`IntradayCumulativeProfile` shipped classified as backed up and carried by
nothing. The drain folds the per-sample rows into twenty-four running totals
and deletes the originals in the same transaction, so past the grace window
the table is the only copy of a day's curve: a restore rebuilt the account
without it, reported success, and left the same-time baseline reading "still
learning" for a fortnight.
Builder and restore sit together in one file, the way the profile and cycle
pairs do, because the restore route delegates and a grep of the route alone
lies. The section spreads into the payload rather than being copied key by
key. Two curves for the same metric and day, or a curve that is not a whole
day, throw naming the day instead of writing a row every reader drops.
The pair is proven end to end rather than at each end: the round-trip suite
builds a real payload from a populated account, serialises it, parses it back
through the real parser, drives the real restore, and asserts on the rows
written. Remove the read and it goes red.
The classification guard proved every model has an opinion and would have
passed unchanged while a model classified as carried was read into the payload
and never written back — which is what happened to the nutrient day totals, the
custom mood tags and the custom cycle symptoms, three releases running.
Split BACKED_UP into the models with both ends and the models without, each of
the latter carrying what an account loses meanwhile, so the debt is a register
rather than a silence. The check reads declared writer and restore files rather
than grepping for a route, because the route delegates: a review that grepped
only the route concluded the cycle data was never restored and had to be
retracted. Declaring the file list caught its own first omission — measurements
are read through the pager, not directly.
Adds a round trip that builds a real payload, parses it through the wire schema
and drives the real restore, asserting on the rows written rather than on the
payload. Dropping the cycle section spread makes it fail the way production
did: the restore throws on a symptom key nothing wrote back.
Both were classified as backed up when the backup plan was written and carried
by nothing. The custom metric is live data loss: a series the account defined
itself is the one kind no integration can re-sync, so a restore rebuilt the
account without the metric and every one of its readings, and reported success.
Builder and restore live in one file beside each other, the way the cycle pair
does — a grep of the restore route alone does not find either, because the route
delegates to both.
Readings nest inside the metric that owns them rather than referencing it by
name, so the restore has no parent to look up and no lookup to miss. A duplicate
metric name and an undecodable ciphertext field both throw and name the value.
Intake events whose medication did not restore now throw with the unresolved
reference instead of being filtered away into a dose history that comes back
short while the restore reports success.
The Health Score graded the weight pillar against 22 x height squared,
expanded by 2 kg either side: a target nobody set, nothing disclosed,
and the only producer of the pillar's band. For anyone with a height on
file it pre-empted both the honest trend-only path the module header
promised and the null-redistribution behind it, while the target the
user had actually entered sat unread in User.thresholdsJson.
computeHealthScore now takes the band whole plus the yardstick it came
from. Both callers resolve it through one shared builder next to
buildHealthScoreBpInputs, which hands over a band only when
getEffectiveRange reports a real user override; every other account
scores the bare trend. defaultWeightTargetFromHeight is gone.
Same pass, same defect class elsewhere: the dashboard bands, the
weight-drift verdict rung and the weight/BMI record direction all
ignored an explicit target too, and the snapshot never resolved the
mood module, so a mood-off account got a mood pillar in the hero ring
and none in the Insights card. moodEnabled and the weight yardstick are
required parameters now, so a caller that forgets one fails to compile
instead of quietly scoring against a default.
Six provider syncs returned a bare count, which narrowed their failures away:
a Nightscout window in which every SGV row was refused by a constraint
returned the same 0 as a quiet night, and an Oura or Polar run whose
collections all failed returned 0 too. The routes then answered 200 with a
count and the settings card drew a green tick over it.
Every sync now reports what it imported AND whether any part of it did not
land, and the route resolves the outcome server-side so the web card and the
native client cannot disagree. Google Health keeps its 502 for a run that
failed and wrote nothing, but a run that failed after writing some resources
is now a partial rather than a discarded result. The labs OCR commit carries
the same resolved outcome.
Four things an independent read found, three of them things this release said
about itself that were not true.
A custom mood tag travelled without its label, its icon, its sort order and
its SCALE. The label is the smaller loss: the person who named a factor
"Migräne" would have got a key back. The scale is the real one — the inverse
flag marks a factor where a high value is bad, and dropping it does not lose a
label, it silently reverses the meaning of every rating already recorded
against that tag. Custom cycle symptoms lost their label the same way. Both
now carry the ciphertext verbatim, like every other encrypted column in a
disaster-recovery payload.
The plan file claimed, in the present tense, that a guard requires both a
payload reader and a restore branch for every carried model. No such guard
exists. The commit that introduced the file said so honestly; the file itself
said the opposite, and roughly 31 models have neither end. BACKED_UP means
"must be", not "is", and both the plan and its test now say that plainly. The
wrong sentence is recorded rather than quietly swapped, because it is the same
defect the file was written to prevent.
The export route still told operators that labs, allergies, illness episodes
and workouts could be exported but never restored. The restore route
re-creates all of them, and since this release nutrient day totals too. The
scope now points at the plan instead of repeating it beside the code, which is
how that sentence came to be wrong.
And the export card promised "every record you own". It does not, so it no
longer says so — six locales.
The per-medication import and the account-wide dose-history import queued
their work through ninety near-identical lines each: row lock, stale-job
sweep, active-job refusal, job row, pg-boss send, and the fallback that fails
the row when the queue is not there. Five steps written twice drift, and the
drift shows up as an import that hangs on one surface and not the other. The
status projection moved out of these routes for the same reason; this is the
write half.
Scope is the only real difference, and it is one argument. What the two
surfaces legitimately say differently — the 409 wording, the envelope, the
kickoff audit line — stays at the call site.
The replay key had the same shape of problem in smaller form: the export
reader owned a function for it and the hand-listed body inlined the same
template. Both now call one function, with a test that pins them equal for
the same medication and instant.
`binaryReferenceSex` was already the declared owner of the shrink from the
three stored values to the two a sex-split reference table has rows for, but
eight sites still narrowed inline — including a byte-for-byte private copy in
the effective-range resolver and a ternary 37 lines above a `toProfileSex`
call in the same file. Each of those is a place the fallback can drift.
Delete the copy, replace the ternaries, and name the pair once as
`BinaryReferenceSex` so a signature that needs it stops re-listing the two
literals. No behaviour changes: every site already resolved OTHER and "no
answer" to the same neutral or absent value, and the existing suites pass
untouched.
The batch route has accepted a `syncTrigger` since v1.32.8 and put it on the
wide event, where no human reads it. Half of what was promised got built: the
value is written and appears in three places in the codebase, none of which is
a screen anyone looks at.
Persist it on the account, alongside the instant of the most recent batch that
arrived without the app being opened, and publish both from
`GET /api/integrations/healthkit`. The card now names how the last sync arrived
and when data last came in on its own. `healthKitLastSyncedAt` alone reads
identically whether the phone delivers by itself or only while someone has the
app open, which is why "is background delivery working" could not be settled
from either side.
A batch that declares no trigger writes null rather than leaving the previous
one standing — the field describes this sync, and an older client's silence is
not evidence about it. A foreground batch leaves the background timestamp
alone; overwriting it would erase the only answer the card has.
Also here: WHOOP, Fitbit and Google Health join the workout-freshness table.
All three write workouts, and without an entry their cards could report every
measurement type fresh while the workout leg had been silent for weeks. And the
status pill drops a generic `aria-label` that replaced its own accessible name,
so a screen reader announced the same words for a healthy connection as for a
broken one.
`failing_leg` was one slot, so two legs of the same provider failing in
overlapping windows overwrote each other. The row remembered whichever failed
last, and that leg recovering then cleared an error the other one was still
causing — the ledger forgot a live failure and painted the card green over it.
The slot becomes a set. A failure adds its leg, a success removes its own, and
the error state, the per-kind buckets and the streak anchor clear only once the
set is empty. The array is ordered oldest failure first, so the last element is
the leg that wrote the message `last_error` holds; when that leg recovers while
others are still failing, the message is cleared rather than left describing a
leg that is now healthy.
An unattributed failure adds nothing and removes nothing. A single-leg provider
therefore behaves exactly as before, and a multi-leg provider no longer loses
what its other legs already reported.
The column never reached a client — it is absent from the status serialiser and
from the OpenAPI contract — so it is replaced rather than shimmed.
The per-phase "already sent today" guard read the Telegram message
ledger, and that table is written only when a Telegram send succeeds. A
user on email, APNs or ntfy never had a row, so the 15-minute tick
re-derived the same overdue slot and sent it again on every pass — around
fifty mails for a single missed dose.
Anchor the guard in `push_attempts` instead, the ledger the daily
briefing and the illness escalation already use. Two properties are
deliberate: the anchor is stamped for every dispatched slot regardless of
what any channel returned, because keying it on a delivered push would
re-open the flood the moment a channel starts failing; and it is stamped
before the dispatch, so a crash costs one phase's notice rather than a
repeat every quarter hour.
The key carries the schedule id and the slot's real HH:mm alongside the
phase and the local date. Both are load-bearing: two legacy
single-window schedules on one medication share the empty first-class
time-of-day, so a coarser key would collapse the evening dose into the
morning one. The tests assert the other direction too — the next phase
still escalates, and the next local day starts clean.
The Telegram ledger keeps its message-tracking duties; it is no longer
the dedup key. Anchor rows carry a sentinel channel and stay out of the
operator's notification health and diagnostic reads, which count
deliveries, not decisions.
The restore resolves a mood entry's rated factors by key and asks only for the
seeded catalogue. A tag the user created is not in it, so the lookup came up
short and the whole restore threw 'Unknown mood factor keys'. The file was
complete; it simply could not be read back.
That is the same cause as the cycle symptoms two commits ago, with the
opposite ending. There, an unresolvable key was filtered out and the loss was
silent. Here it stopped everything. One shape of missing definition, two
answers, neither of them the right one.
The account's own tag definitions travel now, get written before the factors
resolve, and the lookup accepts the seeded catalogue or the owner's own. The
seeded rows stay out of the file for the same reason as before: a restore must
not rewrite another instance's reference data.
Four more test mocks needed the new delegate, which is again the compiler and
the suite naming the call sites rather than me hunting for them.
The export has written nutrient day totals since v1.29. The canonical schema
never declared the field, so `.passthrough()` carried it through parsing and
no reader ever looked at it: every water and vitamin total in the file was
discarded on restore, and the restore reported success.
Declared in the contract, cleared and re-created beside its siblings, and
counted in both places that count — what the file holds and what the restore
replaced. A count that stops at the domains someone remembered is how this
stayed quiet.
restoreCycleData was loud about one missing reference and silent about
another, three lines apart. An unknown cycle reference threw; an unknown
symptom key was filtered out of the list, so the day-log came back with one of
its symptoms quietly gone and the restore reported success.
The cause was upstream: the seeded catalogue is reference data every instance
has, but a symptom the user created lives only in their account and was never
carried. The key had nothing to resolve against, and the filter turned that
into silence.
Both ends now. The account's own definitions travel with the backup, the
seeded rows deliberately do not — shipping those would let one instance's
restore rewrite another's reference data. And the resolve step throws on an
unresolvable key rather than filtering it, so the same function answers the
same question the same way twice.
Widening the builder's client type made four export tests fail on a missing
delegate, which is the sweep working: those are the call sites, named by the
compiler instead of found by reading.
The properties this provider has to keep: it resolves against the base
URL that was saved for it, the pinned OpenAI arm cannot see that URL and
still posts to api.openai.com, and the OpenAI key never travels to the
gateway. Each is asserted at the wire, not on internals.
The SSRF floor is checked through the same alt-notation classes the
Local provider is checked against, and the pinned tags are shown to keep
requiring a public host even when the operator opened every private one.
The AI settings connect-src is pinned to what it already allowed: the
gateway is called server-side, so no CSP change is needed, and a future
change that needs one will turn this red.
The chain gains a seventh entry. It builds the OpenAI client against the
base URL the user saved, with the bearer they saved for it and the model
they named, and it reads none of the OpenAI columns — the pinned
api.openai.com arm stays pinned.
Host policy is the Local provider's, unchanged: a public host always, a
private one only where the operator allowlisted it, which is what a LAN
LiteLLM or vLLM needs. Egress keeps riding safeFetch.
The JSON-mode dialect the Local client learns per endpoint moves into a
shared module and now serves both clients, so a gateway that rejects
response_format is detected once and retried without it.
The entry stays out of the default chain: it can only resolve against a
base URL somebody configured.
A Coach retrieval tool that read the window and found nothing returned
`reason: "no_data"` — the same code for two situations that have nothing in
common: the record holds nothing for that metric, and the record holds a
substantial history for it, all of it older than the window that was searched.
Nothing downstream could tell them apart, so the Coach said the honest-sounding
sentence for the wrong case, and then, having been told there was nothing there,
changed the subject. Someone with a year of imported glucose readings was told
the readings did not exist, on the same account whose glucose page was showing
them.
The window cap stays. It exists because a multi-year history does not fit a
prompt budget, and widening it would only move the same failure. What was
missing is the ability to say a different true sentence.
- `tools/availability.ts` — one grouped aggregate per miss, no rows
materialised, resolving four states: `no_data` (probe confirmed empty),
`outside_window` (rows exist, older than the searched window; carries the
count, the date range in the user's own timezone, and a bounded per-series
mean/min/max), `unavailable_in_scope` (rows exist inside the window and the
domain still produced none — a module is off), and `no_data_unconfirmed` (the
probe itself failed; absence was never established, so it is not asserted).
- Every empty read in the executor routes through it. A bare `no_data` can no
longer be returned without the record having been checked.
- The DATA INVENTORY carries the same distinction, so a domain the window
cannot reach is advertised with what it holds instead of as absent — the model
no longer skips the fetch, and a vague follow-up keeps the subject.
- Both instructions that told the model to report absence and move on now
branch on the reason code, and forbid answering about one metric by reporting
another.
- The out-of-window aggregate joins the authoritative set for the prose
verifier, so the sentence the fix exists to make sayable is not elided.
- A cross-cutting narration block that throws is now counted rather than
vanishing into a `null` that looks like honest absence.
- The medication-compliance page tells a failed read apart from an account with
no medications, instead of inviting someone to re-enter what it already holds.
Refs #648
A supply container went EXPIRED 30 days after its first use no matter what
kind of container it was. That window exists because puncturing an injection
pen exposes its contents and the product information caps how long the rest
stays usable; a blister of tablets has no such limit, every tablet sits in
its own sealed cavity, and pressing the first one out says nothing about the
rest. The state machine never read `containerType`, so a tablet pack opened
five weeks ago had its remaining stock written off.
The clock now keys off the container kind. PEN and AMPOULE carry it: both are
a single sealed reservoir that the first dose breaches. BLISTER, INHALER,
BOTTLE and OTHER do not: their units stay individually sealed, or the
arrangement is simply unknown, and a fixed 30 days would be a number nobody
entered. The printed expiry still applies to every kind, so an unknown
container is not an unbounded one.
`computeExpiresAt` takes the kind too, so a clock-less container with no
printed date now persists no `expiresAt` at all and the daily expire scan
never sees it.
The per-item PATCH gains a way back out: `markAsFirstUseAt` accepts null and
clears the opening date, which is the correction a container needs after the
intake hook auto-opened it from a back-dated dose.
Also drops `daysRemainingInUse`. It had no caller anywhere in the tree and
its docblock described a chip that does not exist.
Adds the cases that were missing everywhere except the FHIR conformance
suite: an empty string clears without taking its siblings down, OTHER
round-trips through the profile and onboarding writes, an unsupported
value is still refused and says which field it is about, the Strain
model scores an unanswered account on neither side, the dashboard bands
give OTHER the neutral fallback, the snapshot payload carries the value
instead of flattening it, and the doctor-report cover omits the row
rather than claiming a value the account never chose.
Refs #645
The profile validator has accepted MALE, FEMALE and OTHER for a long
time, but the published contract documented two, and a client written
against that contract had no way to know the third existed. The profile
PATCH is one write, so a rejected gender took every sibling field with
it - a time-format change lost to a field the person never touched.
Gender now clears on an empty string, the same contract every other
profile field documents, and an unsupported value is refused with a
message that names the field and its accepted values instead of the
validator's own prose. Onboarding validated against a narrower enum
than the profile schema and 422'd the whole submission; its form could
not record the third value at all.
The rest is the same defect in other clothes. The Strain model scored
an unanswered or OTHER account on the male Banister coefficients; it
now uses the midpoint of both published models, matching every other
sex-split formula here. The dashboard snapshot emitted null for an
account that answered OTHER, which is indistinguishable from no answer.
Three casts asserted a two-value type over a three-value column. All of
them now carry the stored value and narrow once, at the boundary of a
reference table that genuinely has no third row, through one named
helper in src/lib/profile/sex.ts.
Refs #645
A device can write the same period twice: an original envelope and a
corrected one, same start, later end, distinct external ids. Both rows
belong to the same writer, so the writer collapse keeps both, and the
per-stage totals added them. One night served a 10 h 13 min in-bed
headline next to a 20 h 17 min in-bed legend on the same screen, and
the hypnogram drew the night twice over.
Every per-stage total is now the measure of the union of that stage's
spans rather than the sum of the rows, and the same merged spans feed
the hypnogram segments and the time-asleep headline. Stages merge
independently: two stages describing one minute is a contest, and the
writer collapse is this file's mechanism for that - arbitrating again
would collapse the summary-shaped writers, which stamp every stage
total on the sleep end instant and nest by design.
stages.IN_BED is now the in-bed envelope itself, the same union
inBedMinutes reports, so the legend cannot contradict the headline and
a night whose envelope only a losing writer recorded still reports it.
The seven documented statuses are four kinds of thing, so they get four
rulings instead of one.
Taken and Skipped state a decision about a dose and each maps onto something
already recorded here — a row with a take time, and a row marked skipped. That
second mapping was checked rather than assumed: skipped is documented as a
deliberate skip and held apart from autoMissed, which is the marker for a dose
nobody ever acted on, and the compliance re-fold counts a skipped slot in its
own column and never as taken. So a deliberate skip arrives as one.
Not Interacted, Not Logged and Unspecified are absences rather than
statements. Written as taken they would invent a dose; written as skipped they
would invent a decision, because not answering a notification is not choosing
not to take something; written as pending they would put outstanding doses
from years ago in front of someone today. Snoozed describes what happened to a
reminder. Notification Not Sent is about the software. None of the five
becomes a row.
All five are refused, but each under its own name, because "the file says
nothing about this dose" and "this row is about a reminder" are different
things and a person acts on them differently. Three reasons where there was
one, each with its own sentence in six locales.
An inactive medication's history imports and the medication stays inactive.
Preserving what happened and putting a medication back on the active list are
two acts, and only the first belongs to an import.
Three things the tests said were covered and were not.
A column flipped from honoured to ignored moved both sides of its own
assertion, because the check read the verdict off the table it was checking.
The verdicts are now written out as literals, so changing one is a decision
somebody states twice.
The preview block was unreachable from an SSR-only test, so nothing would
have noticed it rendering through the outcome view — which would classify
what a preview *would* write as a success and put a tick on a run that never
ran. It moves into its own component that takes the verdict as a prop, the way
the CSV result view already does, and the preview and the archived-row report
are asserted directly.
The account-wide import narrows its in-progress check to account-wide jobs, so
an import running on one medication's page does not refuse it. Nothing pinned
that; now something does.
Also correct two comments about the earlier replay-key fault. The repeated
value in the reported file was not a dose quantity — it was copied from the
example this dialog itself displays. The field never carried identity, and the
submission was never at fault.
The dose-history import gets its own card in Settings, because the file
covers a whole regimen and the per-medication dialog on a medication's page
covers one medication.
Preview before writing. The dry run parses the file, matches every row
against the record, and answers with the whole verdict: rows read, rows that
would land, rows refused grouped by reason, and the medication names that
match nothing — verbatim, so they can be added and the file re-run. Nothing
is written until the second button.
The column rulings sit on the card before a file is chosen, one line each,
naming whether the column is used, reported, or not read and why. A column
read and dropped in silence is indistinguishable from a column honoured, and
that is how somebody comes to believe an importer looked at something it
never did.
Outcomes render through the same primitive the other three import surfaces
use, so a run that wrote nothing cannot carry a success tick. The preview
borrows the reason lines and deliberately not the outcome sentence: a preview
has written nothing, and classifying it by the counts it would produce would
put a tick on a run that never ran.
The fixture is the export a self-hoster attached, de-identified as it
arrived: 3,395 rows, sixteen medications, three and a half years, two UTC
offsets, three statuses, two units, blank cells in four columns. A
hand-built fixture would have carried one status and one offset and proved
nothing about the file that prompted the work.
The integration pass runs it through the real derivation into a real
Postgres, because the claim is about rows: 3,387 land, 8 are refused because
the file records no decision about them, and imported plus refused equals
every row read. 2,799 of the doses were taken after they were due, which is
the fact that survives only because the scheduled slot and the take are two
columns.
Structural cover so the verdicts cannot rot: every column of both shapes has
exactly one ruling, and every parse-time refusal is spelled the same as a job
skip reason — a reason that exists in only one vocabulary renders as "reason
not recorded", which is a refusal nobody can act on.
The intake importer took a hand-written list of dates and times for one
medication. A self-hoster with a ten-column export covering sixteen
medications and years of history was left translating it by hand, which is
where the scheduled time and the time a dose was actually taken get
flattened into one — the distinction the record wants most.
The export keeps them as two columns, so read the file's own shape.
`MedicationIntakeEvent` already models that pair as `scheduledFor` +
`takenAt`; an imported dose now populates both instead of anchoring itself
on the take. `Skipped` becomes a deliberate skip with no take time, which is
how every other skip path writes it. A dose whose actual amount differs from
the amount the schedule expected carries the difference as a per-dose
override; an unremarkable amount stays absent, which is what absent means
there.
Timestamps carry their own UTC offset (`+1030` and `+0930` on adjacent rows
of one file) and it is read literally: the epoch is computed from the stated
offset rather than handed to the platform's lenient date parser, and a value
without an offset is refused instead of assumed to be the server's zone.
An export covers a whole regimen, so the job is account-wide and each
payload entry names its own medication — migration 0276 widens
`medication_intake_import_jobs.medication_id` to nullable for it. The
per-medication route is unchanged and keeps naming its medication on the job
row. A medication is never created from an import file; unmatched names come
back verbatim so they can be added properly and the file re-run.
Every column gets a verdict, and `?dryRun=1` returns the whole one before
anything is written.
The intake import built its replay key from the row's optional `zaehler`
field. That reads as a per-row counter — the documented example showed one —
but nothing required it to be unique and nothing checked. A reported export
carried the dose quantity there instead: 1 tablet, on all 28 rows. Every entry
queued under the same key, one dose reached the ledger, and the other 27 came
back reported as duplicates of a dose they had nothing to do with.
The key is the instant now, and `zaehler` is out of the contract rather than
accepted-and-ignored. Nothing is lost by dropping it: the live-row unique on
`(user_id, medication_id, scheduled_for, source)` already makes an imported
dose unique per instant, so a re-import of a file first imported under the old
key still dedups.
The telling is the other half. Two different facts were counted as one number:
entries of a submission that collide with each other, and doses the ledger
already holds. They are separate reasons now, grouped with a count, and the
dialog renders them through the same classifier and the same outcome line as
the CSV and JSON import cards — so an import that wrote nothing can no longer
answer in success tone. That rule shipped for the settings import panel and
this surface was not part of it; the guard now lists every import surface by
path, so a fourth one has to be added deliberately. `skippedInvalid` is gone:
it was hardcoded to zero on every path and reported a capability the importer
never had.
Alongside it, the other half of the environment report — a scheduled job that
fails every run has to say so. `recordError()` increments one unnamed counter,
so the admin status page could show a number and not which queue produced it,
and the module's own screen showed a zero day count with nothing to
distinguish "nothing stored yet" from "every run failed". pg-boss has held the
answer the whole time: a job that exhausts its retries keeps its queue name,
its error and its timestamp. The admin status now names the failing queues
with counts and the last error, the environment overview reports its own
account's failed runs, and neither needed a change at any of the thirty
`recordError()` call sites — a visibility fix that has to be remembered per
call site is the same failure one level up.
Refs #650, #646
Mutation-checked against the production paths they cover: the escalation
verdict, the leg guard in `recordSyncSuccess`, the streak anchor the verdict
dates itself by, the status envelope threading it, and the pill's relative
timestamp.
Also give the four legacy per-provider status routes the verdict the
consolidated envelope already carries. They answered `connected: true` plus a
`state` string and nothing else, so a client reading one of them saw a live
connection over a pipe that had delivered nothing for weeks.
A sync failure the classifier bucketed as `transient` had no exit. The park
test read `kind === "persistent"` and the persistent streak anchor was only
ever stamped by a persistent failure, so a streak could run for a thousand
attempts with the persistent counter at zero, the state frozen at
`error_transient`, and no ladder it could climb. `transient` is a hypothesis
about retryability, and the classifier defaults every timeout, 429, 5xx and
unrecognised response to it precisely because the wire cannot tell a reboot
from a permanent break. That default is right for one attempt and wrong for a
thousand: an unbroken streak retried hourly for a full day has refuted it by
experiment. Record it as `persistent` from there, which feeds the park ladder
that already exists — 48 h of unbroken failure end to end before an
integration stops attempting.
The counters could not accumulate anyway. `IntegrationStatus` is keyed
(user, integration) while Withings runs four legs on four crons and WHOOP four
resources on four more, and a success cleared the error, every bucket, the
streak anchor and the state whatever leg had recorded them. The ECG tick at
:41 wiped what the sleep tick recorded at :15 — including a reauth park — so
the strike ladder was reset several times an hour and the card painted a green
"connected · 12 minutes ago" over a data class that had stopped arriving. A
success now clears only what it is entitled to clear.
Two columns carry it: `failing_since_at` dates the streak, `failing_leg` names
its owner. The migration backfills the anchor for rows already in an error
state so a connection broken for weeks escalates on its next attempt rather
than restarting its clock.
The defect is about rows that survive, so a mocked client proves nothing. The
new integration test seeds a row into every table in the schema, driven by
information_schema and pg_constraint rather than a fixture, runs the wipe and
asks the database what is left. A table added later is seeded and asserted
without anyone remembering to.
It holds all four halves: nothing in the wipe list survives, everything in the
exemption list does, everything reached only by a database cascade is gone,
and the account row comes back reset but able to sign in. A second file pins
the allergy and checkup-reminder deletes actually removing their row.
The reproductive-health note gains a Deletion section. It taught people to
reason carefully about a host being imaged and never said what pressing
delete does; now it says which of the three deletions removes the row and
which only hides it.
The wipe deleted thirteen tables against a schema that carries more than
eighty user-scoped ones. Mental-health assessments, lab results, the
menstrual record, allergies, family history, the document vault, every AI
conversation and live clinician share links all survived a confirmation
that promised to permanently delete all health data. So did
MeasurementRollup, the per-day reconstruction of the measurements the same
transaction had just removed.
The list now lives in src/lib/data-wipe/wipe-plan.ts next to its own
exemption list, and a structural guard enumerates schema.prisma and fails
when a model belongs to neither. Adding a model can no longer widen the set
of things that survive a wipe by default. The same guard covers the User
row's own columns, which had drifted the same way.
The boundary is explicit: everything the account owns goes, except what is
needed to sign in again. The confirmation and the toast say so before the
person types the confirmation rather than after.
Checkup reminders and allergies promised permanence over a soft delete with
no restore path; both now hard-delete, so the dialog is true. The lab
biomarker dialog was checked and is already accurate — it maps to the
hard-deleting /api/biomarkers/[id] route, not to the soft-deleting lab
result route.
The capability descriptor named `fhir:read` as the scope a narrow token needs
for the REST face. No code path mints a token carrying it — every mint grants a
wildcard, the medication ingest scope, or an MCP scope — so the face is
reachable by the owner's cookie session or a wildcard device token and by
nothing else. Advertising an unobtainable credential invites a client to go
looking for one. The constant stays where it belongs, as the fail-closed check
each route makes; the descriptor now reports the fact instead.
End-to-end coverage for the scope picker: the first run opens it expanded with
the fenced tier rendered and no group control over it, a group row clears the
44 px floor at 390 px, and a leaf grid opens from its chevron. All on stable
test ids rather than text a breakpoint can hide.
Two downloads under the token — the FHIR document Bundle and the clinical PDF —
behind the same unlock cookie the document route enforces, serving exactly the
link's frozen selection. That is what the removed FHIR toggle promised, in the
form a practice actually uses: open the link, unlock it, save the file. No new
credential type, no new scope, no mint path that does not exist.
The gate is the document route's, step for step: the same live check, the same
token-scoped cookie, the same blunt 404 for every miss class so a probe cannot
tell "no such link" from "revoked" from "documents-only". It differs in one
number, because generating a bundle is far more expensive than serving a stored
blob and must not share a budget with it. Each download writes its own audit
row. The scope cannot exceed the page's: both resolve the same frozen leaf list
through the same resolver, and the insurance leaf is refused at create, so the
insurance number cannot reach this path at all.
The MCP doctor-visit summary stops claiming presence it cannot support. An
account whose owner never saved a report selection resolves to the empty one on
that surface, and an empty scope produces an empty payload — which now reads as
{ present: false, reason }, the same sentinel the other reads use, instead of a
record with every section quietly missing.
Mutation-checked: removing the unlock check, the rate limit, the documents-only
guard or the audit row reddens its own case; pointing the bucket at the document
route's key reddens the bucket assertion; making presence unconditional reddens
the absence case.
The saved profile's shape moves out of the module that reads the row. The panel
is a client component and parses the blob from the /me payload; importing the
reader dragged the database client into the browser bundle, which typecheck and
the unit suite both pass and only `next build` catches.
Five layers, because the defect had five places to hide.
The catalogue guard checks what the compiler cannot state: every leaf resolves
a label a human can read, every group resolves one, the fenced tier stays last,
and the shipped template intersects the fence at nothing.
The selection guard pins the three minting functions against each other. A
stored blob this build cannot read resolves to the empty selection, never to a
default set — that is what makes the revoked legacy links revocable rather than
silently re-scoped. A request naming an id the server does not know is refused
by name rather than dropped, because dropping it would narrow a scope the
caller did express.
The egress guard freezes the set of aggregator callers with the source of each
one's selection written down. The required brand-typed parameter already stops
a new path compiling without an answer; this stops one being added without a
human writing the answer down, which is the moment a reviewer asks the
question.
The behavioural sweep aggregates every leaf in and out against a fixture that
carries a row for each, and asserts the payload differs. It is parametrised
over the catalogue, so a leaf added later is covered the day it is added. Its
positive control asserts the all-on payload is genuinely populated first, so a
"no difference" result means the gate is inert and not that the account is
empty. Beside it: an unmapped measurement type is excluded rather than passed
through, no table behind an unchosen leaf is queried at all, and an empty
selection produces an empty record.
The artefact layer runs the real route and reads what comes out — the FHIR
bundle, the PDF text and the zip's contents — with a positive control beside
every exclusion.
Mutation-checked: making the gate admit everything reddens the sweep for every
leaf; passing an unmapped type through reddens the fail-closed case; dropping
the mood query's condition reddens the zero-read case; returning the BMI
unconditionally reddens the sweep naming BODY_MASS_INDEX; adding a fenced leaf
to the template reddens the purity guard; removing the panel's seeding block
reddens the first-run and repeat-run cases; dropping the insurance refusal
reddens the share-link case; adding a caller outside the frozen list reddens
the egress guard naming the file.
The panel suite grew past the practice name it was written for and is renamed
for what it now covers: the three states, the fenced tier having no group
control, and the scope line naming its sensitive inclusions.
Integration coverage moves to the leaf model, including the case this release
exists for: an account with data in every domain and a caller that named
nothing gets an empty record.
The OpenAPI contract catches up with the routes — the required selection, the
refused keys, the share summary's new fields, the moved `Patient/$everything`,
the Coverage search and the five typed reads.
The export panel rendered twenty flat switches behind a collapsed disclosure,
and the share-link form rendered none at all — it posted whatever the create
schema defaulted to. Both now mount the same picker: twelve named groups, a
count on each, the leaf grid one chevron away, and a fenced tier below a
separator.
The fence is mechanical, not a label. The sensitive tier has no group
checkbox, so no single control anywhere in the picker can turn on more than
one of mood, cycle, family history, PHQ-9, GAD-7, WHO-5 or SCI at a time.
There is no select-all. The shipped template contains none of them. And the
scope line under the button restates every sensitive inclusion by name rather
than folding it into a count, because a number cannot be checked at a glance
and "incl. Mood, PHQ-9" can.
First run opens expanded with the named standard template applied and the
fenced tier visibly empty, so the user presses Generate having seen twelve
named groups. Every later run opens collapsed carrying their own last
selection, which makes the waiting-room path two interactions.
Only leaves are ever stored. A group's checkbox is derived from its leaves, so
the two cannot disagree, and switching a group off and back on inside one
session restores the pattern instead of flooding it.
The cycle export card is deleted. It posted empty groups under a docblock
claiming every other section was off, and empty groups resolved to the
defaults — so a "cycle only" download carried weight, blood pressure, pulse,
oxygen saturation, body fat, body composition, the medication list, adherence,
labs, allergies and family history. Cycle is a fenced leaf in the one picker
now, reachable for the PDF as well as for FHIR, which is more than the card
offered.
The panel gains a 30-day preset and a custom window, and its error line says
what went wrong instead of interpolating a status code.
The Checkbox primitive learns the indeterminate state it already had the Radix
support for. A partly-selected group drawn as unchecked would say "none of
this is included", which on this surface is a false statement about what
leaves the instance.
The report resolved an absent key to "included". A caller that sent no
sections object, or an empty group inside one, received the full record at
server-chosen defaults: roughly fifty metrics plus the medication list, labs,
allergies and family history. The web panel sent every key explicitly so it
looked fine from the browser, but the share link, the FHIR REST face, the MCP
doctor-visit resource and the cycle-only export card all went through paths
where absence meant yes. No arrangement of booleans fixes a default that means
yes, so the shape goes.
A selection is now an inclusion list of leaf ids. A leaf is the smallest thing
that can be released or withheld: every measurement type, and thirteen
structured sections — identity, insurer, the glucose panel, labs, the drug
list, the administration ledger, adherence, the GLP-1 block, allergies,
illness episodes, family history, mood, cycle. Membership is inclusion,
absence is exclusion, and there is no defaults constant anywhere to drift.
Three locks keep a metric added later off a report chosen earlier. A stored
selection is a list of what was chosen, so a leaf that did not exist then is
not in it. The catalogue is keyed over the measurement enum, so adding a
member without deciding its group fails typecheck in the same commit. And the
aggregator's filter inverts: a type the catalogue does not know is excluded and
annotated, where it used to be passed through.
The aggregator's third parameter is now required and brand-typed, which turned
the three surfaces that had no scope at all into compile errors. Each one had
to name a source, and each now replays the owner's saved selection — the same
object reviewed in Settings. An account that never saved one gets nothing
there rather than a guess.
Identity and insurance become selectable, and a share link refuses the
insurance leaf outright. The share view never decrypted the number; that is
structural now instead of incidental. The KVNR is not even read unless the
leaf was chosen.
Two surfaces gain a record they always implied. A share link serves its frozen
selection as a FHIR bundle and as the PDF, behind the same unlock cookie the
document route uses, with its own rate bucket, its own audit row and the same
blunt 404 for every miss. That is what the removed FHIR toggle promised, in
the form a practice actually uses.
The AI summary leaves the report. Its text came from the cached briefing with
no relation to the selection, so its scope could not be proven, and prose whose
scope cannot be proven has no place on a document whose whole point is a proven
scope.
The PDF table stops being a nine-type whitelist. It prints every selected leaf
that has data, sub-headed by group, in the same order the panel shows — so
selecting resting heart rate no longer means seeing it in the bundle and not in
the PDF. The clinician view is grouped the same way and reads real labels
instead of "Phq9 score".
Migration 0273 adds the saved-selection column, drops the orphaned prefs column
and the two retired share-link scope columns, and revokes every live record
share link minted before this model. Their frozen scope was "everything except
mood and cycle", which is a scope nobody chose; narrowing it would still be a
scope nobody chose. Documents-only shares are untouched. The sharing list shows
each closed link in a pick-again state with its label, window and expiry kept.
The retired allowFhirApi and resourceTypes stay on the create and list
responses as the constant false and empty list. The request refuses them. They
come off the response once the native client confirms it does not decode them.
Six files are split at seams this change already touched: the aggregator into
its gate, its dense-bucket query, its series, its glucose panel, its medication
ledger and its clinical records; the export route's three emitters into their
own module; the clinician view into its sections, its document list and its
downloads.
Two layers, because the defect had two halves and each needs its own kind of
proof.
The structural guard walks the panel's control shape, folds every control
through the wire schema and the resolver the route uses, and fails when
flipping one changes nothing in the resolved selection. It also checks the
panel renders a row for every control it declares, and that every resolved
flag is read downstream, either by gating measurement types or by name in the
aggregator. That is the link nobody had written: the dead switches were dead
for several releases and no test connected "the panel renders this" to "the
export honours this".
The behavioural half runs the real export route and reads what comes out. The
previously-dead measurement switches are asserted against the FHIR bundle and
the PDF table, with a positive control beside each exclusion so nothing passes
on an empty fixture. The screening totals are asserted absent for a caller
that names other sections and for a caller that sends no sections at all, then
present when asked for by name. Allergies and family history are asserted
absent from the bundle and never read from the database, and the package case
opens the zip and checks the bundle inside it agrees with the PDF beside it.
Mutation-checked: reverting the allergy gate, the medication-list gate, the
screener entries or the measurement entries turns the matching cases red and
leaves the rest green; removing a control's fold entry or its aggregator entry
turns the guard red with the control named.
The remaining changes update fixtures the new shapes touch: prefs objects now
resolve the added flags from the defaults, and the share-link fixtures drop
the retired FHIR scope, with a case pinning that the create route now refuses
those keys instead of ignoring them.
The export panel rendered twenty data switches and eight of them changed
nothing. The grouped selection folded down to twelve flat flags and dropped
oxygen saturation, body fat, body composition, resting heart rate, HRV, VO2
max, steps and distance on the way, so a user who switched any of them off
still exported the readings in the PDF, in the FHIR bundle, in the package,
through a clinician share link and over MCP. Each one now resolves to a flag
the aggregator reads, and the rows are excluded at the query rather than
fetched and dropped.
Three more controls were untruthful in their own way:
- The medications switch documented itself as excluding all medication data
and excluded the adherence figures only. The drug list and the per-dose
administration ledger rode along regardless. Both follow the switch now;
the rows are still read, because compliance and the GLP-1 block are computed
from them, and they no longer leave the aggregator.
- Allergies and family history were gated for the PDF and fetched
unconditionally for the FHIR bundle, so a package could carry a compliant
PDF and a violating bundle in the same zip. The reads are gated, and a
deselected section is not read at all.
- The PHQ-9, GAD-7, WHO-5 and SCI screening totals had no per-report control.
They rode the mental-health module alone, which has been default-on since
v1.29.1, so depression and anxiety screeners reached FHIR bundles, share
links and the MCP doctor-visit resource on accounts that never chose to send
them. They get their own section key, defaulting off, with the module gate
kept as the second lock, and the stale privacy-by-default comment that
argued otherwise is corrected.
The share link's FHIR promise is removed rather than implemented. The create
form offered a toggle and a resource-type picker, the values were persisted
and badged on the finished link, and the API description called the toggle a
REST reachability switch, while no route has ever answered a share token with
FHIR or any other machine-readable format. Serving one is a feature with real
security surface and does not belong in a correctness fix. The toggle, the
picker, the badge and both claims are gone; the create schema rejects the two
keys instead of accepting and ignoring them; the columns stay, unread, so no
data is destroyed to undo a promise.
Two files are split along seams this change already touched. The
measurement-type gating maps and the filter that reads them leave the
aggregator for their own module, so the query gate and the output gate cannot
disagree; the export panel's control shape and the selection it builds leave
the component, so the selection contract can be extended without the
rendering. Three accepted-and-discarded wire keys (activity energy, GLP-1,
side effects) are dropped: nothing rendered them and nothing read them.
Same shape as the CSV and JSON cards: reaching the done state rendered the
success tick whether or not a single row was upserted. The archive's count
picks the tone now, and an archive that wrote nothing says so.
The clinical-record count stays out of that decision. Skipping
electrocardiograms and lab documents is a documented, deliberate exclusion,
not a refused row, so it must not read as a warning.
Refs #640
`medication_intake_events.idempotency_key` carried a GLOBAL unique from
0001_init. The value is client-supplied, so two people running the same
client can mint the same key — and on a global unique the second one is
simply refused by the constraint. Their dose is not written and nothing
tells them so. The bulk drain made it worse: its replay probe read the
key with no user scope, resolved the first user's row, and reported the
second user's entry as a duplicate carrying a stranger's row id.
Migration 0273 replaces the global unique with `(user_id,
idempotency_key)`, the grain every other client-supplied identity on the
table already uses. Both unscoped reads in the bulk drain now key on the
composite; the other four reads were already narrowed by user.
On existing data this is a relaxation, so nothing needs reconciling: the
old constraint is strictly stronger than the new one, and no pair of rows
can violate an index the previous one already forbade. The migration
still carries a reconciliation step for a database whose global index was
dropped by hand at some point. It never deletes or rewrites a dose — it
clears the dedup HINT on the later row of a colliding pair and keeps
every intake event, timestamp, attribution and inventory stamp intact.
The new index is created before the old one is dropped, so a failure
aborts with the old protection still in place.
A structural guard freezes the read side: no `medicationIntakeEvent`
query may filter on the key without narrowing by `userId`.
The dedup key on the medication intake surfaces is not only `externalId`.
`MedicationIntakeEvent.idempotency_key` is a `@unique` column persisted
with the dose row forever, with no TTL and no sweep, matched by plain
equality on the per-medication POST, the bulk drain and the external
ingest bridge. That makes it an identity, not a replay token, and it
carries the same failure mode: a key that rotates per client launch never
matches its own earlier post, so every retry logs the dose again. The
blank case is sharper still — the column is unique table-wide, so an
empty key resolves to whichever unrelated row stored it first. Refuse
both shapes at the schema on the single-entry paths and per entry on the
bulk drain.
The MCP write path hashes a host-supplied key into the `externalId` half
of its dedup key, so the shape is laundered before anything downstream
could see it and the check has to run on the input. That closes a live
one: every tool handler falls back to `""` when the host omits the
argument, and `""` digests to a constant, so each keyless write after the
first reported `already_logged` and was silently dropped.
The HTTP `Idempotency-Key` header stays out, and now says why in the
guard: `IdempotencyKey.expiresAt` bounds it and the cleanup job sweeps
it, so it is a windowed replay token and rotation is its design.
Extend the structural guard with a provenance rule for identities that
never pass a Zod request schema — a spreadsheet column, an MCP tool
argument. Inside the import and MCP trees, a module handling an identity
must apply the floor itself or import a module that does. That is a real
chain rather than a list of known offenders: a new importer that mints an
`externalId` from file input and imports nothing checked fails it, with
no allowlist to escape into.
Harden the structural guard so it reads the file body with its imports
stripped: grepping the raw source cannot tell a file that APPLIES the
check from one that merely imports it, so deleting the call while
leaving the import slipped straight through.
Add the partial-success case on a second batch envelope — the mood bulk
ingest echoes the offending entry back with its index, status and
reason while the good rows still upsert.
An external id is half of every ingest dedup key — (userId, source,
externalId), (userId, externalSource, externalId), (userId, type,
source, externalId). Re-posting the same triple is idempotent and
returns the existing row, which holds only while the id is stable
across client launches. A client that serialised an opaque platform
object with its default object description sent a per-allocation
memory address instead, so no sweep ever matched its own earlier row
and each one minted a fresh record: a live instance grew 23 phantom
medications in a day, none of which could collect a dose, because the
dose side resolved through the same rotating string.
Add one shared classifier for identifiers that provably cannot be an
identity — an angle-bracketed object description carrying a hex
pointer, a bare 0x address, and a blank value — and wire it at every
surface that accepts a client-supplied externalId.
Single-entry creates refuse through the schema, so the client gets the
standard 422 multi-issue envelope with a message naming the shape it
sent and what to send instead. Batch and bulk surfaces classify per
entry and report the offending row as skipped with reason
unstable_external_id, leaving the rest of the payload to land: one bad
row must not stop a sync. Every refusal carries pinned wide-event meta
(count, shape, surface) and never the id itself.
A structural guard freezes both routes into the floor: a request-side
externalId declaration either applies the field check or carries a
marker naming the file that checks it per entry, and the guard verifies
that file really does. The backup-restore payload is the one exemption,
with its reason recorded — it replays ids the server itself wrote.
Marc-André Bombeck