A content-index attempt that failed (raster failure, a scan with no
text layer, a provider error) recorded its reason only in the server's
observability stream. In the vault, hasContentIndex false looked
identical for a document nobody ever tried and one that failed three
times, and the detail sheet had nothing to say about either.
Apply the summaryState pattern to the index. Two additive columns on
InboundDocument (migration 0333) record when the last attempt finished
and why it produced no index, as a closed reason set: local-empty,
local-unsupported, decrypt-error, raster-failed, provider-error,
pdf-needs-anthropic, empty-transcription. The writer sits at the choke
point the auto job and the corpus backfill share, and in the manual
index route; a success clears the reason. The provider path's specific
failure now survives the local fallback, since "no text" is less
actionable than "the PDF would not render". rasterizePdf names its
failure class so a build that cannot rasterize at all is distinguished
from a PDF that would not render. New guard in both index paths: an
empty provider transcription never becomes a successful empty index.
The detail sheet renders the reason in plain words (muted, six
locales). The DTO and OpenAPI carry the two fields; the disaster
recovery backup and restore carry them verbatim like their summary
siblings.
Refs #776
A lab panel files itself against the visit it came from, and never has to. The
OCR review and the manual form both offer the suggestion through the one shared
field, anchored on the draw date rather than on now, so backdating a reading
moves the offer with it. The commit writes one link PER RESULT ROW, which is
why the join is m:n: a marker re-run on a different day belongs to its own
visit. Best-effort by design — the readings are the write that matters and must
not be lost to a link that could not be made.
The condition side gets a Visits about this card with an action that pre-links
the episode. From the episode side only, and that is a decision: an episode
spans weeks and a visit is a point, so matching the other way would be wrong
often enough to teach a person to ignore every suggestion in the product.
A due checkup gains a second action beside erledigt. Filing the visit as done
satisfies the checkup through the same forward-only, idempotent primitive the
checkbox uses, so doing both is one satisfaction and no error. The two actions
answer different questions — one says it happened, the other says where.
An appointment now appears where a person looks, and NEITHER surface relaxes
the reminder-table exclusion that keeps it out of the preventive-care lists.
Both read the visit table: a quiet line under the dashboard checkup block for
anything inside two weeks, and one rail item for today or tomorrow. A diff in
either that touches origin is the wrong fix.
A visit write now also refreshes the reminder reads. Closing a checkup moves
its next-due date on three surfaces that would otherwise keep showing it due
until their own poll.
OpenAPI regenerated in the same commit.
A lab runs its own method on its own device, so the window a physician
evaluates a value against is the one printed next to it on that report,
not a catalog band averaged over every lab. Reading a report pulled the
value and dropped that range: the extraction asked for it, the commit
handed it to the biomarker resolver, and the resolver only uses it when
it mints a NEW marker. For every analyte the user already had — the
normal case after a first panel — the printed range was read and then
thrown away.
Add `sourceReferenceLow` / `sourceReferenceHigh` / `sourceReferenceText`
to `LabResult` and carry the range from the report to the reading. The
text is stored whether or not numbers can be read out of it, because
"bis 5,0" and "negativ" state a window too; a range that could not be
parsed is kept verbatim, never replaced with invented bounds.
`resolveEffectiveReferenceRange` is the one place the precedence lives:
the source window wins for that single reading, and the catalog stays
the net for readings without one. A printed string with no derivable
bound does not displace the catalog. Every surface that judges a
reading routes through it — the API verdict, the doctor report, the
insights blocks and per-marker assessment, the coach snapshot, the MCP
read and the FHIR `referenceRange` — so a value cannot read in range on
one surface and out on another.
The API keeps `referenceLow` / `referenceHigh` as the window in force,
so a client that reads only those two renders the right range and the
right verdict with no change of its own; the catalog band, the source
window, its origin and a divergence flag ride alongside for clients
that want to show both.
Read side: the chart draws the source window as a second, visually
distinct band with the reading it came from named beneath it, the
reading rows name the printed range and the catalog band where the two
disagree, and the doctor-report PDF prints the report's own string with
a footnote naming the saved range. Entry side: one optional field on
the lab form, folded away until asked for, and the printed range is
editable on the scan review screen.
The range parser covers the notations German and English reports
actually print — two-sided, one-sided, comma or dot decimals, thousands
separators, trailing units — reads units without ever converting them,
and refuses to guess on anything ambiguous.
A grant has meant one thing since it shipped: the whole record, to read or to
add to. This lays the words for the two shapes the rest of the sharing work
needs — part of a record, and management of one — while changing what no
existing grant does.
`ShareDomain` is a closed set of eight sections in `src/lib/sharing/scope.ts`,
clustered from the delegable read surfaces rather than invented, plus the
distinguished `record` for the routes that read across them. It never converts
to a `ModuleKey` and never imports one: two masks, two questions, no shared
spelling, because the day they share a name is the day somebody makes one
imply the other, and a module the owner enabled is not a section the owner
shared.
`account_grants.scope_json` is NULL on every row that exists, and NULL is the
entire record — the answer those rows were consented as, so no backfill and no
re-consent. A non-NULL value is read through one fail-closed normaliser: a
blob it cannot parse opens nothing, including a section the blob happened to
name. That is the deliberate inverse of the module preference normaliser,
which fails open on purpose; both do the safe thing with a value nobody can
read, and the safe thing differs because one answers an authorization question
and the other a presentation question.
`MANAGE` joins the level enum, ordered above WRITE so a write grant can never
satisfy it, and carries no scope at all: management of part of a record
promises a boundary that cannot survive an edit, so the invite path refuses to
write one.
`requireRecordAuth` takes the section as a second required argument. The
requirement is the lever — a delegable route without a classification does not
typecheck, so the set of classified routes cannot fall behind the set of
delegable ones. All fifty-seven modules carry theirs. The structural guard
freezes each against the production vocabulary, fails when a module's own arms
disagree, and pins a non-zero count of resolved sections so a matcher that
stopped reading the argument fails instead of agreeing with everything.
`requireGuardianAuth` is exported and reaches nothing yet. It gates on the
managed-profile marker rather than on the grant, so an adult who granted
management of their own record cannot arrive at that record's settings by any
argument about what MANAGE means: widening MANAGE would widen the record
resolver and would not touch this one. Its frozen list lands empty, with the
declaration site as the positive control that keeps "nothing reaches it" a
measurement rather than a renamed symbol.
`users.managed_profile_at` says since when a record is one somebody else runs.
A timestamp and not a boolean, for a reason the schema has to keep possible:
clearing it is the handover, and the grants and the activity trail span it
untouched.
The dose-history purge was the one destructive verb in the intake family
that removed rows outright. Both siblings, the single-event DELETE and the
bulk delete, stamp `deletedAt` and bump `syncVersion`; the purge called
`deleteMany`, so a mis-tap was final and a client offline at purge time kept
every row forever, because a row that no longer exists produces no tombstone
for the sync feed to carry. It tombstones now, scoped to live rows so a
second purge counts zero. No inventory refund: a purge wipes a history as
bookkeeping, and refunding every dose ever taken would inflate the current
container count instead.
The manual water quick-add and the lab-result un-delete both wrote health
data and reached only the wide event, which expires. Months later nothing
could answer who put a day's total there or who brought a reading back, and
with a second person able to act on a shared record that question has a
second possible answer. Both write a durable row now, named after the
neighbours they sit beside.
The refused-delegation audit comment claimed the row was written for the
owner's benefit. It is not: it is filed under the caller, it is only written
for a header refusal, and a header names an account the caller merely
asserts. Filing under that claim would let anyone write rows into any
account's activity feed by naming it. The comment says what the row is now,
and points at `recordDelegatedAccess`, which is the half the owner does see.
Two comments in the biomarker surfaces still claimed the `SetNull` foreign
key left the readings behind when a marker is deleted. That stopped being
true when delete became a "drop this and its history" action and the
confirmation copy was rewritten in six locales to say so.
The purge route gains a call-shape assertion rather than a count assertion,
because a count comes back identical from a `deleteMany`. The lab restore
route had no test at all and now has one.
POST /api/labs and POST /api/biomarkers resolve the record. The free-text
lab path mints its biomarker under the record's catalogue rather than the
caller's — a result added to somebody's record whose marker landed on the
helper's account would leave the owner with a reading they cannot chart.
Adding a marker the record already tracks stays the ordinary 409 from the
same per-account uniqueness the owner would hit themselves. The PUT and
DELETE on the sibling routes are unchanged and still refuse under a switch.
Both validation breadcrumbs move to auditLog(), the only writer that stamps
the acting account.
Ten routes: lab results and their detail, the biomarker catalogue and its
detail, allergies, family history, the mental-health screener history, and
the health-profile facts. All GET arms; every write arm in the same files
keeps `requireAuth()` and refuses under a switch.
The family-history payload is the one admitted read that carries third-party
health information by design — it describes the owner's relatives — and it is
admitted because a caregiver reading a family history is what the feature is
for and the rows are the owner's own.
The mental-health module gate resolves against the record, not the caller.
That is the recorded decision: the module map says which parts of a record
exist, so a delegate who enabled the screener on their own account gains no
screener view inside somebody else's. The integration test asserts both
directions.
Six provider syncs returned a bare count, which narrowed their failures away:
a Nightscout window in which every SGV row was refused by a constraint
returned the same 0 as a quiet night, and an Oura or Polar run whose
collections all failed returned 0 too. The routes then answered 200 with a
count and the settings card drew a green tick over it.
Every sync now reports what it imported AND whether any part of it did not
land, and the route resolves the outcome server-side so the web card and the
native client cannot disagree. Google Health keeps its 502 for a run that
failed and wrote nothing, but a run that failed after writing some resources
is now a partial rather than a discarded result. The labs OCR commit carries
the same resolved outcome.
Every ingest path in the product can now emit a typed, salience-classified
event into pg-boss, consumed by one worker that claims a durable per-day
reaction marker and fans out to the reaction surfaces.
The recency classifier runs at the seam, before anything is enqueued, so a
mass backfill — a multi-year Apple Health export, a provider re-sync, a
30-day catch-up — emits nothing at all. Non-salient writes are annotated and
dropped.
The worker makes no provider call by construction: it imports no provider
module, writes only markers, and enqueues nothing that is not budget-gated
downstream. Business refusals return a status rather than throwing, so a
refusal is never retried against a ceiling that will not move until the local
day rolls over.
Seams: sleep (one hook, inherited by all seven transports), workouts (the
batch route, the four provider syncs, the export importer), weight and blood
pressure (both measurement routes), labs (manual, OCR commit, document fact
commit).
The provider workout syncs could not previously tell a created row from an
updated one, so a re-sync of a recent session would have re-fired on every
poll; they now recover the distinction from the row the upsert already
returns.
Reaction lines are AES-256-GCM at rest, following the InsightNarrative
precedent, and the column is registered for key rotation. Markers are pruned
after 14 days by a daily maintenance job.
Best-effort background work was swallowed with `.catch(() => {})` — a
persistent failure (a broken reminder enqueue, a lost re-auth transition)
left no annotate() or logger trail, against the project's own
'annotate() on every interesting path' rule.
Add `fireAndForget(promise, { action })`: it annotates the rejection into
the current wide event under a per-action meta key (so it rides the
central redaction at emit time — the raw message never hits the console)
and warns the action label only for failures that settle after the event
flushed. Control flow is unchanged; the promise stays fire-and-forget.
Adopt it at the meaningful sites: reminder-satisfy enqueues (measurement
+ labs writes and the five integration sync workers), the post-write
safety-floor dispatch, and the consent audit-log write. The Withings
re-auth mark stays awaited (its persisted state feeds the same response)
but now breadcrumbs its failure instead of swallowing it.
Two directions, folding the vault and labs pipelines into one linking path
without weakening either manual flow.
Vault document → lab values (auto-stage). After the per-document auto-index
job transcribes a stored document, a lab-looking document is run through the
same inbound extraction the manual "Extract" button uses, but the facts land
PENDING for the existing human review — nothing is committed. Gated on both
the documents and labs modules plus the auto-AI-read consent gate the
auto-index external path already uses; a text-structuring pass over the
transcription the index just produced, so no second vision call is spent. The
staging is a guarded STORED→EXTRACTED transition, and a keyword heuristic (or
an explicit LAB_RESULT kind) keeps an arbitrary photo from burning a call.
Everyone without the opt-in keeps the manual extract button.
Lab scan → vault. A lab report scanned in the labs area is now also filed
into the Documents vault (kind LAB_RESULT) through the existing upload —
encrypted at rest, EXIF-stripped, thumbnailed, sha256-deduped — and the
committed labs are cross-linked back to it with the same APPROVED-observation
provenance the manual vault → labs path produces. Text-mode scans keep the
image on-device and file nothing. Idempotent: a re-commit inserts no rows and
links nothing new, and the vault dedupe means no duplicate document.
Owner-scoped and module-gated on both sides; the cross-link is best-effort so
it never fails the authoritative write.
Lab-report OCR now rasterizes a PDF to page images for any non-Anthropic
vision provider, exactly as the document vault already does — Anthropic keeps
its native PDF block, every other vision provider (codex/OAuth, OpenAI, local)
reads the rendered pages. The capability probe reports `pdfSupported` whenever
the picked provider reads PDFs natively or the server-side rasterizer is
available, so the "scan a PDF" affordance shows for a codex provider too.
Drop the dedicated document-scan (Lab-OCR) provider: labs OCR always uses the
main configured provider chain. Removes the settings card, the `aiOcr*`
resolution branch, the GET/PATCH handler fields, the OpenAPI schema fields, the
i18n keys across all locales, and the five backing `User` columns (migration
0234). The on-device tesseract fallback is untouched.
Dashboard hero: stack the overdue-dose action directly beneath the verdict
text (tight gap, left-aligned) on every viewport instead of pushing it to the
far container edge on desktop.
The structured lab-create path (POST /api/labs) now accepts an optional
`source` marker ("MANUAL" | "OCR"). The on-device-OCR ingestion path posts
"OCR" so a reading captured from a phone-camera lab photo records its
provenance; the raw image never touches the server on this path. Omitting
the field reads as "MANUAL", so the existing hand-entry contract is
unchanged. The value is narrowed by a closed Zod enum and assigned
field-by-field, never spread from the body. Mirrors the "OCR" source the
server-side /api/labs/ocr/commit path already stamps.
Regenerate the OpenAPI spec for the widened request body.
The daily AI-token gate was a flat 25,000/day for every provider. That cap
exists to bound the OPERATOR's API bill, but a ChatGPT-OAuth (Codex) or BYOK
chain egresses on the USER's own plan/key and costs the operator nothing, so
gating it on the operator-cost ceiling is wrong. A single gpt-5.x reasoning
turn legitimately reports 20k-40k gross total_tokens (re-sent system prompt +
inventory + tool defs per round + hidden reasoning, summed across rounds), so
one or two turns exhausted the flat cap and locked the user out of a plan they
pay for.
Classify the chain's cost owner by its primary provider via resolveDailyCap:
an admin-openai primary (operator pays) keeps the operator-cost cap; every
user-egress primary (codex/openai/anthropic/local) gets a generous
abuse-only ceiling. Threaded into the Coach chat gate and both OCR-extract
modes.
Raise the operator-cost cap 25,000 -> 200,000 so the operator-key path also
survives a normal day of reasoning turns, keeping gross-token accounting
rather than reworking the reconcile math.
Subtract cached input tokens at reconcile: the Responses-API gross total still
includes prompt-cached input the user did not re-pay for. The codex client
already parsed cached_tokens; sum it through the tool loop and bill
total_tokens minus cached.
Drop the unreachable text-only-model reason from the OCR capability
enum and its DTO type. Replace the literal NUL delimiter in the Fitbit
dedup map keys with a named constant so text tooling stops treating the
file as binary (behaviour unchanged). Correct the Coach tool-executor
docblock, which overstated cross-tool snapshot-cache sharing.
Text-mode OCR structures browser-extracted text rather than running a
vision call, so it reserved and reconciled the full vision budget even
though the spend is far lower. Add an ocrExtractText ceiling and reserve
that in text mode, and refund the reservation in full on a clean extract
failure instead of charging the reserved estimate.
Add an opt-in in-browser OCR path so a user whose provider cannot read
images (ChatGPT-OAuth/Codex, a text-only model) can still scan a lab
report. The capability probe gains a `mode` field: `vision` when the
provider reads the image directly, `text` when local OCR is enabled and
any provider is configured, or null. The extract route grows a text
branch that accepts the in-browser-OCR'd text as JSON and structures it
through the existing schema + review/commit flow; the raw image never
reaches the server in text mode. New `labsLocalOcrEnabled` user column
(migration 0184, default off) gates it, with a dedicated PATCH endpoint.
The per-row commit loop ran isDuplicate() then create() sequentially, so
two identical rows in one confirmed document only collapsed because row 1
autocommitted before row 2's live query. Track written keys in a
per-request seen-set keyed on analyte+day+value so in-batch dedup no
longer depends on DB visibility. Note the mint-then-create orphan on a
mid-row failure is benign and self-healing, matching the manual path.
Resolve a vision-capable provider, gate with consent + a 6/hour rate bucket +
a reserved per-day token budget, then transcribe an uploaded photo or PDF into
structured proposed rows. The raw upload stays in memory only and is never
persisted. The commit route writes only the rows a human confirmed, resolving
or minting a biomarker per row with source OCR and skipping commit-time
duplicates. The capability probe drives whether the UI shows the scan entry.
Extracted text is treated as untrusted; the review screen is the safety
boundary.
Add first-class qualitative lab findings (positive / negative / borderline
serology) alongside the existing numeric path. A LabResult is now EITHER a
numeric reading (value + unit, optional reference bounds) OR a qualitative one
(valueText, e.g. "negativ"), never both, never neither.
- schema: make `value` nullable, add `value_text`; migration 0181 is additive
(DROP NOT NULL + ADD COLUMN), every existing numeric row is untouched.
- validation: numeric-XOR-qualitative refine on create + update; unit/bounds
apply to the numeric path only; valueText capped at 120 chars. The single
resource PUT rejects a cross-type edit.
- serialise: carry valueText through both DTOs; a qualitative row reports the
neutral `unknown` range verdict (no number to classify).
- FHIR: a qualitative result emits valueCodeableConcept — SNOMED qualifier
value for confidently-known terms (Negative 260385009, Positive 10828004,
Not detected 260415000, Detected 260373001), text-only for borderline /
grenzwertig and any unrecognised term. The raw text always rides .text.
- UI: a numeric/qualitative toggle in the lab form; list, history, detail,
chart, sparkline, and the doctor-report PDF all render qualitative readings
as their text and never plot or divide on a null value.
- i18n: new labs.form keys across all six locales.
- openapi: response carries a nullable value + valueText; regenerated.
The illness module shipped opt-in/default-off via a bornGated flag, the
inverse of the standard disabled-allowlist. Make it a normal optional
module that defaults on (opt-out), matching labs and its siblings.
No module used bornGated other than illness, so drop the flag, its
isBornGatedModule helper, and the gate resolver's born-gated branch
entirely. The module stays a normal toggle under What you track and the
operator-level availability override is unchanged; an account that wants
it off sets an explicit false. Refresh the gate, doctor-report, labs and
biomarkers comments plus the OpenAPI route descriptions accordingly.
A PUT that moves a single reference bound past the row's stored other
bound slipped through the schema refine (which only fires when both bounds
arrive together). Both the lab-result and biomarker routes now merge the
effective bounds and 422 on low > high. Editing catalog-resolved fields
(analyte/unit/panel/range) on a linked reading is also rejected rather than
silently no-oped. Shared isInvertedRange/effectiveBound helpers with tests.
A free-text lab write resolves or mints a user-scoped biomarker by
(userId, lower(analyte)) so no LabResult row ever persists unlinked. An
existing marker is reused as-is (its unit/range stay authoritative); a
miss mints one from the reading's own spelling. Every reading is now
editable and detail-navigable, and the boot-time backfill becomes a pure
pre-upgrade migration. Closes the unlinked-row dead-end and the contract
hole in one path.
Add a user-scoped Biomarker catalog so a marker is defined once — name,
unit, lower/upper bound, optional encrypted context, panel — and every
later reading just links it. New /api/biomarkers CRUD plus a structured
/api/labs create path: a biomarkerId resolves the unit + reference range
server-side, so the list and detail DTOs carry the resolved values and
the client never recomputes the range. Lab reads include the linked
marker and fall back to the legacy free-text fields for unlinked rows.
Add a lab-result restore endpoint for the delete-Undo affordance, a
shared serialiser, a static common-panel seed list, and tests for
catalog validation, structured-entry resolution, and the context codec.
Add a reminder-satisfy pg-boss queue (mirrors pr-detection) that every
measurement and lab ingest path enqueues — manual create, batch, and the
Withings / Polar / Oura / Nightscout / Fitbit / WHOOP syncs. A reminder
now auto-resolves the moment a matching reading lands instead of waiting
up to 15 minutes. The 15-minute cron stays as the idempotent safety net;
the forward-only guard lets the eventful hook and the cron converge
without double-stamping.
The worker honours the module toggle (a reminder for a disabled module
produces no engine activity) and runs the same satisfaction primitives
the cron uses.
Record discrete biomarker readings (HbA1c, LDL, ferritin, TSH, …) with
their value, unit, reference range and sample date. The store pairs with
the annual blood-panel reminder, which until now had nowhere to record
the result it reminds the user to obtain.
The list/create/update/delete endpoints narrow userId from the session,
build the write data field-by-field, soft-delete via deletedAt, and
encrypt the optional note at rest. A neutral three-state reference-range
classifier (in-range / below / above / unknown) is computed
server-side so every surface renders the same calm verdict.
findLatestLabResultForAnalytes exposes the read point the blood-panel
reminder consults to mark itself satisfied, without coupling the two.
Marc-André Bombeck