The server answers before pg-boss is bound, and a producer rebinds in
the background after losing its connection. A request in either window
read the boss as null and skipped its enqueue: OAuth callbacks lost the
first sync and the history backfill, measurement and mood writes lost
their rollup recompute, WHOOP webhook deliveries were dropped.
whenBossReady() waits for the boss while a start is under way (boot or
reconnect), bounded at 60 s and logged when it gives up, and answers
null at once when nothing is coming. enqueueWhenBossReady() sends at
once through a bound boss and otherwise defers the send to the
background, so the request is not held for the boot.
A guardian finishing a connect for a managed profile could attach their
own provider account to the profile. Every OAuth callback (Withings,
WHOOP, Fitbit, Google Health, Strava, Polar, Oura) now refuses a
provider account another record already holds with reason
already_linked, shown as its own message on the integrations page.
WHOOP's owner_conflict tag becomes already_linked as well.
Oura keeps the account id of a grant (personal_info, migration 0441) so
the check has something to compare; existing connections fill it at
their next connect.
A disconnect leaves Withings webhook subscriptions and the Strava app
authorisation in place while another record holds the same account,
and the Withings webhook routes an account held twice to the record
that linked it first instead of whichever row a lookup returned.
The provider app copied from a guardian onto a managed profile is now
marked (migration 0442) and removed again on disconnect or when that
guardian no longer holds a live MANAGE grant: revoke, renounce,
removal, handover, account deletion and data wipe. Each removal is
audited as integration.client_app.removed.
Migration 0434 turns the route opt-in on for every account that already
holds a stored workout track, so its tracks keep arriving after the
upgrade; only accounts without one start off.
Workouts stored before this release with a track but no elevation get
their metres climbed written into Workout.elevationM by a one-time
background pass. It runs detached at worker boot, reads one track at a
time with a pause between batches of 100, and keeps its position in
app_settings, so a restart resumes and a finished pass ends at once.
The "starting" health reason is bounded: after five minutes the probe
says plain degraded and the process logs one line, and the time the
background role took to come up is logged either way. The compose
healthcheck's ten-minute start period already keeps those probes from
counting; its comment now says so.
POST /api/measurements/batch ran one interactive reconciler transaction
per fresh sample: a savepoint, three advisory locks, two candidate reads
and the insert, about ten round trips. A 500-entry upload of new samples
was 500 of those, the 2 to 15 second outliers. Fresh samples now land
through INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING under the same per-account
advisory lock. Both measurement identities are full unique indexes, so
the statement inserts exactly what the reconciler would have inserted,
and every skipped row still goes through the reconciler for its own
verdict. Only rows whose external and natural keys each occur once in
the batch are buffered, and the buffer is flushed before any other row
is reconciled, so the order of effects stays the sequential one. The
contract and every per-entry status are unchanged; a golden test runs
each batch through both paths against the same table.
/api/health took seconds after a start because register() awaited the
whole pg-boss worker start (queues, schedules, boot discovery) before
the server took a request. The worker, or a web process's producer, now
starts in the background after the blocking boot checks; the probe
answers at once with reason "starting" until it is up, and gives the
database two seconds before calling it not answering.
Six Apple Health signals leave the deferred list and ride
POST /api/measurements/batch and the export.zip import end to end:
EXERCISE_MINUTES, STAND_MINUTES and STAND_HOURS (the exercise and stand
rings), MINDFUL_MINUTES, STATE_OF_MIND_VALENCE (iOS 18 State of Mind,
-1..1) and AFIB_BURDEN (AFib History, percent of the week). The ring
types and mindful minutes are cumulative, so the daily rollup is their
sum; AFib burden is scaled strictly from Apple's fraction and a value
above 1 is refused rather than guessed at. The archive import takes
mindful minutes from the session's dates and skips idle stand hours.
Every registry carries them: units, ranges, labels in all locales,
categories, chart tokens, report catalogue (mindful minutes and the
valence fenced as sensitive), signal registry with FHIR codings, and
MCP exposure for the three ring types only.
Workout GPS tracks are now an opt-in, off by default
(PATCH /api/auth/me/workout-routes, a switch on Data & Privacy). While
it is off, the workout batch route and the export import keep every
workout and drop its track with the same per-entry status. With it on,
the import reads the referenced GPX files from the archive one bounded
member at a time, thins each to the point cap and stores it sealed.
The climb a track carries is written to Workout.elevationM at write
time, so the workout insight no longer opens the track, and the AI
egress guard now freezes the set of files that read route geometry.
Every Oura collection, workouts and heart rate included, is now read
back to the start of the account's history by a backfill that runs
through the shared integration lane in five-minute slices. Each
collection walks from the day the backfill began toward the past one
window at a time (ninety days, thirty for sleep, seven for heart rate)
and the progress note on the user row records after every window where
it got to, so a slice cut short by its budget, the lane or a rate limit
resumes there. A 429 ends the slice and the next one waits for the
Retry-After Oura named. Activity and sleep are walked first to learn
where history starts; the rest stop a week before it.
Heart rate streams a page at a time and keeps only the days it touched,
so memory stays flat however long the history is. A collection the
grant does not cover is a scope note, not a failure; the first slice of
the next chain asks again, and a connect clears the completion stamp so
a newly granted scope is read without walking anything twice.
The two columns arrive empty, so every existing connection is offered
the backfill at the next boot without reconnecting. Before anything
else the backfill retires the WALKING_RUNNING_DISTANCE rows earlier
syncs wrote from the equivalent walking distance and refolds their days;
an account that kept such rows after disconnecting is offered too.
A guardian acting on a managed profile can now connect and disconnect its
Withings, WHOOP, Oura, Polar, Strava and Google Health from the profile's
integration cards, and each card says whose record it connects for. The
connect starts with a fenced fetch that mints a state naming the profile;
the provider's callback lands tokens and data there only after checking
that the browser belongs to a guardian with a live MANAGE grant on it.
Without a provider app of its own, the profile borrows the guardian's,
with an audit row. Withings and Google Health callbacks read the session
directly, since a provider redirect cannot carry the record-session header.
Minting the state, building the consent URL and dropping a grant each had a
copy per provider route. The routes keep their auth, rate limits and
redirects and hand the rest to one implementation, which the managed-profile
routes reuse.
The getting-started requirements now say a host needs 3 GB of RAM, 4 GB
recommended, and drop the advice to lower APP_MEMORY_LIMIT to 1g on a
2 GB host. The compose and .env example comments say the same.
At boot the app reads its cgroup memory limit (v2, then v1) and logs one
line when it is below MEMORY_FLOOR_MB. The support report adds the
container limit and a note below the floor, and Admin > System status
shows "below the supported floor" next to the existing low-heap flag.
The app keeps running either way.
Every write has gone to insights_cached_text_encrypted since 0411, and
the boot-time free-text backfill sealed the rows written before it.
Migration 0430 drops insights_cached_text and the backfill index that
served it. A host that skipped the intervening releases loses only a
cache of model output; the next warm writes a fresh, sealed payload.
The cipher module now reads and writes the sealed column only, the
backfill job loses its insights step, and consent withdrawal, the wipe
plan, the backup plan and the session projection follow the schema.
Backups never carried the column, and restore ignores unknown account
settings; a round-trip test now proves an old backup naming the field
still restores cleanly. The access guard pins exact counts for where
the sealed name may appear. Fixtures, the demo seed and the demo
migration script seed the sealed column instead of plaintext.
The status route refreshed an expiring token on its own, without the lock
the sync takes, so a status read and a sync could spend the same one-time
refresh token and park a healthy connection at reconnect. Both now go
through the kit.
Add per-user columns for the labs, illness and checkups list presentation
and for preview-feature opt-ins, each with a GET plus a preserve-when-absent
write under /api/settings. The list hook now reads and writes the server
value and carries a browser-stored order up once when the server holds
none, so an existing arrangement follows the person to every device instead
of resetting.
Without from, GET /api/day/notable started at the last completed visit
of any kind, while the web passes the next planned visit's
preparation.from, so a client that omits from read a different list for
the same appointment. Without from the window now starts at that
preparation day (anchor nextVisit, documented in OpenAPI); with nothing
booked it keeps the last completed visit or the 90-day fallback.
One failing per-night stage read threw out of the loop, so the nights
already read and the summary vitals were never written. A failed read
now leaves the others to be written, books the leg failed afterwards
and marks the night to be read first next run. A night that answers
without a stage three times is no longer read on every run; a full sync
still reads it. The per-night record lives on the connection (migration
0421) and is reset on reconnect.
Removing a provider key, like setting one, left no audit row, unlike
every other credential change. Each key slot a PATCH touches now writes
user.ai-provider.key.set or .remove with the slot and never the value.
After the Web API turndown every account still saw a Fitbit card that
can no longer connect. The status entry now publishes
retirement.offered: false once the API is gone for an account with no
Fitbit connection, no Fitbit app of its own and no Fitbit data, and the
connections panel leaves the card out. Accounts that had Fitbit keep it
with the retirement notice.
Fitbit and Google Health HRV is filed as RMSSD since migration 0420, so
an account whose only HRV comes from them lost it wherever a display
surface read SDNN alone. The dashboard HRV tile keeps its RMSSD fallback
with Recovery off while the account has no SDNN, and its toggle stays
offered for either estimator. A briefing HRV signal counts as measured
today when either series has a reading. The doctor report already files
RMSSD as its own ungated leaf; a guard now holds that. Readiness, HRV
balance and stress stay on SDNN; a test pins that an RMSSD-only account
renormalises over the other components.
A source a ladder does not name ranks 90, below every source it does.
Five had no place anywhere: a weight typed as a reply to a Telegram
reminder lost its day to a WHOOP strap's estimate, one an assistant
logged over MCP lost to a Fitbit estimate, and a Health Connect day
lost to a hand-typed count.
Health Connect now sits right after Apple Health on the ladders for
what it imports; EXTERNAL, MCP and TELEGRAM sit right after MANUAL, in
the alphabetical order they already broke ties in, so MANUAL still
outranks the person's own bridge. Relative to each other the sources
the ladders already named keep their order, and saved ladders gain
the new entries at their end as before.
Google turns the legacy Fitbit Web API off on 30 October 2026 (support
ended on 30 September). From that day the hourly poll, the backfill,
the sleep repair and the token refresh make no call, the connect, sync
and test routes refuse with `provider_retired`, and the connection
reads as not connected to the health read and the watchdog, so the
shutdown pages nobody and asks nobody to reconnect. The connection row
and everything it imported stay.
The status envelope publishes `retirement` on the Fitbit entry (the
day, whether it has come, the successor), and the Fitbit card shows
when the connection stops, how to move to Google Health (same devices,
one more consent, tokens cannot be carried over) and that the data
stays; sync and connect grey out after the day. Both integrations can
run side by side meanwhile: every type Fitbit writes is laddered with
Fitbit just above Google Health, so a day both deliver counts once.
The test setups pin the turndown off, so the Fitbit suites do not turn
red on the day; the turndown's own tests flip it.
The setup flow asks for the name the greeting and the reports use, and
the profile route has always accepted it, but no settings surface offered
the field and /api/auth/me did not publish it. A name chosen on the
first day stayed for good.
The account payload now carries `displayName`, the profile card shows the
field beside the username and saves it with the rest of the profile, and
an emptied field clears the name.
The visit preparation and the doctor report offered for an appointment
started at the last visit of any kind. An internist one week and a
dermatologist the next gave the dermatologist a one-week window of
nothing it is about.
The list read now publishes `preparation` on every booked upcoming
visit: the first day of the window, the rule that chose it and the
earlier visit it is the day of. First match wins over the visits that
took place before it: the same practitioner, else a practitioner of
the same specialty (free text, compared without case or spacing), else
the same kind for routine, preventive and therapy visits, else the last
90 days. One query of past visits per page, independent of the list's
own filters. Null on every other row; absent on the detail and on
write responses.
The workouts leg recorded its failures under its own leg but left the
success to the vitals leg. A leg-scoped success clears only its own
leg, so one workouts failure stayed on the row for good and kept the
connection in error however healthy the exercises read became. Each
leg now records its own success.
AccessLink documents its 403 as missing consent for that data. A 403
on one collection while a sibling succeeded with the same token was
classified reauth_required and put a working connection behind a
reconnect prompt no reconnect clears. Like Oura's scope refusals, such
a collection (or the exercises read, once the vitals leg proved the
token) is now noted on the wide event and not counted as a failure. A
403 on every collection, or any 401, stays one.
The /notifications matrix read the constant default table, where the
mood reminder is off, while delivery derives it from the reminder card.
An account receiving the reminder saw every one of its channel switches
off.
The no-row default now lives in one resolver that delivery and the
preferences read both use. GET /api/notifications/preferences publishes
it as `eventDefaults`, the matrix renders a switch without a stored row
from that map, and the reminder card refreshes the matrix when it flips.
The v2 recovery webhook carries the id of the associated sleep, and a
recovery's rows are keyed off that same sleep id. The delete branch
matched on the `<id>:` prefix, so a `recovery.deleted` event also
soft-deleted every sleep row of that night, and a `sleep.deleted`
event took the recovery with it. Recovery now names its exact ids
(pinned against the mapper's field tags); sleep keeps the prefix minus
those ids.
The targeted refresh for `recovery.updated` passed the same sleep UUID
into `/v2/cycle/{cycleId}/recovery`, which answered 404 and booked a
sync failure on every recovery webhook. It now reads the sleep for its
`cycle_id` first.
A scan sent the whole report to one call under an 8000-token ceiling and
validated the reply against a 100-row envelope. A long multi-panel report
lost everything either way: the reply stopped mid-row and failed to parse,
which the person saw as "try a clearer photo", or it held more than 100
rows and the schema refused all of them. One malformed row refused the lot
as well. Reasoning models made it worse, because the call sent no
reasoning setting and OpenAI, Codex and Claude's 5 generation reason by
default against the same output allowance.
A PDF of more than one page is now rendered and read a page per call on
every provider (up to 20 pages), as many reads as the run's deadline
allows, and the pages are merged in order with a reading printed twice
listed once. A photo, a one-page PDF on a provider that reads PDFs, and
OCR'd text up to 4000 characters stay one read; longer text is split at
line boundaries. Each read carries an explicit reasoning off, so a model
that can stop reasoning does and one that cannot gets its minimum budget
on top of the answer's. A reply cut at the output limit is detected from
the finish reason (Codex's incomplete stream included), keeps the rows
that closed before the cut and is named in the result instead of retried;
when no read produced a row the run fails as labs.ocr.outputLimit. A
provider failure after the first page keeps the pages already read.
Rows are validated one by one, the row cap is 400 for the scan and the
commit, and a report past it keeps its first 400 and says how many it
had. The run settles what the provider reported it spent rather than the
fixed reservation, so a page-by-page read still counts against the day's
budget in full.
The signed-state callbacks (Oura, Polar, Strava) claimed the state before
the session, code and issuer checks. A denied consent comes back without a
code, so it spent the claim on a `nocode` error page, and allowing on the
same authorize URL afterwards never exchanged the valid code: the browser
was sent to the stored error page instead. Every check that refuses a
callback without touching the code now runs first; the claim still sits
strictly before the exchange.
Expired claims were swept only when a callback completed, so a quiet
instance kept its last rows. The daily OAuth-state cleanup at 03:20 now
sweeps them as well.
Resilience sits behind Oura's `stress` scope, not `heart_health`, so a
connection that granted every scope HealthLog asked for still answered 401
on `daily_resilience`. `src/lib/oura/scope.ts` now maps every collection the
sync reads to the scope the live API enforces and is the one source for the
authorize request, the per-collection permission detection, the reconnect
hint and the settings card. The request asks for `stress` as well.
Oura names a missing scope in its 401 body ("Token is not authorized access
stress scope."), while a dead token reads differently. A collection refusal
now carries that scope: it spends no token refresh, never counts toward the
reconnect threshold and marks only the collections it names. A 403 (a lapsed
membership) is a persistent failure rather than a reconnect. The callback
also records what the token response says was granted, so an unticked
permission shows on the card before the first sync.
A browser can deliver an OAuth callback twice with the same code. Both
requests exchanged it, and Oura answers a reused code by revoking the token
the first exchange issued. Every connect callback (Oura, Polar, Strava,
WHOOP, Withings, Fitbit, Google Health) now claims its state in
`oauth_callback_claims` before the exchange: one request exchanges, the
duplicate waits for it and redirects to the same page without touching any
token. The ledger flows claim inside the transaction that consumes their
state row. A failed exchange settles with its error page, and a new connect
mints a new state.
Oura token refreshes are serialised per user with an advisory lock, so
overlapping syncs no longer spend the same single-use refresh token, and the
write stays conditional so a reconnect's new grant is never overwritten by a
refresh of the old one.
The proof gates now read whether an account has a password from its own
row rather than from the per-request user, so the suites that drive
them mock that read instead of carrying the hash on the session user.
The provider rows, the unified connection health and the per-metric
freshness were awaited one after another although none depends on the
others, so a cold first visit to the settings card paid their latencies
end to end. They now run in one round.
The summary's all-time aggregate grouped every live reading of the
account by type: one index entry per reading, millions on an account
with a watch, two to four seconds whenever they were not in memory and
the slowest read of the request on every cache miss. The count now sums
the DAY buckets that already hold a per-day count of every source,
counts live only the readings before the fold window and any type not
folded yet, and takes lastSeenAt from the newest reading the
latest-reading read already returns. Parity with the live count is
pinned against a real Postgres.
Every provider sync and the shared mutation tail refolded its touched
(type, day) buckets one at a time: an aggregate, a transaction and three
queue sends per day. They now hand the whole set to
recomputeBucketsForKeys, which leaves the DAY tier exactly as the per-key
hook did (pinned by a parity test against it) at the cost of one
aggregate per chunk of keys and one coarse job per run of buckets.
The session lookup and the Bearer resolver loaded the whole users row on
every authenticated request, including the profile picture bytes, the
cached briefing text and every stored integration credential. Both now
select SESSION_USER_SELECT, a named allowlist of the small columns the
request path reads, and so does the owner load for a switched record.
The few routes that need a credential or a large column read it
themselves at the moment of use: the factor verifiers load the password
hash and TOTP secret, the profile response loads the insurance number,
and the snapshot read loads the cached briefing text. A structural guard
holds the lookups to the projection and keeps every Bytes and
secret-shaped column out of it.
A dead refresh token was asked again on every hop of every run: the
proactive refresh failed and was swallowed, the request 401'd, the on-401
refresh failed again, and the nightly warm repeated that for the briefing
and every card. A refusal that proves the grant dead now flips the
connection to the existing expired state (compare-and-set on the refused
token, one signal per transition), so the chain, the presence probe and
the AI capabilities stop counting it. A new device-code sign-in clears the
refused credential's ledger rows so the fresh one resumes in place.
A reading entered here goes to Apple Health as well, and the quiet
verdict already counted it, but the row still showed the newest reading
that arrived from the phone, so a type entered two minutes ago read one
day old. The server now resolves lastSeenAt to the newer of the two for
the types the app writes back, and the row and the verdict agree.
Refs #1247
The shared write bucket threw on any SQL error, so a lock on rate_limits
answered every authenticated write with 500. It is a loop cutter, not an
access check: when the bucket cannot be read the write now goes ahead with
a warn signal. The login and other auth-surface limits call the limiter
directly and still fail closed. requireAuth now passes readOverPost to the
meter, the draft-only document assist declares it, and the three chat
routes, which meter their turns with buckets of their own, declare that
instead of being counted twice.
The web record and the doctor report named the practitioner of a live
visit after the address-book entry was deleted; the MCP read, the search
and the appointment reminder did not. All of them now name it, the entry
stays out of the address book and the pickers, and a portable backup
carries it as a tombstone instead of dropping the visit's reference.
/api/feature-flags answered Deprecation: true and nothing else: a client
learned the route was going, never when, and the log could not tell which
builds still called it. deprecated() (src/lib/http/deprecation.ts) applies
one reviewed notice per route: Deprecation as an RFC 9745 date, Sunset as
an RFC 8594 HTTP-date, the successor Link, and a wide-event annotation
with the client build read from the User-Agent.
feature-flags was deprecated on 2026-09-24 (v1.39.0); its sunset is
2027-03-31. The headers are declared on the operation, and a test holds
every notice to a deprecated operation that answers through the helper.
169 of 364 mutating handlers met no rate limit, every PATCH and DELETE on
an [id] among them. The shared per-account write bucket (300 a minute,
keyed on the acting account) was called by hand in a dozen creates; it is
now charged by the identity resolvers for any POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE,
once per request, so a route is metered by resolving its caller.
The bulk ingest routes the native client syncs through in bursts
(measurements, workouts, intake, mood and cycle bulk, nutrients, the ECG
sweep) declare writeBucket: "own" and keep their dedicated ceilings, so a
large HealthKit backfill cannot lock the person out of logging a dose. A
read-over-POST stays free.
write-rate-limit-guard fails on any mutating route that neither resolves
its caller through a metering resolver nor calls a limiter, unless it is
on a short reasoned exception list; an opt-out must be on its own reviewed
list and call its own limiter.
listPage (src/lib/http/list-query.ts) reads one row past the limit and
cuts it back, on top of the existing list-cap signal rather than beside
it. Every capped list now gets its page there, and every read passed to
it orders by something ending in the row id, so rows that share a sort
value cannot repeat or vanish at a page boundary.
- practitioners, vaccinations and encounters were cut at their take
with no signal; they now answer meta.truncated and accept offset, and
their web readers walk the pages instead of stopping at the first
- symptoms/events reported hasMore on a page that was exactly full; it
is now true only when a row past the page exists
- the document list's hand-rolled limit + 1 goes through the helper
- security-activity answers an out-of-range limit with the 422 its
published schema already promised instead of clamping it
list-page-guard binds every apiListSuccess route to listPage, forbids
hand-cut lists and length-derived hasMore, and requires the id
tiebreaker in every listPage read.
A response parsed against its own registered schema disagreed in thirteen
operations. Where the handler was right, the schema now says so; where the
handler had drifted from its siblings, it follows them.
Schema:
- measurements list and detail declare aggregationProvenance
- series-batch and sleep night stages are partial records: only the
requested types and the recorded stages are present
- medications declare deliveryForm, the injection-site fields, externalId,
externalSource, the low-stock bookkeeping, schedules[].doseWindows and
nextDueScheduleId on the list
- notification prefs declare coach.nudgeAiComposed and measurementReminder
- mood insights correlations declare suppressed
- record settings profile.unitPreference is nullable, as stored
- insights/comprehensive describes the computed overview it returns rather
than the model digest fields it never sends
Handler:
- GET /api/mood-entries/{id} shares the list projection and now carries
tagKeys and ratedFactors
- GET and PATCH /api/custom-metrics/{id} carry latest and entryCount
- /api/analytics no longer leaks anomalyCount through the per-night sleep
summary and the glucose meal-context split
Marc-André Bombeck