merge: QA fix inbound-encryption into release/v1.25.0

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Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-06-28 18:35:33 +02:00
commit e8228a67e3
8 files changed
+123 -23

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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
-- v1.25 (W-DOCS-IN, security) — encrypt the staged extracted-fact payloads.
--
-- The inbound-document store already encrypts the raw upload
-- (`inbound_documents.content_encrypted`) precisely because it is sensitive
-- PHI. The per-fact staging columns `extracted_facts.data_json` /
-- `provenance_json`, however, persisted the SAME class of data in the clear:
-- the FHIR-staged clinical values (diagnosis text, lab values, medication
-- names, stated codes) and the verbatim source span (up to 2000 chars copied
-- straight out of the discharge letter / lab report). That defeated the
-- at-rest guarantee for the feature. This migration converts both columns to
-- the AES-256-GCM `*_encrypted` BYTEA convention shared with the note columns;
-- the application encrypts on write and decrypts at confirm time.
--
-- Transactional + fail-closed: encryption is application-layer, so the plaintext
-- JSONB cannot be re-encrypted in SQL. Staged facts are EPHEMERAL pre-confirm
-- (nothing committed until the user approves them) and this feature has not
-- shipped, so any rows staged by a pre-release build carry plaintext PHI we
-- will not retain — they are dropped here rather than left unencrypted, and
-- their parent document keeps its encrypted original and can be re-extracted.
-- The whole migration runs in one transaction, so a failure rolls back wholly.
--
-- Reversibility (down) — re-add the plaintext columns (data is not recoverable):
-- ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" ADD COLUMN "data_json" JSONB;
-- ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" ADD COLUMN "provenance_json" JSONB;
-- ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" DROP COLUMN "data_encrypted";
-- ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" DROP COLUMN "provenance_encrypted";
-- Add the encrypted replacements (nullable during the swap).
ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS "data_encrypted" BYTEA;
ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS "provenance_encrypted" BYTEA;
-- Drop any pre-release staged rows: their plaintext payload cannot be
-- re-encrypted in SQL, and a pre-confirm fact carries no committed data.
DELETE FROM "extracted_facts" WHERE "data_encrypted" IS NULL;
-- Enforce the at-rest guarantee: every staged fact now carries ciphertext.
ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" ALTER COLUMN "data_encrypted" SET NOT NULL;
ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" ALTER COLUMN "provenance_encrypted" SET NOT NULL;
-- Drop the plaintext columns so no verbatim clinical span survives.
ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS "data_json";
ALTER TABLE "extracted_facts" DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS "provenance_json";
+9 -3
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@@ -5621,11 +5621,17 @@ model ExtractedFact {
/// The FHIR-staged fields, STATED status only, shaped per `factType`
/// (Condition / Observation / MedicationStatement). Codes (SNOMED / ICD-10
/// / LOINC / RxNorm / ATC) are present only when the document writes them.
dataJson Json @map("data_json")
/// Stored encrypted: the JSON payload (diagnosis text, lab values,
/// medication names, stated codes) is clinical PHI transcribed verbatim from
/// the source document, so it rides the AES-256-GCM `*_encrypted` BYTEA
/// convention shared with the note columns rather than as plaintext JSONB.
dataEncrypted Bytes @map("data_encrypted")
/// Per-field provenance: the verbatim source span the value came from, an
/// optional page index, and per-field confidence. Makes "extract what's
/// written" auditable against the original.
provenanceJson Json @map("provenance_json")
/// written" auditable against the original. The source span is a verbatim
/// excerpt of the clinical document (PHI), so it is stored encrypted with the
/// same codec as `dataEncrypted`.
provenanceEncrypted Bytes @map("provenance_encrypted")
/// The id of the structured-store row created when the fact was approved
/// (LabResult / IllnessEpisode / Medication), or NULL while PENDING /
/// REJECTED.
+16
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@@ -486,6 +486,22 @@ async function main() {
prisma.inboundDocument,
),
);
// The staged extracted-fact payloads: the FHIR-staged clinical values and the
// verbatim source-span provenance. Both NOT NULL, so every staged row rotates.
results.push(
await rotateBytesColumn(
"ExtractedFact",
"dataEncrypted",
prisma.extractedFact,
),
);
results.push(
await rotateBytesColumn(
"ExtractedFact",
"provenanceEncrypted",
prisma.extractedFact,
),
);
console.log("\n=== Rotation summary ===");
let totalRotated = 0;
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ import {
returnAllZodIssues,
safeJson,
} from "@/lib/api-response";
import { prisma, toJson } from "@/lib/db";
import { serialiseFact } from "@/lib/documents/store";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import { encryptFactData, serialiseFact } from "@/lib/documents/store";
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
import { requireModuleEnabled } from "@/lib/modules/gate";
import {
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ export const PATCH = apiHandler(
const updated = await prisma.extractedFact.update({
where: { id: fact.id },
data: {
dataJson: toJson(editToFactData(parsed.data)),
dataEncrypted: encryptFactData(editToFactData(parsed.data)),
// The values are now user-asserted — the fail-closed gate is cleared.
needsReview: false,
},
+5 -3
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@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ import {
resolveDailyCap,
} from "@/lib/ai/coach/budget";
import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
import { prisma, toJson } from "@/lib/db";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import {
InboundExtractError,
runInboundExtraction,
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ import {
} from "@/lib/documents/extract";
import {
encryptDocumentToBytes,
encryptFactData,
encryptFactProvenance,
serialiseDocument,
} from "@/lib/documents/store";
import {
@@ -108,8 +110,8 @@ async function persistExtraction(args: {
status: "PENDING" as const,
confidence: f.confidence,
needsReview: f.needsReview,
dataJson: toJson(f.data),
provenanceJson: toJson(f.provenance),
dataEncrypted: encryptFactData(f.data),
provenanceEncrypted: encryptFactProvenance(f.provenance),
})),
},
},
+7
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@@ -179,6 +179,13 @@ export const ENCRYPTED_COLUMNS: readonly EncryptedColumn[] = [
// AES-256-GCM string → UTF-8 bytes. The most sensitive blob in the wave
// (a full clinical document); never logged, never in wide-event meta.
{ model: "InboundDocument", field: "contentEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
// The staged extracted-fact payloads: the FHIR-staged clinical values
// (diagnosis text / lab values / medication names / stated codes) and the
// verbatim source-span provenance. Both are PHI transcribed from the source
// document, so the staging rows carry the same at-rest guarantee as the
// document itself rather than persisting as plaintext JSONB.
{ model: "ExtractedFact", field: "dataEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
{ model: "ExtractedFact", field: "provenanceEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
] as const;
/** Stable `Model.field` key for a registry entry. */
+7 -12
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@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
*/
import { encryptToBytes } from "@/lib/ai/coach/bytes-codec";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import { decryptFactData } from "@/lib/documents/store";
import { resolveOrMintBiomarker } from "@/lib/labs/biomarker-store";
import type { ExtractedFact } from "@/generated/prisma/client";
import type {
@@ -152,20 +153,14 @@ export async function commitApprovedFact(
userId: string,
fact: ExtractedFact,
): Promise<CommittedRecordRef> {
// Decrypt the staged payload at confirm time to write it into the normal
// structured store. Fail-closed: a bad key id throws and aborts the commit.
const data = decryptFactData(fact.dataEncrypted);
if (fact.factType === "OBSERVATION") {
return commitObservation(
userId,
fact.dataJson as unknown as ObservationFactData,
);
return commitObservation(userId, data as ObservationFactData);
}
if (fact.factType === "CONDITION") {
return commitCondition(
userId,
fact.dataJson as unknown as ConditionFactData,
);
return commitCondition(userId, data as ConditionFactData);
}
return commitMedication(
userId,
fact.dataJson as unknown as MedicationStatementFactData,
);
return commitMedication(userId, data as MedicationStatementFactData);
}
+34 -2
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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
*/
import { Buffer } from "node:buffer";
import { decryptFromBytes, encryptToBytes } from "@/lib/ai/coach/bytes-codec";
import { decrypt, encrypt } from "@/lib/crypto";
import type {
ExtractedFact,
@@ -40,6 +41,37 @@ export function decryptDocumentFromBytes(buf: Uint8Array): Buffer {
return Buffer.from(base64, "base64");
}
/**
* Encrypt a staged fact's FHIR-staged payload into the `Bytes` column the
* schema stores. The structured clinical values (diagnosis text, lab values,
* medication names, stated codes) are PHI, so they ride the shared AES-256-GCM
* note codec (JSON → `encrypt()` string → UTF-8 bytes) rather than plaintext
* JSONB.
*/
export function encryptFactData(data: FactData): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {
return encryptToBytes(JSON.stringify(data));
}
/** Decrypt a staged fact's payload back to its DTO shape. Throws on bad key. */
export function decryptFactData(buf: Uint8Array): FactData {
return JSON.parse(decryptFromBytes(buf)) as FactData;
}
/**
* Encrypt a staged fact's provenance. The verbatim source span is a clinical
* document excerpt (PHI); encrypted with the same codec as the fact data.
*/
export function encryptFactProvenance(
provenance: FactProvenance,
): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {
return encryptToBytes(JSON.stringify(provenance));
}
/** Decrypt a staged fact's provenance back to its DTO shape. */
export function decryptFactProvenance(buf: Uint8Array): FactProvenance {
return JSON.parse(decryptFromBytes(buf)) as FactProvenance;
}
/** Map a persisted document row (+ counts) to the list/detail DTO. */
export function serialiseDocument(
doc: InboundDocument,
@@ -72,8 +104,8 @@ export function serialiseFact(fact: ExtractedFact): ExtractedFactDto {
status: fact.status as ExtractedFactStatus,
confidence: fact.confidence,
needsReview: fact.needsReview,
data: fact.dataJson as unknown as FactData,
provenance: fact.provenanceJson as unknown as FactProvenance,
data: decryptFactData(fact.dataEncrypted),
provenance: decryptFactProvenance(fact.provenanceEncrypted),
committedRecordId: fact.committedRecordId,
committedRecordType: fact.committedRecordType,
};