The list of provider tags that send data out through a credential the
operator holds (admin-openai, admin-codex) existed four times: in the
consent gate, in the capability resolver, in the shared-provider health
read and in the admin provider-health ordering. A tag added to one and not
the others would be consented for in one place and not the other. The list
and the local-provider test now live in src/lib/ai/provider-egress.ts and
every reader imports them.
The guard meant to keep one copy matched a variable name, so the copy in
the resolver, under another name, never tripped it. It now matches the
list itself in either order and names the one file allowed to hold it.
A refresh token issued to a device is refused when presented under another
device id, but leaving the X-Device-Id header out skipped the comparison,
so a stolen token rotated simply by naming no device. A token whose row
carries a device id now rotates only for a caller naming that same id.
Tokens issued without one still rotate as before. The iOS app sends its
device id on every request, sign-in and refresh included.
The passkey sign-in, security-key sign-in and security-key registration
verifiers read the challenge, verified the response, and deleted the
challenge afterwards. Two requests carrying the same assertion could both
read it before either deleted it, and both be accepted.
A challenge is now claimed with one guarded DELETE ... RETURNING that also
checks its ceremony, its account and its expiry, before anything is
verified; a concurrent second request finds nothing. A passkey sign-in also
refuses a challenge that was begun for a different account than the passkey
belongs to.
The log and error redactor missed the registration invite token (hlv_) and
the native sign-in handoff code (hlh_). The filter that keeps secrets out
of the idempotency replay cache and out of relayed upstream error bodies
missed the handoff code and the three MCP OAuth artifacts (hlac_, hlrt_,
hlc_). Both now cover every prefix the app issues: hlk_, hlr_, hls_, hle_,
hlv_, hlh_, hlac_, hlrt_ and hlc_.
Password sign-in was limited per client address only, so guesses spread
over many addresses reached one account without end. Each account now has
its own ceiling of ten failed attempts in fifteen minutes, whichever
addresses they come from. The attempt is counted before the password is
hashed and given back when the password is right, so the owner signing in
does not use it up. An identifier that matches no account is counted under
its hash with the same ceiling, so the refusal does not reveal whether the
account exists. Passkey and single sign-on remain open while the ceiling
is reached.
The client-IP resolver read X-Real-IP on every path: with
TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0, which means no proxy in front and no forwarding header
to believe, and on the path where the X-Forwarded-For chain was shorter
than the declared hops, which means the proxies were bypassed. A caller
sending a new X-Real-IP with each request got a new per-IP rate-limit
bucket each time.
X-Real-IP now gets the trust X-Forwarded-For gets: it is read only when at
least one proxy hop is declared and the request carries no X-Forwarded-For.
A short chain resolves to no address. The reverse-proxy guide no longer
suggests TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 for a proxy that sets X-Real-IP; such a proxy
takes 1.
"Sign out everywhere" ended web sessions and device logins but left every
credential that works without signing in: a connected AI assistant kept its
OAuth connection and minted the next access token from it, a connector or
ingest token kept working, and a clinician share link kept opening the
record. A password change revoked the tokens but not the assistant's
connection or the share links. Anything a stolen session had minted
outlived the remedy.
- Sign out everywhere now ends every other sign-in, every AI-assistant
connection, every programmatic token except the caller's own, and every
clinician share link. Share links are revoked by default; the web offers
a checkbox to keep them (keepShareLinks=1), and a client that sends
nothing, such as the shipped app, gets the safe default.
- A password change and an admin password reset also end AI-assistant
connections, share links and step-up elevations.
- Turning on the first second factor (TOTP or a security key) ends every
other sign-in, as a password change does. Adding a further factor does
not.
destroyOtherSessions takes an explicit reach ("sign-ins" or "everything")
so each caller says how far it goes.
Exporting the whole record, making a clinician share link, minting a token,
and the admin backup download, upload and restore, data wipe and password
reset ran on a live session alone. The plaintext full backup did, while the
encrypted one beside it asked for a second factor. Whoever held a stolen
session could take the record, or leave behind a credential that outlives
the session.
These now go through one gate, requireRecentProof (assertRecentCookieProof
for the routes that resolve their caller themselves). A browser session
passes after a sign-in or re-proof within five minutes: a second factor on
an account that has one, otherwise the password or a passkey. The refusal is
401 auth.reproof.required with meta.methods, and the web opens the re-proof
dialog, posts the proof to the new POST /api/auth/reproof and retries. A
password proof stamps the new Session.reproofAt (migration 0359), never
mfaVerifiedAt, so it cannot stand in for a second factor anywhere.
On Bearer, the full backup asks for an X-Step-Up elevation; the encrypted
export asks for a second-factor elevation on an account that has one. Share
links and connector tokens keep taking the token alone, because the shipped
app calls them without an elevation and reads a 401 there as a dead
session; the guard test names them.
Key rotation keeps its stricter second-factor gate.
The seven integration clients now read their redirect URI and the app URL
through envValue/envOr instead of a local ?.trim() ||. The empty-env guard
drops its pending entry and floors its walk, and proves its matcher still
fires on a real client with the old read put back.
expandTodayIntakes had no caller left once the today projection moved onto
the recurrence engine and localHmAsUtc; it carried the last private
wall-clock solver in the medication code. The recurrence engine now takes
its offset and UTC-day helpers from the tz module instead of local copies.
The medication and measurement-reminder code now imports DEFAULT_TIMEZONE
from the tz module like every other fallback, so the lint rule no longer
exempts those paths.
Building the coarse buckets from the DAY tier read every day of the window
into the process: a five-year yearly read moved thousands of rows per type,
and the Coach's history bands read several such windows per request. The
per-day source pick and the fold now run in Postgres (DISTINCT ON the day,
ordered by the ladder rank and then the source name, the same order the
in-process pick uses), so a coarse read returns one row per bucket. The
long-range chart picks its tier from the span of the window's days and reads
that tier once. The Coach snapshot hands its already-loaded source order to
the history bands instead of each band reading it again.
The upload route is now outside the proxy matcher, so nothing bounded the
multipart parser, which holds the whole form. The bytes are counted first
and the form is parsed from what was kept, stopping at the 10 MB cap.
Next reads the body of every non-GET request the proxy matches into
memory before the route runs. The ceiling was 512 MB so the Apple Health
importer could receive whole archives, which let any anonymous POST to any
API path make the server hold that much.
The ceiling is now 1 MB (proxyClientMaxBodySize). The fifteen routes whose
real bodies are larger are left out of the proxy matcher and read their
own body after authenticating; apiHandler gives them the proxy's refusals
(worker-only, demo mode), security headers and a CSP. safeJson now counts
bytes while it reads and stops at its cap instead of reading everything
first, the CSV and dose-history imports do the same, and a multipart
backup upload is counted while it is read. A test compiles the matcher the way
Next does and checks it skips exactly the listed routes and every route
with a larger body is listed.
Local lab OCR runs its WebAssembly engine in a worker served from
/tesseract/. Those responses, and the /labs and /documents pages that start
the OCR, now carry 'wasm-unsafe-eval' in script-src; no other route does.
A report whose end date lies in the past listed medications that started
after it, the dose history up to today and the latest injection even when it
came later. It now lists a medication only if its course had begun by the
end date (or it had a dose scheduled inside the window) and had not ended
before the start, and dose history and the last injection stop at the end
date.
The status assessments folded their recent days, weeks, months and years on
Berlin days whatever the user's zone, the mood and cycle crosstabs keyed
their metric days in Berlin, the resting-pulse proxy defaulted to Berlin
days, the briefing's opener rotated at Berlin midnight, and every
assessment prompt labelled today's date as Berlin's. They now use the
user's zone. Rollup months and years are labelled by their UTC start,
which is how they are cut; read in a zone west of UTC the label named the
month before.
"Europe/Berlin" was written out in some eighty places. DEFAULT_TIMEZONE in
lib/tz/format is now the one definition: the second copy in mood/date-key,
DISPLAY_TIMEZONE, the Berlin-only day key helpers and the per-route copies
are gone. An in-repo lint rule rejects the literal outside lib/tz and
tests; four areas another change owns are listed as pending.
The shipped compose file passes TRUST_PROXY_HOPS as an empty string when
the operator never set it, and the parser rejected the empty string as an
invalid value, throwing wherever the client address was read. Empty now
means the default of one trusted hop.
The SSO callback bound a verified provider email to the local account with
the same address on the spot. The local address is not verified: anyone
could register with it, or type it into their profile, and the SSO user
then landed in an account the other person still held the password to.
The callback now links nothing. It records the link it would make in a
sealed, ten-minute, HttpOnly cookie and sends the browser to the sign-in
page, and the link is made only when that browser then signs in to that
same account with its password (and second factor) or passkey. Under an
SSO-only policy the password form opens for exactly that account. The
native sign-in answers oidc_link_required; the link is confirmed once on
the web.
Moving an account to a new email address now also needs a fresh proof: a
sign-in or second factor in the last five minutes, or the current password
sent alongside the change. Without it the address is left as it was and
reported in rejectedFields; the rest of the save still lands.
The compose file passes every whitelisted variable through, so an unset
redirect URI reaches the process as an empty string. Withings then sent
redirect_uri= to the provider, and Fitbit and Google Health refused to start
the connection as not configured although NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL was set. Every
integration now treats an empty or blank value as unset and derives the
callback from the app URL.
The MCP writes, the Telegram reply, the CSV and backup importers and the
Apple export import refreshed the rollups by hand and never re-warmed the
cached status assessments, so a reading logged there kept the day's old
assessment until the nightly pass. They now run the shared post-write tail,
and the export import re-warms every type it wrote. The WHOOP body sync
removed its legacy weight row without refolding that day; it does now.
A structural test lists every file that writes measurements and how it keeps
both readers current, so a new write site fails until it says.
The all-time weight, blood-pressure and pulse figures the insight features
carry averaged every raw row, so a device that samples densely outweighed the
readings the source ladder prefers on the same days. They now keep one source
per day, like the dashboard's all-time figures.
The period-over-period range delta averaged readings. For step-like totals
the current window still holds the last day and a half as many small
samples, so the average collapsed; it now compares average daily totals. For
sleep it averaged stage segments and in-bed envelopes; it now compares
average nights of time asleep. The API descriptions say which.
The export importer keeps the largest source subtotal per day for step-like
totals, and it told sources apart by name, version and device. On the day a
phone or watch updates, its records carry two versions, so the one device
became two sources and the day kept only the larger half. The identity is
now the source and its device without any version.
Withings, Fitbit, Google Health, Polar and Oura wrote each daily total and
daily summary at noon UTC of its date. From UTC+12 on (New Zealand all year,
Fiji, Tonga, Samoa) noon UTC is already the next local day, so every synced
step count, SpO2 or resting-pulse day showed up a day late. The rows now sit
at local noon of their date in the user's zone, and the fetch windows run
through the user's own today.
Fitbit weigh-ins carry a local wall clock without an offset and were read
as UTC; they are read in the user's zone now.
ExternalIds stay on the calendar date, so the next sync finds each row and
moves it in place instead of adding a second one, and the day a row leaves
is refolded. Rows inside each integration's re-read window heal on the next
sync; Fitbit and Google Health re-read the whole history on reconnect.
A browser session on its own could start TOTP enrollment or register a
security key. Combined with a pending secret counting as a factor, that let
a stolen session give itself a second factor, register a passkey with it,
and keep access after the owner changed the password.
TOTP setup and security-key registration now pass on the cookie path only
when the session signed in or completed a second factor in the last five
minutes, or when the body carries a proof in the step-up shape (password,
a confirmed authenticator code, or a passkey or security-key assertion).
The settings cards ask for that proof when the server answers
auth.reproof.required and retry the same call with it. The Bearer path is
unchanged: its elevation already is the proof.
Every route that checks a password or a factor as a re-proof now uses one
verifier and one per-account budget of five attempts per fifteen minutes,
shared with the step-up mint, and records each refused proof as
auth.mfa.failed. Passkey enrollment and password change had neither the
limit (passkey enrollment) nor the audit row (both). A structural test
freezes the set of credential-verifying routes and requires a throttle and
an audit call in each.
Today's key, each new record's day and the streak series were UTC days, so
through a New York evening a best set that afternoon counted as yesterday's
and dropped out of the digest. All three are now the user's own days; the
streak series is folded live on local days for this read.
Both heatmaps stepped back from now in 24-hour strides and cut each key in
UTC, so in the evening west of UTC, or the morning east of it, the newest
cell was a different day from the one the server keyed the readings on. The
days now come from today's key in the user's display zone, stepped on keys.
Local day bounds had three implementations. The day-key one read the zone
offset at UTC midnight, which on a transition day in zones far from UTC
(Pacific/Auckland, Australia/Sydney) is the offset after the change, so the
day started an hour off. The instant one converged on local 00:00, which in
zones that skip midnight (America/Santiago, America/Havana) does not exist,
and returned 23:00 of the previous day.
startOfLocalDayKey and localDayWindow in lib/tz/local-day are now the only
implementation: the first instant that reads the day, tried under every
offset in force around it. A skipped wall clock resolves to the moment the
clocks jump, the day-keyed copies in the measurement drains, the compliance
rollups and the dashboard batch window are gone, and the noon and mid-hour
anchors use the same converge.
A snooze lives on the medication row, and the reminder tick applied it to
every slot of that medication. A Telegram "skip" of the morning dose
snoozes to the end of the day, so the evening dose of the same medication
was neither reminded nor marked missed by the reminder path. A snooze now
holds only slots whose reminder window had opened when it was set, dated by
the row's updatedAt that the snooze write stamps (the same reading the skip
and pin suppression already uses). A later edit to the row can only widen
the hold back to the old behaviour.
The doctor report kept adherence in a map keyed by medication name, so two
medications with the same name (an ended course and a new one, two
strengths) collapsed into one row and the second overwrote the first. The
map is keyed by medication id now and carries the name as the label; the
report's medication list carries the id. The PDF, the FHIR adherence
observations, the MCP visit summary, the clinician view and the GLP-1
section read it that way.
The activity pillar averaged the 28 days ending today, so any score computed
during the day counted a step total that was still growing and pulled the
average down. The window is now the 28 completed local days ending
yesterday, cut on day keys.
The streak walked back from UTC midnight of today's key and read each
instant in the user's zone. West of UTC that instant is still yesterday, so
the walk started a day early and the streak came out one day short. It now
steps through the day keys themselves.
Rows older than the five-year rollup window were added to the all-time
figures without choosing a source per day, so a vital recorded by two
devices counted both on every one of those days. They now keep the
ladder-canonical source per day, like the rollup half and the live path.
The year-ago 30-day average read the monthly tier and kept whichever month
began inside the window, which could be a month off or leave the value
empty. It is now the count-weighted mean over exactly the 30 days that start
395 days ago.
Local lab OCR reads a report photo on the device with tesseract.js, whose
defaults load the worker, the WebAssembly core and the language data
from cdn.jsdelivr.net. The production CSP allows workers and fetches only
from this origin, so the engine could not load; where it did load (dev),
the browser of anyone scanning a report contacted a third-party CDN.
The worker, the three LSTM core builds and the deu and eng best_int
language data (about 17 MB) are now copied from pinned packages into
public/tesseract/ at prebuild and predev, and createWorker is pointed at
them with the worker started from its URL rather than a blob. A test
holds the options against the staged file list.
The rollup writer keeps one row per bucket and source. Collapsing the stored
WEEK / MONTH / YEAR rows picked one source for the whole bucket, so a month
of manual blood-pressure readings plus one synced reading reported the synced
day alone, and a step month that switched devices lost every day the losing
device carried. The live weekly and monthly chart fold made the same pick.
Every coarse bucket is now folded from the canonical DAY buckets: the source
ladder picks one source per day, then the week, month or year counts every
one of its days. Spread, slope and r² are composed from the summed day
accumulators. The live fold picks per local day before folding into weeks
and months. Ties between sources without a ladder rank break alphabetically
on the SQL paths too, matching the rollup reader.
The README said everything is kept encrypted at rest, that allergies and
family history are encrypted records, that the doctor report is
generated client-side, that there is no telemetry of any kind, and that
S3 backups are switched on in the admin panel. Free text, documents,
questionnaire answers, AI-written text and credentials are encrypted;
measurement values, lab values, medication names, mood scores and the
allergy substance or family condition are not. The PDF is rendered on
the server. Off-host backups are configured through the BACKUP_*
variables, and the admin panel only shows their status. The server's own
outbound requests are named along with their switches.
.env.example now says it is a starter and points at
.env.production.example as the complete reference, which is the file CI
checks against the env manifest. The Withings client id and secret it
listed are not read from the environment at all; they are entered in
Settings.
Two requests left the server without anything being connected: the
HaveIBeenPwned range query on every password set (registration, change,
admin reset) and the daily GitHub releases request behind the About page
and the admin version tile. Neither could be turned off, which made
"nothing leaves" untrue for an instance that wanted it to be.
PASSWORD_BREACH_CHECK_DISABLED and UPDATE_CHECK_DISABLED (1, true, yes or
on) stop each request. Both stay on by default. The breach check keeps
its fail-open contract: switched off, a password is simply not looked up.
The update route answers status "unknown" with reason "disabled" and
the admin tile says the check is off. The password routes reach the
check only through the switch, and a test holds that import line.
Both are on the compose whitelist, in the env manifest under a new
"Outbound requests" group with IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED, and documented in
both env examples and the getting-started guide.
Marc-André Bombeck