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feat(auth): add token-bound step-up elevations for second-factor management
Second-factor management has been cookie-only since v1.23. The gate is right: a Bearer token is a credential whose provenance the server cannot see, and tearing down a second factor must not be reachable from the weaker of an interactive login and a value pasted into a script. What was missing was never Bearer access to those routes — it was a way to say, over a transport with no session row, that the human holding this device just re-proved a factor. An elevation is that proof. It is minted only against a re-proved account password or primary passkey, bound to the exact token that re-proved, single-use via a conditional UPDATE, five-minute-lived to match the cookie path's step-up window, and stored hashed. A stolen token mints nothing; a second token cannot redeem another's elevation; a password change drops every one the account holds. requireMfaManagementAuth is the one gate the management routes share. On a cookie session it delegates to the original helpers unchanged, so the web flow runs the code it always did. requireAdmin stays cookie-only and out of reach.
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@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
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* POST /api/auth/me/mfa/disable
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*
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* Tear down the second factor. Double-gated:
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* 1. `requireFreshMfa` — a cookie session that completed a second factor
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* within the step-up window (Bearer can never satisfy this).
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* 1. `requireMfaManagementAuth({ freshFactor: true })` — a cookie session that
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* completed a second factor within the step-up window, OR a Bearer token
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* presenting a single-use elevation it minted by re-proving a factor.
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* 2. A current TOTP or recovery code in the body — proves live possession at
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* the moment of the destructive action, not just a stale fresh-session.
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*
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@@ -12,9 +13,8 @@
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*/
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import {
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apiHandler,
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requireFreshMfa,
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requireMfaManagementAuth,
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HttpError,
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MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
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} from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import {
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apiError,
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@@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ const DISABLE_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
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export const POST = apiHandler(async (req: Request) => {
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// Step-up gate first — throws StepUpRequiredError (401 + errorCode) if the
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// session is not freshly second-factor-verified.
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const { user, session } = await requireFreshMfa(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
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const { user, session } = await requireMfaManagementAuth({
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freshFactor: true,
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});
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const rl = await checkRateLimit(
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`mfa:disable:${user.id}`,
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@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@
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* POST /api/auth/me/mfa/recovery-codes/regenerate
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*
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* Issue a fresh recovery-code batch, invalidating the entire prior set in one
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* transaction. Step-up gated (`requireFreshMfa`) — a recovery-code rotation is
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* a sensitive action; Bearer can never satisfy the gate. The new codes are
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* returned **once**.
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* transaction. Step-up gated (`requireMfaManagementAuth({ freshFactor: true })`)
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* — a recovery-code rotation is sensitive, so it takes either a freshly
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* second-factor-verified cookie session or a single-use step-up elevation minted
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* by the calling token. The new codes are returned **once**.
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*/
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import {
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apiHandler,
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requireFreshMfa,
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requireMfaManagementAuth,
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HttpError,
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MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
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} from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import { apiError, apiSuccess, getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response";
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import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ const REGEN_RATE_LIMIT = 5;
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const REGEN_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
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export const POST = apiHandler(async (req: Request) => {
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const { user } = await requireFreshMfa(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
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const { user } = await requireMfaManagementAuth({ freshFactor: true });
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// Defence in depth — regeneration only makes sense for an active factor.
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if (!user.totpConfirmedAt) {
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@@ -3,11 +3,12 @@
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*
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* Second-factor status for the security settings hub: whether TOTP is active,
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* how many recovery codes remain, and the registered WebAuthn security keys.
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* Cookie-only (`requireCookieAuth`) — managing MFA is never a Bearer surface.
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* Gated by `requireMfaManagementAuth`: a cookie session, or a Bearer token
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* presenting a single-use step-up elevation. A token alone is not enough.
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*
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* Returns only metadata: no secret, no recovery-code plaintext, no public key.
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*/
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import { apiHandler, requireCookieAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import { apiHandler, requireMfaManagementAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import { apiSuccess } from "@/lib/api-response";
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import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
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@@ -16,7 +17,7 @@ import { countRemainingRecoveryCodes } from "@/lib/auth/mfa/recovery-codes";
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export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
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export const GET = apiHandler(async () => {
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const { user } = await requireCookieAuth();
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const { user } = await requireMfaManagementAuth();
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const [recoveryCodesRemaining, webauthn] = await Promise.all([
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countRemainingRecoveryCodes(user.id),
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@@ -6,13 +6,21 @@
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* the accepted time-step (replay guard), generates + persists the Argon2id-
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* hashed recovery codes, and returns the codes **once** for the user to save.
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*
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* The completing session is also stamped `mfaVerifiedAt = now()` so the user
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* can immediately manage the freshly-enabled factor (disable / regenerate
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* codes) without an extra step-up round-trip.
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* On the cookie path the completing session is stamped `mfaVerifiedAt = now()`
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* so the user can immediately manage the freshly-enabled factor (disable /
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* regenerate codes) without an extra step-up round-trip. A Bearer caller has no
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* session row to stamp — the stamping `updateMany` simply matches nothing — and
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* mints a fresh elevation per action instead.
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*
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* Cookie-only (`requireCookieAuth`): an API token can never enrol MFA.
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* Gated by `requireMfaManagementAuth`: a cookie session, or a Bearer token
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* presenting a single-use step-up elevation. A token on its own can still never
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* enrol MFA.
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*/
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import { apiHandler, requireCookieAuth, HttpError } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import {
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apiHandler,
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requireMfaManagementAuth,
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HttpError,
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} from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import {
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apiError,
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apiSuccess,
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@@ -38,7 +46,7 @@ const CONFIRM_RATE_LIMIT = 10;
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const CONFIRM_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
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export const POST = apiHandler(async (req: Request) => {
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const { user, session } = await requireCookieAuth();
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const { user, session } = await requireMfaManagementAuth();
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const rl = await checkRateLimit(
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`mfa:confirm:${user.id}`,
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@@ -8,11 +8,17 @@
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* not active until `/confirm` verifies a code, so `totpConfirmedAt` stays
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* null here.
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*
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* Cookie-only (`requireCookieAuth`): an API token can never enrol MFA. The
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* recovery-code batch is issued at `/confirm` (after the factor is proven),
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* not here, so an abandoned setup never persists codes.
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* Gated by `requireMfaManagementAuth`: a cookie session, or a Bearer token
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* presenting a single-use step-up elevation minted against a re-proved factor.
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* A token on its own can still never enrol MFA. The recovery-code batch is
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* issued at `/confirm` (after the factor is proven), not here, so an abandoned
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* setup never persists codes.
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*/
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import { apiHandler, requireCookieAuth, HttpError } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import {
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apiHandler,
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requireMfaManagementAuth,
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HttpError,
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} from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import { apiError, apiSuccess, getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response";
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import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
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@@ -27,7 +33,7 @@ const SETUP_RATE_LIMIT = 5;
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const SETUP_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
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export const POST = apiHandler(async (req: Request) => {
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const { user } = await requireCookieAuth();
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const { user } = await requireMfaManagementAuth();
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const rl = await checkRateLimit(
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`mfa:setup:${user.id}`,
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@@ -2,17 +2,14 @@
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* PATCH /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/[id] — rename a registered security key.
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* DELETE /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/[id] — remove one (step-up gated).
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*
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* Rename is cookie-authenticated (non-destructive). Removal is a sensitive
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* action: it is gated on a fresh second-factor step-up (`requireFreshMfa`,
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* cookie-only — a Bearer token can never satisfy it).
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* Both go through `requireMfaManagementAuth`: a cookie session, or a Bearer
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* token presenting a single-use step-up elevation. Removal additionally demands
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* the fresh-factor arm (`freshFactor: true`) — on the cookie path a session that
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* completed a second factor inside the step-up window, on the Bearer path an
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* elevation minted against a re-proved factor.
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*/
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import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import {
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apiHandler,
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requireCookieAuth,
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requireFreshMfa,
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MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
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} from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import { apiHandler, requireMfaManagementAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import {
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apiError,
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apiSuccess,
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@@ -31,7 +28,7 @@ export const PATCH = apiHandler(
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request: NextRequest,
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{ params }: { params: Promise<{ id: string }> },
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) => {
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const { user } = await requireCookieAuth();
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const { user } = await requireMfaManagementAuth();
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const { id } = await params;
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const { data: body, error: jsonError } = await safeJson(request, {
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@@ -70,7 +67,7 @@ export const DELETE = apiHandler(
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) => {
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// Step-up gate first — throws StepUpRequiredError (401 + errorCode) if the
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// session is not freshly second-factor-verified.
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const { user } = await requireFreshMfa(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
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const { user } = await requireMfaManagementAuth({ freshFactor: true });
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const { id } = await params;
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const existing = await prisma.webauthnMfaCredential.findUnique({
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@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
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/**
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* POST /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/options
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*
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* Begin registering a WebAuthn security key as a second factor. Cookie-only —
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* an API token can never enrol MFA. Returns the SimpleWebAuthn creation
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* options + the server-issued challenge id to present back at /register/verify.
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* Begin registering a WebAuthn security key as a second factor. Takes a cookie
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* session or a Bearer token presenting a single-use step-up elevation; a token
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* on its own can never enrol MFA. Returns the SimpleWebAuthn creation options +
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* the server-issued challenge id to present back at /register/verify.
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*/
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import { apiHandler, requireCookieAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import { apiHandler, requireMfaManagementAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import { apiError, apiSuccess } from "@/lib/api-response";
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import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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import { checkRateLimit, rateLimitHeaders } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
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@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ import { createMfaRegistrationOptions } from "@/lib/auth/mfa/webauthn";
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export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
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export const POST = apiHandler(async () => {
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const { user } = await requireCookieAuth();
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const { user } = await requireMfaManagementAuth();
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const rl = await checkRateLimit(
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`mfa:webauthn:register:${user.id}`,
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@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
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/**
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* POST /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/verify
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*
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* Finish registering a WebAuthn security key as a second factor. Cookie-only.
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* Verifies the attestation against the user-bound challenge and stores the
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* credential in `WebauthnMfaCredential` (kept separate from primary passkeys).
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* Finish registering a WebAuthn security key as a second factor. Takes a cookie
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* session or a Bearer token presenting a single-use step-up elevation. Verifies
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* the attestation against the user-bound challenge and stores the credential in
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* `WebauthnMfaCredential` (kept separate from primary passkeys).
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*/
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import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { apiHandler, requireCookieAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import { apiHandler, requireMfaManagementAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import {
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apiError,
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apiSuccess,
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@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ import { setMfaEnrollCookie } from "@/lib/auth/mfa-enrollment";
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export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
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export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
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const { user } = await requireCookieAuth();
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const { user } = await requireMfaManagementAuth();
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const { data: body, error: jsonError } = await safeJson(request, {
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maxBytes: 64 * 1024,
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