fix(idempotency): refuse to cache bodies containing third-party AI keys

P12. The body-content guard already rejected `hlk_` / `hlr_` (our access
and refresh tokens). Extend it to also reject `sk-` so any OpenAI or
Anthropic key that might be echoed by a misrouted handler never lands
in the IdempotencyKey table. The substring match also covers `sk-ant-`
so we don't need a second branch.

Adds a parametrised vitest case asserting all four prefixes
(hlk_, hlr_, sk-, sk-ant-) suppress caching, plus a
positive case to prove a normal payload still caches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André BombeckandClaude Opus 4.7 committed 2026-05-09 02:00:49 +02:00
1 parent e903d9a2c2
commit c7b600575e
2 files changed
+52 -4

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+41
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@@ -270,6 +270,47 @@ describe("defaultUserIdResolver (audit C-4)", () => {
});
});
// P12: bodies that contain a freshly-issued bearer token, refresh token,
// or third-party AI provider key must NEVER be persisted to the
// idempotency cache. Even if a future caller forgets and wraps an
// auth/settings route in withIdempotency, the body-content guard refuses
// to write the secret into the DB.
describe("withIdempotency body-content exclusion (P12)", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.resetAllMocks();
vi.mocked(prisma.idempotencyKey.findUnique).mockResolvedValue(null);
vi.mocked(prisma.idempotencyKey.create).mockResolvedValue({} as never);
});
it.each([
["hlk_ access token", '{"data":{"token":"hlk_abc123"},"error":null}'],
["hlr_ refresh token", '{"data":{"refresh":"hlr_xyz789"},"error":null}'],
["sk- OpenAI key", '{"data":{"echoed":"sk-1234567890"},"error":null}'],
[
"sk-ant- Anthropic key",
'{"data":{"echoed":"sk-ant-api03-xyz"},"error":null}',
],
])("does NOT cache responses containing %s", async (_label, body) => {
const handler = vi.fn(
async () => new NextResponse(body, { status: 201 }),
);
const wrapped = withIdempotency<[NextRequest]>(handler, async () => "u-1");
await wrapped(makeRequest("POST", { "idempotency-key": "abc-12345678" }));
expect(handler).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prisma.idempotencyKey.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("still caches a normal payload that does not carry a secret", async () => {
const handler = vi.fn(
async () =>
new NextResponse('{"data":{"id":"m-1"},"error":null}', { status: 201 }),
);
const wrapped = withIdempotency<[NextRequest]>(handler, async () => "u-1");
await wrapped(makeRequest("POST", { "idempotency-key": "abc-12345678" }));
expect(prisma.idempotencyKey.create).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
// V3 audit STILL-V2-NEW: the cachable-status filter (do-not-cache for
// 401/403/408/429/5xx) had zero tests, so a regression that re-cached an
// expired bearer token's 401 would have been silent.
+11 -4
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@@ -219,12 +219,19 @@ export function withIdempotency<
if (isCachableStatus(response.status)) {
// Defence-in-depth: never persist a body that carries a freshly-issued
// bearer or refresh token. Auth routes shouldn't be wrapped in
// withIdempotency to begin with, but if a future caller forgets we
// refuse to leak. `hlk_` = access tokens, `hlr_` = refresh tokens.
// bearer / refresh token or a third-party AI provider key. Auth and
// settings routes shouldn't be wrapped in withIdempotency to begin
// with, but if a future caller forgets we refuse to leak.
// `hlk_` = our access tokens
// `hlr_` = our refresh tokens
// `sk-` = OpenAI keys (also matches `sk-ant-` Anthropic keys)
const cloned = response.clone();
const text = await cloned.text();
if (!text.includes("hlk_") && !text.includes("hlr_")) {
if (
!text.includes("hlk_") &&
!text.includes("hlr_") &&
!text.includes("sk-")
) {
await persistCached(ctx, response, text);
}
}