Adds the structural guard that freezes the exact route set an elevation can
unlock, plus the behavioural suite that drives each threat case against a real
Postgres: a token alone mints nothing, an elevation minted for one token is
refused for another (same account included), a second redemption fails, a
concurrent redemption lets exactly one winner through, an expired one is
refused, an elevation never reaches requireAdmin, a wrong password is throttled
and audited without saying what was wrong, and the cookie flow is untouched.
The OpenAPI registry carries both new routes and names the accepting set in
prose, so the client implements against the contract rather than against a
description of it.
Second-factor management has been cookie-only since v1.23. The gate is right:
a Bearer token is a credential whose provenance the server cannot see, and
tearing down a second factor must not be reachable from the weaker of an
interactive login and a value pasted into a script. What was missing was never
Bearer access to those routes — it was a way to say, over a transport with no
session row, that the human holding this device just re-proved a factor.
An elevation is that proof. It is minted only against a re-proved account
password or primary passkey, bound to the exact token that re-proved, single-use
via a conditional UPDATE, five-minute-lived to match the cookie path's step-up
window, and stored hashed. A stolen token mints nothing; a second token cannot
redeem another's elevation; a password change drops every one the account holds.
requireMfaManagementAuth is the one gate the management routes share. On a
cookie session it delegates to the original helpers unchanged, so the web flow
runs the code it always did. requireAdmin stays cookie-only and out of reach.
Also closes the device list's exposure of the same value, refuses a
cross-device refresh rotation, replaces a vacuous expiry test with one
that fails when the check is removed, and asserts the Nightscout host
guard at save time rather than relying on the probe's placement.
The settings mount fires an idempotent consent heal so an account that
predates the gate does not fall into the no-key state. It looked only for
an active receipt, so a deliberate withdrawal — which sets revokedAt —
read the same as never having consented, and the next visit to the AI
settings granted again, writing an audit row for an act the user never
performed. GDPR Art. 7 (3) puts withdrawal on the same footing as the
grant; one undone by a page load is not a withdrawal.
The mint now distinguishes the two callers. The mount heal grants only to
an account with no consent history at all and leaves a revocation
standing; switching document auto-read on is the consent act itself and
may supersede an earlier revocation. The revocation is re-checked inside
the transaction so a withdrawal landing mid-mint is not overwritten.
The revoke endpoint has existed since v1.4.40 but only the native client
called it: on the web, consent could be given and never taken back. The
AI settings now carry the standing decision and the control that changes
it, in all six languages.
The cookie was the Session row's cuid. cuid is built for collision-
resistant identity across distributed writers, not for unguessability —
it encodes a millisecond timestamp and a process-local counter and never
touches a CSPRNG. A session cookie is a bearer credential and has to be
unguessable, so it now carries 32 random bytes and only the HMAC of that
value is stored, matching how api_tokens and refresh_tokens already hold
their secrets.
Compatibility is passive, and deliberately so. A backfill cannot help:
the cookie already sitting in a browser is the cuid, and nothing we
generate server-side can be pushed into it — backfilling would sign
everyone out at deploy. Upgrading a row in place on first use loses to
the parallel requests a single page load fires: each mints its own
secret, one write wins, and the losers cannot re-emit the winner's
secret because only a hash is stored, so the browser can end up holding
a value the row does not honour. Instead, rows minted before the column
keep a NULL token_hash and stay resolvable by id, and are denied the
sliding-expiry extension so they drain within the 30-day session
lifetime. Every login from this release forward is on a secret at once,
and an id stops authenticating the moment its row holds one.
Note for operators: API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY now also keys session cookies, so
rotating it signs browser sessions out as well as invalidating tokens.
It is already Core-required, so no deployment gains a new prerequisite.
Egress was already correct — the client fetches through safeFetch with
requirePublicHost pinned off the user's opt-in, manual redirects and a
timeout — but the check on the value we STORE was only a side effect of
the live probe the connect route happens to run first. That makes the
guard contingent on the probe's placement rather than on the input.
Run isPublicUrl at input time, gated on the same self-hoster opt-in, so
the URL that gets encrypted onto the row is the URL that was validated.
Cover the alt-notation classes the helper knows about; each case asserts
the probe was never reached, which is what distinguishes the input-time
refusal from the fetch-time one.
Rotation refused a replayed token under a spoofed device id (M-4) but
still rotated a *live* one presented from a different device, and then
inherited the caller's id onto the new row — putting the resulting family
outside the victim device's containment scope. Refuse the mismatch
outright when both ids are present; an absent id on either side stays
unattributable and rotates as before, so a client that sends no
X-Device-Id is not locked out.
The expiry refusal had no coverage at all: the standing test presented a
token that was never issued, so it passed on not_found and stayed green
with the expiry branch deleted. Replace it with the real secret plus a
just-inside-the-window companion, and cover the device binding.
Field-by-field comparison of the handlers against the registered Zod
schemas across measurements, workouts, medications, daily and auth. The
spec was corrected to match the handlers; no runtime behaviour changed.
Measurements:
- GET /api/measurements returns `{ measurements, meta: { total, limit,
offset, … } }` on all seven of its modes. The spec claimed a top-level
`total` that no arm has ever emitted.
- The list rows are stored rows minus the notes ciphertext, or synthesised
day-sum / sleep-segment rows, or pre-folded aggregate buckets. The
resource declared seven fields; the rest are now on the wire contract.
- POST accepts a bare ARRAY body (the combined blood-pressure write) and
answers with an array, and returns 409 on the dedup index.
- GET/PUT/DELETE /api/measurements/{id} carried no path entry at all.
Workouts: both GET operations run the module gate and answer 403
`module.disabled`; the reusable block existed but was never spread. The
batch ingest stays deliberately ungated and undocumented for it.
Medications: `nextDueAt` / `nextDueOverdue` are computed by the read paths
and absent from the create/update results, so they cannot be required on
the shared shape (the list row keeps them required). `stockUnitsRemaining`
sums a Decimal(12,4) and is fractional, not an integer. The cadence chips
object documented four fields that do not exist and missed the five that
do. `IntakeSource` admits APPLE_HEALTH.
Auth: the token bundle had its optionality inverted — `user` is always
returned, the token pair only for native callers. Adds the undocumented
403 `oidc_only`, the passkey 403/404, the TOTP enrolment 409s, the
attestation 400, the no-key-registered 409, the security-key 404s, the
refresh `revoke` response shape, and the path/query parameters three
operations read but never declared.
Daily was checked and is accurate; so are the batch ingest, series,
series-batch, bulk-delete, restore and by-external-ids routes.
persistRollupRows scoped its delete to the [min, max] bucket range of the rows
the aggregate RETURNED. That made the repair self-limiting in exactly the case
that needs it: a recompute could only overwrite a bucket the live aggregate
still produces, so a bucket whose source rows had all gone was never in the
delete range and kept its stale aggregate.
Three shapes of the same hole. An empty aggregate skipped the write entirely
(the caller short-circuited on rows.length === 0). A returned range narrower
than the requested window left the edge buckets untouched. A type that lost
every reading in the window dropped out of the returned rows, so the per-type
delete filter could never reach it.
The DAY write hook masked it — it deletes its own bucket by hand when the day
empties — but nothing covered the WEEK / MONTH / YEAR worker, which recomputes
one bucket span at a time: deleting the last reading of a type in a week
dropped the DAY bucket and left the coarser ones stale forever. The coverage
probe still reported hasBuckets = true, so the read-swap served them.
A recompute now prunes the window it was asked for and writes its rows in the
same transaction. The single-bucket write hook keeps its own scope, which is
correct there because it already deletes its bucket when the aggregate empties.
Still one tier: the rollup replaces the legacy read and falls back to live SQL
only on a coverage miss.
The per-document summary job is enqueued at upload time and no-ops while the
documentsAutoAiRead opt-in is OFF. Nothing ever re-enqueued it, so the switch
only applied to documents uploaded AFTER the flip — a user who filled the vault
first and opted in later had documents that would never be read, and the
setting looked inert.
A genuine OFF->ON transition now schedules one bounded catch-up pass over the
user's un-summarised documents. It grants nothing of its own: it only enqueues
the ordinary summary job, which still re-reads the opt-in, re-asserts the
per-document egress consent and reserves the daily token budget. The pass
itself re-reads the opt-in first, so a toggle flipped back OFF before it runs
egresses nothing.
Bounded by an id-cursor walk capped at 200 documents per pass (a summary is a
provider call, unlike the local-compute thumbnail backfill). Idempotent at four
levels: the trigger fires only on a real transition, the per-user singleton
collapses a double toggle, the candidate set excludes summarised documents, and
the summary job skips one that already has a summary.
Every staged fact carried a sourceText the model echoed back, stored verbatim
as 'the exact verbatim span of the document the fact came from'. Nothing
checked that the span existed. A paraphrase, a normalised rendering, or an
outright invention was persisted and shown to the reviewer as a transcription
of their own clinical record — an anchor pointing at nothing, or at a span the
document never contained.
Treat the echo as a lookup key instead. anchorSourceText resolves it against
the extracted text (exact, then whitespace-collapsed and case-folded to absorb
OCR reflow) and stores the span the document actually carries, with its offset.
A quote that matches nothing is dropped and the fact is flagged unanchored;
vision mode has no extracted text at all, so its facts are unanchored by
construction. Rows written before this resolve to unanchored on read — their
quote is preserved but never presented as checked.
The retry suffix still described the strict insight wrapper that was removed
long ago: it demanded citations[] and warnings[] — fields insightResultSchema
does not have — required metricSource, rationale, id and severity on every
recommendation when all four are optional, and named none of the five fields
the live schema actually requires (classification, findings, correlations,
dataQuality, disclaimer).
So the one corrective pass steered the model away from the contract it was
being corrected towards. A reply that obeyed the correction could not
validate, fell through parseComprehensiveResult's raw-object escape hatch,
and the downstream surfaces read an unvalidated payload.
Describe insightResultSchema and nothing else, and carry the contract as data
in RETRY_CONTRACT_EXAMPLE so a test can assert prompt and validator agree.
The dashboard, Insights, the workouts list, the medications list and the
Coach server-prefetch their data and serialise one account's health record
into the HTML document through a TanStack HydrationBoundary. Those pages
are dynamic today only as a side effect of reading the session cookie —
a property of the page code, not a guarantee. A stray revalidate export, a
force-static segment, or a caching proxy in front of the app would be
enough to retain one account's record and hand it to the next caller.
Stamp `Cache-Control: private, no-store` at the edge instead, driven by the
same predicate that governs the auth redirect, so a page cannot be
session-gated without also being uncacheable. Public legal, auth and
locale-catalog surfaces keep their cacheable posture; API routes keep
managing their own caching.
Two guards: the proxy test pins the header on gated pages and its absence
on the public ones, and a structural test walks the app tree and refuses a
prefetching page that sits on a public path or opts into static /
revalidated rendering.
A READY row whose ciphertext will not open reports UNAVAILABLE, so the view
does not render a heading over nothing. Nothing asserted that, and removing the
degrade left the suite green.
Opening a document said "the summary is being prepared" and kept saying it.
The view had one fallback for a null summary column and used it for every
outcome: a document nobody ever enqueued, a missing vision provider, a spent
budget, a withdrawn consent, an unreadable file, a provider error, and a
summary the outbound screen withheld all rendered as work in progress.
The common case is not the screen. The background job is enqueued at exactly
one place — a fresh upload with the auto-read opt-in already on — and no
backfill reaches anything else. Every document uploaded before the toggle went
on has a null column no job will ever fill, and the view promised all of them a
summary that was never coming.
Record the outcome as `summary_state` (migration 0254, additive, defaults to
NONE which is truthful for every existing row) and branch on it. Only PENDING,
set when a job genuinely exists, may claim generation is running. NONE,
WITHHELD and UNAVAILABLE each say what happened and offer to generate one.
The withhold keeps its rule and loses its dead end. Blocked prose is still
never shown and never stored — only the fact of the refusal is kept, and it is
no longer terminal, so asking again re-runs the gauntlet. That was the original
intent; leaving the column null defeated it, because null read as "generating"
and the guard meant nothing would ever overwrite it.
The on-demand summary now persists what it produces. It is the only repair path
for the documents the job never ran for, and re-deriving the same paragraph on
every open costs a provider call for nothing. Generation is still only ever a
click — nothing runs because a view rendered. Transcription stays session-only.
Also drop the "read by AI" line from the detail footer.
The Today hero carried a read-the-full-briefing link to /insights while
the health-score ring above it already opened the same page — two doors
to one room in a single card. The ring stays; the link and its six
locale strings are gone.
The document sheet's close control sat at the plain p-4 right edge, but
an icon button carries its own inner inset, so the glyph landed ~28px
from the frame against a title starting at 16px. Trim the right padding
by that inset when a consumer renders its own trailing control, leaving
the tap target reaching the frame.
Also rewrites the v1.30.15-v1.30.31 changelog entries: they had drifted
into summary lines, internal vocabulary and reasoning asides that do not
belong in a release note.
The Today hero stayed on its all-clear line while a dose was actually due:
the dose-window item only fired once the slot was already overdue, so a
dose the user could take right now produced no rail item at all. Emit the
item from the moment the dose becomes takeable — the on-time window's lead
plus the early grace, the same instant logging it starts crediting the
slot — and give the two faces distinct wording and status: a due dose reads
calm and informational, an overdue one keeps the warning. A settled day
still emits nothing, and a cached block whose anchor has since passed keeps
rendering neither face. Push reminders are untouched; they still fire only
on overdue.
The briefing grounding gate discarded the whole block over one number it
could not verify, and it could not verify plenty of legitimate ones: the
allow-set was a hand-maintained list of feature blocks that had already
drifted from the prompt three times, and still omitted medication
compliance, the context counters, the correlation coefficients, every
coverage object and the comparison snapshot — all of which the prompt hands
the model verbatim. Derive the allow-set by walking the prompt payload
instead, so grounded means exactly what it says: a figure the server gave
the model. A fabricated number still matches nothing.
Fix the disposal to match. A content-failed retry left a hole while a
transport-failed one fell back to the previous cached briefing, though in
both cases the rejected text is discarded and the previous briefing passed
this same gate when it was written. Fall back on both paths, and only
report the briefing as withheld when there is genuinely nothing to show.
The on-demand route had no fallback at all; it now mirrors the background
generator that writes the same cached payload.
With the error notice hoisted to the page, the three cards fell through
to their skeleton on a failed read — a spinner that can never resolve.
Return null instead, so a card rendered outside the page's gate is still
honest about having nothing to show.
The rhythm, average-sleep and chronotype cards on /insights/sleep share
a single ["sleep-rhythm"] read, and each rendered its own copy of the
same failure sentence — so one failed read painted the identical notice
three times, none of them offering a way to try again.
The page owns the shared state now: one notice with a retry in place of
the card row. The cards keep their loading and empty handling and drop
the duplicated error branch.
Importing the plural helper directly from the dashboard trend tile cost
~78 KB gz across the route chunks: the module is tiny, but a new edge
from a widely-instantiated component gets duplicated into every chunk
that contains it rather than hoisted. The provider is already in every
chunk, so expose a plural-aware tCount() there and let components call
that instead. Total client JS goes back under budget.
Also fix the two tests the honest-loading-state change invalidated: the
mental-wellbeing landing tests seeded a never-resolving read and so now
render skeletons rather than instrument cards, and the achievements page
needs a router in scope for its module-gate redirect.
The reminder, coach and plural fixes were pinned; the three formatter
fixes were not. Add the duration abbreviations across all six locales
and a structural check that the cycle calendar, device-score tile and
sleep-stage axis pass a resolved app locale to Intl rather than
undefined, which silently resolves to the browser locale.
"No data yet" is a claim about the user's record. Making it when the
read failed states something false about their health history.
The mental-wellbeing surface was the one that mattered: the assessment
history read dropped isError entirely, so a failure left both
instrument cards showing "not taken yet" and the detail sheet showing
an empty trend. Someone with months of screening results was told, on
a mental-health surface, that the results did not exist. It now tells
loading, failed and genuinely empty apart, with a retry on the failure.
Also swept:
- the workouts insights page read isEmpty but not isError, so a failed
list read fell through every branch to null and painted a titled
shell with nothing in it;
- the micronutrients card (not in the original list) rendered its "no
nutrient data" empty state on a failed read, while its sibling
hydration card already used the shared error card;
- the medication detail page and the custom-metric values list showed
an honest error with no way out. Both keep retry: false — right for
a deleted row, wrong for a transient failure — and gain a
user-initiated retry instead, which cannot storm;
- /achievements rendered a blank page on a direct hit with the module
disabled. It now bounces to /insights like every other gated page.
The achievements query error branch, the custom-metric error branch and
the chronotype notice were already correct and are left alone.
Four locales received English on surfaces whose translations were
already complete, because the resolving code was a de/en binary.
- Medication reminder push and the Telegram inline-keyboard labels
admitted only de/en, so es/fr/it/pl got the English template on every
channel. Route the resolver through a shared coerceLocale().
- The Coach's trailing "reply now in X" clause said English for any
non-German locale, overriding the correct system-prompt directive.
Read the language name from a shared map instead.
- Coach refusal copy was a de/en constant pair, answering four locales
in English at the one turn the Coach is declining to help. Move the
copy into the bundles; the EN/DE constants now derive from them.
- The sleep-stage chart formatted axis ticks as en-US for four locales;
the cycle calendar and the device-score tile followed the *browser*
locale rather than the app locale.
- Three components carried a byte-identical duration formatter that
branched on German. Lift it to one key-driven helper.
Polish needs a third plural tier: 2-4 takes a "few" form a two-form
scheme cannot express, so "2 godzin temu" read as "2 of-hours ago".
Add a pluralKey() helper driven by Intl.PluralRules and a Few tier to
the relative-time and stale-hint keys. The five locales whose rules
have no "few" category resolve exactly as before by construction, and
their Few values mirror Other. Teach the reverse-coverage guard to
expand a pluralKey() base into its three tiers.
generateInsight() parsed against the strict aiInsightResponseSchema,
cross-checked that every recommendation's metricSource appeared in
citations[], and threw InsightSchemaError on a second failure. Its only
caller was runWithFallback(), which had no production caller — every
live surface runs runRawCompletionWithFallback. So none of it executed.
Wiring it into the live path was the alternative and it is not viable:
the live insightResultSchema has no citations[] field at all and treats
metricSource as optional, so the cross-check would have rejected
essentially every generation rather than tightening anything.
Removed: runWithFallback and its param/result types, generateInsight
and its private helpers, findUncitedRecommendations,
findRecommendationsMissingRationale, the never-thrown InsightSchemaError
and the isHardProviderFailure branch that excluded it, and
computeConfidence — a deterministic override that only ran inside the
dead wrapper.
Kept: buildRetryCorrectionMessage, which comprehensive-generate sends on
its own retry leg; the file it lived in is renamed to match what it now
holds. aiInsightResponseSchema stays as the shape that message
describes. Note the retry prompt asks for a stricter payload than the
live validator requires — that mismatch predates this and is left alone.
computeCitationCoverage is untouched and still live: it is a metric, not
a gate, and v1.30.24 wired it into the comprehensive post-parse step.
Chain-runner coverage the deleted tests carried (last-working cache,
empty-input guard) is ported onto runRawCompletionWithFallback, which
shares the machinery.
Three things the write surface claimed but did not hold.
Scope: the run bodies never re-checked ctx.canWrite. Enforcement was
real but lived entirely in the registration decision, and the test
asserted registration only — so a refactor that registered the write
tools unconditionally and meant to refuse at call time would open the
surface with the suite still green. Wrap every run body in a scope
guard at the registry level, so a new write tool inherits it, and drive
the run bodies directly from a read-only context in the test.
Free text: medication names, doses, treatment classes and lab analyte
names were interpolated into tool prose with no delimiter. A lab
analyte name is transcribed out of an uploaded document, so a hostile
document chooses it, and the write tools ride the same wire. Fence the
assembled prose with the shared data-fence markers and scrub short
result titles, which would leak markers into a host's result list.
Confirm: the header called the confirm flag a PROTOCOL-LEVEL CONFIRM
GATE. It is a client-asserted boolean with nothing binding it to a
prior preview. Binding it to a server-issued preview token would prove
only that a preview call happened, which any client can do, so it buys
no human-in-the-loop for a round trip and server state the stateless
transport does not want. Describe it as the convention it is and name
what actually bounds the blast radius.
enforceBudget and recordSpend have no callers left. Both defects they
carried recurred every time a surface copied them: a TOCTOU window
between the read and the bump, and a cap parameter defaulting to the
operator ceiling so an omitted argument rationed a self-hoster paying
for their own key. Deleting them means a future surface cannot reach
for the older, simpler-looking helper and reintroduce either.
getDailyTokenSpend goes with them — it existed to feed the read half.
The ledger-poisoning clamps recordSpend carried (NaN, negative,
fractional token counts) move to reserveBudget, where the property now
lives. Refresh the doc comments that still narrated the old flow.
The route used the enforceBudget + recordSpend read-then-write pair and
passed no cap, so every call measured against the operator ceiling — a
self-hoster on their own key was rationed by the operator's bill while
paying for their own usage. It also left the TOCTOU window the rest of
the codebase closed: concurrent calls could each read a sub-cap total
and all proceed.
Move the gate after the chain resolves and reserve atomically against
resolveDailyCap(chain), matching runStatusCompletion and the document
paths. Reconcile on every exit: the provider's reported count on a
completed call, a full refund when nothing was generated.
Pin the four guarantees at the new chokepoint and at both call sites: spend
lands on the ledger, over-cap is refused before any egress, a BYOK chain is
measured against the user-plan ceiling rather than the operator's, and a
failed call refunds in full. Also pin the ordering the consent gate depends
on — a consent-blocked user is never charged.
The fixture described a clean resting series but supplied rows for only
twenty of the thirty days it fed PULSE for. Now that the resolver merges
per day, the ten resting-free days are estimated from their own readings
— and on a day whose only readings are a 150 bpm workout the honest
estimate falls outside the band. Match the spans so the case tests what
its name claims; gap-day behaviour is pinned in resting-pulse.test.ts.
The status tier funnels every generation through runStatusCompletion, which
reserves against the day's ledger before egress and reconciles after. The
comprehensive briefing did not: the shared generator and the on-demand
POST /api/insights/generate route both called the provider chain directly, so
none of that spend reached coach_usage and no daily ceiling applied to it.
Route every briefing provider call — first pass, JSON-shape retry,
grounding-correction retry, and the daily paragraph re-roll — through one
chokepoint that reuses reserveBudget / reconcileSpend and resolveDailyCap. The
reservation lands after the consent gate, so a consent-blocked user is never
charged, and a failed or timed-out call is refunded in full.
Over-cap is a typed skipped outcome for the off-request generator (no upstream
fault to retry against, so no failure marker and no retry enqueue) and a 429
for the on-demand route.
Each case fails on the pre-fix code: the rollup tests on an unaligned
recompute window, the batch tests on the older stats: snapshot winning,
and the resting test on a series that stops at the fold horizon.
resolveRestingPulseSeries returned the resting branch as soon as a
single RESTING_HEART_RATE row existed and never consulted the PULSE
proxy again. Since the retention fold began minting derived resting
rows for the days it folds, a proxy account carries derived rows for
old folded days and nothing but raw PULSE for the recent ones — so the
visible series stopped dead at the fold horizon.
Merge per day instead: a day with a resting row uses it, a day without
falls back to the proxy. which stays a three-value labelling signal and
reports proxy as soon as one point is estimated, so a partly-estimated
series is never labelled resting heart rate.
Widen the intraday baseline read to pull PULSE history when the newest
resting row is stale, not only when the rows are few — the count gate
alone pinned the baseline to the fold horizon.
Two entries carrying the same stats: key in one batch both miss the
existing-row probe, so the overwrite branch never runs, both land in the
bulk insert, and skipDuplicates keeps whichever the unique index saw
first. The older snapshot of a per-day cumulative total or of a filling
ten-minute heart-rate bucket therefore won and the newer, larger figure
was dropped silently — both entries reported inserted, the counters
still summed, and the client checkpointed past both.
stats: rows carry overwrite semantics by contract, so within one batch
the last entry for a key is the authoritative one. Resolve it up front
and report the superseded earlier entries as duplicate with a
superseded_in_batch reason, a status the client already checkpoints
past.
recomputeUserRollups filtered measurements by a caller-supplied from/to
but grouped them by date_trunc, and persistRollupRows then deletes every
rollup row in the bucket range it is about to write. A from that landed
mid-bucket therefore replaced a complete bucket with an aggregate
computed only from the readings after that instant.
Every caller passes a moving instant — now minus ninety days on the
read-path refresh, an arbitrary instant on the coverage fallback, now
minus five years on the boot backfill and the restore path — so a
different oldest bucket was corrupted on each invocation and nothing
repaired it. Snap both edges out to whole buckets via bucketSpan, whose
own contract note already required exactly this of every recompute.
Marc-André Bombeck