A selector pointed at a record whose grant has lapsed reports the same
disagreement on every /api/auth/me, so routing it to the hydration gate
rendered a permanent spinner with no controls. Expiry reaches this state
on its own: revocation clears the selector inside its transaction and
expiry does not.
- treat an unprovable context as a refusal, which paints the door with
the button back to one's own record
- check the refusal ahead of the hydration gate, so neither trigger can
render behind a spinner again
A browser-issued <img src>, <iframe src> or <a href download> cannot
carry the record-session assertion, so the fence refused all three on
any session that had been inside a shared record — permanently, since
none of them will ever send a header.
- add a structural guard: no client file may name a record-fenced route
in a src=, href= or window.location sink
- fetch the thumbnail, the inline preview and the download through the
app transport and hand the DOM an object URL, revoked on unmount
- make the two API probes in the managed-profiles browser spec assert
the same context the app beside them asserts
- attach the asserted context to every same-origin request inside the
three fetch entries, so no call site classifies itself
- discard a response whose echoed context contradicts the adopted one;
serve one that carries no echo, which is what keeps the public poll
and every actor surface working
- adopt from /api/auth/me and the switch response, and from nothing else
- send the epoch on every switch and retry once after reconciling
- hold and reconcile on the 409 instead of leaving the record
An owner can now narrow a grant to the parts of their record they mean to
share, and can offer the third level. Both decisions are made once, on the
invitation, and neither widens afterwards.
The invite schema takes `scope`: absent or null is the entire record, which
is what every stored grant means and what an owner who does not narrow still
gets. An empty array, a key outside the vocabulary and the whole-record
sentinel are each refused with a 422 naming the field; `inviteGrant` refuses
the same three underneath, and its `invalid_scope` now has an HTTP mapping
instead of falling into the generic refusal.
Offering MANAGE asks for a fresh second factor when the account has one. That
gate resolves through the session cookie and has no Bearer fall-through, so a
token caller is refused first with `sharing.invite.manage_browser_only` rather
than being told it is not authenticated by a route that had just
authenticated it. The consequence is deliberate: management of a health
record is offered from a browser.
The account payload gains `sections` and `level` beside `access` and
`canWrite`, resolved server-side and ordered as the consent screen reads.
`access` was `grant.access === "WRITE" ? "write" : "read"`, which would have
published a grant that can delete entries as read-only; it is a total map
now, so the next level cannot ship silent. The capabilities hook carries both
facts and turns neither into an affordance yet — the edit and delete controls
come back in the release where the routes behind them answer.
The consent surface asks two questions in order rather than laying out a
nineteen-cell grid. The level is three radios, narrowest preselected. What
they can open is two radios, the entire record preselected, and only the
narrow branch expands the eight sections with a sentence each. Both honest
limits are stated above the checkboxes, where the decision is being made: a
section shares everything written in it, and the cross-record surfaces do not
appear for a narrowed grant. Documents carries its own warning, cycle appears
only for an owner who tracks it, and Manage collapses the question to the one
line that answers it.
The Manage sentence says the other person can add, change and remove entries,
including ones the owner entered themselves, and says in the same breath what
it does not reach. The acceptance side gets its own responsibility line rather
than the write one wearing a stronger adjective.
Six locales.
Account sharing shipped read-only, and everything that consulted the grant
lived in the application chrome: the nav bars, the banner, the switcher. No
feature surface asked. A delegate opened somebody else's record, saw the add
button on every page, filled the form, and was refused by a server that was
right to refuse. Nothing leaked; it taught people the product was broken.
This is the answer every mutation affordance asks for. Two booleans, because
a grant at WRITE admits a short closed list of verbs and nothing else:
`canAdd` for an entry of an admitted kind, `canManage` for changing what is
already there or adding what the list does not name. `canWrite` arrives
resolved from the server and is bound, never recomputed; what this decides is
only which class of control a resolved level covers.
The absent case is the permissive one. Failing closed would blank every add
button in the app for every account on every cold load, to spare a delegate
one frame between the reload and the account query landing.
Each behaviour here was verified by removing the code that provides it and
confirming the test went red, then putting it back. Two of them did not, and
both were rewritten rather than kept:
The restore-side persister check asserted that the delegate's own dashboard
could not be read back inside a shared record. Deleting the guard left it
green, because the record-scoped hash already makes a snapshot written in one
record unreadable in another. It now counts what landed in the cache, so the
guard it names is the thing it measures — and the weaker line is kept beside
it with a note saying why.
The switcher's account rows were asserted from server-rendered markup. Radix
portals do not render server-side at all, so an earlier draft was measuring
the renderer. Those rows moved to the browser suite; what stays here is the
gate, which fails sharply — with the `canSwitch` bail removed the two cases do
not return different markup, they throw.
Two more shapes worth naming. The cache dimension is exercised through a real
QueryClient built from the app's own defaults, because "the hash string
changed" and "one record's data cannot be read while inside another" are
different claims. And the invalidation is a plain function over a client with
three live entries seeded, with a test that asserts they start valid — without
it, a client that failed to seed and one where everything was invalidated look
the same from every other assertion.
The admin panel offered a toggle for the Health-Score explainer and
described it as the ? next to the delta line. That ? had already been
taken off the insights surface a release earlier, and the caption that
replaced it went away entirely when the health score was replaced by
the reference composite. Since then an operator could turn the switch
off, get a saved confirmation, and change absolutely nothing.
The toggle, its wording in all six languages, its place in the flag
matrix the app and the iOS client both read, and its column on
app_settings are all gone. Nothing is left to promise a control that
does not exist.
A guard goes in with it: every remaining assistant sub-flag has to be
read by some surface, and the panel and the plumbing that carry all of
them by construction do not count as proof.
A dose logged from another screen marked the Today hero and the dashboard
stale without re-reading them, so returning to the home page kept showing the
old state until the 120 s poll or a hard reload. The daily reads run with
refetchOnMount off, so a bundle invalidation with the default active
refetch-type never touched them while they were unmounted.
Route every intake-affecting medication write through one blessed
invalidateMedicationReads (bundle invalidation plus a forced inactive refetch
of the digest and snapshot): Take all due, the intake edit dialog, the history
bulk/row delete, the dose-history ledger and its add dialog, the lifecycle and
danger-zone actions, and the intake import. Give the Vorsorge reminder
mutations the same daily-rail refresh, bust the biomarker assessment and the
labs-changes read after a lab write, and refetch the daily reads after a
briefing regenerate so the Today lead updates without a reload.
Restore the dashboard-layout concurrency belt: the settings layout query now
always loads its own tokened copy, so a home-page visit can no longer strand a
save without its base token and silently drop the v1.32.16 conflict guard.
Add a structural guard that fails CI when a new site invalidates a daily-reads
bundle without the paired inactive refetch, so this class cannot recur a
fourth time, plus behavioural coverage for the batch take and the Vorsorge
refresh.
Refs #581
The dynamic /i18n/[locale] route handler answered with Next's default
Cache-Control (private, max-age=0, must-revalidate) and no validator —
its immutable-cache header was overridden, so a non-PWA browser would
re-download the full catalog on every hard load. Static public/ files
keep an ETag (repeat loads revalidate to a 304) and the service
worker's cache-first rule covers the offline relaunch; the ?v= build
key the layout appends busts both per deploy.
scripts/generate-i18n-boot.mjs writes public/i18n/<locale>.js for all
six locales as a prebuild/predev step (the sw-version.js pattern);
output is gitignored. The route handler is removed.
Measured on a production build, authenticated DE session: dashboard
document 522 KB raw / 139 KB gz -> 170 KB raw / 24.6 KB gz; the DE
catalog moves into a one-time 119 KB gz cached asset.
H2
A failed /api/auth/me now only counts as a session END on an explicit
401/403. Network-level failures (offline relaunch fetch TypeError, the
service worker's synthetic 503 offline envelope, abort/timeout) and 5xx
carry no session verdict: the hook holds the last-known auth state via a
non-sensitive localStorage marker instead of flipping unauthenticated.
Pre-fix, an airplane-mode relaunch of the installed PWA redirected to
/auth/login and ran clearCachesForSessionEnd(), wiping the SW data/page
caches and the IndexedDB query snapshot — the entire offline read path
was unreachable in exactly the scenario it exists for.
- use-auth: isAuthVerdictUnknown() classification, was-authenticated
marker (set on every successful /me, cleared on session end),
isAuthUnknown exposed for the shell
- auth-shell: the wipe runs only on a real verdict; a non-verdict
failure without a prior-session marker redirects without wiping
- explicit logout and true 401/403 expiry wipe exactly as before
H1
The root QueryClient is created once and survives every client-side
navigation, so logout then login on the same browser left the previous
account's non-user-scoped health-data queries in memory and the next
account read them before any refetch landed. Wipe the entire in-memory
cache on logout, on session expiry, and at the start of a fresh login,
alongside the existing IndexedDB and service-worker cache wipe, so no
session ever inherits another account's data.
One-shot prettier pass so the new format:check gate starts from a clean
baseline. Formatting only — no behaviour change. Generator-owned and
vendored artifacts stay untouched via .prettierignore.
The sleep, blood-glucose, workouts, and recovery insights pages
fetched their series and half-rendered when the backing module was
disabled — a disabled account that navigated straight to the URL saw
the surface flash before any guard. They now resolve a shared
useModulePageGuard hook (mirroring the cycle page): an unauthenticated
visitor bounces to login, a disabled-module account bounces to
/insights, and the page renders a calm loader until the gate clears.
The backing /api routes enforce the gate server-side, so this is the
UX layer, not the security boundary.
The update poller and the chunk-error reload guard key on the target
version instead of disarming for the whole session, so a second deploy
re-arms the self-heal and a stale shell can no longer strand with
404ing chunks. Lazy chart imports retry once and mount inside a
per-card error boundary with a reload affordance — a failed chunk
degrades to one card instead of replacing the page. The JSON API
client attaches a fifteen-second timeout unless the caller brings its
own signal (the raw streaming path is exempt), chart queries surface
errors with a retry instead of rendering as an empty period, per-type
fetch failures reject instead of caching an empty series as fresh, and
the session and snapshot queries retry once on transient network or
server errors.
The stale-while-revalidate path serves the last-good assessment on a cache
miss and returns a terminal payload, so the status hook stopped polling. The
worker warmed a fresh assessment out of band seconds later, but the open card
never picked it up — the stale text stuck until the page remounted.
Add a `revalidating` flag to the read-only miss outcome, set only when
last-good text is served AND a refresh was enqueued (false on the
suppressed-stub branch and when no prior text exists). Thread it through the
generic metric-status generator and the seven specialised generators onto the
wire, type it on the client, and make `nextStatusPollInterval` keep polling on
`preparing || revalidating`. The existing 12-attempt ceiling bounds both
signals, so a persistently failing generation still cannot poll forever.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit c9217534fbdb304c4df1b6eb55fb19e4360b8a10)
The per-metric status cards and the inline medication-compliance query
poll the read-only status route every 4 s while the payload reports
preparing:true. A configured provider whose generation persistently
fails leaves preparing pinned true, so an open Insights page would poll
indefinitely — steady battery and network draw on a screen the user has
walked away from.
Cap the poll at 12 attempts (~48 s) through a shared
nextStatusPollInterval helper both call sites route through. Past the
ceiling the card settles on its existing static / empty state. The happy
path is unchanged: a generation that lands within a couple of intervals
clears preparing and stops the timer exactly as before, and a terminal
no-provider payload never carried preparing so it stays terminal.
Operator-side assistant feature-flag matrix, /insights tab-strip blocking fix on mobile, and the GHCR-propagation-race Coolify auto-deploy fix. Full notes in CHANGELOG.
Marc-André Bombeck