An account created through OIDC holds no password, passkey or second
factor, so the recent-proof gate in front of token minting, MCP
connections, exports and the admin reset had nothing to ask it for and
the web could only say "sign in again" (#1296).
GET /api/auth/oidc/reproof sends the browser back to the configured
provider with prompt=login and max_age=0, its own state, nonce and PKCE
verifier, and the signed-in account and session sealed into the state
cookie. The shared callback branches on that intent: it refuses unless
the browser still carries the bound session (checked before the code is
redeemed), the ID token names the account's linked issuer and subject,
and auth_time lies inside the gate's five-minute window. It then stamps
Session.reproofAt exactly as a password re-proof does, creates no
session, and returns to the page it left with ?reproof=done|failed.
recentProofMethods offers "oidc" only to an account without a second
factor whose identity is linked while a provider is configured, and the
fresh-factor gate never lists it. GET /api/auth/me/mfa publishes the
list as proofMethods, so the passkey card offers what the account can
actually give, and register-options takes { method: "oidc" } on a fresh
provider re-proof, so such an account can add a passkey as a second way
to confirm. Both re-proof dialogs offer the provider and a toast reports
the outcome on return.
The callback's missing-state branch and the passkey card's enrollment
flow move into their own functions to keep both handlers under the size
ratchet.
Settings now reads as nine groups: Account, Tracking, Arrangement,
Notifications, Health profile, AI, Connections, Data and System. On a
phone one button names the current section and opens the grouped list,
replacing the strip of every section.
What moved, every old address still working:
- Sessions, trusted devices and security activity sit under Security;
the privacy page anchors forward there.
- Notifications holds every reminder kind: the Coach nudges and the
checkup reminder switches joined, and a card names the reminders set
where their subject lives (dose times, cycle reminders).
- Arrangement holds order and view only. Mood tags, the labs biomarker
catalog and on-device text recognition, and the injection sites live on
module pages under /settings/modules/<id>, linked from each Modules row
and from the module's own wrench. /settings/layout/mood redirects.
- The timezone saves on change in the Display card, with a one-tap offer
of the device zone.
- Screening hints sit beside the life circumstances they come from.
- System gains Preview features with the Topics switch.
Duplicates: the Coach and MCP pages show their state and link to the one
switch in Modules (turning MCP off keeps tokens), the Coach overlay shows
the provider and model with a link to Settings > AI instead of a second
set of selects, and the privacy page drops its copy of the export links.
A guard walks every historical /settings address through the redirects
and every forwarded anchor to a page that renders.
A browser session on its own could start TOTP enrollment or register a
security key. Combined with a pending secret counting as a factor, that let
a stolen session give itself a second factor, register a passkey with it,
and keep access after the owner changed the password.
TOTP setup and security-key registration now pass on the cookie path only
when the session signed in or completed a second factor in the last five
minutes, or when the body carries a proof in the step-up shape (password,
a confirmed authenticator code, or a passkey or security-key assertion).
The settings cards ask for that proof when the server answers
auth.reproof.required and retry the same call with it. The Bearer path is
unchanged: its elevation already is the proof.
Every route that checks a password or a factor as a re-proof now uses one
verifier and one per-account budget of five attempts per fifteen minutes,
shared with the step-up mint, and records each refused proof as
auth.mfa.failed. Passkey enrollment and password change had neither the
limit (passkey enrollment) nor the audit row (both). A structural test
freezes the set of credential-verifying routes and requires a throttle and
an audit call in each.
Security now reads authenticator, then security keys, then passkeys,
then the password — the password card was mounted first. Keep it outside
the factor-status conditional so a stalled MFA read never takes it down;
it just renders last instead of first. A source-order guard pins the
sequence, since this class of ordering regression is easy to miss.
Two cards on Settings → Account were asking questions that already have a
home somewhere else.
- cycle tracking is a module, and the Modules hub carries the switch that
drives the same `cycleTrackingEnabled` column. The Account card was a
second door to one decision, so it goes, and the "manage in Account"
deep-link beside the module switch goes with it. That link pointed at a
`#cycle-tracking` anchor no element ever rendered, so it never landed
anywhere in the first place
- changing a password belongs with the second factors and the passkeys.
The card moves to Settings → Security and leads that page. It renders
before the factor status resolves: it is now the only way to change a
password and must not depend on a read it does not need
Account keeps the profile, the photo, the identity fields and the AI
context. The `settings.cycleTracking.*` strings leave all six bundles.
Revert the nine-group consolidation and the card relocations back to the
flat sidebar: sessions, trusted devices, and login activity return to
Privacy, and account deletion returns inline under Advanced. Drop the
/settings/layout redirect and the now-unused group and sign-in cross-link
i18n keys across all six locales.
Keep the collapse-by-default sessions and activity cards, the medical-history
cross-link from "About me", and the chronic-conditions consolidation.
Follow-ups on the v1.25.1 settings group consolidation.
- Sign-in security is no longer split across two top-level groups. Active
sessions, trusted devices, and the login-activity feed move into Account
> Security alongside the second-factor and passkey controls, so every
"who can sign in as me" control sits in one place. The Data & Privacy
pane keeps the data / retention / encryption story and cross-links to
the security home. Sessions and activity are no longer duplicated on the
Profile tab.
- First-child sub-tabs no longer repeat their group name: the section
titles become "Profile & preferences", "Connections", and
"Privacy & retention" across all six locales.
- Account deletion moves out of Advanced into the Account group as a
standalone card; research mode and the data reset stay in Advanced.
- Disambiguate the Spanish labels for the health record vs medical
history (they both read "Historial médico"); medical history becomes
"Antecedentes médicos".
- The section heading carries its id on a single breakpoint instance to
clear a duplicate-id-aria violation; the focus hook keeps targeting
both instances and picks the visible one.
- The in-page sub-tab strip scrolls its active tab into view on a narrow
viewport, matching the group strip.
- Redirect /settings/layout to the Display landing now that nothing links
to the old personalisation hub.
- Note in code that delivery channels deliberately stay under
Integrations (a channel is a delivery provider).
Trusted devices was mounted on both the Security section and the Privacy
dashboard. Keep it only on the Privacy dashboard, which already gathers sessions
and security activity, and drop it from the Security section. While here: the
Retention card painted an empty list while the privacy summary was loading and
on error — give it a skeleton placeholder and a one-line fallback, and align the
"What's stored" indentation with the other privacy cards.
Add an opt-in "remember this device" at the second-factor step. On opt-in
a random token is minted, set in an httpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie,
and only its HMAC hash is stored in a new TrustedDevice table. A later sign-in
from the same browser still requires the password (factor 1); a matching,
unexpired trusted device lets the login skip factor 2 only.
The token is never accepted for step-up — a trusted-device login does not stamp
mfaVerifiedAt — so a stolen device cookie cannot reach a destructive action.
Trusted devices are listed and revocable from the security surface, are revoked
wholesale when the second factor is removed or the user signs out everywhere,
and cascade away on account deletion. A recovery-code login never trusts the
browser. Migration 0204 adds the table (and the instance-wide mfa_required
policy column that the enforcement work reads).
Introduce a dedicated /settings/security section that gathers every
account-protection control in one place: TOTP enrolment (QR plus manual
secret, confirm, recovery codes shown once with copy and download),
WebAuthn security keys as a second factor (register, list with last-used,
rename, step-up-gated removal), recovery-code count and regeneration, and
primary passkey management.
The second-factor WebAuthn path keeps its own credential store, separate
from primary passkeys, and uses non-resident keys so an account can hold
many. Relying-party resolution is shared with the passkey path. A status
endpoint backs the hub; the step-up gate now recognises a registered
security key as an active second factor so a WebAuthn-only account can
still reach the gated actions.
Marc-André Bombeck