Output of `node scripts/strip-planning-tags.mjs --write`: 3,157 comment
lines in 1,308 files lose the work-item identifier at their head. Release
versions and issue references stay; nothing outside comment text
changes, which the script checks per file against a comment-free
printout. healthlog/no-planning-tags is enabled at error level with this
commit, so the tree it lands on is clean.
Correlation fixtures wrote minute-long midday sleeps, which the nap
rule now reads as naps; they write nights. The analytics test mocks the
user read the empty recovery reason makes, and the control-byte guard
asserts the size of its sweep.
The latest canonical reading per type ran as `DISTINCT ON (type)` over
every live row of the account in five places (summaries slice warm and
cold path, comprehensive aggregator warm and cold path, targets). With no
skip scan in Postgres 16 that sorted the whole account to keep one row
per type. `readLatestCanonical` drives the read from the type list
instead: one index probe for each type's latest instant, then a closed
one-day window ranked by the source ladder. The closed window also keeps
the plan under `jit_above_cost`. The targets read reuses `readLatestEver`
with a floor.
The summaries slice was built inside three cache cells (the tile-strip
route, the thick analytics body, the dashboard snapshot). It now has one
cell, read through `readSummariesSlice`; composing callers read it
fresh-only so a refresh after a write cannot cache the pre-write slice
again, and the snapshot folds the water tile into a copy instead of the
cached object.
A server that issues Secure session cookies cannot sign anyone in on a
plain http:// page: the browser drops the cookie. The login request was
still verified, the MFA ticket minted and then claimed, and the next
attempt answered "Invalid or expired challenge".
The web client now sends an optional clientTransport on the browser
sign-in requests (password login, passkey start, both MFA completions).
When the server issues Secure cookies and the page is plain http on a
non-loopback host, the request is refused with 409
auth.session.insecure_transport before the password is checked, a
ticket is minted or claimed, a code is spent, or a passkey challenge is
issued. A request without the field is never refused. The SSO start
takes client_proto/client_host and sends such a page back to the login
page instead of to the provider.
GET /api/auth/registration-status publishes sessionCookieSecure, and the
login page shows the reason with both fixes and disables the sign-in
controls before anything is sent; on localhost it shows a note only.
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE keeps its meaning; the header heuristic log line
stays.
The per-account password limit refused every attempt once ten failures
had landed in fifteen minutes, counted before the password was checked.
Ten guesses from two addresses therefore locked a password-only account,
the app's password sign-in included, and repeating them kept it locked
for as long as anyone cared to.
A place the account has signed in from before is now neither counted nor
held back: a remembered browser, a phone presenting the device id a login
of this account was issued to, or an address a session or device login of
this account came from in the last thirty days. Anywhere else gets five
free failures a day and then a wait that doubles with each failure, from
thirty seconds to at most fifteen minutes, instead of a wall. The per-IP
limit is unchanged, and an unknown identifier is limited the same way on
its hash.
Under an SSO-only policy, a password sign-in to an account other than the
one a pending link names is now refused before the password is checked,
so that exception no longer tells right passwords from wrong ones.
Password sign-in was limited per client address only, so guesses spread
over many addresses reached one account without end. Each account now has
its own ceiling of ten failed attempts in fifteen minutes, whichever
addresses they come from. The attempt is counted before the password is
hashed and given back when the password is right, so the owner signing in
does not use it up. An identifier that matches no account is counted under
its hash with the same ceiling, so the refusal does not reveal whether the
account exists. Passkey and single sign-on remain open while the ceiling
is reached.
The login challenge read its attempt count, verified the factor, and only
then incremented. Requests sent in parallel all read the same count below
the cap, so one ticket allowed more guesses than the cap. Each attempt is
now reserved by a single guarded UPDATE before the factor is evaluated,
and a failure only settles the reserved attempt.
Sign-in returned the moment it found no account, or an account carrying
no password hash, before it reached the verifier. An account that did
have a password paid a full Argon2id verification at 19 MiB and t=2. The
three refusals answered with the identical 401 body and three very
different durations, so the clock told an anonymous caller whether an
address is registered and whether it carries a password.
`verifyPasswordOrDummy` verifies against a stand-in hash minted once per
process at the same cost parameters real hashes use, and returns false
whenever there is nothing to verify, so the passkey-only account takes
the same path as one with a password. The dummy arm discards its own
verdict and swallows a throw, so no outcome there can be read as a
success or answer with a different status.
`POST /api/auth/check-user` answered, for any typed identifier and with
no credential at all, whether an account exists and whether it carries a
passkey or a password. Its header called that the intended contract with
the native client; it is not one any more. The native client never calls
it, and no web surface in this repository does either.
Removed without a replacement: the route, its two test files, the
OpenAPI operation and its two schemas, the surface's mention in the
rate-limiter doc comment, the bucket expectation in the auth-surface
rate-limit test, and the login route's comment pointing at it. No stub,
no deprecation shim, no 410 arm — there is no caller to keep.
A refused client had nothing to back off against. `rateLimitHeaders()`
emitted `X-RateLimit-Remaining` and an ISO `X-RateLimit-Reset`, no
`Retry-After` and no cap, and only about 70 of the 199 route files that
consult a limiter attached even those two. The rest answered with a bare
prose envelope, including every endpoint an offline replay queue hits:
the four batch ingests, `/api/sync/changes` and `/api/auth/refresh`. A
first-run Apple Health import trips the 60-per-minute batch ceiling
reliably, and the only strategy left to the client was a blind backoff.
Threading headers through 129 handlers is 129 edits the next new route
forgets, so the verdict is carried instead: `checkRateLimit` records it
in a request-scoped cell and `apiHandler` dresses any 429 that leaves
without headers. A route that already built its own is left alone —
`Retry-After` is the presence test, and it comes from the same builder.
`Retry-After` is whole seconds rounding UP (RFC 9110 §10.2.3), floored
at zero. `X-RateLimit-Limit` is new and needs the cap, so the limiter
result carries it. `X-RateLimit-Reset` keeps its ISO form: it is the
wrong convention for the name, but it is on the wire today and changing
it is a decision of its own.
The cell lives in its own leaf module because 177 test files replace
`@/lib/rate-limit` wholesale with a mock factory, and `apiHandler` must
not depend on anything those factories stand in for.
Both routes 500'd in their unit tests because the change gave them
dependencies the mocks did not know about: the widgets GET reads a module
flag and probes for an SDNN row, and the analytics slim slice resolves the
module map. Neither test mocks `@/lib/modules/gate`, and the widgets test's
prisma double has no `measurement` model — so both calls threw and the
handler answered 500. Real breakage from this branch, not stale
expectations.
The widgets GET no longer resolves the whole module map for one answer.
`hrv` is the only conditionally-dead widget and `recovery` the only module
that decides it, so it reads that one flag through `isModuleEnabled`, the
way this route's neighbours read a single flag.
Both gate mocks spread the real module so only the one call is stubbed;
everything else that imports it keeps live behaviour. The widgets
`beforeEach` states the modules-on default explicitly, because
`resetAllMocks` strips a factory's implementation and every test below
assumes it.
Added coverage for the behaviour itself rather than only unbreaking the
suite: recovery off with no SDNN marks `hrv` unavailable, an account WITH
SDNN keeps the toggle, and recovery on does not run the probe at all — the
one added read on a hot cached route must not touch the common account.
Add an opt-in "remember this device" at the second-factor step. On opt-in
a random token is minted, set in an httpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie,
and only its HMAC hash is stored in a new TrustedDevice table. A later sign-in
from the same browser still requires the password (factor 1); a matching,
unexpired trusted device lets the login skip factor 2 only.
The token is never accepted for step-up — a trusted-device login does not stamp
mfaVerifiedAt — so a stolen device cookie cannot reach a destructive action.
Trusted devices are listed and revocable from the security surface, are revoked
wholesale when the second factor is removed or the user signs out everywhere,
and cascade away on account deletion. A recovery-code login never trusts the
browser. Migration 0204 adds the table (and the instance-wide mfa_required
policy column that the enforcement work reads).
When a password is accepted for an account with a second factor, the
login response carries a single-use ticket instead of a session. The
login page now renders a second step: a TOTP or recovery code, or a
WebAuthn security-key assertion scoped to the account's registered keys.
A WebAuthn-only account (no TOTP) is recognised at the password step and
offered the security-key path.
The security-key verify endpoints validate the open ticket, verify the
assertion against the user's second-factor credentials, and only then
mint the session through the shared login tail, so no session exists
before the factor passes. The login page also arms passkey conditional-UI
autofill on the username field.
When a password is accepted for an account with a confirmed TOTP factor, the
login route no longer mints a session or token. It creates a single-use,
~5-minute MfaChallenge (the opaque ticket is stored only as a hash) and
returns HTTP 200 with data:null, error:null and meta.mfaRequired + mfaTicket +
methods. The client completes the login at POST /api/auth/mfa/verify with the
ticket + a TOTP or recovery code, receiving the exact same token bundle the
password path issues, with the session stamped second-factor-verified.
- The ticket is claimed once, atomically, only after the factor verifies, so
two concurrent submissions can mint at most one session; no session ever
exists before factor two.
- Wrong codes increment the ticket attempt counter and burn it at the cap
(throttle, not an account lock); the anonymous verify surface is also
rate-limited per IP.
- meta.mfaRequired is returned only after a valid password and the
invalid-credentials response is identical regardless of MFA state, so an
attacker without the password cannot enumerate MFA.
- The session/token tail is extracted to login-response.ts and shared by both
the password path and the verify path, keeping the transport contract
identical. OpenAPI registers the verify endpoint, the MFA management
endpoints, and the mfaRequired login variant.
One-shot prettier pass so the new format:check gate starts from a clean
baseline. Formatting only — no behaviour change. Generator-owned and
vendored artifacts stay untouched via .prettierignore.
Deleting a measurement or mood entry can be undone from the toast via
new restore endpoints, dialogs submit on enter with busy states, silent
mutations gain error toasts, and the settings area finishes its
consolidation: provider and integration cards live in focused
subcomponents, every setting persists server-side at exactly one home,
and the save conventions are written down. The remaining raw fetches in
settings move onto the shared client.
v1.4.49 shipped the slim-slice cold-fallback fix but the production HAR
on the new image still showed `GET /api/analytics` at 8 s cold AND the
supposedly-fixed `?slice=summaries` request hit the same 8 s when fired
concurrently. Investigation found the slim slice queues behind the
default slice's per-type live walk: the 15-way `fetchMeasurementSeriesChunked`
fan-out saturates the `p-limit(4)` lanes and packs the 20-slot Prisma
pool for the full ~8 s on Marc's 467 745-row tenant, starving every
other Prisma client (including the concurrent slim slice) until the
walk drains.
The default slice's `summaries` field has been produceable from the
rollup tier for two releases — the slim slice already uses
`computeFromRollups` + a 90-day narrow `$queryRaw` and returns the
identical `DataSummary` shape sub-second. The walk lived on because
two thick-only fields (`anomalyCount`, `avg30LastMonth`) only existed
on the live path. A grep of every consumer in the repo confirmed:
- `anomalyCount`: no consumer reads it from `/api/analytics`. The
insights pipeline pulls it from its own `comprehensive-aggregator`
narrow query. Slim's `0` constant is what the default route's
consumers already received.
- `avg30LastMonth`: read by `src/app/page.tsx:321` (dashboard
comparison tile) and `src/components/insights/vo2-max-chart-row.tsx`.
Easy to lift: extend the slim narrow `$queryRaw` with one extra
FILTER clause for `[30d, 60d)` — the rows are already inside the
90-day outer cap so the planner reads zero additional blocks.
With both fields covered, `buildAnalyticsResponse` calls
`computeSummariesSlice(user.id)` once and uses its `summaries` +
`lastSeenByType` directly. The 15-way fan-out, the chunked walker,
the `ANALYTICS_TYPE_FETCH_CONCURRENCY` p-limit cap, the 425-day
`since` window, and the `meta.analytics.bp_aggregate` annotate all
delete cleanly — none had callers outside the removed code path.
Net diff: -418 LOC across the route + its tests.
Test updates:
- `route.test.ts`: dropped the 130k-row PULSE stress test (was pinning
V8's spread-arg ceiling on the now-deleted JS-side loop) and the
`caps per-type Prisma fan-out at ANALYTICS_TYPE_FETCH_CONCURRENCY`
test (the cap is gone). Added a negative assertion that
`prisma.measurement.findMany` is never called with the chunked-walk
shape `(select.id + source + deviceType, take: 5000)` and a positive
assertion that `avg30LastMonth` reaches the response envelope.
- `since-cap.test.ts`: dropped the `where.measuredAt.gte` per-type
assertion and the `bp_aggregate.live_since` annotation assertion
(both pinned the removed walk). The slim-slice no-per-type-loop
invariant survives.
Final: 5268 unit + integration tests pass, zero failures, lint clean,
typecheck clean.
Eight touch-disjoint waves landed on develop before this release:
- W-INSIGHTS-HOT + W-RECONCILE-INSIGHTS — extract the timeout-stub
persist helper and wire all seven *-status routes through it, closing
the recurring ~14 s warm response the iOS client sees on dashboard
open once the AI provider has stalled once that day.
- W-DELETED-2 — close the remaining three soft-delete reader-tier gaps
(export bundle, gamification achievements, doctor-report aggregator)
with a five-route integration-test pin.
- W-ORG — types consolidation into src/types/analytics.ts and
src/types/backups.ts; prompt directory unification.
- W-FRONTEND-FACTORY — queryKey factory expansion + ESLint rule lift.
- W-IOS-COORD — POST /api/auth/check-user four-branch onboarding
discovery, identifier matched verbatim, per-IP rate-limited.
- W-SIMPLIFIER — today-intake projection helper extract; unused tx?
params dropped; 13 knip-flagged dead exports trimmed.
- W-PERF-OPS — v1.4.39 W-SUM legacy-NULL UNION discovery arm retired.
- W-PROCESS-DOCS — pg.Pool sizing operator doc; ESLint rule
formalisation; knip CI gate staged for v1.4.42 flip.
No migration, no env-var change, no API contract break for iOS v0.5.4.
The new check-user endpoint is an additive surface. AP-2 .p8 key is
installed; SB-5 time-sensitive APNs is live as of this deploy.
pnpm test --run green at 4732 passing / 1 skipped.
pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm knip green.
Eleven touch-disjoint waves landed on develop plus a six-axis QA
reconcile round before tagging. See CHANGELOG.md for the user-facing
prose; this commit message documents the wave + report inventory for
release-management traceability.
Waves shipped (each with a phase report under .planning/):
- phase-W-POOL-v1440-report.md — p-limit(4) wrapper around the
analytics 15-way fan-out + pg.Pool max raised 10 -> 20. Closes the
v1.4.39 empirical-trace finding #1 (Prisma pool starvation).
- phase-W-DELETED-v1440-report.md — 11 reader-tier helpers + 3
integration contracts close audit Critical Finding #3 (soft-delete
invisibility) across dashboard, analytics, summaries, rollup tiers,
and the Coach snapshot path.
- phase-W-INSIGHTS-v1440-report.md — mood-rollup swap on the three
/api/insights/{features,targets,cards} routes plus the
compliance-rollup hook gap closure for bulk-projection mints; the
post-QA reconcile patch closes the six remaining measurement.findMany
sites in the cluster that still leaked tombstoned rows.
- phase-W-INFRA-v1440-report.md — rollup helper umbrella consolidation
under src/lib/rollups/* with zero orphan re-exports; lint, typecheck,
knip, and 93/93 rollup tests green post-restructure.
- phase-W-RSC-v1440-report.md — per-tile Suspense boundaries plus the
queryKey factory-bypass walker test (extended to comparison/ in the
reconcile pass).
- phase-W-PRIVACY-v1440-report.md — bilingual /privacy page with 17
paired-section tests pinning the 9 SB-3 disclosure requirements.
- phase-W-AASA-v1440-report.md — /.well-known/apple-app-site-association
endpoint pinned to S8WDX4W5KX.dev.healthlog.app with app-ID parity
assertions guarding against split rotation.
- phase-W-APNS-NOTIFY-v1440-report.md — MEDICATION_REMINDER
time-sensitive APNs payload (priority 10 + interruption-level)
scoped via a parameterised test that pins all 6 other event-types
do not bypass Focus. AP-2 .p8 install gates real delivery.
- phase-W-CONSENT-v1440-report.md — AI consent receipts CRUD with
append-only invariant pinned in test; revoke-then-regrant leaves
both rows; idempotent DELETE returns 200 + receipt: null.
- phase-W-WMY-WIRE-v1440-report.md — three previously-dead WMY readers
(week/month/year) wired through summaries-slice and
health-score-fast-path with a linear-composability parity test
pinning the cross-consumer routing contract.
- phase-W-GHOSTS-v1440-report.md — ~1 177 lines of dead code removed
across 9 atomic commits; startOfUtcDay + wallClockInTz consolidation
eliminates a sibling-drift risk; knip whitelist trimmed to three
files pending follow-up.
QA reconcile patches applied per the v1.4.40 QA round (six reports
under .planning/round-v1440-QA-*-findings.md):
- senior C1 — dashboard-suspense-boundaries regex aligned with the
post-W-INFRA Thread 2 userTimezone-local lift.
- senior H1 — soft-delete filter added to the six remaining
insights measurement.findMany sites.
- specialist H1 — Promise.allSettled around bulk-projection
compliance recompute on both /api/medications/intake and
/api/dashboard/summary.
- ux H1 — compare-toggle migrated to queryKeys.dashboardWidgets
factory; walker test extended to src/components/comparison/.
- security M1 — consent artefact 64 KB cap enforced via
Buffer.byteLength (UTF-8 bytes, not UTF-16 code units).
Quality gates green at tag: pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm knip
--include files,dependencies,binaries,unlisted, pnpm test --run
(4726 passing / 1 skipped). Tests 4525 -> 4726 unit + 1 skipped over
the v1.4.39 -> v1.4.40 span.
User-facing prose: see CHANGELOG.md.
Squashed merge of the v1.4.39 wave work from develop. The release
extends the v1.4.38 fast-path posture to two more endpoints that
still walked the source table on every cold mount and folds a
cumulative `sum_value` column into the existing rollup tier so step /
flight / distance / daylight / active-energy sparklines no longer
re-derive their daily totals in Node.
Raw measurements / mood_entries / medication_intake_events tables are
byte-unchanged. Three new tiers (mood_entry_rollups,
medication_compliance_rollups, measurement_rollups.sum_value) are
derived caches that self-heal via boot-time backfill on first reach.
Migrations 0070, 0071, 0072 are additive only. The sum_value column
add is catalog-only DDL on PostgreSQL 11+ — no table rewrite, writes
resume in milliseconds. No environment-variable change. No API
contract break. No iOS contract change.
Expected wins (live perf-verify rides the post-deploy window):
- /api/mood/analytics cold 12.7 s -> ~200 ms
- /api/medications/intake?scope=compliance cold 3.2 s -> ~200 ms
- /api/dashboard/summary cumulative sparkline ~500 ms -> ~300 ms
- /api/analytics live-fallback row cap 347 k -> ~5 k (425 d cap
preserves the year-ago baseline tile)
Tests 4 524 -> 4 640 (+116). Typecheck clean. Lint clean.
See CHANGELOG.md for the full v1.4.39 entry.
Marc-André Bombeck