Commit Graph
5089 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck fa46f27b01 feat: scope Telegram reminder tracking to recipients
- keep delegated recipient slots independent\n- bind callback cleanup to the recipient account
2026-08-06 04:38:09 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 5807879439 test: cover recipient-scoped telegram reminders
- Keep identical slots separate for each recipient\n- Update one slot when a recipient changes chat
2026-08-06 04:33:35 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 9380ea0f18 feat: separate notification event anchors
- Store record-scoped scheduler events outside delivery attempts\n- Keep delivery diagnostics free of bookkeeping rows
2026-08-06 04:32:52 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 2999b75ea6 test: cover notification event anchors
- Require record-scoped reminder deduplication\n- Keep anchors independent of delivery recipients
2026-08-06 04:29:54 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 1ba73a4d51 fix: enforce notification delivery authority
- Require active Guardian authority before cross-record delivery\n- Serialize managed delivery checks with lifecycle changes
2026-08-06 04:29:18 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck b78d64cb98 test: cover notification delivery authority
- Require active Guardian authority for managed delivery\n- Cover inactive and mismatched grants
2026-08-06 04:27:27 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 2ccd022410 test: update notification sender attempt mocks
- Exercise identity-aware delivery attempt recording\n- Keep self-delivery assertions explicit
2026-08-06 04:05:33 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck d9b675f993 feat: attribute notification delivery attempts 2026-08-06 03:59:08 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e4993af909 test: cover notification diagnostic attribution 2026-08-06 03:57:55 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 906118f86e fix: resolve notification delivery identity 2026-08-06 03:57:23 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 913a41b37d test: cover notification delivery identity 2026-08-06 03:49:49 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 3bb9349171 test: cover notification attribution constraints 2026-08-06 03:49:42 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 6108a71d80 feat: separate notification subjects and recipients 2026-08-06 03:46:57 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 6771b9060f test: cover notification attribution persistence 2026-08-06 03:43:35 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 389f2a042b fix: complete managed Guardian invitation lifecycle 2026-08-06 03:19:34 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 493437207e test: cover managed Guardian invitation lifecycle 2026-08-06 03:14:47 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 32380b1935 fix: clear revoked Guardian sessions
Return a removed Guardian's browsers to their own record.
2026-08-06 03:08:51 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck ffe3225639 fix: complete managed Guardian lifecycle
Use locked Guardian membership and transactional lifecycle audits.\n\nKeep acceptance and marker changes atomic.
2026-08-06 03:05:19 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 55291ad32d test: cover managed Guardian lifecycle races
Exercise cookie routes, transaction rollback, and record-serialized races.
2026-08-06 03:01:12 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 523ab3220b fix: serialize managed profile Guardians
Protect every Guardian-reducing lifecycle transition with a record lock.\n\nReturn a recoverable refusal when the final Guardian remains.
2026-08-06 02:50:30 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 5059bc9b69 test: cover managed profile Guardian races
- Exercise concurrent final-Guardian reductions against Postgres\n- Cover recoverable account and profile deletion paths
2026-08-06 02:36:08 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e5e3590ca3 feat: add managed profile Guardians
- Keep the ordinary invitation consent flow for a second Guardian\n- Clear managed Guardian expiry when the invitation is accepted
2026-08-06 02:32:59 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 665f223dc4 test: cover managed profile Guardian consent
- Pin ordinary second-Guardian acceptance\n- Pin non-expiring accepted Guardian grants
2026-08-06 02:29:55 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 58434a2b44 feat: create managed profiles atomically
- Require a fresh cookie MFA proof before creation\n- Create the credential-less profile and initial Guardian grant together
2026-08-06 02:28:56 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 51cbbae17f test: cover managed profile creation
- Prove truthful profile attributes and the initial Guardian grant\n- Prove grant-write failure rolls the profile transaction back
2026-08-06 02:25:19 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck c3125078b9 chore: resolve sharing lint checks
Keep attribution and provider-work tests lint-clean.
2026-08-06 02:13:50 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck d404d8275a fix: preserve import job wipe ownership
Keep durable actor attribution from deleting record-owned jobs.

Align provider and idempotency coverage with fail-closed behavior.
2026-08-06 02:11:01 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f5ca810643 chore: format sharing authority controls
Apply repository formatting to provider and import coverage.
2026-08-06 02:05:24 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck a620a730b9 test: extend sharing boundary guards
Cover provider work authority and import actor attribution.
2026-08-06 02:04:04 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 620817b10b fix: retain import actor attribution
Persist record and actor identities through job completion.\nWrite one bounded transactional completion audit per job.
2026-08-06 02:00:35 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck adb932052c fix: keep managed system work operator-scoped
Resolve managed record credentials through the operator policy for system work.
2026-08-06 01:53:04 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 2b2080f48c test: pin import actor attribution
Cover durable record and actor attribution across completion retries.
2026-08-06 01:52:43 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e209db24f4 fix: block delegated provider egress
Carry bounded work authority through queues and revalidate it at dispatch.\nResolve shared records without personal credentials.
2026-08-06 01:49:33 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f7a06df2bc test: pin provider origin controls 2026-08-06 01:38:35 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 60b842f614 fix: reauthorize delegated replay
- Recheck the live grant before returning cached delegated responses

- Refuse cached replay when the acting record cannot be resolved safely
2026-08-06 01:29:07 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck f8b05d541e test: pin delegated replay revocation
- Cover active, revoked, and own-record cache replay against Postgres
2026-08-06 01:22:33 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 09ff1fb23d feat: enforce managed sharing boundaries 2026-08-06 01:16:18 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck d86358f3e4 fix: recover managed sharing boundaries 2026-08-06 00:19:35 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 01562b4aef test: use the shared browser test entry point 2026-08-06 00:08:54 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 8669df4cda feat: add scoped record invitations 2026-08-05 23:58:30 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 4923db6464 fix: preserve account access compatibility 2026-08-05 23:58:26 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e4e773d543 feat: define scoped sharing levels 2026-08-05 23:58:18 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck ab14fdb6f3 Let an invitation name its sections and offer management
An owner can now narrow a grant to the parts of their record they mean to
share, and can offer the third level. Both decisions are made once, on the
invitation, and neither widens afterwards.

The invite schema takes `scope`: absent or null is the entire record, which
is what every stored grant means and what an owner who does not narrow still
gets. An empty array, a key outside the vocabulary and the whole-record
sentinel are each refused with a 422 naming the field; `inviteGrant` refuses
the same three underneath, and its `invalid_scope` now has an HTTP mapping
instead of falling into the generic refusal.

Offering MANAGE asks for a fresh second factor when the account has one. That
gate resolves through the session cookie and has no Bearer fall-through, so a
token caller is refused first with `sharing.invite.manage_browser_only` rather
than being told it is not authenticated by a route that had just
authenticated it. The consequence is deliberate: management of a health
record is offered from a browser.

The account payload gains `sections` and `level` beside `access` and
`canWrite`, resolved server-side and ordered as the consent screen reads.
`access` was `grant.access === "WRITE" ? "write" : "read"`, which would have
published a grant that can delete entries as read-only; it is a total map
now, so the next level cannot ship silent. The capabilities hook carries both
facts and turns neither into an affordance yet — the edit and delete controls
come back in the release where the routes behind them answer.

The consent surface asks two questions in order rather than laying out a
nineteen-cell grid. The level is three radios, narrowest preselected. What
they can open is two radios, the entire record preselected, and only the
narrow branch expands the eight sections with a sentence each. Both honest
limits are stated above the checkboxes, where the decision is being made: a
section shares everything written in it, and the cross-record surfaces do not
appear for a narrowed grant. Documents carries its own warning, cycle appears
only for an owner who tracks it, and Manage collapses the question to the one
line that answers it.

The Manage sentence says the other person can add, change and remove entries,
including ones the owner entered themselves, and says in the same breath what
it does not reach. The acceptance side gets its own responsibility line rather
than the write one wearing a stronger adjective.

Six locales.
2026-08-05 23:37:00 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck feb9d25e87 test: anchor sharing release journeys 2026-08-05 23:29:55 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck bd6220bbba test: add sharing security principals 2026-08-05 23:26:42 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck d9e68e7ee3 test: freeze sharing authorization inventories 2026-08-05 23:24:54 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck e05bad0ec2 chore: refresh the sharing release foundation 2026-08-05 23:14:01 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 553e0b4a28 Merge commit 'd07b9249c' into release/v1.37.0 2026-08-05 23:04:39 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck d42d2bb784 Merge branch 'main' into release/v1.37.0 2026-08-05 23:04:36 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck d07b9249c8 fix: complete dashboard hydration 2026-08-05 23:03:17 +02:00