The baseline-drift card reported a pulse in the hundreds of millions against a
usual range in the tens of thousands. Neither figure is a heart rate, and both
came from the same place.
The application declares a plausibility domain per metric, and every
interactive, import, MCP and Telegram write validates against it. The
derivation layer did not ask. So a single stored value outside that domain — a
provider unit-decode slip, or a row from a writer that never had the gate — was
folded into the day mean, carried by the median into the band, and then held
against itself as "currently". The two numbers in the sentence were wrong by
different amounts, which is why the line read as nonsense rather than as an
exaggeration.
Both readers now refuse a value the application has already declared
impossible: the per-day means behind the band, and the latest-day mean the
deviation reads. A day left with no plausible reading contributes nothing
rather than a fabricated point, and the vital drops out of the comparison — the
coverage floor already knows how to report an absent day. The rollup branch
applies the same rule to a bucket mean, since the rollup writer averages
whatever is stored. Everything downstream of `readDayMeanSeries` inherits it,
which is every consumer of the usual range: the band strip, the drift card, the
changepoint detector, readiness, trajectory, the coach read.
The card also printed raw doubles. Each figure now renders at the metric's own
decimal precision through the shared formatter, so a mean reads as a number
rather than as a float and follows the reader's number convention.
Left open, and recorded for a separate pass: the provider sync writers do not
enforce the domain on the way in, so the impossible rows keep landing.
Marking a missed dose taken from the Verlauf ledger showed the row flip to
taken and then fall straight back to missed, with the entry nowhere on the day
it was made for.
The ledger posts the displayed slot's own anchor as `scheduledFor` and means
"record THIS dose". The route resolved the slot by window band from `takenAt`
instead, which answers a different question: which slot the recording moment
falls into. Backfilling an older slot matches no band, so the write fell
through to the standalone insert and landed as an ad-hoc row anchored at the
recording moment. The named slot stayed unserved, the optimistic row was
overwritten by the authoritative refetch, and the dose sat under today with no
sign of where the user had put it.
A named instant that is a real slot of this medication now decides the binding,
validated against the same band anchors the "diesem Slot zuordnen" pin uses, so
an arbitrary client instant still records ad-hoc. A slot that lies ahead of the
take is still refused by the existing forward guard, so a late-morning dose
cannot consume the evening slot. When the naming and the clock disagree the
binding rests on the user's choice, so the row stores it as such and the read
ledger anchors it there rather than dropping back to ad-hoc; an ordinary
on-time take resolves to the same anchor either way and is untouched.
The tests drive the shipped POST and the shipped dose-history GET, and assert
the persisted row and the ledger read back from it.
The dead-code gate has been red on this branch since the sharing refusal
contracts landed. Neither name is new and neither was noticed, because
knip is not in the local gate.
consentRequiredResponse lost its last caller when every delegable route
started sharing one 403 description through recordRefusal(); the AI
consent sentence it wrapped is still used and stays, with a note at the
constant saying why there is no response object beside it any more.
mutateThenRestore was written with the sharing security fixtures and has
never been called.
No ignore entries: an export with no consumer is the thing the gate is
for.
The eight journeys were enumerated and one of them was wired. The other
seven existed as claims in a fixture file, which is the gap the enumeration
was written to close: a browser suite reports what it ran, never what it did
not, and a journey nobody wired reads exactly like a journey that passed.
All eight are wired now, and the list is checked in both directions — an
enumerated journey missing from the wiring fails, not just a wiring entry
naming a journey nobody declared. Before this, a subset was legal, so a
dropped journey and a not-yet-written one looked the same.
A journey names more than one file where more than one file carries it. J1
claims a grant runs through invite, accept, switch, expiry, revoke and a
direct URL; the browser proves the switch, what each level opens and the
direct-URL refusal, and the transitions either side are database facts
proved against real Postgres. Folding that into one file would mean a
browser spec driving expiry through the clock or an integration file
asserting what a page renders, and both are worse tests than the two that
exist.
Three journeys ride Playwright and five ride Vitest, so a green run of this
guard means all eight are claimed and here is which have executed in the
ordinary gate — never that all eight passed. The runner is derived from the
path rather than trusted, so it cannot become a label set to whichever value
made the split read better.
The extractor now reads `it(` as well as `test(`, and the parameterised
`it.each(table)("title")` form alongside the single-call one. It saw neither
before: five of the journeys are proved by Vitest files, every per-file leg
is over a matched set, and an empty match set satisfied them all. The
synthetic spec that proves the parse grew a Vitest half, and it is what
caught the parameterised form being invisible. What the matcher still cannot
see is written into its own doc comment.
The cross-midnight test read `push_attempts` for a synthetic `DEDUP`
channel. Separating the scheduler's bookkeeping from delivery diagnostics
moved the anchor to `notification_events`, and nothing has written that
channel since. The query matched no rows, `findMany` answered the empty
list, and the assertion compared an empty set it had no reason to expect —
a check that could not fail whatever the tick did.
It now reads `notification_events` by record and event type, and asserts
the single row's `dedupKey`. Removing the claim from the tick fails the
dispatch-count leg above it; narrowing the key so it no longer names the
slot fails this leg on the key's own content, which is what makes it a
check rather than a comment.
Four cases in the accountAccess integration test were written against a
contract this release rejected. They asserted an entry of seven fields and a
block of three, both of which gained one; and they asserted that a MANAGE
grant publishes `access: "manage"`.
It does not, by design. `access` is the v1.36.0 name and its union is
`read | write` — a client compiled against that release decodes it as a
closed set. MANAGE therefore publishes as `write` there and as `manage` on
`level`, and the entry schema raises a validation issue unless a manage
entry carries exactly legacy write access and whole scope. The expectations
move; the schema does not.
`recordKind` is required on an entry and on the block. Both are asserted
now, including the block-level value moving from `self` to `shared` across
a switch, so a value stuck on either reads as two cases disagreeing.
The lifecycle suite took the invitation route's answer as an account-grant row
and reached for `id` and `expiresAt`. It answers with the roster's entry now,
so the id arrives as `grantId` and the expiry is read off the stored column,
which proves it was persisted rather than echoed.
Freezes the authority split the third level ships with. A token exercises a
MANAGE grant, and a Guardian's authority over a managed profile, exactly as a
browser does — proved at the resolver, where neither had a Bearer case before.
A token cannot offer MANAGE and cannot create a managed profile at all, because
both gates resolve through the session cookie; the second had no test until now,
and it runs against a real database with a wildcard token to make the width of
the permission irrelevant.
The claim set is held together by a map naming, per claim, the file and the test
title that proves it, so removing any one of them fails rather than quietly
narrowing what a native client may do.
The fence's client-facing half is frozen beside it: the account payload publishes
the record context on a cookie session and null on a token, and the published
contract says so under the same header names the server matches on.
- publish the roster's entry from the invitation and `{ grantId, revokedAt }`
from the removal, instead of the account-grant row Prisma returned
- drop the invitation's self refusal: it named a code no request can elicit,
because a Guardian grant's grantor is the profile and never the caller
- name the duplicate grant error rather than catching every grant refusal into
a sentence that would be wrong for any other one
- keep the rate limit and the unknown-identifier 404 free of an error code,
as their siblings elsewhere are, and say why at the call site
- bound profile creation at ten an hour per account, the ceiling its
guardian sibling has carried since it shipped
- distinguish a failed roster read from a slow one, with the way back
- cover the three caller states the roster read has to refuse: an
unaccepted invitation, an expired grant, and MANAGE held elsewhere
- cover what deletion does to a guardian standing inside the record
- list who looks after a profile, invite another guardian and end an
existing access from the profile's own row
- state the last-guardian floor from the real roster before the act, and
say plainly that an invitation counts only once it is accepted
- give each of the invitation refusals its own sentence, branching on
status for the two the route sends without an error code
- cover every call the card can make against the real routes
- add GET /api/managed-profiles/{id}/guardians, cookie-only, refusing
anybody who is not an active guardian of that profile with the same 404
an unknown id gets
- disclose the grant id, the party block already shared between grant
parties, the derived state and the two timestamps, and nothing else
- publish the route in the OpenAPI contract
The revoke dialog tells an owner that "who entered what" stays answerable for
N days, and the activity list prints the same number under its heading. The
query behind that list had no date filter: on an instance whose retention was
shortened it showed rows the sentence said were already gone, and the number
was a caption over an unbounded read rather than its limit. It is the filter
now, resolved once so the bound and the sentence cannot drift apart.
The list also stopped at a hundred rows and said nothing about it, which is the
more dangerous of the two silences — an owner who scrolls to the bottom reads
the oldest visible line as the beginning, and a busy household reaches the cap
in a fraction of the window. The response says which of the two limits it hit,
and the view states it only when it did: a caveat that is always on is one
people learn to skip.
The self-hosting page said an empty list means nobody opened the record. It
means nobody did so within the window. Corrected, with the row cap named
alongside it.
Every delegable route files a breadcrumb when a request does not parse, and it
files it through auditLog on purpose: that helper is what stamps the actor, and
without the stamp a delegate's malformed request would read as the owner's own.
The rows are meant to be attributable. None of them had a sentence, so all of
them rendered in the owner's activity view as "made a change in your record" —
including one a view-only delegate can trigger by sending a query the route
cannot parse. Nothing had changed and nothing could have.
Thirty-three actions now have honest lines. A refusal says it was an attempt
and says it was refused; it never borrows the language of something that
happened. Two of them are filed by library modules the routes import — a
background import's completion row and a medication lifecycle reconciliation —
and a walk over route files alone could not see either.
The inventory guard was asking a different question from the feed. It kept only
awaited audit calls while the feed shows fire-and-forget rows identically, and
it read route files while the feed shows whatever the request reached. Both
criteria now match the feed's, the three rows the feed structurally cannot show
are excluded by name with the reason written down, and the exclusion list is
pinned at three. A leg asserts the shape of the sentence for every refusal, so
a future arm cannot map an attempt onto an ordinary verb and pass on coverage.
The whole round trip is covered against real Postgres: a view-only delegate
sends a malformed query, the row lands attributed to them under the owner, and
the sentence the owner reads is an attempt.
POST /api/allergies and POST /api/family-history have resolved
requireRecordAuth("manage", "profile") since the level shipped, while the only
form in the product that posts to either sat behind a Settings destination
classified unavailable. The write was admitted, audited and owner-scoped, and
nobody could reach it — the one-ended change this repository keeps
rediscovering, with the permission shipped and the surface left as a follow-up.
The destination now carries a classification that means what the routes mean:
reachable by everybody they already admit, which is a guardian inside the
profile they administer and an adult delegate holding manage. The four places
that decided visibility on the guardian-only literal were each updated
deliberately, and the shell that refused every settings path in an adult share
now admits exactly the destinations classified as record content. Record
configuration — modules, thresholds, notification routing — stays with the
owner at every level.
The page inside a record is its own component holding the two managers whose
routes answer for a delegate. Mounting the personal section would have put
three more forms on screen that refuse on submit. The family-history card says
whose statement the row is, which the route comment could not.
Both routes carried a long paragraph arguing the write was deliberately
unreachable. It is gone rather than left to send the next reader back to close
what this opens.
The integration coverage moves from the undeclared-mode refusal to a manage
contract: a manage delegate and a guardian each write and the row lands under
the owner with the delegate named as actor, while read and write delegates get
the insufficient-access refusal. Nothing exercised either route at manage
before.
The shared-record accessibility suite had four tests for five states: success
and empty shared one, and neither of them ever entered an empty state. A
browser run reports what it ran and never what it did not, so a state nobody
wrote a test for produced exactly the same output as a state that passed.
The five states are enumerated in a fixture, each test names its state, and a
fast guard reads the spec back against the list — a state that loses its test,
its anchor, or one of its proofs now fails in the ordinary gate rather than at
the point somebody notices the spinner is silent.
Every state runs four proofs: an axe scan, the document reading order, either
a keyboard reach with a visible focus indicator or a live-region announcement
for the one state with nothing to press, and, where the copy is something a
person has to act on, that it renders as content rather than as muted meta and
clears the contrast floor. The retry control on the read-failure card gained a
stable slot so the keyboard proof targets the affordance rather than its
wording.
The eight release journeys are enumerated in the same fixture.
The batch path had no unique-violation handling at all, so one duplicate
anywhere in the transaction answered 500 — indistinguishable from a
server fault, and what every client retries against. The single path
narrowed with instanceof, the form prisma-errors.ts exists to replace.
- give every acceptance case a stable id and assert the mapping from a
runnable artifact, recording which cases execute in the ordinary gate
and which await the browser stage
- add the browser spec for the cases no cooperative layer can reach:
peers reconciling to an exact context, an aborted switch response, a
closed initiator, a delayed response, and the offline disk layers
- evaluate the fence in the wrapper above findCached, so a stale request
neither replays a body, learns a cell exists, nor inserts a claim
- return the refusal rather than throwing: one route composes the
wrapper outside apiHandler, where a throw escapes the envelope
- read the claim and the session's own context on one session lookup
- both record resolvers check the fence after authentication and before
the carrier, off the one session row that also decides the scope
- POST /api/account/switch takes an optional expectedEpoch and writes
conditionally, so concurrent switchers resolve to one outcome
- GET /api/auth/me publishes the context a browser bootstraps from
- every response that resolved a record scope echoes it back
- regenerate the API contract
- add sessions.record_epoch, owned by a BEFORE UPDATE trigger so the
ON DELETE SET NULL path and raw SQL writes cannot skip it
- normalise pre-existing rows so epoch zero means never switched
- project the epoch off the row getSession already loads
- Time out stalled provider sends without unhandled late rejections\n- Record a transient timeout outcome for cascade fallback\n- Cover timeout fallback with unit and integration tests
- Exclude and erase egress claims with recipient-side lookup support\n- Serialize data wipes with managed-profile Guardian authorization\n- Cover last-Guardian and queued-claim wipe races
- Commit a final authorization claim under the lifecycle lock\n- Keep provider calls and retry outcomes outside database transactions\n- Retain authorization claims with notification delivery diagnostics
Marc-André Bombeck