`undici` moves to 8.10.0 and the `fast-uri` override rises to 3.1.5. Both were
published as high after the last run on the trunk, so this is new information
rather than neglect, and both matter here: undici is what backs `safeFetch`,
which is the one documented egress boundary and the place the connect-time
DNS-rebinding pin lives.
The undici advisory is a cross-user information disclosure and a parse-time
crash through degenerate private cache directives. `fast-uri` arrives four ways
through transitive dependencies and the existing override was pinned one patch
short of the fix.
The safe-fetch dispatcher suite passes against the new client, which is the
part that had to be checked rather than assumed: the pin reaches into undici's
connect hook and a client bump is exactly where that could quietly stop being
enforced.
The dose-history purge was the one destructive verb in the intake family
that removed rows outright. Both siblings, the single-event DELETE and the
bulk delete, stamp `deletedAt` and bump `syncVersion`; the purge called
`deleteMany`, so a mis-tap was final and a client offline at purge time kept
every row forever, because a row that no longer exists produces no tombstone
for the sync feed to carry. It tombstones now, scoped to live rows so a
second purge counts zero. No inventory refund: a purge wipes a history as
bookkeeping, and refunding every dose ever taken would inflate the current
container count instead.
The manual water quick-add and the lab-result un-delete both wrote health
data and reached only the wide event, which expires. Months later nothing
could answer who put a day's total there or who brought a reading back, and
with a second person able to act on a shared record that question has a
second possible answer. Both write a durable row now, named after the
neighbours they sit beside.
The refused-delegation audit comment claimed the row was written for the
owner's benefit. It is not: it is filed under the caller, it is only written
for a header refusal, and a header names an account the caller merely
asserts. Filing under that claim would let anyone write rows into any
account's activity feed by naming it. The comment says what the row is now,
and points at `recordDelegatedAccess`, which is the half the owner does see.
Two comments in the biomarker surfaces still claimed the `SetNull` foreign
key left the readings behind when a marker is deleted. That stopped being
true when delete became a "drop this and its history" action and the
confirmation copy was rewritten in six locales to say so.
The purge route gains a call-shape assertion rather than a count assertion,
because a count comes back identical from a `deleteMany`. The lab restore
route had no test at all and now has one.
The activity feed maps an audit action to a sentence. The web client posts to
/api/medications/[id]/intake, which has audited as `medication.intake` since
v1.0.0, but the map only knew `medications.intake.update` — so a delegate
recording a dose showed up in the owner's feed with no verb at all. Both
spellings are recognised now, plus `measurement.create.batch`.
A new test reads the audit actions straight out of every route that calls
requireRecordAuth("write") and fails when one has no case in the map, so the
next route to be opened for delegates cannot land a silent gap.
The delegate notification is fire and forget now, like every neighbouring
side effect. The dispatcher awaits each channel in the cascade, so one
unreachable channel added its whole timeout to the request of the person
standing next to the patient waiting for a dose to register. The integration
test polls the ledger rather than relying on the await, so nothing about the
proof weakens.
The coach positive control navigates to the dashboard to prove the launcher
renders for a delegate in their own record. It left the browser there, and the
next step clicks Accept, which lives on the access page. The click waited out
its timeout against a page that does not carry the button.
An assertion inserted mid-journey has to restore the state it borrowed.
A server-prefetching page dehydrates a health record into the HTML and
seeds it into the client's query cache under the key the client cell
reads. That copy is only right when the account the page read is the
account the client's route would answer with, and under an account
switch it never is: `getSession()` answers who is CALLING, deliberately
and permanently, so all five prefetching pages seeded the delegate's own
rows into a document opened on somebody else's record. The dashboard was
the worst of it — snapshot, digest and widget layout ride routes that
refuse the refetch, so the delegate's numbers stayed on the owner's
dashboard, while the chart row refetched to the owner and left the page
showing two people at once under a banner naming one.
Resolve the session through `getUnswitchedSession()` instead, which
answers null while the browser is acting on another record. The prefetch
steps aside and every cell fetches through its route, which is where the
grant check lives. Resolving the owner here instead was the other
candidate and is worse: the grant check has exactly one home, half of
what these pages prefetch rides routes that declared themselves not
delegable, and re-deriving it in an RSC would be a second program
deciding whose record this is.
Close the two shell-level doors beside it. The Coach launcher, its
drawer mount and the module tour hang off `<AuthShell>` rather than off a
route, so dropping Insights and Coach from the navigation under a switch
left them painting on every page in the record and on the unavailable
panel too — one tap from a drawer whose every action refuses, and a
`POST /api/insights/coach/seen` fired by opening it at all. All three
bind `useRecordCapabilities()`, the same resolved grant the banner and
the switcher read. Absent, not disabled.
The prefetch rule is structural: the guard walks the app tree, so a sixth
prefetching page is covered the moment it lands rather than the moment
somebody remembers. The pages stay on the session-surface allowlist with
their reasons rewritten, because a wrapper one directory deeper is the
easiest way for a surface to walk out of a guard.
The activity view told an owner that a delegate acted on their record. With
delegated writing it can say which act: added a reading, recorded a lab result,
marked a dose. The mapping already existed as a pure module with its own test
and a fallback for anything unmapped; this is the wire it was missing.
The component suite runs without a DOM renderer, so it proves what a page
paints and never what a button does. That is the right shape for this work,
because the property that matters most is a control being absent — but it
leaves the other half unproven: a form that renders is not a form that
submits, and a write that reaches somebody else's record is exactly the thing
worth watching happen.
The journey stands down while the invitation form has no level control, since
minting a WRITE grant behind the UI's back would prove a path no person can
walk. It names the control it is waiting for, so a run that skips while the
control exists reads as a bug here rather than an absence upstream.
Sharing lived in a settings panel and a menu three levels deep. That is where
a grant is managed and not where it is used: somebody who opens this app every
morning to check on a parent does not go through settings to do it, and the
design standards draw the same line, settings being account utilities rather
than feature destinations. So the dashboard carries one compact card listing
the records shared with this account, each row a one-tap switch through the
existing flow.
It is a doorway and not a preview. No numbers, no last reading. A slice of
somebody else's record on the delegate's own dashboard would sit outside the
one frame the design leans on, the banner naming the record you are inside.
An account nobody has shared with sees nothing at all.
The other half is the receipt: a reading, a lab result or a dose recorded
under a switch now says which record it landed in, because "Saved" alone is
the confirmation somebody acting for another person does not need. The undo
on the dose toast goes at the same time, since a delegate cannot remove what
they recorded and an undo they can see is one the server refuses.
Also here: the lines the owner's activity view owes each admitted verb, as a
translated mapping with a fallback, so a later release filing a verb it has
never heard of still renders a sentence rather than a blank row.
Marking a dose taken or skipped is the verb the delegation was written for:
somebody looking after a parent confirms the morning tablet. Adding a
medication and noting a side effect come with it. The card menu keeps only
what survives and disappears entirely when nothing does.
Four detail tabs leave the registry inside somebody else's record, because
their whole content is owner work: the schedule editor and its plan history,
the supply ledger, the external-token row, and the advanced surface holding
the wizard, the import and the destructive zone. A stale deep link into one
lands on the landing tab, the way an inapplicable tab already does.
The take-all-due sweep goes too. It rides the bulk intake route, which the
delegation does not name, and a control that half-works is worse than one
that is not offered.
Every page a switch can reach now renders the controls the grant covers and
none of the others. Readings, lab results and illness entries keep their add
path at WRITE and lose edit, delete and selection at both levels. Mood,
screeners, cycle days, checkup reminders and the document vault lose every
mutation control at both levels, because no grant admits those verbs and the
routes behind them refuse a switched session outright.
Absent, not disabled, throughout. The banner already says whose record this
is, so no chip repeats it beside each missing button; the one exception is
the measurements empty state, where somebody who may add will look for the
edit control beside the row they just entered, and one muted line says where
the limit is.
Two dead ends went with them: the custom-metric section on the measurements
page linked every row into a route the shell turns a delegate away from, and
the wrench glyphs point at settings pages sharing does not cover.
Three controls carry most of the app's mutation surface between them. The row
delete is spelled once for measurements, lab results, biomarkers, allergies,
family history, custom metrics and medication supply; the selection bar is
the only bulk delete; the capture picker is the fastest path to four entry
forms on a phone and bypasses every page header.
Deleting belongs to the owner at every grant level, so the first two are
absent inside somebody else's record rather than greyed out: a disabled bin
still claims the row is the delegate's to remove. The picker keeps the two
kinds a delegation admits and drops a mood entry and a glass of water, which
the server refuses under a switch; when nothing survives, the bar's plus
button goes with them instead of opening an empty sheet.
The surface guard grows a write leg. Membership is decided by the argument
a module passes to the record resolver, not by the identifier, because a
delegable read and a delegable write name the same symbol and mean opposite
things. The call matcher resolves aliased and namespace-qualified calls
back to the original name, and proves it can against synthetic modules.
Two assertions carry the decision not to add a provenance column to eleven
tables. Every module in the write list has to call auditLog, which is the
only writer that stamps the acting account, and none of them may reach the
audit table through the client instead. That decision rested on the trail
existing; it now rests on a test.
The prose on the read list said the write arms keep refusing under a
switch. Eleven of them no longer do, so those sentences are rewritten
rather than left to lie.
The integration suite drives the shipped POST exports through the real
handler, resolver, grant table and Prisma. Five legs per verb: the write
lands under the owner and nowhere else, a read grant is refused with
nothing written, a caller who was never granted is refused the same way,
the request after a revocation is refused with no re-login, and a caller
who never switched is indistinguishable from before. The grant is minted
through the invitation flow rather than planted, and the audit assertion
reads both ends of the row.
Account sharing shipped read-only, and everything that consulted the grant
lived in the application chrome: the nav bars, the banner, the switcher. No
feature surface asked. A delegate opened somebody else's record, saw the add
button on every page, filled the form, and was refused by a server that was
right to refuse. Nothing leaked; it taught people the product was broken.
This is the answer every mutation affordance asks for. Two booleans, because
a grant at WRITE admits a short closed list of verbs and nothing else:
`canAdd` for an entry of an admitted kind, `canManage` for changing what is
already there or adding what the list does not name. `canWrite` arrives
resolved from the server and is bound, never recomputed; what this decides is
only which class of control a resolved level covers.
The absent case is the permissive one. Failing closed would blank every add
button in the app for every account on every cold load, to spare a delegate
one frame between the reload and the account query landing.
Four medication verbs resolve the record: adding a medication with its
nested schedule, recording a side effect, and both forms of marking a dose.
Editing and deleting a medication stay refused under a switch, which is the
sharpest asymmetry in the feature — a delegate can create a medication and
can never correct the typo in its dose afterwards.
The side-effect rate bucket keys on the acting account rather than the
record. That was the condition on which the verb was admitted: on the
record key a delegate could exhaust the owner's allowance and lock them out
of their own log, and could collect a fresh one by switching to another
record. Everyone who has not switched lands in the bucket they always did.
Both intake routes tell the owner who marked their dose. Everything else
downstream stays addressed to the owner and is correct there: the
cross-device sync wakes their devices, the web-push clear closes their
pending reminder and recounts their badge, the compliance rollup recomputes
their day.
Two validation breadcrumbs move to auditLog(), the only writer that stamps
the acting account.
An allergy, a family-history entry, an illness episode and a custom-metric
value now resolve the record rather than the caller.
Two of them carry a consequence worth naming. The family-history row
describes the record's relatives, so it is the one admitted write where
third-party health information is present by design; it is stored as the
record's own, exactly as the read arm already serves it. The illness module
gate runs against the record before the write, so a delegate cannot open an
episode inside a record whose owner switched the module off, whatever they
set on their own account.
The custom-metric entry reaches its metric through the ownership hop, which
now resolves against the record: a delegate can only feed a definition the
owner made, and their own metric of the same name is unreachable from in
there. Its validation breadcrumb moves to auditLog().
POST /api/labs and POST /api/biomarkers resolve the record. The free-text
lab path mints its biomarker under the record's catalogue rather than the
caller's — a result added to somebody's record whose marker landed on the
helper's account would leave the owner with a reading they cannot chart.
Adding a marker the record already tracks stays the ordinary 409 from the
same per-account uniqueness the owner would hit themselves. The PUT and
DELETE on the sibling routes are unchanged and still refuse under a switch.
Both validation breadcrumbs move to auditLog(), the only writer that stamps
the acting account.
Both POST arms of /api/measurements resolve the record rather than the
caller. Every `userId: user.id` in the handler already meant "the record",
so the bodies are untouched: the safety-floor check, the reminder
satisfaction, the rollup recompute and the cache eviction are statements
about the record and stay addressed to it.
The two validation breadcrumbs move from a bare client create to
auditLog(). That helper is the only writer that stamps the acting account,
and a delegate's malformed payload filed without it reads as the owner's
own typing.
The sync-changes fixtures seeded rows at a literal calendar date. The route
serves only what sits inside the tombstone retention horizon, which is sixty
days plus a fifteen-day margin, so the fixture was inside the window when it
was written and fell out of it exactly seventy-five days later. Three cursor
round-trips started failing at midnight with no commit behind them, and would
have failed on every run from then on.
The rows now anchor five days before the current time, so they cannot age out
of the window they are meant to be inside. The mood entry's own date string is
derived from the same anchor rather than written out, because the two drifting
apart is the same defect one level down.
The payload type still said the level is read throughout and `canWrite` false.
Both were true of the shipped release and neither survives the invitation
gaining a choice. Also says what `canWrite` does not mean, since the word
invites a larger reading than the thing it grants.
A delegate retrying with one `Idempotency-Key` across two people's records met
itself in one cell. The cache tuple was `(caller, key, method, path)`, so the
second record's request replayed the first record's cached 201: the handler
never ran, no row was written for the second person, and the caller was told it
had been — with the other person's id in the body. Nothing errored and nothing
logged a conflict, and five of the write verbs about to become delegable are
wrapped here.
Fold the claimed record into the `key` component, centrally, once. Not into
`userId`: that column is a foreign key to `users` with a cascade behind it and
cannot hold a composite. It keeps naming the caller, which is what makes two
delegates on one record two cells for free. The separator is a byte the key
validator refuses, so a caller cannot hand-craft a key into a cell belonging to
a request they are not making.
A request with no acting account keys byte-for-byte as it did before, so a
client that never heard of sharing cannot be affected.
Accepted and pinned by test: the fold uses the CLAIM, before the grant check,
so within the 24h window a delegate whose access has ended can still replay a
key they had already completed. They receive bytes they already had, nothing
new is written, and a fresh key from them is refused because that request
reaches the handler.
Both frozen surfaces move in this diff. The claim reader gains a guard leg
freezing its consumers, since an unchecked claim is exactly the value a future
caller must not mistake for permission.
The module header still described a permission to read, and the grantee field
still said "invited to read it". Both are half the sentence once the level is
a choice.
The rule that decides what a request says it is acting as — session stamp on
the cookie transport, selector header on Bearer, a header on a cookie request
naming nothing — sat inside the resolver that acts on the answer. A second
caller needs the same question answered before any auth context exists, and
two implementations of "whose record is this" drift; the copy that drifts is
the one nobody reads.
Move the decision, the header name and the two predicates into
`auth/acting-carrier`, as a pure function of what the transport carried. The
resolver keeps what only it may do: turning a claim into a data scope once a
live grant says so. No behaviour changes — the resolver's arms are the same
arms, and its suite passes untouched.
The header-name guard follows the constant to its new file.
The invitation form gains the choice, and the option labels say what actually
ships rather than the word "write": a delegate can add readings, results,
observations, a medication and a marked dose, and can edit or delete nothing,
including what they entered a moment ago. That gap between what "write access"
sounds like and what it does is where a support case lives, so it is on the
card rather than in a reply.
The delegate reads the same thing before they accept. A pending write
invitation states its level and one sentence about what accepting means, on the
screen where they accept it, because acceptance is where the two consents meet
and it happens once.
Ending an access says what stays: the entries remain and the owner can remove
any of them, and the activity view keeps saying who entered what for as long as
the instance's audit window reaches. That number comes from the server, so an
instance running ninety days says ninety, and a browser that has not been told
says nothing rather than a made-up year.
The browser journey now invites at the wider level and reads the posted body
for it. That is the only check in the tree that can: the component convention
is server-rendered only, so no test under src/ runs the form's submit path, and
every one of them stays green with the control wired to a constant.
A grant has always had an access column and `inviteGrant` has always written
READ into it. That was the right way to ship the first version: "this release
never grants write" was a property of the file rather than a promise in a
comment. Remove it deliberately now, so somebody sharing their record can offer
reading or reading plus adding.
The level is a required argument to `inviteGrant` and is defaulted in exactly
one place, the invite schema, where an omitted field becomes READ. An older
client's payload therefore stays valid and stays narrow, and the domain module
never guesses a level nobody named.
There is no upgrade path and that is the decision, not a gap. A grant is READ
or WRITE from the moment it is offered and stays that way until somebody ends
it. Widening a live one would change what the delegate agreed to without asking
them again, and their consent is half of what makes a write grant legitimate.
The way up is a new invitation, accepted again.
The audit row and the wide event carry the level: "who was given what, and by
whom" is the question that row exists to answer.
The intake routes call notifyDelegatedIntake with both account ids and
the helper decides. Keeping the comparison here rather than at the call
sites means a route added later cannot notify somebody about a dose they
marked themselves, and a snooze is answered in one place as what it is:
moving a dose, not resolving one.
The medication name is read scoped to the owner, because that name goes
onto the owner's lock screen. Nothing addresses the delegate: the
dispatcher takes a single account id, and under record substitution that
id is the owner. The person who marked the dose learns what they did
from the response they are already awaiting.
The integration test asserts the ledger row before the sender mock, so a
dispatch nobody recorded cannot pass as a dispatch.
The matrix derives each row's label from the event name, so a new event
type gets a row whether or not anybody wrote the strings for it. That is
how SECURITY_ALERT has been rendering its own raw key since v1.23: the
forward i18n coverage test only sees literal call sites, and this key is
assembled from a runtime value.
Move the derivation out of the page so a test can compute the keys the
page computes, assert both resolve in all six bundles, and name the
missing one. Write the sign-in row's strings, and the strings for the
delegated-dose row and its push body.
The owner of a shared record gets an alert when a delegate marks one of
their doses. It is the one exception to the rule that bookkeeping stays
in the activity view: whether the tablets were taken is a fact about the
owner's own body, and they should not have to go looking for it.
Default ON, against the opt-in precedent of PERSONAL_RECORD, because the
event only exists once the owner has invited somebody and given them
write access. The per-channel row in the matrix is the valve for anyone
who finds it noisy, and both positions of that preference are covered.
Marc-André Bombeck