Merge pull request #557 from MBombeck/release/v1.30.33

release/v1.30.33 — the session cookie becomes a secret

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,38 @@
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [1.30.33] — 2026-07-19
+
+Security release. It ships on its own because it changes how a browser
+session is recognised.
+
+- **The session cookie is a purpose-generated secret.** It used to be the
+  session record's own database key — an identifier built to avoid
+  collisions, not to be unguessable, and one that appears wherever that
+  record is referenced. The cookie now carries 32 bytes from the system's
+  random source, and only its hash is stored, so the value in your
+  browser exists nowhere on the server.
+- **You are not signed out by this.** Sessions from before the change
+  keep working and are simply not renewed, so they run out their normal
+  30 days and disappear. Every sign-in from this release onward is on the
+  new scheme.
+- **The device list no longer hands out working credentials.** It
+  identified each device by that same record key — which, for a session
+  predating this release, is that device's cookie. It now shows an opaque
+  handle that is useless as a login, and the same handle is what signs a
+  device out.
+- **A refresh token cannot be rotated from a different device**, and an
+  expired one is refused. The test that was supposed to prove the expiry
+  passed a token that had never been issued, so it proved nothing: with
+  the expiry check deleted, the suite still went green. It is a real test
+  now.
+- **A Nightscout address is checked when you save it**, not only when it
+  happens to be probed first. The check itself already refused private,
+  loopback and cloud-metadata addresses.
+
+Operators: rotating `API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY` now also signs out every browser
+session, not just API tokens. One migration (0255), additive.
+
 ## [1.30.32] — 2026-07-19
 
 - **A withdrawn AI consent stays withdrawn.** Opening the AI settings

docs/api/openapi.yaml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 openapi: 3.1.0
 info:
   title: HealthLog API
-  version: 1.30.32
+  version: 1.30.33
   description: >-
     Self-hosted personal-health-tracking PWA — public API surface for the iOS native client and external ingest.
 

docs/self-hosting/getting-started.md

@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ echo "ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)"       >> .env
 echo "API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)"   >> .env
 ```
 
-| Variable             | Purpose                                                                                | Rotation cost                                          |
-| -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ |
-| `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`  | Bundled Postgres password — used by both the `db` service and `DATABASE_URL`           | Database restart + connection-string update            |
-| `ENCRYPTION_KEY`     | AES-256-GCM key for at-rest secrets (Withings tokens, AI provider keys, VAPID secrets) | Coordinated; see `docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md` |
-| `API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY` | HMAC-SHA256 key for hashing Bearer API tokens before storage                           | Invalidates every issued `hlk_*` token                 |
+| Variable             | Purpose                                                                                | Rotation cost                                                              |
+| -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`  | Bundled Postgres password — used by both the `db` service and `DATABASE_URL`           | Database restart + connection-string update                                |
+| `ENCRYPTION_KEY`     | AES-256-GCM key for at-rest secrets (Withings tokens, AI provider keys, VAPID secrets) | Coordinated; see `docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md`                     |
+| `API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY` | HMAC-SHA256 key for hashing Bearer API tokens and web session cookies before storage   | Invalidates every issued `hlk_*` token and signs out every browser session |
 
 You do **not** edit `DATABASE_URL` on the bundled `docker-compose.yml`
 stack: compose constructs the connection string inside the `app`

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "healthlog",
-  "version": "1.30.32",
+  "version": "1.30.33",
   "description": "Self-hosted personal-health-tracking PWA with Withings integration, AI insights, and doctor-report PDF export.",
   "license": "PolyForm-Noncommercial-1.0.0",
   "homepage": "https://healthlog.dev",

prisma/migrations/0255_session_token_hash/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-- Session cookies carry a purpose-generated secret rather than the row's cuid
+-- primary key.
+--
+-- A cuid is built for collision-resistant identity, not for unguessability: it
+-- embeds a timestamp and a monotonic counter and does not come from a CSPRNG.
+-- A session cookie is a bearer credential and must. The cookie now carries a
+-- 32-byte random token (`hls_<hex>`) and only its HMAC-SHA256 hash is stored,
+-- matching how api_tokens and refresh_tokens already hold their secrets.
+--
+-- Additive and nullable ON PURPOSE: every session row that exists at deploy
+-- time keeps NULL here and stays resolvable by its id, so the release signs
+-- nobody out. Those rows cannot have their sliding expiry extended, so the
+-- id-as-credential path drains itself within the 30-day session lifetime with
+-- no operator action. Postgres permits many NULLs under a unique index, so the
+-- constraint below does not conflict with the backfill-free transition.
+
+-- AlterTable
+ALTER TABLE "sessions" ADD COLUMN "token_hash" TEXT;
+
+-- CreateIndex
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "sessions_token_hash_key" ON "sessions"("token_hash");

prisma/schema.prisma

@@ -1023,6 +1023,16 @@ model Passkey {
 model Session {
   id            String    @id @default(cuid())
   userId        String    @map("user_id")
+  // v1.30.32 — HMAC-SHA256 of the session cookie's secret. The cookie carries
+  // a 32-byte CSPRNG token (`hls_<hex>`), never this row's cuid: a cuid is
+  // collision-resistant, not unguessable (embedded timestamp + counter), and a
+  // session identifier is a bearer credential. Hash-at-rest mirrors the
+  // ApiToken / RefreshToken posture — a database read yields no usable cookie.
+  //
+  // Nullable for the transition only: rows minted before this column existed
+  // carry NULL and are still resolvable by id until they expire. See the
+  // resolution comment in `src/lib/auth/session.ts`.
+  tokenHash     String?   @unique @map("token_hash")
   expiresAt     DateTime  @map("expires_at")
   createdAt     DateTime  @default(now()) @map("created_at")
   ipAddress     String?   @map("ip_address")

public/sw.js

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ try {
 // v1.4.38.4 → v1.4.42. Do not hand-edit; bump `package.json` and rebuild.
 const CACHE_VERSION =
   (typeof self !== "undefined" && self.__APP_VERSION__) ||
-  /* @sw-version-fallback */ "v1.30.32";
+  /* @sw-version-fallback */ "v1.30.33";
 const STATIC_CACHE = `healthlog-static-${CACHE_VERSION}`;
 const PAGE_CACHE = `healthlog-pages-${CACHE_VERSION}`;
 // v1.18.6 — read-only data cache for a curated allowlist of safe GET `/api/*`

scripts/env-manifest.json

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
         },
         {
           "name": "API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY",
-          "purpose": "HMAC-SHA256 key for hashing external Bearer tokens. 64 hex chars."
+          "purpose": "HMAC-SHA256 key for hashing external Bearer tokens AND web session cookies. 64 hex chars. Rotating it signs every browser session out on top of invalidating every issued token."
         }
       ]
     },

src/app/api/auth/me/sessions/__tests__/route.test.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,25 @@
 import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
 import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
 
+// The handle is an HMAC, so the route needs the key the real helper reads.
+process.env.API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY ??= "a".repeat(64);
+
 vi.mock("@/lib/db", () => ({
   prisma: { session: { findMany: vi.fn() } },
 }));
 
-vi.mock("@/lib/auth/session", () => ({
-  getSession: vi.fn(),
-  destroyOtherSessions: vi.fn(),
-  destroySessionById: vi.fn(),
-}));
+// `sessionHandle` stays REAL: the point of the handle test is that the route
+// emits the actual derivation, and a stubbed one would let the route return
+// row ids while the assertion still passed.
+vi.mock("@/lib/auth/session", async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("@/lib/auth/session")>();
+  return {
+    getSession: vi.fn(),
+    destroyOtherSessions: vi.fn(),
+    destroySessionById: vi.fn(),
+    sessionHandle: actual.sessionHandle,
+  };
+});
 
 vi.mock("@/lib/geo", () => ({
   lookupIpLocation: vi.fn(async () => "Berlin, DE"),
@@ -39,6 +49,7 @@ import {
   getSession,
   destroyOtherSessions,
   destroySessionById,
+  sessionHandle,
 } from "@/lib/auth/session";
 
 const SESSION_OK = {
@@ -90,7 +101,6 @@ describe("GET /api/auth/me/sessions", () => {
     const list = body.data.sessions;
     expect(list).toHaveLength(2);
     expect(list[0]).toMatchObject({
-      id: "sess-current",
       device: "Firefox on macOS",
       ipMasked: "203.0.x.x",
       location: "Berlin, DE",
@@ -100,6 +110,42 @@ describe("GET /api/auth/me/sessions", () => {
     // The full IP never appears in the response body.
     expect(JSON.stringify(body)).not.toContain("203.0.113.7");
   });
+
+  it("never puts a session row id in the response body", async () => {
+    // A row id created before the secret cookie landed IS that session's
+    // cookie value, so listing it hands the client working logins for the
+    // account's other devices. The list carries an opaque handle instead;
+    // it is what the revoke route accepts.
+    vi.mocked(getSession).mockResolvedValue(SESSION_OK as never);
+    vi.mocked(prisma.session.findMany).mockResolvedValue([
+      {
+        id: "sess-current",
+        ipAddress: "203.0.113.7",
+        userAgent: "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh) Firefox/120.0",
+        lastActiveAt: new Date(),
+        createdAt: new Date(),
+      },
+      {
+        id: "sess-other",
+        ipAddress: "198.51.100.4",
+        userAgent: "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) Chrome/119.0.0.0",
+        lastActiveAt: null,
+        createdAt: new Date(),
+      },
+    ] as never);
+
+    const res = await GET();
+    const body = await res.json();
+    const serialised = JSON.stringify(body);
+
+    expect(serialised).not.toContain("sess-current");
+    expect(serialised).not.toContain("sess-other");
+    // Still identified well enough to act on: distinct, stable handles.
+    const [a, b] = body.data.sessions.map((s: { id: string }) => s.id);
+    expect(a).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(a).not.toBe(b);
+    expect(a).toBe(sessionHandle("sess-current"));
+  });
 });
 
 describe("DELETE /api/auth/me/sessions (sign out everywhere)", () => {

src/app/api/auth/me/sessions/route.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
 import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
 import { getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response";
 import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
-import { destroyOtherSessions } from "@/lib/auth/session";
+import { destroyOtherSessions, sessionHandle } from "@/lib/auth/session";
 import { lookupIpLocation } from "@/lib/geo";
 import { coarseDeviceLabel, maskIp } from "@/lib/auth/device-fingerprint";
 
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ export const GET = apiHandler(async () => {
   );
 
   const result: SessionDTO[] = sessions.map((s) => ({
-    id: s.id,
+    id: sessionHandle(s.id),
     device: coarseDeviceLabel(s.userAgent),
     ipMasked: maskIp(s.ipAddress),
     location: s.ipAddress ? (locationByIp.get(s.ipAddress) ?? null) : null,

src/app/api/nightscout/connect/__tests__/route.test.ts

@@ -140,6 +140,63 @@ describe("POST /api/nightscout/connect", () => {
     expect(userUpdate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 
+  // Input-time SSRF floor. Every case below leaves the default happy-path
+  // `fetchSgvEntries` mock in place — it RESOLVES — so the only thing that
+  // can produce a 422 is the check that runs before the probe. Asserting the
+  // probe was never called is what separates this from the fetch-time guard:
+  // a URL that never reaches the egress layer cannot have been refused by it.
+  describe("refuses private / non-public hosts before the probe runs", () => {
+    const cases: Array<[string, string]> = [
+      ["loopback", "http://127.0.0.1:1337"],
+      ["loopback by name", "http://localhost:1337"],
+      ["link-local", "http://169.254.1.1"],
+      ["cloud metadata endpoint", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"],
+      ["RFC1918 class A", "http://10.0.0.5"],
+      ["RFC1918 class C", "http://192.168.1.5"],
+      ["CGNAT", "http://100.64.0.1"],
+      ["IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback", "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]"],
+      ["IPv6 loopback", "http://[::1]:1337"],
+      ["IPv6 unique-local", "http://[fd00::1]"],
+      ["octal IPv4 loopback", "http://0177.0.0.1"],
+      ["hex IPv4 loopback", "http://0x7f000001"],
+      ["decimal IPv4 loopback", "http://2130706433"],
+      [".internal suffix", "http://cgm.internal"],
+      [".local suffix", "http://cgm.local"],
+    ];
+
+    it.each(cases)("refuses %s", async (_label, url) => {
+      const res = await post(req({ url, token: "tok" }));
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(422);
+      expect(String(res.error)).toMatch(/private network/i);
+      expect(fetchSgvEntriesMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(userUpdate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it("still lets the explicit self-hoster opt-in through to the probe", async () => {
+      // The floor is gated, not absolute: a LAN instance stays reachable for
+      // the operator who asked for it. Without this the opt-in is dead code.
+      const res = await post(
+        req({
+          url: "http://192.168.1.5:1337",
+          token: "tok",
+          allowPrivateHost: true,
+        }),
+      );
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(fetchSgvEntriesMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(userUpdate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    it("lets an ordinary public instance through", async () => {
+      const res = await post(req({ url: "https://ns.example.com" }));
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(fetchSgvEntriesMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+  });
+
   it("rate-limits the connect surface", async () => {
     rateLimitMock.mockResolvedValue({
       allowed: false,

src/app/api/nightscout/connect/route.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import { markReconnected } from "@/lib/integrations/status";
 import { SafeFetchError } from "@/lib/safe-fetch";
 import { fetchSgvEntries, NightscoutApiError } from "@/lib/nightscout/client";
 import { nightscoutConnectSchema } from "@/lib/validations/nightscout";
+import { isPublicUrl } from "@/lib/validations/notifications";
 
 /**
  * Connect (or update) the user's Nightscout instance (v1.17.0).
@@ -49,6 +50,25 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
 
   const { url, token, allowPrivateHost } = result.data;
 
+  // SSRF floor at INPUT time, not merely as a side effect of the live probe
+  // below. `fetchSgvEntries` does route through `safeFetch` with the same
+  // public-host pin, so today both paths refuse the same URLs — but that
+  // makes the guard on the value we PERSIST contingent on the probe staying
+  // exactly where it is. Reorder it, make it best-effort, or add a "save
+  // without testing" affordance and the stored URL is suddenly unchecked.
+  // Assert it here so the thing that gets encrypted onto the row is the
+  // thing that was validated.
+  //
+  // Gated on the same explicit opt-in the fetch path uses: a self-hoster who
+  // deliberately points at a LAN instance has asked for the private host and
+  // must still be able to connect.
+  if (!allowPrivateHost && !isPublicUrl(url)) {
+    return apiError(
+      "That instance is on a private network. Enable the private-network option to connect to it.",
+      422,
+    );
+  }
+
   // Live validation: pull a single SGV entry. A connection that can't even
   // fetch one row is not worth storing.
   try {

src/lib/auth/__tests__/refresh-token.test.ts

@@ -394,21 +394,95 @@ describe("rotateRefreshToken", () => {
     expect(liveDev1).toHaveLength(0);
   });
 
-  it("rejects expired refresh tokens", async () => {
-    await issueAccessAndRefresh({
+  it("rejects an expired refresh token by its own secret", async () => {
+    // The token presented here is the REAL one, so the row is found and the
+    // expiry branch is what refuses it. Presenting an unknown string instead
+    // would pass on `not_found` and prove nothing about expiry at all.
+    const initial = await issueAccessAndRefresh({
       userId: "u1",
       policy: NATIVE_POLICY,
       source: "login.password",
     });
-    // Manually expire
     dbState.refreshTokens[0].expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() - 1000);
+
     const result = await rotateRefreshToken({
-      refreshToken: "hlr_doesnt_matter",
+      refreshToken: initial.refreshToken,
       policy: NATIVE_POLICY,
     });
+
     expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
     if (result.ok) return;
-    expect(result.reason).toBe("not_found");
+    expect(result.reason).toBe("expired");
+    // An expired token must not mint a replacement pair.
+    expect(dbState.refreshTokens).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it("accepts the same token one millisecond before it expires", async () => {
+    // Boundary companion: proves the expiry refusal above is driven by the
+    // clock and not by the rotation path refusing everything.
+    const initial = await issueAccessAndRefresh({
+      userId: "u1",
+      policy: NATIVE_POLICY,
+      source: "login.password",
+    });
+    dbState.refreshTokens[0].expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 60_000);
+
+    const result = await rotateRefreshToken({
+      refreshToken: initial.refreshToken,
+      policy: NATIVE_POLICY,
+    });
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a live token presented under a different device id", async () => {
+    // Device A's token replayed from device B. The token is valid and unused,
+    // so only the device binding can refuse it.
+    const dev1 = await issueAccessAndRefresh({
+      userId: "u1",
+      policy: NATIVE_POLICY,
+      source: "login.password",
+      deviceId: "dev-1",
+    });
+
+    const result = await rotateRefreshToken({
+      refreshToken: dev1.refreshToken,
+      policy: NATIVE_POLICY,
+      deviceId: "dev-2",
+    });
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (result.ok) return;
+    expect(result.reason).toBe("device_mismatch");
+    // Refused, not consumed: the legitimate device can still rotate it.
+    expect(dbState.refreshTokens[0].usedAt).toBeNull();
+    expect(dbState.refreshTokens).toHaveLength(1);
+
+    const legitimate = await rotateRefreshToken({
+      refreshToken: dev1.refreshToken,
+      policy: NATIVE_POLICY,
+      deviceId: "dev-1",
+    });
+    expect(legitimate.ok).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("still rotates when the caller sends no device id at all", async () => {
+    // An older client that never sends `X-Device-Id` must not be locked out
+    // by the device binding — a presented null is unattributable, not a
+    // mismatch.
+    const dev1 = await issueAccessAndRefresh({
+      userId: "u1",
+      policy: NATIVE_POLICY,
+      source: "login.password",
+      deviceId: "dev-1",
+    });
+
+    const result = await rotateRefreshToken({
+      refreshToken: dev1.refreshToken,
+      policy: NATIVE_POLICY,
+    });
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
   });
 
   it("rejects revoked refresh tokens", async () => {

src/lib/auth/__tests__/session.test.ts

@@ -6,23 +6,48 @@ const cookieState = vi.hoisted(() => ({
   set: vi.fn(),
 }));
 
+interface SessionRow {
+  id: string;
+  userId: string;
+  tokenHash: string | null;
+  expiresAt: Date;
+  lastActiveAt: Date | null;
+  user: { id: string; locale?: string | null };
+}
+
+const store = vi.hoisted(() => ({ sessions: [] as unknown[] }));
+
 vi.mock("@/lib/db", () => ({
   prisma: {
     session: {
-      findUnique: vi.fn(),
+      // Dispatches on the `where` shape so the two resolution paths — by
+      // secret hash and by primary key — stay distinguishable in assertions.
+      findUnique: vi.fn(
+        async ({ where }: { where: { id?: string; tokenHash?: string } }) => {
+          const rows = store.sessions as SessionRow[];
+          if (where.tokenHash !== undefined) {
+            return rows.find((r) => r.tokenHash === where.tokenHash) ?? null;
+          }
+          return rows.find((r) => r.id === where.id) ?? null;
+        },
+      ),
+      create: vi.fn(async ({ data }: { data: Record<string, unknown> }) => {
+        const row = {
+          id: `sess_cuid_${(store.sessions as SessionRow[]).length + 1}`,
+          lastActiveAt: null,
+          user: { id: data.userId as string },
+          ...data,
+        } as unknown as SessionRow;
+        (store.sessions as SessionRow[]).push(row);
+        return row;
+      }),
       delete: vi.fn(),
       deleteMany: vi.fn(),
       update: vi.fn(),
     },
-    apiToken: {
-      updateMany: vi.fn(),
-    },
-    refreshToken: {
-      updateMany: vi.fn(),
-    },
-    trustedDevice: {
-      deleteMany: vi.fn(),
-    },
+    apiToken: { updateMany: vi.fn() },
+    refreshToken: { updateMany: vi.fn() },
+    trustedDevice: { deleteMany: vi.fn() },
     $transaction: vi.fn(async (ops: Promise<unknown>[]) => Promise.all(ops)),
   },
 }));
@@ -35,6 +60,12 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/logging/context", () => ({
   getEvent: () => undefined,
 }));
 
+// Deterministic stand-in for the HMAC so tests assert the *shape* of the
+// stored value rather than re-deriving a keyed digest.
+vi.mock("@/lib/auth/hmac", () => ({
+  hashToken: (raw: string) => `hash:${raw}`,
+}));
+
 vi.mock("next/headers", () => ({
   cookies: vi.fn(async () => ({
     get: (name: string) =>
@@ -47,20 +78,165 @@ vi.mock("next/headers", () => ({
 }));
 
 import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
-import { getSession, destroyAllSessions, destroySession } from "../session";
+import {
+  getSession,
+  createSession,
+  destroyAllSessions,
+  destroySession,
+} from "../session";
+
+const THIRTY_DAYS_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+function seed(row: Partial<SessionRow> & { id: string }): SessionRow {
+  const full: SessionRow = {
+    userId: "user-1",
+    tokenHash: null,
+    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + THIRTY_DAYS_MS),
+    lastActiveAt: new Date(),
+    user: { id: row.userId ?? "user-1" },
+    ...row,
+  } as SessionRow;
+  (store.sessions as SessionRow[]).push(full);
+  return full;
+}
 
 beforeEach(() => {
-  vi.resetAllMocks();
+  vi.clearAllMocks();
+  store.sessions = [];
   cookieState.sessionId = "sess-expired";
+  // `clearAllMocks` drops recorded calls but keeps implementations, so a
+  // rejection staged by one test would otherwise leak into the next. Re-arm
+  // the write mocks with a benign default each time.
+  vi.mocked(prisma.session.delete).mockResolvedValue({} as never);
+  vi.mocked(prisma.session.deleteMany).mockResolvedValue({ count: 1 } as never);
+  vi.mocked(prisma.session.update).mockResolvedValue({} as never);
+});
+
+describe("createSession", () => {
+  it("puts a CSPRNG secret in the cookie, never the row's primary key", async () => {
+    cookieState.sessionId = undefined;
+
+    await createSession("user-1", false);
+
+    const row = (store.sessions as SessionRow[])[0];
+    const cookieValue = cookieState.set.mock.calls.find(
+      (c) => c[0] === "healthlog_session",
+    )![1] as string;
+
+    // A cuid is collision-resistant, not unguessable. The cookie must not be
+    // the primary key under any encoding.
+    expect(cookieValue).not.toBe(row.id);
+    expect(cookieValue).not.toContain(row.id);
+    // 32 bytes of randomness, hex-encoded, behind a greppable prefix.
+    expect(cookieValue).toMatch(/^hls_[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
+    // Only the hash is persisted — a table dump yields no usable cookie.
+    expect(row.tokenHash).toBe(`hash:${cookieValue}`);
+    expect(row.tokenHash).not.toContain(row.id);
+  });
+
+  it("mints a distinct secret per session", async () => {
+    cookieState.sessionId = undefined;
+    await createSession("user-1", false);
+    await createSession("user-1", false);
+
+    const [first, second] = cookieState.set.mock.calls
+      .filter((c) => c[0] === "healthlog_session")
+      .map((c) => c[1] as string);
+
+    expect(first).not.toBe(second);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("getSession — cookie resolution", () => {
+  it("resolves a modern cookie by its hash, not by primary key", async () => {
+    const row = seed({ id: "sess_cuid_1", tokenHash: "hash:hls_abc" });
+    cookieState.sessionId = "hls_abc";
+
+    const result = await getSession();
+
+    expect(result?.session.id).toBe(row.id);
+    // The lookup went through the hash column.
+    expect(prisma.session.findUnique).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ where: { tokenHash: "hash:hls_abc" } }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a modern-shaped cookie whose hash matches nothing", async () => {
+    seed({ id: "sess_cuid_1", tokenHash: "hash:hls_real" });
+    cookieState.sessionId = "hls_forged";
+
+    await expect(getSession()).resolves.toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("still accepts a pre-upgrade cookie carrying the row id (no forced logout)", async () => {
+    // The compatibility path. A session minted before the secret existed has
+    // a NULL token_hash and the browser holds its cuid; the deploy must not
+    // sign that user out.
+    const row = seed({ id: "sess_legacy", tokenHash: null });
+    cookieState.sessionId = "sess_legacy";
+
+    const result = await getSession();
+
+    expect(result?.session.id).toBe(row.id);
+    expect(result?.user.id).toBe("user-1");
+  });
+
+  it("retires the row id once that row holds a secret", async () => {
+    // Same cuid, but the row has been issued a secret. The id is an internal
+    // identifier again and must not authenticate anything — otherwise the
+    // guessable-credential surface never actually closes.
+    seed({ id: "sess_upgraded", tokenHash: "hash:hls_xyz" });
+    cookieState.sessionId = "sess_upgraded";
+
+    await expect(getSession()).resolves.toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("getSession — sliding expiry", () => {
+  it("extends a modern session and re-emits the same secret", async () => {
+    seed({
+      id: "sess_cuid_1",
+      tokenHash: "hash:hls_abc",
+      expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 2 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
+    });
+    cookieState.sessionId = "hls_abc";
+
+    await getSession();
+
+    expect(prisma.session.update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ where: { id: "sess_cuid_1" } }),
+    );
+    const cookieValue = cookieState.set.mock.calls.find(
+      (c) => c[0] === "healthlog_session",
+    )![1];
+    expect(cookieValue).toBe("hls_abc");
+  });
+
+  it("withholds the extension from a legacy session so the id path drains", async () => {
+    // A legacy row must not renew itself indefinitely, or an active user could
+    // ride a cuid-as-credential session forever. Capped at the expiry it
+    // already carries, the path is gone within the session lifetime.
+    seed({
+      id: "sess_legacy",
+      tokenHash: null,
+      expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 2 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
+    });
+    cookieState.sessionId = "sess_legacy";
+
+    const result = await getSession();
+
+    expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(prisma.session.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
 });
 
 describe("getSession", () => {
   it("swallows expired-session delete races and clears cookies", async () => {
-    vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
+    seed({
       id: "sess-expired",
+      tokenHash: null,
       expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000),
-      user: { id: "user-1" },
-    } as never);
+    });
     vi.mocked(prisma.session.deleteMany).mockRejectedValue(
       new Error("already deleted") as never,
     );
@@ -76,7 +252,33 @@ describe("getSession", () => {
 });
 
 describe("destroySession", () => {
+  it("deletes the row the secret resolves to, not the cookie value", async () => {
+    // The cookie is no longer the primary key, so a logout that deletes by
+    // cookie value would no-op and leave the session alive.
+    seed({ id: "sess_cuid_1", tokenHash: "hash:hls_abc" });
+    cookieState.sessionId = "hls_abc";
+
+    await destroySession();
+
+    expect(prisma.session.delete).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      where: { id: "sess_cuid_1" },
+    });
+    expect(cookieState.delete).toHaveBeenCalledWith("healthlog_session");
+  });
+
+  it("logs a legacy cookie out too", async () => {
+    seed({ id: "sess_legacy", tokenHash: null });
+    cookieState.sessionId = "sess_legacy";
+
+    await destroySession();
+
+    expect(prisma.session.delete).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      where: { id: "sess_legacy" },
+    });
+  });
+
   it("treats an already-deleted session row (P2025) as an idempotent logout", async () => {
+    seed({ id: "sess-gone", tokenHash: null });
     cookieState.sessionId = "sess-gone";
     vi.mocked(prisma.session.delete).mockRejectedValue(
       Object.assign(new Error("record not found"), { code: "P2025" }) as never,
@@ -92,6 +294,7 @@ describe("destroySession", () => {
   });
 
   it("clears the cookie even when the row delete fails on a transient fault", async () => {
+    seed({ id: "sess-live", tokenHash: null });
     cookieState.sessionId = "sess-live";
     vi.mocked(prisma.session.delete).mockRejectedValue(
       Object.assign(new Error("connection reset"), { code: "P1001" }) as never,

src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ export async function issueAccessAndRefresh(
 }
 
 export type RotationFailureReason =
-  "not_found" | "expired" | "already_used" | "revoked";
+  "not_found" | "expired" | "already_used" | "revoked" | "device_mismatch";
 
 export type RotationResult =
   | { ok: true; bundle: IssuedRefreshBundle }
@@ -158,6 +158,26 @@ export async function rotateRefreshToken(input: {
     return { ok: false, reason: "already_used" };
   }
 
+  // A live token belongs to the device it was issued to. The M-4 escalation
+  // above already treats a mismatched deviceId on a REPLAY as a spoofing
+  // signal; the same mismatch on a still-live token is refused outright
+  // rather than silently rotated. Without this the reuse-detection scope is
+  // only as honest as the caller: a thief could rotate a stolen token under
+  // their own fabricated device id, and the resulting family — keyed on the
+  // attacker's id, because `issueAccessAndRefresh` below inherits
+  // `row.deviceId ?? input.deviceId` — would sit outside the victim device's
+  // containment blast radius.
+  //
+  // Both ids must be present to compare. A stored null means the row predates
+  // per-device issuance and cannot be attributed; a presented null means the
+  // caller sent no `X-Device-Id` header. Neither is treated as a mismatch, so
+  // this cannot lock out an older client that never sends the header.
+  const presentedId = input.deviceId ?? null;
+  const storedId = row.deviceId ?? null;
+  if (presentedId !== null && storedId !== null && presentedId !== storedId) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "device_mismatch" };
+  }
+
   // Issue the new pair first, THEN mark old consumed in a transaction.
   // (Race: if two concurrent refreshes hit the same row, both will try to
   // mark `usedAt`. We use updateMany with a `usedAt: null` guard so only

src/lib/auth/session.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
 import { cookies } from "next/headers";
 import type { User } from "@/generated/prisma/client";
+import { hashToken } from "@/lib/auth/hmac";
 import { ensureDbCompatibility } from "@/lib/db-compat";
 import { getEvent } from "@/lib/logging/context";
 import { shouldEmitSecureCookie } from "@/lib/auth/secure-cookie";
@@ -11,6 +13,77 @@ import { LOCALE_COOKIE, setLocaleCookie } from "@/lib/i18n/locale-cookie";
 const SESSION_COOKIE = "healthlog_session";
 const SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days
 
+/**
+ * Marks a cookie value as a v1.30.32 session secret. Doubles as the branch
+ * between the two resolution paths below, so a cookie is only ever looked up
+ * one way and a raw cuid can never be tried as a secret (or vice versa).
+ */
+const SESSION_TOKEN_PREFIX = "hls_";
+const SESSION_SECRET_BYTES = 32;
+
+/**
+ * Mint a session cookie secret: 32 CSPRNG bytes, hex-encoded.
+ *
+ * This exists because the cookie used to carry `Session.id` — a `cuid()`.
+ * cuid targets collision-resistant identity across distributed writers, not
+ * unguessability: it encodes a millisecond timestamp and a process-local
+ * counter and never touches a CSPRNG. That is a fine primary key and an unfit
+ * bearer credential. Only `hashToken(secret)` reaches the database, so a
+ * leaked table dump yields no usable cookie — the same posture ApiToken and
+ * RefreshToken already hold.
+ */
+function mintSessionSecret(): string {
+  return `${SESSION_TOKEN_PREFIX}${randomBytes(SESSION_SECRET_BYTES).toString("hex")}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the session row a cookie value refers to, or null.
+ *
+ * COMPATIBILITY DECISION (v1.30.32). Two paths, and the transition is
+ * deliberately passive:
+ *
+ *   1. `hls_…` — the modern secret. Looked up by `hashToken(value)`.
+ *   2. anything else — a pre-upgrade cookie carrying the row's cuid. Accepted
+ *      ONLY while that row's `tokenHash` is still NULL.
+ *
+ * A migration-time backfill cannot work: the cookie already in the user's
+ * browser is the cuid, and no token we generate server-side can be pushed into
+ * it. Backfilling would sign out every logged-in user at deploy — the one
+ * outcome this change must not cause.
+ *
+ * Upgrading a legacy row in place on next use was the other candidate and was
+ * rejected as unsafe. A browser fires several requests in parallel, all
+ * carrying the same legacy cookie; each would mint its own secret and race to
+ * claim the row. Exactly one write can win, and the losers cannot learn the
+ * winner's secret to re-emit it — the row stores only a hash. Whichever
+ * response reached the browser last would decide the cookie, and if that was a
+ * loser's, the user is signed out. A guarded update narrows the write but not
+ * the outcome: a loser that declines to re-cookie leaves the browser holding a
+ * legacy id the row no longer honours. The race has no correct resolution, and
+ * its failure mode is precisely the forced logout we are avoiding.
+ *
+ * So legacy rows are left alone and simply live out the expiry they already
+ * have — `getSession` withholds the sliding-expiry extension from them (see
+ * there). That bounds the id-as-credential path to the 30-day session lifetime
+ * from the deploy, self-draining, with no operator step and no backfill. Every
+ * login from the deploy onward is on a secret immediately.
+ */
+async function findSessionByCookie(cookieValue: string) {
+  if (cookieValue.startsWith(SESSION_TOKEN_PREFIX)) {
+    return prisma.session.findUnique({
+      where: { tokenHash: hashToken(cookieValue) },
+      include: { user: true },
+    });
+  }
+
+  const legacy = await prisma.session.findUnique({
+    where: { id: cookieValue },
+    include: { user: true },
+  });
+  // A row that already holds a secret has retired its id as a credential.
+  return legacy && legacy.tokenHash === null ? legacy : null;
+}
+
 // v1.23 — throttle window for the user-facing active-session list's "last
 // seen" stamp. A write only happens when the prior stamp is older than this,
 // so the high-churn `getSession` path costs at most one extra UPDATE per
@@ -73,9 +146,13 @@ export async function createSession(
   // "single-factor session" and never satisfies step-up.
   mfaVerifiedAt?: Date | null,
 ): Promise<string> {
+  // The secret is the cookie; the row id stays an internal identifier and is
+  // never handed to the client.
+  const secret = mintSessionSecret();
   const session = await prisma.session.create({
     data: {
       userId,
+      tokenHash: hashToken(secret),
       expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS),
       ipAddress: ipAddress ?? null,
       userAgent: userAgent ?? null,
@@ -84,7 +161,7 @@ export async function createSession(
   });
 
   const cookieStore = await cookies();
-  cookieStore.set(SESSION_COOKIE, session.id, {
+  cookieStore.set(SESSION_COOKIE, secret, {
     httpOnly: true,
     secure: shouldEmitSecureCookie(),
     // OAuth callbacks (e.g. Withings) arrive via top-level cross-site redirect.
@@ -117,18 +194,15 @@ export async function getSession(): Promise<{
   }
 
   const cookieStore = await cookies();
-  const sessionId = cookieStore.get(SESSION_COOKIE)?.value;
-  if (!sessionId) return null;
+  const cookieValue = cookieStore.get(SESSION_COOKIE)?.value;
+  if (!cookieValue) return null;
 
-  const session = await prisma.session.findUnique({
-    where: { id: sessionId },
-    include: { user: true },
-  });
+  const session = await findSessionByCookie(cookieValue);
 
   if (!session || session.expiresAt < new Date()) {
     if (session) {
       await prisma.session
-        .deleteMany({ where: { id: sessionId } })
+        .deleteMany({ where: { id: session.id } })
         .catch(() => {});
     }
     cookieStore.delete(SESSION_COOKIE);
@@ -136,18 +210,26 @@ export async function getSession(): Promise<{
     return null;
   }
 
-  // Sliding expiry: refresh if more than 1 day old
+  // Sliding expiry: refresh if more than 1 day old.
+  //
+  // Withheld from legacy (`tokenHash === null`) rows on purpose. Extending
+  // those would let a cuid-as-credential session renew itself indefinitely for
+  // an active user, and the whole point of the passive transition is that the
+  // id-resolvable path drains on its own. Capping them at the expiry they
+  // already carry bounds it to at most 30 days past the deploy; the user then
+  // logs in once and lands on a secret. Re-emitting the cookie is likewise
+  // pointless for a legacy row — its value cannot be improved in place.
   const oneDayMs = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
   if (
-    session.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now() <
-    SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS - oneDayMs
+    session.tokenHash !== null &&
+    session.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now() < SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS - oneDayMs
   ) {
     const newExpiry = new Date(Date.now() + SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS);
     await prisma.session.update({
       where: { id: session.id },
       data: { expiresAt: newExpiry },
     });
-    cookieStore.set(SESSION_COOKIE, session.id, {
+    cookieStore.set(SESSION_COOKIE, cookieValue, {
       httpOnly: true,
       secure: shouldEmitSecureCookie(),
       sameSite: "lax",
@@ -211,33 +293,43 @@ export async function getSession(): Promise<{
  */
 export async function getSessionUserLocale(): Promise<string | null> {
   const cookieStore = await cookies();
-  const sessionId = cookieStore.get(SESSION_COOKIE)?.value;
-  if (!sessionId) return null;
+  const cookieValue = cookieStore.get(SESSION_COOKIE)?.value;
+  if (!cookieValue) return null;
 
-  const session = await prisma.session.findUnique({
-    where: { id: sessionId },
-    select: { expiresAt: true, user: { select: { locale: true } } },
-  });
+  // Same two-path resolution as `getSession`, read-only: this runs in the root
+  // layout where the cookie store cannot be written, so there is nothing to
+  // refresh or clear here.
+  const session = await findSessionByCookie(cookieValue);
   if (!session || session.expiresAt < new Date()) return null;
   return session.user.locale;
 }
 
 export async function destroySession(): Promise<void> {
   const cookieStore = await cookies();
-  const sessionId = cookieStore.get(SESSION_COOKIE)?.value;
-  if (sessionId) {
+  const cookieValue = cookieStore.get(SESSION_COOKIE)?.value;
+  if (cookieValue) {
+    // Resolve the cookie to its row before deleting — the cookie is a secret,
+    // not the primary key, so `delete({ where: { id: cookieValue } })` would
+    // silently no-op on every modern session and leave the row alive after a
+    // logout.
+    //
     // Logout is idempotent: a session row that no longer exists (P2025) is a
     // no-op. Any other failure is a real delete error — record it on the wide
     // event rather than swallowing it silently, but never block the cookie
     // clear below: a transient DB fault must not leave the client logged in
     // with the cookie intact.
-    await prisma.session.delete({ where: { id: sessionId } }).catch((err) => {
-      if (!isP2025(err)) {
-        getEvent()?.addWarning(
-          `destroySession delete failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
-        );
-      }
-    });
+    const session = await findSessionByCookie(cookieValue).catch(() => null);
+    if (session) {
+      await prisma.session
+        .delete({ where: { id: session.id } })
+        .catch((err) => {
+          if (!isP2025(err)) {
+            getEvent()?.addWarning(
+              `destroySession delete failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
+            );
+          }
+        });
+    }
   }
   cookieStore.delete(SESSION_COOKIE);
   cookieStore.delete(ONBOARDING_COOKIE);
@@ -309,16 +401,48 @@ export async function destroyOtherSessions(
 }
 
 /**
- * v1.23 — revoke a single web session by id, scoped to the owning user so a
- * caller can never delete another user's session row. Returns whether a row
- * was actually removed (false → not found or not owned).
+ * The public handle for a session row, used by the session-management list
+ * and its revoke route.
+ *
+ * The list needs a per-row identifier the client can send back to revoke one
+ * device. It used to send the row id — which, for every session created
+ * before the secret cookie landed, IS that session's cookie value. The list
+ * was therefore handing the client live credentials for all of the account's
+ * other devices, and anything that captured one response body (an error
+ * reporter, a proxy log, a screenshot of devtools) captured usable logins.
+ *
+ * The handle is an HMAC of the row id: stable within a deployment so the
+ * client can round-trip it, and structurally useless as a cookie because the
+ * legacy lookup matches a cuid primary key and a 64-char hex digest is not
+ * one. Nothing is stored — the handle is recomputed per request, so this
+ * needs no column and no migration.
+ */
+export function sessionHandle(sessionId: string): string {
+  return hashToken(sessionId);
+}
+
+/**
+ * v1.23 — revoke a single web session, scoped to the owning user so a caller
+ * can never delete another user's session row. Returns whether a row was
+ * actually removed (false → not found or not owned).
+ *
+ * Takes the public handle rather than the row id. The account's own rows are
+ * a handful, so resolving the handle by walking them costs one indexed read
+ * and a few HMACs — cheaper than a column, and it keeps the id server-side.
  */
 export async function destroySessionById(
   userId: string,
-  sessionId: string,
+  handle: string,
 ): Promise<boolean> {
+  const own = await prisma.session.findMany({
+    where: { userId },
+    select: { id: true },
+  });
+  const match = own.find((s) => sessionHandle(s.id) === handle);
+  if (!match) return false;
+
   const result = await prisma.session.deleteMany({
-    where: { id: sessionId, userId },
+    where: { id: match.id, userId },
   });
   return result.count > 0;
 }

src/lib/validations/nightscout.ts

@@ -7,11 +7,17 @@ import { z } from "zod/v4";
  * on `User` (`nightscoutUrlEncrypted` / `nightscoutTokenEncrypted`); the
  * private-host opt-in maps to `nightscoutAllowPrivateHost`.
  *
- * The URL is validated to be a parseable http(s) origin at input time. The
- * SSRF floor (public-host requirement, unless `allowPrivateHost` is set) is
- * enforced at fetch time by the client through `safeFetch` — input-shape
- * validation here only rejects garbage early so the connect route can return
- * a clear 422 instead of letting a malformed string reach the egress layer.
+ * The URL is validated to be a parseable http(s) origin here. The SSRF floor
+ * (public-host requirement, unless `allowPrivateHost` is set) is asserted
+ * twice on purpose: the connect route runs `isPublicUrl` before it persists
+ * anything, and `safeFetch` re-checks plus pins the resolved IP at connect
+ * time. The shape check here only rejects garbage early so the route can
+ * return a clear 422 instead of letting a malformed string reach either.
+ *
+ * The floor is NOT expressed as a Zod refinement because it depends on the
+ * sibling `allowPrivateHost` field and needs its own error message; folding
+ * it in here would collapse "malformed URL" and "private host, opt in to
+ * reach it" into one opaque 422.
  */
 export const nightscoutConnectSchema = z.object({
   // Trimmed: a trailing space / newline from a copy button reaches the

tests/integration/auth-flow.test.ts

@@ -132,6 +132,138 @@ describe("session lifecycle (real Postgres)", () => {
     expect(cookieJar.get("hl_onboarding")).toBeUndefined();
   });
 
+  /**
+   * v1.30.32 — the cookie carries a CSPRNG secret, not the row's cuid.
+   * These run against real Postgres because the thing under test is the
+   * migration plus the unique index plus the two lookup paths; a mocked
+   * client can assert the shape but not that the column and constraint
+   * actually exist on a migrated database.
+   */
+  describe("session cookie secret (migration 0255)", () => {
+    it("issues a secret cookie and stores only its hash", async () => {
+      const { createSession } = await import("@/lib/auth/session");
+      const { hashToken } = await import("@/lib/auth/hmac");
+
+      const user = await getPrismaClient().user.create({
+        data: { username: "secret-cookie", email: "secret@example.test" },
+      });
+      const sessionId = await createSession(user.id, false);
+
+      const cookie = cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")!;
+      expect(cookie).toMatch(/^hls_[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
+      expect(cookie).not.toBe(sessionId);
+
+      const row = await getPrismaClient().session.findUnique({
+        where: { id: sessionId },
+      });
+      // The raw secret is nowhere on the row.
+      expect(row?.tokenHash).toBe(hashToken(cookie));
+      expect(row?.tokenHash).not.toBe(cookie);
+    });
+
+    it("authenticates by the secret and refuses the row id", async () => {
+      const { createSession, getSession } = await import("@/lib/auth/session");
+
+      const user = await getPrismaClient().user.create({
+        data: { username: "id-retired", email: "retired@example.test" },
+      });
+      const sessionId = await createSession(user.id, false);
+
+      // The secret works.
+      expect((await getSession())?.session.id).toBe(sessionId);
+
+      // The primary key does not. This is the whole point: knowing or
+      // guessing a cuid must no longer authenticate anything.
+      cookieJar.set("healthlog_session", sessionId);
+      expect(await getSession()).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it("keeps a pre-upgrade session alive on its row id", async () => {
+      // The compatibility contract. This row is exactly what the migration
+      // leaves behind: a real session with a NULL token_hash whose cookie in
+      // the user's browser is the cuid. The deploy must not sign them out.
+      const { getSession } = await import("@/lib/auth/session");
+
+      const user = await getPrismaClient().user.create({
+        data: { username: "legacy-session", email: "legacy@example.test" },
+      });
+      const legacy = await getPrismaClient().session.create({
+        data: {
+          userId: user.id,
+          expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 20 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
+        },
+      });
+      expect(legacy.tokenHash).toBeNull();
+
+      cookieJar.set("healthlog_session", legacy.id);
+      const result = await getSession();
+
+      expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(result?.session.id).toBe(legacy.id);
+      expect(result?.user.id).toBe(user.id);
+    });
+
+    it("does not extend a pre-upgrade session's expiry", async () => {
+      // Withholding the sliding refresh is what bounds the transition: the
+      // id-resolvable path drains within the session lifetime instead of
+      // renewing forever under an active user.
+      const { getSession } = await import("@/lib/auth/session");
+
+      const user = await getPrismaClient().user.create({
+        data: { username: "legacy-drain", email: "drain@example.test" },
+      });
+      const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 2 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+      const legacy = await getPrismaClient().session.create({
+        data: { userId: user.id, expiresAt },
+      });
+
+      cookieJar.set("healthlog_session", legacy.id);
+      expect(await getSession()).not.toBeNull();
+
+      const after = await getPrismaClient().session.findUnique({
+        where: { id: legacy.id },
+      });
+      expect(after?.expiresAt.getTime()).toBe(expiresAt.getTime());
+    });
+
+    it("gives concurrent sessions distinct secrets under the unique index", async () => {
+      const { createSession } = await import("@/lib/auth/session");
+
+      const user = await getPrismaClient().user.create({
+        data: { username: "many-secrets", email: "many@example.test" },
+      });
+      await createSession(user.id, false);
+      const first = cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")!;
+      await createSession(user.id, false);
+      const second = cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")!;
+
+      expect(first).not.toBe(second);
+      const rows = await getPrismaClient().session.findMany({
+        where: { userId: user.id },
+      });
+      expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);
+      expect(new Set(rows.map((r) => r.tokenHash)).size).toBe(2);
+    });
+
+    it("logs out by resolving the secret to its row", async () => {
+      const { createSession, destroySession } =
+        await import("@/lib/auth/session");
+
+      const user = await getPrismaClient().user.create({
+        data: { username: "secret-logout", email: "logout@example.test" },
+      });
+      const sessionId = await createSession(user.id, false);
+
+      await destroySession();
+
+      // A logout that deleted by cookie value would leave this row behind.
+      const row = await getPrismaClient().session.findUnique({
+        where: { id: sessionId },
+      });
+      expect(row).toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+
   it("destroySession clears the hl_onboarding cookie alongside the session cookie", async () => {
     const { createSession, destroySession } =
       await import("@/lib/auth/session");

tests/integration/auth-password-change.test.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 
 import { cookieJar, headerJar } from "./mock-next-headers";
 import { getPrismaClient, truncateAllTables } from "./setup";
+import { hashToken } from "@/lib/auth/hmac";
 
 vi.mock("next/headers", async () => {
   const { cookieJar, headerJar } = await import("./mock-next-headers");
@@ -140,7 +141,14 @@ describe("POST /api/auth/password (real Postgres)", () => {
     expect(remainingSessions).toHaveLength(1);
     expect(remainingSessions[0].id).not.toBe(sessionId);
     expect(remainingSessions[0].id).not.toBe(siblingSession.id);
-    expect(cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")).toBe(remainingSessions[0].id);
+
+    // v1.30.32 — the cookie carries the session secret, not the row id, so
+    // bind them through the stored hash instead. Strictly stronger than the
+    // old identity check: it proves the cookie actually authenticates the
+    // surviving row, and that the row id never leaves the server.
+    const rotatedCookie = cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")!;
+    expect(rotatedCookie).not.toBe(remainingSessions[0].id);
+    expect(remainingSessions[0].tokenHash).toBe(hashToken(rotatedCookie));
 
     // The API token is flipped to revoked rather than deleted so the
     // audit trail survives.

tests/integration/sessions-and-known-devices.test.ts

@@ -5,12 +5,17 @@
  * Covers the DB-layer contracts the unit mocks can't pin:
  *   - destroyOtherSessions keeps the current session, deletes the rest, revokes
  *     native refresh tokens, and leaves API tokens untouched.
- *   - destroySessionById is scoped to the owning user (no cross-user delete).
+ *   - destroySessionById is scoped to the owning user (no cross-user delete)
+ *     and takes the public handle, never the row id.
  *   - the (userId, deviceHash) unique index enforces the login-alert dedupe.
  */
 import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 
-import { destroyOtherSessions, destroySessionById } from "@/lib/auth/session";
+import {
+  destroyOtherSessions,
+  destroySessionById,
+  sessionHandle,
+} from "@/lib/auth/session";
 import { getPrismaClient, truncateAllTables } from "./setup";
 
 beforeEach(async () => {
@@ -85,14 +90,26 @@ describe("destroySessionById", () => {
       data: { userId: other.id, expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 1e6) },
     });
 
-    // Cross-user attempt: owner tries to delete the intruder's session.
-    expect(await destroySessionById(owner.id, otherSession.id)).toBe(false);
+    // Cross-user attempt: owner presents the intruder's handle.
+    expect(
+      await destroySessionById(owner.id, sessionHandle(otherSession.id)),
+    ).toBe(false);
     expect(
       await prisma.session.findUnique({ where: { id: otherSession.id } }),
     ).not.toBeNull();
 
-    // Owned delete succeeds.
-    expect(await destroySessionById(owner.id, ownerSession.id)).toBe(true);
+    // The row id is not an accepted key: a caller who somehow learned it
+    // still cannot revoke with it, which is what keeps the id out of the
+    // client's hands from being load-bearing in both directions.
+    expect(await destroySessionById(owner.id, ownerSession.id)).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      await prisma.session.findUnique({ where: { id: ownerSession.id } }),
+    ).not.toBeNull();
+
+    // Owned delete succeeds on the handle.
+    expect(
+      await destroySessionById(owner.id, sessionHandle(ownerSession.id)),
+    ).toBe(true);
     expect(
       await prisma.session.findUnique({ where: { id: ownerSession.id } }),
     ).toBeNull();

tests/integration/setup.ts

@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ import type { PrismaClient } from "@/generated/prisma/client";
 process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY ??=
   "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
 
+// v1.30.32 — session cookies now carry a CSPRNG secret whose HMAC is what
+// lands in `sessions.token_hash`, so `createSession` needs this key exactly
+// like token issuance already did. It is a Core-required variable in
+// `scripts/env-manifest.json` (the app refuses to boot without it), so
+// defaulting it here matches production rather than papering over a gap.
+// Same `??=` treatment as the encryption key above: files that set their own
+// still win.
+process.env.API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY ??=
+  "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210";
+
 /**
  * The application's Prisma singleton. Tests use this so any code
  * imported via `await import("@/lib/...")` shares the exact same client