed-entry warning printed the entry verbatim, which is where
a pasted token or userinfo sits; the parser now hands callers scheme
and host only, plus the reason in words. The Nightscout list throws a
named error with that redacted entry and reason, and the connect route
answers it as a 422 with the message instead of a bare 500, so a
self-host that listed http://localhost:1337 reads what to change.
The two settings cards translate a coded save refusal like the test
button does; the docs and the changelog name the sub-host and sibling-
port narrowing; the dispatcher floor tests assert the policy marker so
a real NXDOMAIN cannot pass for a refusal.
Refs #947
The mark named its action unconditionally, so a job that had already
named its own (the low-stock underflow branch) or a settings route
whose test then failed at the relay lost that name on the wide event.
Set the action only when the event has none, and always land the
channel and origin meta pair, through a small hasAction() on the
builder. Note the parse-time floor on the Nightscout page, which shares
the grammar.
Refs #947
A self-hoster's Gotify or ntfy on a private network was refused at
dial time with no operator override: both senders pinned the public
resolver, and the two grants that exist for other surfaces were never
read here. Add the third grant, NOTIFICATION_PRIVATE_ORIGINS, a comma-
separated list of exact origins read from the server environment.
A listed origin runs under the operator-approved pin: still resolved
and pinned inside the connector, redirects forbidden, loopback and
metadata answers refused. An origin not listed keeps the public pin it
always had. A malformed entry is logged once and grants nothing, and
the valid entries beside it keep working, so a typo in one relay's
origin cannot take every public webhook down with it. There is no
`=true`, CIDR, wildcard or suffix form.
One function, evaluateNotificationTarget, gives the verdict for both
senders, so the test button and the scheduled reminder cannot disagree.
A refusal now carries its own reason (`*_private_origin_refused`) and
an errorCode instead of collapsing into a network error, and a send
that used the grant marks the wide event with
`notification.egress.private_origin` and the channel plus origin.
The pin inventory keeps both senders in the conditional shape and
refuses a bare true or false in either.
Refs #947