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39
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Marc-André Bombeck
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45fec0fc1b |
feat(02-12.1): refuse a record request whose context has moved
- both record resolvers check the fence after authentication and before the carrier, off the one session row that also decides the scope - POST /api/account/switch takes an optional expectedEpoch and writes conditionally, so concurrent switchers resolve to one outcome - GET /api/auth/me publishes the context a browser bootstraps from - every response that resolved a record scope echoes it back - regenerate the API contract |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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59359738c8 |
feat(02-12.1): decide record-session context in one place
- add an import-free contract module both bundles can name, holding the header names, the parse and the verdict - add the server fence: header read, wide-event stamp, and the refusal - add RecordSessionChangedError as a third sibling on the existing sharing-error arm, so the 409 needs no new serialisation branch |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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e209db24f4 |
fix: block delegated provider egress
Carry bounded work authority through queues and revalidate it at dispatch.\nResolve shared records without personal credentials. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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d86358f3e4 | fix: recover managed sharing boundaries | ||
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Marc-André Bombeck
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da3cabb55f |
Give a grant a section set and a third level
A grant has meant one thing since it shipped: the whole record, to read or to add to. This lays the words for the two shapes the rest of the sharing work needs — part of a record, and management of one — while changing what no existing grant does. `ShareDomain` is a closed set of eight sections in `src/lib/sharing/scope.ts`, clustered from the delegable read surfaces rather than invented, plus the distinguished `record` for the routes that read across them. It never converts to a `ModuleKey` and never imports one: two masks, two questions, no shared spelling, because the day they share a name is the day somebody makes one imply the other, and a module the owner enabled is not a section the owner shared. `account_grants.scope_json` is NULL on every row that exists, and NULL is the entire record — the answer those rows were consented as, so no backfill and no re-consent. A non-NULL value is read through one fail-closed normaliser: a blob it cannot parse opens nothing, including a section the blob happened to name. That is the deliberate inverse of the module preference normaliser, which fails open on purpose; both do the safe thing with a value nobody can read, and the safe thing differs because one answers an authorization question and the other a presentation question. `MANAGE` joins the level enum, ordered above WRITE so a write grant can never satisfy it, and carries no scope at all: management of part of a record promises a boundary that cannot survive an edit, so the invite path refuses to write one. `requireRecordAuth` takes the section as a second required argument. The requirement is the lever — a delegable route without a classification does not typecheck, so the set of classified routes cannot fall behind the set of delegable ones. All fifty-seven modules carry theirs. The structural guard freezes each against the production vocabulary, fails when a module's own arms disagree, and pins a non-zero count of resolved sections so a matcher that stopped reading the argument fails instead of agreeing with everything. `requireGuardianAuth` is exported and reaches nothing yet. It gates on the managed-profile marker rather than on the grant, so an adult who granted management of their own record cannot arrive at that record's settings by any argument about what MANAGE means: widening MANAGE would widen the record resolver and would not touch this one. Its frozen list lands empty, with the declaration site as the positive control that keeps "nothing reaches it" a measurement rather than a renamed symbol. `users.managed_profile_at` says since when a record is one somebody else runs. A timestamp and not a boolean, for a reason the schema has to keep possible: clearing it is the handover, and the grants and the activity trail span it untouched. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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029c526252 |
Give the intake purge a tombstone, and two health writes their audit row
The dose-history purge was the one destructive verb in the intake family that removed rows outright. Both siblings, the single-event DELETE and the bulk delete, stamp `deletedAt` and bump `syncVersion`; the purge called `deleteMany`, so a mis-tap was final and a client offline at purge time kept every row forever, because a row that no longer exists produces no tombstone for the sync feed to carry. It tombstones now, scoped to live rows so a second purge counts zero. No inventory refund: a purge wipes a history as bookkeeping, and refunding every dose ever taken would inflate the current container count instead. The manual water quick-add and the lab-result un-delete both wrote health data and reached only the wide event, which expires. Months later nothing could answer who put a day's total there or who brought a reading back, and with a second person able to act on a shared record that question has a second possible answer. Both write a durable row now, named after the neighbours they sit beside. The refused-delegation audit comment claimed the row was written for the owner's benefit. It is not: it is filed under the caller, it is only written for a header refusal, and a header names an account the caller merely asserts. Filing under that claim would let anyone write rows into any account's activity feed by naming it. The comment says what the row is now, and points at `recordDelegatedAccess`, which is the half the owner does see. Two comments in the biomarker surfaces still claimed the `SetNull` foreign key left the readings behind when a marker is deleted. That stopped being true when delete became a "drop this and its history" action and the confirmation copy was rewritten in six locales to say so. The purge route gains a call-shape assertion rather than a count assertion, because a count comes back identical from a `deleteMany`. The lab restore route had no test at all and now has one. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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f24ae6deb8 |
Read the acting-account carrier from one place
The rule that decides what a request says it is acting as — session stamp on the cookie transport, selector header on Bearer, a header on a cookie request naming nothing — sat inside the resolver that acts on the answer. A second caller needs the same question answered before any auth context exists, and two implementations of "whose record is this" drift; the copy that drifts is the one nobody reads. Move the decision, the header name and the two predicates into `auth/acting-carrier`, as a pure function of what the transport carried. The resolver keeps what only it may do: turning a claim into a data scope once a live grant says so. No behaviour changes — the resolver's arms are the same arms, and its suite passes untouched. The header-name guard follows the constant to its new file. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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843c74c98c |
feat(sharing): record who acted when it was not the account's owner
Adds AuditLog.actorUserId (migration 0294) and threads it centrally, out of the wide-event context the acting-account resolver already stamps. No call site passes an actor, so no route can forget one. NULL keeps meaning "acted for themselves" — the reading every existing row carries. The threading fills the column only when a request resolved an acting account AND the row is being filed under that account, so a self-action, a refusal, and a delegate's row about themselves all stay NULL rather than acquiring an id that would rewrite what the history says. Delegated reads coalesce to one row per owner, delegate and day, through a partial unique index and an insert that expects to lose the race. The alternative is a row per request on the busiest table in the schema and an activity view made of identical lines. The column carries no foreign key, against the grain of user_id beside it: SET NULL there erases an account from its own history, while here it would turn "the delegate opened this record" into "the owner opened this record". An id that no longer resolves reads as a deleted account; an id that silently became NULL reads as a lie. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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e9029ed3c2 |
feat(sharing): resolve the acting account inside the auth layer
One resolver, both transports, on every request. The cookie path reads
the carrier off the session row it has already loaded; the Bearer path
reads the `X-HealthLog-Account` selector header, because stamping switch
state onto a long-lived token would make the credential itself ambient
authority. Two carriers converge on one function for the same reason
`resolveBearerToken` lives in one file for two wires.
Three declared modes. `requireRecordAuth("read" | "write")` honours a
valid switch and substitutes the owner as the data scope while keeping
the delegate as the actor. `requireActorAuth()` always serves the
caller's own rows and keeps working under a switch, which is what the
switcher and the banner need.
Bare `requireAuth()` refuses to run under a switch at all, with a stable
`sharing.not_permitted` code. It does not fall back to the caller's own
account, and that arm is the point of the whole design: a delegate who
believes they are reading the owner's record and is handed their own is
the same data mixing pointed the other way. A route nobody has reviewed
is inaccessible while switched, never wrongly accessible.
The grant is loaded from Postgres on the request that uses it. Nothing
memoises the verdict, so a revocation lands on the delegate's next
request rather than their next login.
Refusals do not enumerate. The denial takes no constructor arguments and
carries a fixed message, and neither branch looks the named account up:
an account that does not exist and one that granted nothing produce the
same empty row from the same query, so the two answers are identical in
bytes and in timing rather than by careful wording. The reason reaches
the audit row and the wide event and nothing else.
`getSession()` still answers who is calling. That is what leaves
`requireAdmin`, `requireCookieAuth` and `requireFreshMfa` structurally
out of a switch's reach; the row's carrier rides out beside the session
id as a value to be checked, never as a decision already made.
The selector header is a Bearer carrier only. Sent over the cookie
transport, or to an actor surface, it is refused rather than ignored. A
client that names an account on a route which never reads one has a bug,
and a correct response to a wrong expectation hides that bug until it
arrives as a support case about data that looks wrong.
Five test files gain the session shape their fixtures always claimed to
have; they were building an auth context without one.
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Marc-André Bombeck
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27b548ab13 |
feat(medications,measurements): derive write provenance from transport and surface it
Root-cause the intake source attribution and give the HealthKit batch a
diagnostic sync-trigger, one attribution surface for both.
AuthContext now carries a read-only authMethod ("cookie" | "bearer"),
derived from the same branch that sets the wide event's auth_method. The
medication-intake route maps it to the stored IntakeSource: a Bearer
(native) call records API, a cookie (browser) call records WEB. The other
producer values are untouched — a converge onto a pending reminder row
updates through applyCanonicalSlotWrite, which never rewrites source, so
REMINDER / IMPORT / APPLE_HEALTH provenance is preserved. The value is
never client-asserted, the same posture as userId being narrowed from auth.
The dose-history ledger now selects and returns source per intake row so a
client can label how each dose was recorded. The endpoint gains its first
OpenAPI entry (path plus response schema) so the field lands in the
iOS-consumed contract.
The measurements batch accepts an optional per-request syncTrigger
(foreground | background | push). It is diagnostic-only: recorded on the
measurement.batch.ingest wide event and nothing else — never persisted,
never part of the dedup key, never an input to attribution or how a sample
is stored. Sending it or omitting it produces byte-identical row outcomes.
Regenerated docs/api/openapi.yaml.
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Marc-André Bombeck
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0991d754e4 |
fix(auth): make the re-proved factor decide what an elevation reaches
A step-up elevation minted from the account password satisfied the fresh-factor routes. That is a second-factor bypass: a stolen token plus a known password could rotate the recovery codes — which take no factor in the body — and then spend one of them to disable the second factor outright. The web has never allowed that chain, because a password login does not stamp mfaVerifiedAt. The method is now an authorisation input. Only totp, webauthn, and passkey satisfy a fresh-factor gate, which is exactly the set of ceremonies the web stamps a session for; password reaches what a plain cookie session reaches and stops. The mint gains TOTP and security-key arms so a TOTP-only account can still manage its factor natively, and the response says which reach it bought. The gate also returns a discriminated context. session.id meant a session row on one arm and a token row on the other, and the disable route passed the token id to a session-scoped query — excluding nothing, so it deleted every browser session and revoked the caller's own device login. The transport is now in the type and the compiler refuses the confusion. Redemption splits into validate-then-commit so a 429, a 422, or a wrong code no longer burns a proof against a five-per-fifteen-minute mint ceiling. The claim is UPDATE ... RETURNING, so the statement that decides is the one that reports. The mint is transactional behind a partial unique index. Sign-out-everywhere and both password-reset paths clear elevations. The status read drops to plain requireAuth — it carries no credential material — and every mutation stays gated. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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e557d9e9e6 |
feat(auth): add token-bound step-up elevations for second-factor management
Second-factor management has been cookie-only since v1.23. The gate is right: a Bearer token is a credential whose provenance the server cannot see, and tearing down a second factor must not be reachable from the weaker of an interactive login and a value pasted into a script. What was missing was never Bearer access to those routes — it was a way to say, over a transport with no session row, that the human holding this device just re-proved a factor. An elevation is that proof. It is minted only against a re-proved account password or primary passkey, bound to the exact token that re-proved, single-use via a conditional UPDATE, five-minute-lived to match the cookie path's step-up window, and stored hashed. A stolen token mints nothing; a second token cannot redeem another's elevation; a password change drops every one the account holds. requireMfaManagementAuth is the one gate the management routes share. On a cookie session it delegates to the original helpers unchanged, so the web flow runs the code it always did. requireAdmin stays cookie-only and out of reach. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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df611227f9 |
fix(auth): make Bearer scope fail closed on every route
resolveBearerToken took an optional permission, and an unset one admitted any valid token. 324 of the 330 route files pass no permission, so a token minted with a narrow scope reached the full-backup export, the labs and measurement surfaces, the coach, and the bulk deletes — the settings copy tells users to hand exactly that token to third-party automations. Invert the default. The scope argument becomes a required ScopeRequirement union: a route that names no scope now accepts cookie sessions and cookie-equivalent ["*"] tokens only, and refuses a narrow token with 403 and an undeclared_scope audit row. A route that means to accept a narrow token names it, as the FHIR routes already do. No route file changes. The absence of an argument becomes a positive statement rather than an omission, so a newly added route denies a newly minted narrow scope by default — the safe outcome is the one you get by doing nothing. /mcp keeps its own posture through an explicit any-valid-token requirement: it authenticates here and authorises downstream on audience and write scope. That is the single deliberate fail-open call site in the tree, and making the parameter required is what keeps it greppable. An MCP-audience token loses its REST read leg as a result, narrowing it to /mcp only. The isMcpAudienceToken guard stays as defence in depth. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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336ce5aef3 |
fix(api): narrow swallowed database errors and redact the incident URL
The incident forwarder stripped the query string but not path-segment secrets from the reported URL; route it through the same redaction the message and stack already use. Several delete-and-swallow paths caught every error as the expected unique/absent-row case, masking real failures on security-notification, logout, and integration-disconnect paths and the Telegram reply-consume guard; narrow each to the specific Prisma code and let real failures surface. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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84683f4ce9 |
perf: bound heavy-tenant memory on feature, consolidation, backup and auth paths
Cap and page the unbounded reads that let a multi-year tenant pull its whole measurement history into memory on hot paths. - extractFeatures: read newest-first with a 6000-row cap (mirrors the Coach snapshot) and reverse to ascending, so a 365-400 day window no longer materialises hundreds of thousands of PULSE / glucose rows per Coach turn and nightly briefing. Full-history extremes still come from readAllTimeExtremes, so the cap never relabels an extreme. - Add a (userId, measuredAt) index on measurements (migration 0210) for the type-less range scans that extractFeatures and the consolidation passes drive; the existing (userId, type, measuredAt) cannot serve them as a prefix. - runConsolidation: keyset-paginate the per-(user, type) source scan on (measuredAt, id) instead of one unbounded findMany, removing the giant single result-set allocation that drove the boot storm. Output is identical; covered by a paging unit test. - Stagger the boot-time backfill enqueues with increasing startAfter offsets so the heavy full-history loads no longer all drain in parallel onto one tenant at startup. Non-boot callers keep their immediate send. - Backups: replace load-all-then-stringify with paged narrow-select reads for the weekly and off-host writers, bounding transient heap. Off-host still includes soft-deleted rows. Covered by a serialize/restore round-trip test. - Drop the per-request auth.bearer.success audit insert; the wide event already records auth_method and user_id, so the polling client no longer drives a write + pool checkout on every request. Failure-path audit stays. - Coach conversation detail: cap the message include to the newest 200 so a long thread no longer decrypts every message on each open; response shape unchanged. - Admin audit-log: floor the scan at the retention horizon so the listing and its count stop sweeping open-ended over the substring filters. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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9bc3b0b101 |
fix(mcp): validate the write preview so it matches the commit outcome
The confirm:false preview echoed the would-be record without running the type / range / instant validation, so a preview could show a value the commit then refused. Run the same shared validation in the preview and surface wouldFail with the error + reason the commit would return, so a preview and its commit never disagree. Also note at the REST read-method allowlist that the MCP-audience guard assumes GET/HEAD/OPTIONS are side-effect-free — a future side-effecting GET must revisit that audience binding. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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fb986bc09d |
merge: bring the MCP server onto the v1.23 base
Combine the remote MCP server (stdio + remote /mcp + OAuth 2.1 + read tools + deep-value reads + a confirmed, audience-bound write surface) with the v1.23 account-security line (MFA, known/trusted devices, free-text note encryption). - schema: keep every v1.23 User relation (MFA, known/trusted devices) alongside the McpOAuthConnection relation; the MeasurementSource enum carries the MCP value. - api-handler: the MCP audience guard (a token scoped to health:read/health:write is bound to /mcp and refused a REST write) and the step-up MFA helpers coexist. - maintenance queues: register the MCP token-cleanup sweep next to the note-encryption backfill and key-rotation queues; shift it to 04:00 so the two daily discovery ticks do not collide. - migrations: renumber the MCP migrations to 0206/0207 so they follow the v1.23 chain (0199-0205). - MCP mood writes route the note through the v1.23 at-rest cipher. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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c458d955e4 |
merge: integrate the v1.23 security settings and MFA wave
# Conflicts: # messages/de.json # messages/en.json # messages/es.json # messages/fr.json # messages/it.json # messages/pl.json # src/lib/openapi/routes/auth.ts # src/lib/query-keys/auth.ts |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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402ea90d45 |
feat(security): add a TOTP and security-key setup hub
Introduce a dedicated /settings/security section that gathers every account-protection control in one place: TOTP enrolment (QR plus manual secret, confirm, recovery codes shown once with copy and download), WebAuthn security keys as a second factor (register, list with last-used, rename, step-up-gated removal), recovery-code count and regeneration, and primary passkey management. The second-factor WebAuthn path keeps its own credential store, separate from primary passkeys, and uses non-resident keys so an account can hold many. Relying-party resolution is shared with the passkey path. A status endpoint backs the hub; the step-up gate now recognises a registered security key as an active second factor so a WebAuthn-only account can still reach the gated actions. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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01689f77bc |
feat(security): require fresh verification before destructive account actions
Account deletion and the keep-account data reset now demand a recent second-factor re-verification for accounts that have a second factor active; single-factor accounts are unaffected and keep the typed- confirmation-only contract. The gate runs through requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled, which is cookie-only by construction — a Bearer transport for an MFA-enrolled account cannot satisfy step-up and surfaces the auth.stepup.required envelope so the UI can launch a re-verification flow. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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3d3018b12e |
feat(auth): add a fresh-MFA step-up gate
Add requireFreshMfa(maxAgeSeconds) and requireCookieAuth alongside requireAdmin. Both resolve through getSession() only, so a Bearer token can never satisfy them — the same structural boundary requireAdmin relies on, not a softenable runtime check. requireFreshMfa passes only for a cookie session whose Session.mfaVerifiedAt is within the window and whose user has an active second factor; otherwise it throws StepUpRequiredError (401 + meta.errorCode "auth.stepup.required") so the client can launch a re-verification flow. createSession now accepts an optional mfaVerifiedAt stamp so a session minted behind a completed second factor records its freshness. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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6de61de010 |
feat(mcp): add a confirmed, audience-bound write surface for logging measurements and mood
Register two write tools — log_measurement and log_mood — only for a
health:write-scoped session; a read-only session never sees them advertised.
Each write mirrors the proven Telegram capture path (same range guard,
canonical unit, cache invalidation and rollup recompute) pinned to the MCP
source, and is idempotent on a hashed externalId derived from a client key, so
a retried call is a no-op rather than a duplicate.
Because the remote wire is stateless (no elicitation), the tools carry a
protocol-level confirm gate: without confirm:true they write nothing and
return the exact record they would write plus an instruction to confirm the
value with the user and re-call with the same idempotency key. Commits run
under a tighter per-credential write budget on top of the per-binding request
limiter.
Harden the resource-server audience binding: a token whose scopes are all in
{health:read, health:write} is bound to the MCP surface and refused on every
REST write/delete. A health:write token therefore admits the in-process MCP
write tools only and can never become a general REST write credential; admin
stays unreachable (cookie-only). Refuse, by construction, any medication, lab,
delete/update, or data-export tool on this surface.
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Marc-André Bombeck
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22eb9cba0d |
fix(mcp): close OAuth 2.1 resource-server gaps before the remote surface ships
Harden the remote MCP endpoint and the in-repo OAuth bridge against the adversarial review of the milestone branch. The two ship-blockers made the "read-only, revocable" promise false; the rest tightened the surface. Audience binding at the resource server: a token whose only grant is the new `health:read` scope is the MCP read credential. The REST edge now accepts it on safe (read) methods and refuses it on writes/deletes with 403, so a connector token can read over `/mcp` and GET routes but can never POST/DELETE the record despite a "read-only" consent. The `/mcp` resolver is unaffected. Revocable, theft-detectable refresh tokens: refresh artifacts now anchor to a persistent connection row. Revoking a connection stops every future refresh and kills its access tokens; a replayed (already-rotated) refresh is treated as theft and revokes the whole connection. Connections surface in settings as the unit a user can disconnect. The old access token is revoked on rotation. Also: fail closed on the OAuth/`/mcp` surface when no canonical origin is configured and mark the discovery documents non-cacheable; honour the global API kill-switch on `/mcp`, `/token`, `/authorize`, and `/register`; cap the CIMD and registration body reads while streaming instead of after; show the verified client origin on consent; validate CIMD redirect-URI schemes; assert same-origin on the consent POST; and add a daily prune for expired connector tokens. New migration 0195 adds the connection anchor and links access tokens to it. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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f3e004998a |
refactor(auth): extract Bearer-token validation into a reusable resolver
Move the canonical Bearer-token validation out of the api-handler request wrapper into src/lib/auth/bearer.ts so it can run outside a Next.js request scope without dragging next/server, next/headers, or the Wide-Event machinery into the import graph. requireAuth's Bearer path now delegates to it and keeps the existing auth.bearer.* audit trail and Wide-Event annotation, so the revoked / expired / scope / lastUsedAt semantics live in one place and cannot drift between callers. Covered by a focused unit test pinning the hash-only lookup and the revoked / expired / insufficient-permission rejections; the existing require-auth Bearer suite stays green. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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1f4ba5939d |
style: apply prettier across the tree
One-shot prettier pass so the new format:check gate starts from a clean baseline. Formatting only — no behaviour change. Generator-owned and vendored artifacts stay untouched via .prettierignore. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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37e9f32f56 |
fix(ai): require active consent before external-provider egress; rate-limit and harden Fitbit sync
Close the launch-blocking gap where the ConsentReceipt infrastructure was built but never enforced as a precondition: a direct API caller with a valid token could forward a health snapshot to a server-managed external LLM with no receipt on file. Consent was enforced client-side only. Add a consent guard (src/lib/ai/consent-guard.ts) and call it before the first external-provider call on the server-managed path. The gate fires only when the resolved chain could egress via the operator's global key (admin-openai); a user's own BYOK key (openai/anthropic), their own ChatGPT OAuth account, and the self-hosted local provider stay ungated — that egress is the user's own act and the settings flow is its consent. The check fails closed: a BYOK-primary chain with an admin-openai fallback still requires a receipt, since the runner may cascade to the operator key. The surface maps to the consent kind (coach -> ai_coach, insights -> ai_insights_only; master ai_full satisfies either). - Interactive routes (insights/chat, insights/generate POST) throw ConsentRequiredError; api-handler renders a 403 with meta.errorCode = "consent.ai.required", mirroring assistant.disabled.* so the client can render an inline grant-consent notice. - Off-request pipelines fail closed quietly: comprehensive generation returns a typed skipped:no-consent outcome, and the per-metric status family (runStatusCompletion, gating every status card + the period-narrative warm + the off-budget Coach memory workers) surfaces the no-key fallback instead of egressing. Also rate-limit POST /api/fitbit/sync (the one Fitbit route without a limiter): a 5/60s baseline plus a tighter 1/hour bucket on the expensive fullSync walk, keyed by user id, matching the sibling Fitbit routes. Harden the Fitbit OAuth redirect_uri: assert it is an absolute https origin (or http on localhost), lands on /api/fitbit/callback, and stays same-origin with NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL — defence-in-depth behind Google's registered-URI check so a Host-coerced or misconfigured app URL cannot redirect the authorization code off-origin. (cherry picked from commit 46b5fc2cea1b6e80bee0445bfdacf5790442c67d) |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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7bef199039 |
v1.4.33 — polish and reliability
Quality-leap release between two HealthKit milestones. The headline is a P0 hotfix for the `/api/analytics` 500 that broke the Insights mother page for any account with more than a few thousand measurements: the six per-metric status helpers were spreading the entire numeric history into `Math.min` / `Math.max`, which trips a stack overflow once a single argument list exceeds the V8 spread cap. Both the surfaced symptom and the latent risk in five sibling helpers were folded onto a reduce-based min/max path. Around that hotfix landed a deep polish pass: the Insights mother page now defers three below-the-fold blocks behind `next/dynamic` to trim the cold mount cost, the analytics endpoint gained a `?slice=summaries` slim slice that the per-metric sub-pages now ride, the Coach snapshot builder picked up a 60 s LRU keyed on `(userId, scope)`, the Settings shell consolidated three duplicate copies of the about / notifications / about-dropdown surfaces, the navigation strip dropped a redundant "Home" group label and a colliding "Notifications" sibling, every icon-only button on the medications and admin surfaces gained an accessible name, every Progress bar gained one too, three pages had their heading hierarchy repaired to a sequential h1 → h2 → h3, the mobile Coach FAB now hides while a chart tooltip is open so it cannot occlude the read-out, and the auth shell normalised every authenticated route to a single `max-w-screen-xl` container. Also lands the Apple App Site Association handler at `/.well-known/apple-app-site-association` on every host that fronts the app, advertising the iOS bundle's App ID prefix (S8WDX4W5KX.dev.healthlog.app) under `webcredentials.apps` so the passkey ceremony shares cleanly between the web origin and the iOS app. The release closes nineteen issues from a five-surface audit + a runtime bug-hunt pass, plus six follow-up tracks of polish across the affected surfaces. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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5ea813e20c |
chore(release): v1.4.31
Operator-side assistant feature-flag matrix, /insights tab-strip blocking fix on mobile, and the GHCR-propagation-race Coolify auto-deploy fix. Full notes in CHANGELOG. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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4f09c3f862 |
chore(release): v1.4.27
v1.4.27 — Mobile capability and maintainer-finding cleanup. ResponsiveSheet primitive (bottom-sheet on narrow viewports, centred dialog on desktop) applied to BD, Weight, Glucose, Mood, Activity forms. Maintainer-finding cleanups across Coach, Insights, Reports, Privacy. GeoLite2 offline geocoding with resilience layer (graceful fallback when EULA not yet propagated). E2E gap-fill coverage. 450-line release notes attached to the GitHub Release. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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17b8d8d2c2 |
chore(release): v1.4.25
Largest feature delta in the v1.4.x line. Insights expands into seven dedicated metric sub-pages; GLP-1 medication tracking lands end-to-end (drug-level chart with Research Mode acknowledgment, EMA titration ladder, cadence + compliance, side-effect taxonomy, pen/vial inventory); cross-source priority becomes a two-axis resolver; per-user timezone threads through ten analytics surfaces; Withings activity + sleep v2 sync; onboarding rebuilt as a nested-route wizard; Personal Records ship end-to-end; Health Score provenance accordion; Coach runs native first-party prompts across six locales with a 1800-assertion refusal-probe matrix; OpenAPI drift gate hard-fails; multi-arch GHCR image. Migrations 0043 through 0060 are additive and forward-only. PROMPT_VERSION 4.24.0 → 4.25.0 with GROUND RULE 9 (refuses dose recommendations) and GROUND RULE 15 (refuses drug-level estimates with MDR + MDCG 2021-24 cites). See CHANGELOG.md for the full per-section delta. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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ca03c6099f |
chore(release): v1.4.24
Security + accessibility hardening release. Closes the highest-priority findings from a focused security audit of the v1.4.23 release: - Bearer auth fail-closed when a route declares no scope (api-handler) - Public /api/send Umami proxy now rate-limits 120 req/min/IP - Proxy nonce generation switched to btoa(...) for Edge portability - Session-expiry delete race uses deleteMany + catch (no more 500s) - POST /api/import returns the standard apiError envelope on 422 - Runtime Docker image pins Prisma 7.8 + worker deps to minors - Notifications page renders a real load-error alert - Accessibility: switch aria-labels, htmlFor pairing, mobile admin Overview link, deep-link anchors on notification settings - Chart overlays: per-chart comparisonBaseline pref, BMI/bodyFat/ sleep/steps overlay keys, TrendCard layout tolerates long labels Verification: pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm test (2244/2244) && pnpm format:check all green. |
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Marc-André BombeckandMarc-André Bombeck
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643e6ec3a0 |
release: v1.4.2 — resurrect v1.4.1 work + bug-fix triple (#152)
* Revert "revert: roll source tree back to v1.4.0 to restore production"
This reverts commit
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Marc-André Bombeck
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e444a90b10 |
revert: roll source tree back to v1.4.0 to restore production
Production at healthlog.bombeck.io has been 503-ing since the v1.4.1
deploys started landing on apps-01 (Coolify). The container boots —
Next.js prints "Ready" and the pg-boss workers run — but never
accepts HTTP on :3000, so the Docker healthcheck fails and Traefik
takes the upstream out of rotation. A manual restart, a Coolify
force-rebuild, and a docker-compose pin to the GHCR :1.4.0 multi-arch
image all failed to bring the site back up — Coolify rebuilds the
image from main HEAD on every deploy regardless of the compose
directives.
This commit resets the working tree to commit
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Marc-André Bombeck
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70353882eb |
fix(security): close moodLog SSRF + central error redaction; fix citation drift (#148)
The v1.4.1 audit pass turned up one CRITICAL, two HIGH, and four medical-citation drift findings. This commit addresses everything that's safe to land in a hardening release; deeper architectural fixes (idempotency-race transactional rewrite, encryption-key fallback gate, refresh-token reuse-detection serialisation, moodLog secret HMAC lookup column) are tracked for v1.4.2 in docs/ops/v141-followup-issues.md. Security -------- CRITICAL — moodLog SSRF src/lib/validations/moodlog.ts now refines the credentials URL with isPublicUrl() so an authenticated user cannot store http://169.254.169.254/ (cloud metadata) or RFC1918 hosts. src/lib/moodlog/sync.ts re-checks isPublicUrl(baseUrl) at the fetch site (so legacy rows stored before the credential guard are also refused) and switches to redirect: "manual" + 3xx → fail so a public host cannot 302 the request to an internal target with the user's apiKey on the redirect hop. New unit test src/lib/validations/__tests__/moodlog.test.ts asserts the guard rejects 169.254.x.x, 10.x, 172.16.x.x, 192.168.x.x, 127.0.0.1, and localhost. HIGH — error-message secret leakage New src/lib/logging/redact.ts redacts Bearer tokens (incl. our hlk_/hlr_), Telegram bot URLs (bot<digits>:<token>), and query-string secrets (?secret=, ?code=, ?token=, ?api_key=). The redactor is called from WideEventBuilder.setError() — every error reaching Loki is scrubbed once, centrally — and from the reportToGlitchtip() call in api-handler.ts so the Glitchtip incident UI is also protected. New unit suite covers the four patterns plus over-redaction (Bearer's \\S+ greedily consumes anything up to the next whitespace, which is the safer side of the trade-off). Truthfulness — citation drift fixes (audit found 0 hallucinations, 4 drift items) - messages/{en,de}.json bpClassificationTitle and avg30dEsc: "ESC/ESH 2018" → "ESH 2023". User-visible on the dashboard and doctor-report PDF. The numeric thresholds are unchanged from 2018; the 2023 update is ESH-only since ESC withdrew from joint authoring. - src/lib/analytics/classifications.ts: section header, getBpTargetsByAge() docblock, and inline comment updated to cite ESH 2023 with the same "numerically unchanged" caveat. - src/app/api/insights/targets/route.ts:375: source label "WHO" → "Saint-Maurice JAMA 2020". The AI-prompt anti-pattern guard explicitly forbids citing WHO for a step number; this surface was the last "WHO" mislabel in the codebase. - Saint-Maurice "mortality plateau 8000-12000" attribution softened to "continued dose-response benefit through ~12,000 steps/day, not a plateau" in src/lib/medical-citations.ts, src/lib/analytics/effective-range.ts, src/lib/analytics/classifications.ts, and both AI prompts. The original JAMA 2020 paper shows continuing benefit (HR 0.49 at 8k vs 4k, HR 0.35 at 12k); the plateau-shaped finding belongs to Paluch 2022 Lancet PH (PMID 35247352), not Saint-Maurice. Quality gates pnpm typecheck clean pnpm test 669 / 669 (was 658; +11 from new suites) pnpm test:integration 10 / 10 (untouched) pnpm lint 0 errors |
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Marc-André BombeckandClaude Opus 4.7
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98a57eb786 |
audit(v1.3.3): SpO2 + body-composition + 14 CRITICAL/HIGH security/correctness fixes (#121)
* fix(measurements): close issue #109 + sync body composition across UI/PDF/thresholds User-visible: TOTAL_BODY_WATER, BONE_MASS, and BLOOD_GLUCOSE now appear in the measurements filter, badge, mobile icon, and edit dialog (issue #109). Server-rendered doctor report now includes body composition rows (audit C-9). Body water + bone mass have proper effective-range thresholds so severity logic doesn't silently return `nominal` (audit C-15). Structural: extracted the per-type display maps from measurement-list.tsx into measurement-list-meta.ts as a deliberate first step toward the single-source manifest planned for phase P5. Coverage tests now fail-fast if a future enum addition skips any of: list label/icon/color, doctor-PDF label/unit/vital-types, chart label, threshold metric order/label/bounds. Audit-2026-05-07 / phase P0: - closes #109 (filter UI gap, root cause for the German raw-enum display) - closes audit C-9 (server PDF used a stale type map) - closes audit C-15 (no warn/critical bands for body composition) Tests: 282 → 296 (14 new). Typecheck clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: align OpenAPI spec + migration comment with body-composition reality - OpenAPI MeasurementType enum: add TOTAL_BODY_WATER + BONE_MASS (was at v1.3.0 baseline; spec drifted past the v1.3 server release) - Bump openapi version 1.3.0 → 1.3.2 to match package.json - Migration 0022 comment: TOTAL_BODY_WATER stores kg (water content), not percent of body weight. Validators (VALUE_RANGES) and the Withings client (type 77 → kg) treat it as kg already; the comment was the lone outlier and would mislead the next reviewer. Audit-2026-05-07 / phase P1a — closes audit M-B1 (partial; OpenAPI enum) and M-B2 (migration unit comment). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): close 3 audit CRITICALs (Withings header / idempotency Bearer / GlitchTip URL strip) C-3 (Withings webhook secret in URL): Now reads X-Withings-Webhook-Secret header in preference; URL ?secret=… fallback retained for legacy Withings configurations and emits a Wide Event warning so operators can spot still-using-the-old-flow integrators. The query-string secret was leaking into Coolify access logs and any GlitchTip event whose request.url got captured. C-4 (idempotency dead for Bearer-token clients): The default userIdResolver only consulted getSession(). Bearer-authed clients (the iOS / n8n / headless-API fleet that PR #117 was built for) fell through, so every retry created duplicate measurements. The default now tries cookie session first, then Bearer token via hashToken+apiToken.findUnique with revoked/expiry checks. All three existing call sites (measurements, mood-entries, medications/intake) get the fix automatically. H-B7 (request.url with secrets shipped to GlitchTip): reportToGlitchtip now strips the query string before forwarding the URL, so Withings legacy ?secret=… and any OAuth ?code=… that errors during the callback don't end up in someone else's incident UI. Audit-2026-05-07 / phase P2. Tests: 296 → 301 (5 new in idempotency.test for the Bearer fallback + revoked/expired/null cases). Deferred to a follow-up (needs DB migration / lock primitive): C-2 moodLog webhook → AES-GCM at rest + HMAC-over-body C-5 idempotency TOCTOU advisory_lock or in-flight sentinel row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(measurements): add OXYGEN_SATURATION (SpO2) as first-class measurement type — v1.3.3 Closes the OxygenSaturation feature request from #109. - Migration 0024 extends MeasurementType enum (additive, IF NOT EXISTS) - Zod validators: plausibility 50–100% (below 50 is incompatible with sustained life; above 100 is physically impossible) - effective-range thresholds: green 95–100, orange 92–94, red <92. Sources: BTS Guideline 2017 (target 94–98%), ATS clinical practice (≥95% at rest is healthy), AHA/clinical literature (<92% = call provider, <88% = ER). Lower-only concern — upper orange wing collapses to greenMax since saturation cannot exceed 100%. - Personalisation: existing thresholds-override UI lets COPD / chronic-respiratory users with a doctor-set 88–92 baseline tune the bands. METRIC_ORDER + METRIC_LABEL_KEYS extended in thresholds-section.tsx; the exhaustive `Record<ThresholdMetric>` forces TS to catch any missed surface. - Withings ScanWatch type 54 mapping (best-effort — only fires for pulse-ox-capable devices). - Wired through measurement-form, measurement-list-meta (icon: Wind), health-chart, both doctor-report-pdf renderers (core + browser-side near-duplicate), OpenAPI spec (version 1.3.0 → 1.3.3), and i18n in 4 sections × 2 locales. - iOS DTO already declared `OXYGEN_SATURATION` — server enum addition closes the long-standing drift flagged in audit V2. - 4 new tests: numeric green band, upper-wing collapse, user-override (COPD baseline), METRIC_BOUNDS shape. Tests: 301 → 305. Typecheck: clean. Audit-2026-05-07 / v1.3.3 / closes #109 SpO2 feature request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(analytics): truthfulness pass on medical citations + clamp override orangeMax Doctor-agent + hallucination-hunter audit V3 found six medical citations in effective-range.ts that the code did not actually implement. Plus a latent bug in the user-override path that produced physically-impossible orangeMax values (>100% saturation, <0% body-fat). Citation rewrites (no numeric changes): - ACTIVITY_STEPS: "WHO ≥8000 steps/day" → Saint-Maurice JAMA 2020. WHO publishes activity in min/week, not steps. Step-count was a misattribution that also leaked into AI prompts. - TOTAL_BODY_WATER: "ESPEN Body Composition Guidance 2017" → Watson formula / ICRP Reference Man. ESPEN 2017 is BIA practice guidance, it does not publish kg cut-offs. - BONE_MASS: "DEXA-equivalent bone mineral content" → "Bioimpedance- estimated; not DEXA-comparable". Withings BIA values typically run 5–7% below DEXA — calling them DEXA-equivalent in a doctor-report PDF was a real legal-exposure misattribution. - OXYGEN_SATURATION: "BTS Guideline 2017 (target 94–98%) + ATS clinical practice (≥95% at rest is healthy)" → "consumer pulse- oximeter consensus (≥95% normal at rest); slightly tighter than BTS 2017 (94–98%); NICE NG115 ≤92% escalation, BMJ panel / FDA pulse-oximeter labelling ≤88% ER threshold". Code uses 95-100/92-100 band — that's an ATS/consumer-consensus number, not BTS's literal 94-98 target. Soften the citation to match the code, not vice versa. Bug fix (1 latent, 1 real-today): - effective-range override path now clamps orangeMin/orangeMax to METRIC_BOUNDS.{min,max}. Without the clamp, a COPD user setting SpO2 override to {95,100} emitted orangeMax = 100.75 (impossible saturation), and a BODY_FAT override of {2,80} emitted orangeMin = -9.7 (negative percent). Default-range case 210 already hard-coded orangeMax: 100 for the same reason — the override path was the only branch missing the invariant. Tests: 305 → 306 (1 new: clamps override orangeMax to physiological 100%). Typecheck: clean. Audit-2026-05-07-V3 / closes Doctor + Senior-Dev medical-citation findings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): Bearer-scope wildcard handling + GDPR Art.17 account-delete erasure Two CRITICAL fixes from audit V3. NEW-V3-1: Bearer-scope bypass. apiToken.permissions ["*"] is meant to be the wildcard "session-equivalent" scope (the iOS app receives this on login). The previous check permissions.includes(requiredPermission) treated "*" as a literal string — never matched. Today many sensitive routes call requireAuth() *without* a requiredPermission, so a leaked iOS token can act as a full-scope token (account delete, settings wipe). Once those routes adopt requireAuth("scope:name"), this wildcard handling keeps the iOS app working while narrower-scoped tokens (e.g. user-issued ["medication:ingest"]) get correctly 403'd. Same wildcard handling added to the standalone permission checks in src/app/api/ingest/medication/route.ts:65, 119. NEW-V3-2: GDPR Art. 17 account-delete erasure completeness. Feedback + AuditLog rows had `onDelete: SetNull` in the schema, which preserved PII (free-text symptom descriptions, IP addresses, login-city geolocation) after the user was deleted. We now explicitly prisma.feedback.deleteMany + prisma.auditLog.deleteMany before the cascade-delete, making account deletion genuinely complete erasure. Tests 306/306 still pass; typecheck clean. Audit V3. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(pdf): real text-content assertions for body composition + SpO2 rows Replaces bytes-only "renders body composition rows" theatre test with pdf-parse-driven text extraction that asserts the actual rendered labels + values for TOTAL_BODY_WATER, BONE_MASS, OXYGEN_SATURATION (DE + EN). Closes V3 audit finding STILL-V2-NEW-3: the previous test only verified "%PDF-" header + byte-count, so a regression that drops a row would still pass. Now a missing label fails the test. - adds dev dep: pdf-parse@^2.4.5 - 308/308 tests pass (was 306, +2 SpO2 + EN-locale coverage) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(measurements): close enum drift cousins — derive 5 type-arrays from canonical enum + extend 2 contract enums V3 audit finding "enum drift cousins": 7 hardcoded module-level type arrays silently dropped SpO2/TBW/BoneMass/BloodGlucose from their respective domains. Adding a new measurement type required hunting these down. Now all aggregation paths derive from `measurementTypeEnum.options`: - /api/insights/comprehensive (AI insights) - /api/dashboard/summary (iOS dashboard adapter) - /api/analytics (analytics aggregator) - /lib/insights/general-status (AI general-status fetch) - /api/import (Zod schema — round-trip now covers all 11 types) External-contract enums extended additively (no breakage for old clients): - /api/measurements/series kindEnum: + oxygen, totalBodyWater, boneMass - /api/dashboard/widgets widgetIdEnum: + oxygenSaturation - DashboardWidgetId + DEFAULT_DASHBOARD_LAYOUT: + oxygenSaturation row - formatMeasurementsForExport: glucoseContext now round-trips Coverage test (`measurement-type-enum-coverage.test.ts`) asserts the canonical enum stays the source of truth and documents PDF exclusions (BLOOD_GLUCOSE renders via context section, SLEEP/STEPS lifestyle-only). 313/313 tests pass (was 308, +5 new). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): close 6 V3-audit HIGH findings (CSP, web-push SSRF, IP geo, AI provider leak, import rate-limit) - CSP: chatgpt.com + api.openai.com only on /settings/ai/** routes (was blanket connect-src on every page including /auth/login → DOM-XSS exfil channel) - web-push: webPushSubscriptionSchema.endpoint requires HTTPS + isPublicUrl refinement; was z.url() only → blind SSRF probe via Push subscription - isPublicUrl: also fixes a regression where DNS labels starting with "fc"/"fd" (fcm.googleapis.com etc.) were falsely classified as IPv6 unique-local. Check is now gated on a colon being present in the host. - /api/ai/test: stop returning provider err.message + bodyExcerpt to the client (leaked provider URLs / partial keys / internal headers). Now returns categorised generic message; full details land in the wide-event via annotate() for the operator. - /lib/geo (auditLog IP geo lookup): switch default provider to ipwho.is over HTTPS, accept ipwho.is + ip-api pro response shapes, add IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED env, refuse non-HTTPS configured URLs. Previously leaked IP+timestamp over plaintext HTTP every auth event (GDPR Art. 32 + Art. 44). - /api/import: add 5/hour rate-limit (was unlimited; bulk-injection vector) Tests: 325/325 pass (was 313, +12 new — webPushSubscriptionSchema SSRF guards, fc/fd-prefix domain regression, geo HTTPS-only, geo provider shapes, geo opt-out env). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security,gdpr): trusted-proxy IP, audit-log retention, idempotency cachable filter, Bearer mock tightening V3 audit follow-on bundle covering 4 HIGH findings. (I) getClientIp — TRUST_PROXY_HOPS env (default 1) replaces blind XFF trust. Reads chain right-to-left so client-supplied leftmost entries cannot rotate the per-IP rate-limit bucket. Default 1 matches typical single-proxy self-host (Coolify/Caddy/Cloudflare-Tunnel); 0 forces x-real-ip / null. New 7-test suite covers the rotation attack + malformed entries + zero-hop fallback. (F) Audit-log retention job — daily 03:15 cleanup of audit_logs older than AUDIT_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 365). Closes GDPR Art. 5(1)(e) "storage limitation" gap; previously IPs + city + login events accumulated forever. 6-test suite covers default + override + misconfig guard (rejects <7 days). (G) isCachableStatus — extracted the inline 4xx/5xx filter into a named, exported, tested function. 7 cases cover the full do-not-cache contract (401 / 403 / 408 / 429 / any 5xx) and confirm 2xx + 4xx validation are still cached. (H) Bearer-mock tightening — apiToken.findUnique mocks in require-auth-bearer.test + idempotency.test now assert the where.tokenHash shape uses the hashed value (not the raw bearer). A regression that switched back to raw-token comparison would have been silent without this assertion. Tests: 345/345 pass (was 332, +13 new). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): encrypt moodLog webhook secret at rest with AES-256-GCM (V3 audit STILL-V2-C-2) The mood_log_webhook_secret column previously stored a plaintext secret that the webhook handler compared timing-safe against every enabled user. A DB dump or backup snapshot leaked active webhook credentials. New contract — no schema migration required: - Writes go through encryptMoodLogSecret() (AES-256-GCM via existing crypto helper, ENCRYPTION_KEY). - Reads go through readMoodLogSecret() which transparently decrypts envelopes and tolerates legacy plaintext rows during the transition (graceful upgrade path — no breaking change for self-hosted users). - Webhook lookup decrypts each candidate before timing-safe compare. - Status endpoint decrypts for the user's settings page. One-shot startup migration in reminder-worker rotates any leftover plaintext rows on next worker boot. Idempotent; encrypted rows are skipped. Tests: 350/350 pass (was 345, +5 new — round-trip, legacy passthrough, isLegacyPlaintext semantics, rotateLegacy idempotence). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: sync README + AGENTS + CLAUDE + CHANGELOG + OpenAPI for v1.3.3 (V3 audit doc-drift) V3 audit Doku Specialist findings — drift between code and meta-docs. - README §Key Features now mentions pulse oximetry (SpO₂) + Withings ScanWatch sync; Tech Stack model count corrected 23 → 25. - AGENTS.md status promoted v1.3.2 → v1.3.3; vitest config corrected `vitest.config.ts` → `vitest.config.mts`; migration range corrected `0001–0022` → `0001–0024`; model count + list updated to 25 (adds Device, IdempotencyKey). - CLAUDE.md model count updated (2 occurrences). - CHANGELOG.md v1.3.3 expanded with Security + Internal sections that were missing the audit-fix-marathon work (Bearer-scope, account-delete cascade, moodLog encryption, CSP tightening, Web-Push SSRF, IP-geo HTTPS, AI-test leak fix, import rate-limit, trusted-proxy XFF, audit-log retention, idempotency cachable filter, Bearer mock tightening, enum-drift cousins, PDF text-content tests). - OpenAPI Bearer description corrected `SHA-256 hashes` → `HMAC-SHA-256 hashes (keyed with API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY)` so the docs match the actual server-side implementation. Wildcard scope contract documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(audit-review): close 4 HIGH + 2 MEDIUM findings from multi-agent review pass Multi-agent review of the audit-fix branch surfaced four HIGH issues and a couple of MEDIUM hardenings. All addressed before merge. HIGH-1 — OpenAPI MetricKind enum drift (iOS strict-decode crash risk). The dashboard-summary route now emits totalBodyWater/boneMass/ oxygenSaturation MetricCards, but the spec still listed only the original 7 kinds. Generated iOS Codable would have crashed the dash the moment a user logged SpO2. MetricKind extended with the 3 new kinds + comment documenting unknown-value defensive decoding. HIGH-2 — kindEnum naming consistency on /api/measurements/series. The series adapter shipped "oxygen" while the dashboard summary used "oxygenSaturation"; both routes now use "oxygenSaturation" so iOS decoders can share a single MetricKind type across endpoints. HIGH-3 — /api/ai/test no-leak guard had no test. Added 4 tests that mock provider errors with sk-leaked-key + provider URLs in the err fields and assert the response body never echoes them, plus the 3-status-categorised generic messages (401/429/5xx/other). HIGH-4 — /api/import 5/hour rate-limit had no test. Added 2 tests that mock checkRateLimit allowed/disallowed and assert the 429 path uses the right key shape (`import:<userId>`, 5, 1h) and that the within- quota path proceeds. MEDIUM-3 — getClientIp under-length XFF chain regression. With TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=2 and a chain of length 1, the previous clamp returned the leftmost (attacker-controlled) entry, silently re-introducing the rotation attack the helper was meant to close. Now: when chain is shorter than configured hops, refuse XFF entirely (fall back to x-real-ip / null). Added regression test. LOW-1 — TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=garbage now throws at boot instead of silently degrading to hops=0. Added regression test. Tests: 358/358 pass (was 350, +8 new). Typecheck clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Marc-André BombeckandClaude Opus 4.7
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54f689247e |
feat(auth): accept Bearer tokens for headless API clients
`requireAuth()` keeps the existing cookie-session path as the primary check; when no session cookie is present it now falls back to validating `Authorization: Bearer hlk_*` against the existing `ApiToken` table (HMAC-SHA-256 hash, expiry + revocation enforced). Behaviour for browser clients is unchanged — the cookie path runs first and short-circuits before the header lookup. `requireAdmin()` stays cookie-only by design. Wide-Event annotation tags `auth_method: "bearer"` so the source is distinguishable in Loki. `auth.bearer.success` and `auth.bearer.failure` audit entries record the token id + reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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908532be73 |
feat(security): SSRF strict IPv4, PAT logging redaction, threshold rate-limit, N+1 fix, pg-boss SIGTERM, blocking CI
Security hardening from 2026-04-26 audit:
- SEC-002: isPublicUrl() now uses a strict IPv4 parser that rejects
leading-zero forms like 010.0.0.1, which historically slipped past
the h.startsWith('10.') check. Also covers CGNAT (100.64/10),
IPv6 unique-local (fc00::/7), and additional metadata-service edge
cases. Documented as input-time only (DNS rebinding still possible
at fetch time).
- SEC-004: GitHub PAT is now redacted from logged error bodies in
publish-github.ts before flowing to Wide Events / Loki. Adds an
escapeRegex helper for safe RegExp construction.
- SEC-006: PUT /api/user/thresholds now goes through checkRateLimit
(30 writes / 5 min, per-user) — audit-log was already there but
unbounded. Makes audit-log enumeration unattractive.
- PERF-001: insights/comprehensive route now batches medication-intake
events into a single 'medicationId IN (...)' query and groups in
memory instead of N+1 per medication. Latency was scaling poorly
for users with many active meds.
- REL-003: pg-boss now installs SIGTERM/SIGINT handlers that call
boss.stop({ graceful: true, timeout: 30s }) so in-flight handlers
drain on docker stop / coolify redeploy instead of being killed.
- LOG-001: Replaced console.log/error in reminder-worker with a
workerLog helper. Lifecycle errors still go to stderr (only audience
outside any handler context); routine init messages are silent
because pg-boss own events + Wide Events from handlers carry the
state.
- CI: ESLint and TypeScript checks are now blocking — continue-on-error
removed. Tests already were. Required pre-existing 'any' types in
api-handler.ts to be properly justified with eslint-disable comments
(Next.js variadic handler signature; the bound type still constrains
return to Promise<Response>).
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Marc-André Bombeck
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0c0c345e82 |
i18n: migrate from German-first to English-first default locale
Switch defaultLocale from "de" to "en" and make English the code-level language throughout. All ~145 hardcoded German strings translated: - API error messages (52 routes) now return English - Zod validation messages in English - Classification/analytics functions return English categories - Notification type labels in English - Component strings use i18n t() calls (heatmap, mood chart, medication form, intake history, password strength, insights card) - ~50 new i18n keys in both de.json and en.json Route migration: - /stimmung → /mood, /zielwerte → /targets (new pages) - 301 redirects in proxy.ts for legacy URLs - Sidebar + bottom nav updated Bump version to 1.0.1. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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38309932f3 |
Initial release v1.0.0
HealthLog — personal health-tracking PWA with weight, blood pressure, pulse, mood tracking, medication compliance, Withings integration, doctor report PDF export, and Dracula-themed UI. |