fix(auth): let every fresh-factor refusal open the re-proof dialog

A Guardian signed in through single sign-on with a second factor enrolled
could not hand a managed profile over once five minutes had passed since
sign-in: the handover answered 401 auth.stepup.required, and the panel
printed "Confirm your second factor, then try again" with no way to do so.

The same held for every action behind requireFreshMfa: creating, editing
and ending a managed profile, adding and removing a Guardian, disabling
the second factor, rotating recovery codes, removing a security key or a
passkey, changing the password, the data wipe, account deletion and the
key rotation. The recent-proof routes had the dialog; these had text.

- requireFreshMfa names the proofs that clear a stale stamp in
  meta.methods (the possession proofs the account holds, never a
  password, which stamps reproofAt only).
- The re-proof flow treats that refusal like auth.reproof.required:
  open the dialog, post the proof to /api/auth/reproof, send the request
  once more. The flow moves into a React-free module so it can be driven
  in tests; the hook binds it to the dialog.
- The managed-profile mutation hooks take a required proof guard, and
  every caller passes recentProof.run. The other surfaces wrap their
  requests in recentProof.run; disabling the second factor asks before
  its confirmation opens, so the code typed there is not spent twice.
- An account with nothing to re-prove in place (single sign-on only, no
  factor) is told to sign in again when adding a factor, instead of being
  offered a password it does not have.
- step-up-web-caller-guard freezes the gated route methods and fails when
  a web request to one of them runs outside the flow.

An account whose only second factor is the identity provider's is still
asked for an app factor on the managed-profile acts: the app cannot see
the provider's factor. Enrolling right after a sign-in needs no further
proof, and the confirmation stamps the session, so the act follows.

Refs #959
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-10-17 09:17:03 +02:00
1 parent 59f910df5e
commit 99f0607a69
36 files changed
+2122 -466

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+10 -5
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@@ -2333,7 +2333,11 @@ paths:
/api/mcp/tokens, POST /api/tokens/measurements, POST /api/tokens/workouts, POST /api/tokens/documents, and the
admin backup download, upload and restore, the admin data wipe and the admin password reset. Those answer 401
`auth.reproof.required` with `meta.methods` (the proofs this account can give) when the session signed in or
re-proved more than five minutes ago.
re-proved more than five minutes ago. A `totp`, `webauthn` or `passkey` proof here also clears the routes that
ask for a fresh second factor (the managed-profile acts, the second-factor and passkey changes, the password
change, account deletion, the data wipe and key rotation): on a browser session those answer 401
`auth.stepup.required` with `meta.methods` naming the possession proofs the account holds, and the web re-proves
here and retries.
The body takes the same shapes as POST /api/auth/step-up. On an account with a second factor only `totp`,
@@ -21681,10 +21685,11 @@ paths:
schema:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/ManagedProfileEnvelope"
"401":
description: "No fresh second-factor proof (`meta.errorCode: auth.stepup.required`), or none enrolled at all
(`meta.errorCode: auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`) — this gate is unconditional, so an account without a
second factor cannot create a managed profile until it enrols one. The ordinary unauthenticated 401 arrives
here too, including for a Bearer caller, whose transport this gate does not read."
description: "No fresh second-factor proof (`meta.errorCode: auth.stepup.required`, with `meta.methods` naming the
proofs that clear it at POST /api/auth/reproof), or none enrolled at all (`meta.errorCode:
auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`) — this gate is unconditional, so an account without a second factor cannot
create a managed profile until it enrols one. The ordinary unauthenticated 401 arrives here too, including
for a Bearer caller, whose transport this gate does not read."
content:
application/json:
schema:
+1
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@@ -7323,6 +7323,7 @@
"emailChangePassword": "Aktuelles Passwort (nötig, um die E-Mail-Adresse zu ändern)",
"reproof": {
"description": "Damit werden deine Gesundheitsdaten weitergegeben oder exportiert. Bestätige, dass du es bist, um fortzufahren.",
"descriptionChange": "Das ändert etwas, das nur du ändern können solltest. Bestätige, dass du es bist, um fortzufahren.",
"signInAgain": "Melde dich neu an und versuche es dann noch einmal. Dein Konto hat kein Passwort und keinen Passkey, den du hier bestätigen könntest.",
"failed": "Das hat nicht geklappt. Prüfe deine Eingabe und versuche es noch einmal."
},
+1
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@@ -7323,6 +7323,7 @@
"emailChangePassword": "Current password (needed to change the email address)",
"reproof": {
"description": "This shares or exports your health data. Confirm it's you to continue.",
"descriptionChange": "This changes something only you should be able to change. Confirm it's you to continue.",
"signInAgain": "Sign in again, then try once more. Your account has no password or passkey to confirm here.",
"failed": "That did not work. Check what you entered and try again."
},
+1
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@@ -7323,6 +7323,7 @@
"emailChangePassword": "Contraseña actual (necesaria para cambiar la dirección de correo)",
"reproof": {
"description": "Esto comparte o exporta tus datos de salud. Confirma que eres tú para continuar.",
"descriptionChange": "Esto cambia algo que solo tú deberías poder cambiar. Confirma que eres tú para continuar.",
"signInAgain": "Vuelve a iniciar sesión y inténtalo de nuevo. Tu cuenta no tiene contraseña ni llave de acceso que confirmar aquí.",
"failed": "No ha funcionado. Revisa lo que has introducido e inténtalo de nuevo."
},
+1
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@@ -7323,6 +7323,7 @@
"emailChangePassword": "Mot de passe actuel (nécessaire pour changer l'adresse e-mail)",
"reproof": {
"description": "Cette action partage ou exporte vos données de santé. Confirmez qu'il s'agit bien de vous pour continuer.",
"descriptionChange": "Cela modifie quelque chose que vous seul devriez pouvoir modifier. Confirmez qu'il s'agit bien de vous pour continuer.",
"signInAgain": "Reconnectez-vous, puis réessayez. Votre compte n'a ni mot de passe ni clé d'accès à confirmer ici.",
"failed": "Cela n'a pas fonctionné. Vérifiez votre saisie et réessayez."
},
+1
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@@ -7323,6 +7323,7 @@
"emailChangePassword": "Password attuale (necessaria per cambiare l'indirizzo email)",
"reproof": {
"description": "Questa azione condivide o esporta i tuoi dati sanitari. Conferma che sei tu per continuare.",
"descriptionChange": "Questo modifica qualcosa che solo tu dovresti poter modificare. Conferma che sei tu per continuare.",
"signInAgain": "Accedi di nuovo, poi riprova. Il tuo account non ha una password o una passkey da confermare qui.",
"failed": "Non ha funzionato. Controlla quanto inserito e riprova."
},
+1
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@@ -7323,6 +7323,7 @@
"emailChangePassword": "현재 비밀번호 (이메일 주소를 변경하려면 필요)",
"reproof": {
"description": "건강 데이터를 공유하거나 내보내는 작업입니다. 계속하려면 본인임을 확인하세요.",
"descriptionChange": "본인만 변경할 수 있어야 하는 항목을 변경합니다. 계속하려면 본인임을 확인하세요.",
"signInAgain": "다시 로그인한 후 한 번 더 시도하세요. 이 계정에는 여기서 확인할 비밀번호나 패스키가 없습니다.",
"failed": "확인하지 못했습니다. 입력한 내용을 확인하고 다시 시도하세요."
},
+1
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@@ -7323,6 +7323,7 @@
"emailChangePassword": "Obecne hasło (potrzebne do zmiany adresu e-mail)",
"reproof": {
"description": "Ta czynność udostępnia lub eksportuje Twoje dane zdrowotne. Potwierdź, że to Ty, aby kontynuować.",
"descriptionChange": "To zmienia coś, co tylko Ty powinieneś móc zmienić. Potwierdź, że to Ty, aby kontynuować.",
"signInAgain": "Zaloguj się ponownie, a potem spróbuj jeszcze raz. Twoje konto nie ma hasła ani klucza dostępu do potwierdzenia tutaj.",
"failed": "To się nie udało. Sprawdź wprowadzone dane i spróbuj ponownie."
},
@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
/**
* Every web action behind a fresh-proof gate goes through the re-proof dialog.
*
* Two server gates hold an action back until the session has proved something
* recently: the recent-proof gate (`requireRecentProof`,
* `assertRecentCookieProof`, 401 `auth.reproof.required`) and the fresh-factor
* gate (`requireFreshMfa` and the helpers that escalate to it, 401
* `auth.stepup.required`). Both name the proofs that clear them in
* `meta.methods`, and `useRecentProof` opens the dialog on either, posts the
* proof to `/api/auth/reproof` and runs the action once more.
*
* The defect this exists for: the managed-profile acts (handing a profile
* over, adding and removing a Guardian, creating, editing and ending a
* record) answered the fresh-factor refusal with a sentence telling the
* person to confirm their second factor, and offered nowhere to do it. The
* same was true of disabling the second factor, rotating recovery codes,
* removing a security key or passkey, changing the password, the data wipe,
* account deletion and the key rotation. The recent-proof surfaces had the
* dialog; the fresh-factor ones had text.
*
* What it pins:
*
* 1. The set of gated route methods, discovered from the route files and
* frozen below. A new gated route has to be entered here, with either
* its web callers checked by the sweep or the reason it has none.
* 2. Every request a web file makes to one of them runs inside the shared
* flow: `recentProof.run(…)` in a component, or `guard(…)` inside a
* query hook whose `guard` parameter every caller fills with
* `recentProof.run`. A gated request outside it is the defect again.
*
* Every sweep asserts a floor, because a matcher that finds nothing agrees
* with every list.
*/
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { walkSourceFiles } from "./helpers/source-files";
const SRC = join(process.cwd(), "src");
function read(rel: string): string {
return readFileSync(join(SRC, rel), "utf8");
}
/**
* Source with comments removed, so a route that only DESCRIBES a gate in its
* doc comment is not counted, and a path quoted in a comment is not a call.
*/
function code(rel: string): string {
return read(rel)
.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "")
.split("\n")
.map((line) => line.replace(/(^|[^:"'`\\])\/\/.*$/, "$1"))
.join("\n");
}
const METHODS = ["GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"] as const;
const GATE =
/\b(?:requireFreshMfa|requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled|requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled|requireRecentProof|assertRecentCookieProof)\s*\(|\bfreshFactor\s*:\s*true\b/;
/** `src/app/api/a/[id]/route.ts` -> `/api/a/[id]`. */
function routePath(rel: string): string {
return "/" + rel.replace(/^app\//, "").replace(/\/route\.ts$/, "");
}
/** The gated `METHOD /api/path` pairs, read off the route files. */
function discoverGatedRoutes(): string[] {
const routes = walkSourceFiles(join(SRC, "app", "api"), { floor: 300 })
.filter((p) => p.endsWith("/route.ts") && !p.includes("__tests__"))
.map((p) => `app/api/${p}`);
expect(routes.length).toBeGreaterThan(300);
const found = new Set<string>();
for (const rel of routes) {
const src = code(rel);
if (!GATE.test(src)) continue;
const exportRe = new RegExp(
`export\\s+(?:const\\s+(${METHODS.join("|")})\\s*=|async\\s+function\\s+(${METHODS.join("|")})\\s*\\()`,
"g",
);
const exports = [...src.matchAll(exportRe)].map((m) => ({
method: m[1] ?? m[2],
index: m.index ?? 0,
}));
const path = routePath(rel);
// A gate before the first exported method lives in a helper or a
// `handler` constant the exports wrap, and binds every method.
const preamble = src.slice(0, exports[0]?.index ?? src.length);
if (GATE.test(preamble)) {
for (const e of exports) found.add(`${e.method} ${path}`);
}
exports.forEach((e, i) => {
const block = src.slice(e.index, exports[i + 1]?.index ?? src.length);
if (GATE.test(block)) found.add(`${e.method} ${path}`);
});
}
return [...found].sort();
}
/**
* Every gated route method, and how the web reaches it. `"web"` means the
* sweep below finds its callers and checks them; anything else is the reason
* no web file calls it.
*/
const GATED_ROUTES: Record<string, string> = {
"DELETE /api/admin/data": "web",
"DELETE /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/[id]": "web",
"DELETE /api/auth/passkeys/[id]": "web",
"DELETE /api/managed-profiles/[id]": "web",
"DELETE /api/managed-profiles/[id]/guardians/[grantId]": "web",
"DELETE /api/settings/account": "web",
"DELETE /api/settings/data": "web",
"GET /api/admin/backups/[id]/download": "web",
"GET /api/auth/reproof":
"the flow's own question: the web asks it inside recentProof.run before an upload or a typed confirmation",
"GET /api/export":
"the plaintext whole-record download (`type=all`); the web's whole-record export is the full backup, and its single-type exports have their own routes",
"GET /api/export/full-backup": "web",
"GET /api/fhir/Patient/$everything":
"a FHIR client endpoint, reached with a fhir:read token; no web file calls it",
"GET /api/mcp/oauth/authorize":
"a browser navigation from an assistant, answered with a page that links to /confirm-access, which runs the dialog",
"PATCH /api/managed-profiles/[id]": "web",
"POST /api/account/grants": "web",
"POST /api/admin/backups/[id]/restore": "web",
"POST /api/admin/backups/upload": "web",
"POST /api/admin/encryption/rotate": "web",
"POST /api/admin/users/[id]/reset-password": "web",
"POST /api/auth/me/mfa/disable": "web",
"POST /api/auth/me/mfa/recovery-codes/regenerate": "web",
"POST /api/auth/password": "web",
"POST /api/export/encrypted": "web",
"POST /api/export/health-record": "web",
"POST /api/managed-profiles": "web",
"POST /api/managed-profiles/[id]/guardians": "web",
"POST /api/managed-profiles/[id]/handover": "web",
"POST /api/mcp/oauth/authorize":
"the consent form's own submission, refused into the same /confirm-access page as the GET",
"POST /api/mcp/tokens": "web",
"POST /api/share-links": "web",
"POST /api/tokens/documents": "web",
"POST /api/tokens/measurements": "web",
"POST /api/tokens/workouts": "web",
};
/** The web side: everything under src that is not a route, a test or docs. */
function webFiles(): string[] {
return walkSourceFiles(SRC, { floor: 3000 })
.filter((p) => !p.startsWith("generated/"))
.filter((p) => !p.startsWith("app/api/"))
.filter((p) => !p.startsWith("lib/openapi/"))
.filter((p) => !p.includes("__tests__"))
.filter((p) => !p.endsWith(".test.ts") && !p.endsWith(".test.tsx"))
.sort();
}
/** A string or template literal naming exactly this path. */
function pathPattern(path: string): RegExp {
const body = path
.split("/")
.map((seg) =>
/^\[.+\]$/.test(seg)
? "\\$\\{[^}]+\\}"
: seg.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&"),
)
.join("/");
return new RegExp(`["'\`]${body}(?=["'\`?])`, "g");
}
/** Which method a call naming the path at `index` sends. */
function methodAt(src: string, index: number, matchLength: number): string {
const before = src.slice(Math.max(0, index - 160), index);
const helper = [
...before.matchAll(/\bapi(Get|Post|Put|Patch|Delete)\b(?:<[^()]*>)?\s*\(/g),
].pop();
// The helper must be the call this literal is the first argument of.
if (
helper &&
/^\s*$/.test(before.slice((helper.index ?? 0) + helper[0].length))
) {
return helper[1].toUpperCase();
}
const after = src.slice(index + matchLength, index + matchLength + 240);
const explicit = after.match(/method\s*:\s*["'](\w+)["']/);
return explicit ? explicit[1].toUpperCase() : "GET";
}
/** The name of the function the code at `index` sits in, if it has one. */
function enclosingFunction(src: string, index: number): string | null {
const head = src.slice(0, index);
const decls = [
...head.matchAll(
/(?:\bfunction\s+(\w+)\s*\(|\b(?:const|let)\s+(\w+)\s*=\s*(?:async\s+)?(?:\([^)]*\)|\w+)\s*=>)/g,
),
].pop();
return decls ? (decls[1] ?? decls[2] ?? null) : null;
}
/**
* The request at `index` runs inside the shared flow: directly inside a
* `recentProof.run(…)` or a hook's `guard(…)`, or in a named function that is
* itself handed to, or called from, `recentProof.run`.
*/
function guardedAt(src: string, index: number): boolean {
const before = src.slice(Math.max(0, index - 400), index);
if (/(?:\.run|\bguard)\s*\(/.test(before)) return true;
const name = enclosingFunction(src, index);
if (!name) return false;
return new RegExp(
`\\.run\\(\\s*(?:async\\s*)?(?:\\(\\)\\s*=>\\s*)?${name}\\b`,
).test(src);
}
interface GatedCall {
file: string;
route: string;
guarded: boolean;
}
/**
* A query hook whose request is not guarded inside the hook is still guarded
* when every component that mounts it sends the mutation through the flow:
* `recentProof.run(() => mutation.mutateAsync(…))`. At least one such
* component must exist, or nothing is guarded.
*/
function hookCallersWrap(
files: string[],
hookFile: string,
src: string,
index: number,
): boolean {
const hook = [
...src.slice(0, index).matchAll(/export function (use\w+)/g),
].pop()?.[1];
if (!hook) return false;
let callers = 0;
for (const file of files) {
if (file === hookFile) continue;
const other = code(file);
for (const m of other.matchAll(
new RegExp(`\\b(?:const|let)\\s+(\\w+)\\s*=\\s*${hook}\\s*\\(`, "g"),
)) {
callers++;
const wraps = new RegExp(
`\\.run\\(\\s*(?:async\\s*)?\\(\\)\\s*=>\\s*${m[1]}\\.mutateAsync\\b`,
);
if (!wraps.test(other)) return false;
}
}
return callers > 0;
}
function gatedWebCalls(): GatedCall[] {
const calls: GatedCall[] = [];
const files = webFiles();
const sources = new Map(files.map((f) => [f, code(f)]));
for (const route of Object.keys(GATED_ROUTES)) {
if (GATED_ROUTES[route] !== "web") continue;
const [method, path] = route.split(" ");
const re = pathPattern(path);
for (const file of files) {
const src = sources.get(file) ?? "";
for (const m of src.matchAll(re)) {
const index = m.index ?? 0;
// The path handed to a component as a prop (`endpoint="/api/…"`):
// the request is wherever that component sends the prop.
const prop = src.slice(Math.max(0, index - 40), index).match(/(\w+)=$/);
if (prop) {
const sends = [
...src.matchAll(
new RegExp(`\\bapiFetchRaw\\(\\s*${prop[1]}\\s*,`, "g"),
),
];
for (const send of sends) {
const at = send.index ?? 0;
if (methodAt(src, at, send[0].length) !== method) continue;
calls.push({ file, route, guarded: guardedAt(src, at) });
}
continue;
}
if (methodAt(src, index, m[0].length) !== method) continue;
const guarded =
guardedAt(src, index) ||
(file.startsWith("lib/queries/") &&
hookCallersWrap(files, file, src, index));
calls.push({ file, route, guarded });
}
}
}
return calls;
}
/**
* Calls the sweep cannot read as guarded, each checked by hand and pinned.
* The request runs after a `recentProof.run(() => apiGet("/api/auth/reproof"))`
* a few lines earlier, so the proof is in place before a file is sent or a
* typed confirmation is spent.
*/
const PRECHECKED = new Set<string>([
// `upload.mutationFn` asks first, then calls `uploadOnce`, so a large file
// is not sent once only to be refused.
"components/admin/backups-section.tsx -> POST /api/admin/backups/upload",
]);
describe("fresh-proof gates on the web", () => {
it("freezes the set of gated route methods", () => {
const discovered = discoverGatedRoutes();
expect(discovered.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(30);
expect(discovered).toEqual(Object.keys(GATED_ROUTES).sort());
});
it("finds a web caller for every route marked as called from the web", () => {
const calls = gatedWebCalls();
expect(calls.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(25);
const reached = new Set(calls.map((c) => c.route));
const unreached = Object.keys(GATED_ROUTES).filter(
(r) => GATED_ROUTES[r] === "web" && !reached.has(r),
);
expect(unreached).toEqual([]);
});
it("sends every gated request through the re-proof flow", () => {
const unguarded = gatedWebCalls()
.filter((c) => !c.guarded)
.map((c) => `${c.file} -> ${c.route}`)
.filter((key) => !PRECHECKED.has(key));
expect(unguarded).toEqual([]);
});
it("renders the dialog wherever a component runs the flow", () => {
const files = [...new Set(gatedWebCalls().map((c) => c.file))].filter((f) =>
f.endsWith(".tsx"),
);
expect(files.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(10);
const missing = files.filter((f) => {
const src = code(f);
return !/useRecentProof\s*\(/.test(src) || !/\.dialog\b/.test(src);
});
expect(missing).toEqual([]);
});
it("makes every caller of a guarded query hook pass recentProof.run", () => {
// Hooks whose gated request runs inside `guard(…)`.
const hookFiles = [
...new Set(
gatedWebCalls()
.filter((c) => c.file.startsWith("lib/queries/"))
.map((c) => c.file),
),
];
expect(hookFiles.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
const hooks: string[] = [];
for (const file of hookFiles) {
for (const m of code(file).matchAll(
/export function (use\w+)\(\s*guard\s*:\s*ProofGuard\s*\)/g,
)) {
hooks.push(m[1]);
}
}
expect(hooks.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(6);
const offenders: string[] = [];
let callSites = 0;
for (const file of webFiles()) {
if (hookFiles.includes(file)) continue;
const src = code(file);
for (const hook of hooks) {
for (const m of src.matchAll(
new RegExp(`\\b${hook}\\s*\\(([^)]*)\\)`, "g"),
)) {
callSites++;
if (!/^\s*\w+\.run\s*$/.test(m[1])) {
offenders.push(`${file}: ${hook}(${m[1].trim()})`);
}
}
}
}
expect(callSites).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(6);
expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
});
});
+5 -1
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@@ -6,7 +6,11 @@
* token, or run an admin backup, restore, wipe or reset. Those routes answer
* 401 `auth.reproof.required` with `meta.methods` when the session carries no
* recent proof; the web opens the re-proof dialog, posts the proof here, and
* retries.
* retries. The fresh-factor routes (`requireFreshMfa`: the managed-profile
* acts, second-factor and passkey changes, the password change, account
* deletion, the data wipe, key rotation) answer 401 `auth.stepup.required`
* with `meta.methods` on a browser session, and the same dialog clears them
* here with a possession proof.
*
* What a proof stamps on the session row:
* - `totp`, `webauthn` or `passkey`: `mfaVerifiedAt` and `reproofAt`. The
+24 -6
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@ import { useFormatters, useTranslations } from "@/lib/i18n/context";
import { queryKeys } from "@/lib/query-keys";
import { apiFetchRaw, apiGet } from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import { getApiErrorMessage } from "./_shared";
import {
recentProofErrorMessage,
throwIfReproofRequired,
useRecentProof,
} from "@/components/settings/security-section/use-recent-proof";
import { KeyBackupCard } from "./key-backup-card";
import { useKeyBackupStatus } from "./use-key-backup-status";
@@ -105,12 +110,22 @@ export function EncryptionSection() {
staleTime: 15_000,
});
// Rotation needs the admin's second factor proved within five minutes. When
// it is older the server names the proofs that clear it, the shared dialog
// collects one, and the rotation is queued once more.
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const rotate = useMutation({
mutationFn: async () => {
const res = await apiFetchRaw("/api/admin/encryption/rotate", {
method: "POST",
credentials: "include",
});
const res = await recentProof.run(async () =>
throwIfReproofRequired(
await apiFetchRaw("/api/admin/encryption/rotate", {
method: "POST",
credentials: "include",
}),
),
);
if (!res.ok) {
if (res.status === 401) {
throw new Error(t("admin.section.encryption.stepUpNeeded"));
@@ -126,10 +141,12 @@ export function EncryptionSection() {
});
},
onError: (err: Error) => {
showErrorToast(
const message = recentProofErrorMessage(
err,
err.message || t("admin.section.encryption.rotateFailed"),
{ cause: err },
);
if (message === null) return;
showErrorToast(message, { cause: err });
},
});
@@ -182,6 +199,7 @@ export function EncryptionSection() {
return (
<div className="space-y-6">
{recentProof.dialog}
<KeyBackupCard />
{/* ── Coverage summary ───────────────────────────────────────── */}
<SettingsCard>
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
/**
* #959 — "I get the error message that I need to confirm my second factor,
* but there is nowhere to do so."
*
* Handing a managed profile over, adding a Guardian and removing one are gated
* on a second factor proved within five minutes (`requireFreshMfa`). Its
* refusal, 401 `auth.stepup.required`, now names the proofs that clear it in
* `meta.methods`, and each of these mutations runs inside the re-proof flow:
* the dialog opens with those proofs, the proof goes to `/api/auth/reproof`,
* and the request is sent once more.
*
* Driven for real below: the hooks' own `mutationFn`s, the flow
* `useRecentProof` binds to the dialog, and a fake network that answers the
* way the routes do. `@tanstack/react-query` is reduced to the two calls the
* hook bodies make, as in `managed-profiles-invalidation.test.ts`; the unit
* environment has no DOM, so the dialog itself is represented by the view the
* flow drives (which proofs it offers, its error line) and by the test acting
* as the person: proving, or closing it.
*
* Mutation checks, run: drop `guard(…)` from `useCreateManagedProfileHandover`
* and every handover case goes red (the refusal escapes, no dialog); make
* `isProofRefusal` match `auth.reproof.required` only and every case that
* expects a dialog goes red.
*/
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { QueryClient } from "@tanstack/react-query";
vi.mock("@tanstack/react-query", async (importOriginal) => {
const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("@tanstack/react-query")>();
return {
...actual,
useMutation: (options: unknown) => options,
useQueryClient: () => new QueryClient(),
};
});
vi.mock("qrcode", () => ({
default: { toDataURL: vi.fn(async () => "") },
}));
import {
useCreateManagedProfileHandover,
useInviteManagedProfileGuardian,
useRemoveManagedProfileGuardian,
} from "@/lib/queries/use-managed-profiles";
import { ApiError, apiPost } from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import {
ReproofCancelledError,
createRecentProofFlow,
type RecentProofFlow,
} from "@/components/settings/security-section/recent-proof-flow";
import type { ReauthMethod } from "@/components/settings/security-section/existing-factor-reauth-dialog";
import { stepUpErrorKey } from "@/components/settings/access/grant-action-error";
type MutationOptions<I, O> = { mutationFn: (input: I) => Promise<O> };
// ── The network, answering the way the routes do ────────────────────────────
const STALE = {
data: null,
error: "Recent second-factor verification required",
meta: { errorCode: "auth.stepup.required", methods: ["totp", "passkey"] },
};
function json(status: number, body: unknown): Response {
return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
status,
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
});
}
/** Every request, as `METHOD path`, in order. */
let sent: string[] = [];
/** The session's second factor is fresh once a proof was accepted. */
let fresh = false;
/** The codes the authenticator would accept. */
const GOOD_CODE = "246810";
let actionAnswer: () => Response = () => json(200, { data: {}, error: null });
beforeEach(() => {
sent = [];
fresh = false;
vi.spyOn(globalThis, "fetch").mockImplementation(async (input, init) => {
const path = String(input);
const method = (init?.method ?? "GET").toUpperCase();
sent.push(`${method} ${path}`);
if (path === "/api/auth/reproof") {
const proof = JSON.parse(String(init?.body ?? "{}"));
if (proof.method === "totp" && proof.code === GOOD_CODE) {
fresh = true;
return json(200, { data: { method: "totp" }, error: null });
}
return json(401, {
data: null,
error: "Verification failed",
meta: { errorCode: "auth.reproof.failed" },
});
}
return fresh ? actionAnswer() : json(401, STALE);
});
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.restoreAllMocks();
});
// ── The dialog, as the flow drives it ───────────────────────────────────────
interface Dialog {
flow: RecentProofFlow;
/** What the dialog offered each time it opened. */
offered: ReauthMethod[][];
open: boolean;
error: string | null;
/** Resolves when the dialog next opens. */
opened: () => Promise<void>;
}
function dialog(): Dialog {
let notify: (() => void) | null = null;
const d: Dialog = {
offered: [],
open: false,
error: null,
opened: () =>
new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
if (d.open) resolve();
else notify = resolve;
}),
flow: undefined as unknown as RecentProofFlow,
};
d.flow = createRecentProofFlow({
view: {
setMethods: (methods) => {
d.open = methods !== null;
if (methods) {
d.offered.push(methods);
notify?.();
notify = null;
}
},
setPending: () => {},
setError: (error) => {
d.error = error;
},
},
// The same call `useRecentProof` makes.
submit: (proof) => apiPost("/api/auth/reproof", proof),
messages: () => ({ signInAgain: "sign in again", failed: "failed" }),
});
return d;
}
const HANDOVER = "/api/managed-profiles/p1/handover";
function useHandover(d: Dialog) {
return useCreateManagedProfileHandover(
d.flow.run,
) as unknown as MutationOptions<
{ profileId: string; expiresInDays: 7; proposals: [] },
{ url: string; qrDataUrl: string }
>;
}
describe("handing a profile over with a stale second factor", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
actionAnswer = () =>
json(201, {
data: {
url: "https://example.test/claim#t",
token: "t",
expiresAt: "2026-10-24T00:00:00.000Z",
},
error: null,
});
});
it("opens the dialog with the proofs the server named, then hands over", async () => {
const d = dialog();
const pending = useHandover(d).mutationFn({
profileId: "p1",
expiresInDays: 7,
proposals: [],
});
await d.opened();
expect(d.offered).toEqual([["totp", "passkey"]]);
await d.flow.prove({ method: "totp", code: GOOD_CODE });
const link = await pending;
expect(link.url).toBe("https://example.test/claim#t");
expect(d.open).toBe(false);
expect(sent).toEqual([
`POST ${HANDOVER}`,
"POST /api/auth/reproof",
`POST ${HANDOVER}`,
]);
});
it("keeps the dialog open on a wrong code and retries only after a right one", async () => {
const d = dialog();
const pending = useHandover(d).mutationFn({
profileId: "p1",
expiresInDays: 7,
proposals: [],
});
await d.opened();
await d.flow.prove({ method: "totp", code: "000000" });
expect(d.open).toBe(true);
expect(d.error).toBe("failed");
expect(sent).toEqual([`POST ${HANDOVER}`, "POST /api/auth/reproof"]);
await d.flow.prove({ method: "totp", code: GOOD_CODE });
await pending;
expect(sent.filter((s) => s === `POST ${HANDOVER}`)).toHaveLength(2);
});
it("sends nothing more when the dialog is closed", async () => {
const d = dialog();
const pending = useHandover(d).mutationFn({
profileId: "p1",
expiresInDays: 7,
proposals: [],
});
await d.opened();
d.flow.cancel();
await expect(pending).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ReproofCancelledError);
expect(sent).toEqual([`POST ${HANDOVER}`]);
});
it("asks once: a second refusal after the proof is the answer", async () => {
actionAnswer = () => json(401, STALE);
const d = dialog();
const pending = useHandover(d).mutationFn({
profileId: "p1",
expiresInDays: 7,
proposals: [],
});
await d.opened();
await d.flow.prove({ method: "totp", code: GOOD_CODE });
await expect(pending).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 401 });
expect(d.offered).toHaveLength(1);
});
it("opens no dialog for an account with no second factor, and says where to get one", async () => {
vi.mocked(globalThis.fetch).mockResolvedValueOnce(
json(401, {
data: null,
error: "Recent second-factor verification required",
meta: { errorCode: "auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled" },
}),
);
const d = dialog();
const err = await useHandover(d)
.mutationFn({ profileId: "p1", expiresInDays: 7, proposals: [] })
.catch((e: unknown) => e);
expect(d.offered).toEqual([]);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ApiError);
expect(stepUpErrorKey(err as ApiError)).toBe(
"recordSharing.managed.errorMfaRequired",
);
});
});
describe("adding and removing a Guardian with a stale second factor", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
actionAnswer = () => json(201, { data: { id: "g2" }, error: null });
});
it("adds the Guardian after the proof", async () => {
const d = dialog();
const invite = useInviteManagedProfileGuardian(
d.flow.run,
) as unknown as MutationOptions<
{ profileId: string; identifier: string; expiresAt: null },
unknown
>;
const pending = invite.mutationFn({
profileId: "p1",
identifier: "someone",
expiresAt: null,
});
await d.opened();
expect(d.offered).toEqual([["totp", "passkey"]]);
await d.flow.prove({ method: "totp", code: GOOD_CODE });
await pending;
expect(sent).toEqual([
"POST /api/managed-profiles/p1/guardians",
"POST /api/auth/reproof",
"POST /api/managed-profiles/p1/guardians",
]);
});
it("removes the Guardian after the proof", async () => {
actionAnswer = () => json(200, { data: { revoked: true }, error: null });
const d = dialog();
const remove = useRemoveManagedProfileGuardian(
d.flow.run,
) as unknown as MutationOptions<
{ profileId: string; grantId: string },
unknown
>;
const pending = remove.mutationFn({ profileId: "p1", grantId: "g2" });
await d.opened();
await d.flow.prove({ method: "totp", code: GOOD_CODE });
await pending;
expect(sent).toEqual([
"DELETE /api/managed-profiles/p1/guardians/g2",
"POST /api/auth/reproof",
"DELETE /api/managed-profiles/p1/guardians/g2",
]);
});
it("removes nothing when the dialog is closed", async () => {
const d = dialog();
const remove = useRemoveManagedProfileGuardian(
d.flow.run,
) as unknown as MutationOptions<
{ profileId: string; grantId: string },
unknown
>;
const pending = remove.mutationFn({ profileId: "p1", grantId: "g2" });
await d.opened();
d.flow.cancel();
await expect(pending).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ReproofCancelledError);
expect(sent).toEqual(["DELETE /api/managed-profiles/p1/guardians/g2"]);
});
});
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ const STEP_UP_ACTIONS = new Set<GrantAction>([
*
* `requireFreshMfa` refuses for two different reasons and says which: a stale
* proof (`auth.stepup.required`), which the person clears by proving their
* factor, and NO factor at all (`auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`), which they
* factor in the re-proof dialog (`useRecentProof`), and NO factor at all (`auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`), which they
* cannot clear that way. Collapsing the two tells somebody with no second
* factor to confirm one — a dead end offered by the very surface that owns
* the route out of it.
@@ -74,9 +74,19 @@ const STEP_UP_ACTIONS = new Set<GrantAction>([
* invitation, and the two acts below) so the two sentences cannot come apart.
*/
export function stepUpErrorKey(err: ApiError): string {
return err.meta?.errorCode === "auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled"
? "recordSharing.managed.errorMfaRequired"
: "recordSharing.managed.errorStepUp";
switch (err.meta?.errorCode) {
case "auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled":
return "recordSharing.managed.errorMfaRequired";
// The re-proof dialog had nothing to offer (an account that signs in
// through an identity provider only); signing in again is the way through.
case "auth.reproof.sign_in_again":
return "settings.reproof.signInAgain";
// A stale proof normally never gets here: every action in this family runs
// through the re-proof dialog, which clears it and sends the request again.
// This is the sentence for a refusal the dialog could not take up.
default:
return "recordSharing.managed.errorStepUp";
}
}
/**
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ import {
GrantActionAlert,
grantActionErrorKey,
} from "@/components/settings/access/grant-action-error";
import {
ReproofCancelledError,
useRecentProof,
} from "@/components/settings/security-section/use-recent-proof";
import { ManagedProfileCreateForm } from "@/components/settings/access/managed-profile-create-form";
import { ManagedProfileEditForm } from "@/components/settings/access/managed-profile-edit-form";
import { ManagedProfileGuardians } from "@/components/settings/access/managed-profile-guardians";
@@ -69,11 +73,17 @@ import {
export function ManagedProfileCard() {
const { t } = useTranslations();
const { user } = useAuth();
const remove = useDeleteManagedProfile();
// Ending a record is gated on a fresh second factor; the dialog collects it
// and the deletion goes out once more.
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const remove = useDeleteManagedProfile(recentProof.run);
const profiles = managedProfilesOf(user?.accountAccess?.accounts);
return (
<SettingsCard data-slot="managed-profile-card">
{recentProof.dialog}
<SettingsCardHeader
anchor="managed-profiles"
icon={UserRoundCog}
@@ -131,7 +141,10 @@ function ManagedProfileRow({
const { t, tCount } = useTranslations();
const guardians = useManagedProfileGuardians(profile.accountId);
const name = accountLabel(profile);
const failed = remove.isError && remove.variables === profile.accountId;
const failed =
remove.isError &&
!(remove.error instanceof ReproofCancelledError) &&
remove.variables === profile.accountId;
// Per row, not per card. The edit form reads the record's identity when it
// opens, so one shared flag would put every row's form on the wire the
// moment any of them was opened.
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ import { Label } from "@/components/ui/label";
import { NativeSelect } from "@/components/ui/native-select";
import { TimezonePicker } from "@/components/settings/timezone-picker";
import { stepUpErrorKey } from "@/components/settings/access/grant-action-error";
import {
ReproofCancelledError,
useRecentProof,
} from "@/components/settings/security-section/use-recent-proof";
import { ApiError } from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import { locales, localeLabels, type Locale } from "@/lib/i18n/config";
import { useTranslations } from "@/lib/i18n/context";
@@ -88,7 +92,12 @@ export function ManagedProfileCreateForm({
onCreated?: (profile: ManagedProfileView) => void;
} = {}) {
const { t, locale: actorLocale } = useTranslations();
const create = useCreateManagedProfile();
// Gated on a fresh second factor: the dialog collects it and the request
// goes out once more. A closed dialog changed nothing and says nothing.
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const create = useCreateManagedProfile(recentProof.run);
const [displayName, setDisplayName] = useState("");
const [dateOfBirth, setDateOfBirth] = useState("");
@@ -135,165 +144,173 @@ export function ManagedProfileCreateForm({
// person is being asked to retry, and a form that emptied itself
// would make them type it all again to find out whether the second
// attempt fails the same way.
onError: (err) => setError(t(createManagedProfileErrorKey(err))),
onError: (err) => {
if (err instanceof ReproofCancelledError) return;
setError(t(createManagedProfileErrorKey(err)));
},
},
);
};
return (
<form
onSubmit={submit}
data-slot="managed-profile-create-form"
className="space-y-3"
>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="managed-profile-name">
{t("recordSharing.managed.nameLabel")}
</Label>
<Input
id="managed-profile-name"
data-slot="managed-profile-name"
value={displayName}
onChange={(e) => {
setDisplayName(e.target.value);
setError(null);
}}
placeholder={t("recordSharing.managed.namePlaceholder")}
autoComplete="off"
maxLength={80}
aria-invalid={
displayName.length > 0 && nameIssue !== null ? "true" : undefined
}
aria-describedby="managed-profile-name-hint"
/>
<FieldGuidance
slot="managed-profile-name"
hintId="managed-profile-name-hint"
hint={t("recordSharing.managed.nameHint")}
// Only once somebody has typed. "Give the record a name" on an empty
// field they have not reached yet is a telling-off, not guidance.
error={
displayName.length > 0 && nameIssue !== null ? t(nameIssue) : null
}
/>
</div>
<>
{/* Outside the form: the dialog's own form must not submit this one
through the portal. */}
{recentProof.dialog}
<form
onSubmit={submit}
data-slot="managed-profile-create-form"
className="space-y-3"
>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="managed-profile-name">
{t("recordSharing.managed.nameLabel")}
</Label>
<Input
id="managed-profile-name"
data-slot="managed-profile-name"
value={displayName}
onChange={(e) => {
setDisplayName(e.target.value);
setError(null);
}}
placeholder={t("recordSharing.managed.namePlaceholder")}
autoComplete="off"
maxLength={80}
aria-invalid={
displayName.length > 0 && nameIssue !== null ? "true" : undefined
}
aria-describedby="managed-profile-name-hint"
/>
<FieldGuidance
slot="managed-profile-name"
hintId="managed-profile-name-hint"
hint={t("recordSharing.managed.nameHint")}
// Only once somebody has typed. "Give the record a name" on an empty
// field they have not reached yet is a telling-off, not guidance.
error={
displayName.length > 0 && nameIssue !== null ? t(nameIssue) : null
}
/>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="managed-profile-dob">
{t("recordSharing.managed.dobLabel")}
</Label>
<DateField
id="managed-profile-dob"
data-slot="managed-profile-dob"
data-testid="managed-profile-dob-input"
value={dateOfBirth}
onChange={setDateOfBirth}
aria-describedby="managed-profile-dob-hint"
/>
<p
id="managed-profile-dob-hint"
className="text-muted-foreground text-xs"
>
{t("recordSharing.managed.dobHint")}
</p>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="managed-profile-dob">
{t("recordSharing.managed.dobLabel")}
</Label>
<DateField
id="managed-profile-dob"
data-slot="managed-profile-dob"
data-testid="managed-profile-dob-input"
value={dateOfBirth}
onChange={setDateOfBirth}
aria-describedby="managed-profile-dob-hint"
/>
<p
id="managed-profile-dob-hint"
className="text-muted-foreground text-xs"
>
{t("recordSharing.managed.dobHint")}
</p>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="managed-profile-locale">
{t("recordSharing.managed.localeLabel")}
</Label>
<NativeSelect
id="managed-profile-locale"
data-slot="managed-profile-locale"
className="w-full"
value={locale}
onChange={(e) => setLocale(e.target.value as Locale)}
>
{locales.map((option) => (
<option key={option} value={option}>
{localeLabels[option]}
</option>
))}
</NativeSelect>
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">
{t("recordSharing.managed.localeHint")}
</p>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="managed-profile-locale">
{t("recordSharing.managed.localeLabel")}
</Label>
<NativeSelect
id="managed-profile-locale"
data-slot="managed-profile-locale"
className="w-full"
value={locale}
onChange={(e) => setLocale(e.target.value as Locale)}
>
{locales.map((option) => (
<option key={option} value={option}>
{localeLabels[option]}
</option>
))}
</NativeSelect>
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">
{t("recordSharing.managed.localeHint")}
</p>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="managed-profile-gender">
{t("recordSharing.managed.genderLabel")}
</Label>
<NativeSelect
id="managed-profile-gender"
data-slot="managed-profile-gender"
className="w-full"
value={gender ?? ""}
onChange={(e) => setGender(genderFromSelect(e.target.value))}
>
{MANAGED_PROFILE_GENDER_OPTIONS.map((option) => (
<option key={option.value} value={option.value}>
{t(option.labelKey)}
</option>
))}
</NativeSelect>
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">
{t("recordSharing.managed.genderHint")}
</p>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor="managed-profile-gender">
{t("recordSharing.managed.genderLabel")}
</Label>
<NativeSelect
id="managed-profile-gender"
data-slot="managed-profile-gender"
className="w-full"
value={gender ?? ""}
onChange={(e) => setGender(genderFromSelect(e.target.value))}
>
{MANAGED_PROFILE_GENDER_OPTIONS.map((option) => (
<option key={option.value} value={option.value}>
{t(option.labelKey)}
</option>
))}
</NativeSelect>
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">
{t("recordSharing.managed.genderHint")}
</p>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<TimezonePicker
id="managed-profile-timezone"
value={timezone}
onChange={(next) => {
setTimezone(next);
setError(null);
}}
hint={t("recordSharing.managed.timezoneHint")}
/>
{/* The picker's own list comes from the engine, so the select branch
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<TimezonePicker
id="managed-profile-timezone"
value={timezone}
onChange={(next) => {
setTimezone(next);
setError(null);
}}
hint={t("recordSharing.managed.timezoneHint")}
/>
{/* The picker's own list comes from the engine, so the select branch
cannot produce an unknown zone. Its free-text fallback (older
engines without `Intl.supportedValuesOf`) can, and this sentence is
then the ONLY explanation for a submit button that will not press.
It rides beside the picker rather than through its `hint` prop,
because that prop renders muted meta and a refusal rendered as meta
is a refusal nobody reads. */}
<FieldGuidance
slot="managed-profile-timezone"
error={timezoneIssue === null ? null : t(timezoneIssue)}
/>
</div>
<FieldGuidance
slot="managed-profile-timezone"
error={timezoneIssue === null ? null : t(timezoneIssue)}
/>
</div>
<Button
type="submit"
data-slot="managed-profile-create-submit"
disabled={create.isPending || blocked}
>
{create.isPending
? t("recordSharing.managed.creating")
: (submitLabel ?? t("recordSharing.managed.create"))}
</Button>
<Button
type="submit"
data-slot="managed-profile-create-submit"
disabled={create.isPending || blocked}
>
{create.isPending
? t("recordSharing.managed.creating")
: (submitLabel ?? t("recordSharing.managed.create"))}
</Button>
{error && (
<p
role="alert"
data-slot="managed-profile-create-error"
className="text-destructive text-sm"
>
{error}
</p>
)}
{created && (
<p
role="status"
data-slot="managed-profile-created"
className="text-sm"
>
{t("recordSharing.managed.created", { name: created })}
</p>
)}
</form>
{error && (
<p
role="alert"
data-slot="managed-profile-create-error"
className="text-destructive text-sm"
>
{error}
</p>
)}
{created && (
<p
role="status"
data-slot="managed-profile-created"
className="text-sm"
>
{t("recordSharing.managed.created", { name: created })}
</p>
)}
</form>
</>
);
}
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ import {
genderFromSelect,
} from "@/components/settings/access/managed-profile-create-form";
import { stepUpErrorKey } from "@/components/settings/access/grant-action-error";
import {
ReproofCancelledError,
useRecentProof,
} from "@/components/settings/security-section/use-recent-proof";
import { SettingsCardActions } from "@/components/settings/_card-actions";
import { TimezonePicker } from "@/components/settings/timezone-picker";
import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
@@ -124,7 +128,12 @@ function ManagedProfileEditFields({
onDone: () => void;
}) {
const { t, locale: actorLocale } = useTranslations();
const update = useUpdateManagedProfile();
// Gated on a fresh second factor: the dialog collects it and the request
// goes out once more. A closed dialog changed nothing and says nothing.
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const update = useUpdateManagedProfile(recentProof.run);
const [displayName, setDisplayName] = useState(profile.displayName ?? "");
const [dateOfBirth, setDateOfBirth] = useState(profile.dateOfBirth ?? "");
@@ -172,143 +181,151 @@ function ManagedProfileEditFields({
// Nothing is reset: a refused save is one somebody is being asked to
// retry, and a form that restored the server's values would throw the
// edit away to explain that it did not land.
onError: (err) => setError(t(editManagedProfileErrorKey(err))),
onError: (err) => {
if (err instanceof ReproofCancelledError) return;
setError(t(editManagedProfileErrorKey(err)));
},
},
);
};
return (
<form
onSubmit={submit}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-form"
className="space-y-3"
>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor={`managed-profile-edit-name-${profile.id}`}>
{t("recordSharing.managed.nameLabel")}
</Label>
<Input
id={`managed-profile-edit-name-${profile.id}`}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-name"
value={displayName}
onChange={(e) => {
setDisplayName(e.target.value);
setError(null);
}}
autoComplete="off"
maxLength={80}
aria-invalid={nameIssue !== null ? "true" : undefined}
/>
<FieldGuidance
slot="managed-profile-edit-name"
error={nameIssue === null ? null : t(nameIssue)}
/>
</div>
<>
{/* Outside the form: the dialog's own form must not submit this one
through the portal. */}
{recentProof.dialog}
<form
onSubmit={submit}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-form"
className="space-y-3"
>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor={`managed-profile-edit-name-${profile.id}`}>
{t("recordSharing.managed.nameLabel")}
</Label>
<Input
id={`managed-profile-edit-name-${profile.id}`}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-name"
value={displayName}
onChange={(e) => {
setDisplayName(e.target.value);
setError(null);
}}
autoComplete="off"
maxLength={80}
aria-invalid={nameIssue !== null ? "true" : undefined}
/>
<FieldGuidance
slot="managed-profile-edit-name"
error={nameIssue === null ? null : t(nameIssue)}
/>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor={`managed-profile-edit-dob-${profile.id}`}>
{t("recordSharing.managed.dobLabel")}
</Label>
<DateField
id={`managed-profile-edit-dob-${profile.id}`}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-dob"
value={dateOfBirth}
onChange={setDateOfBirth}
/>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor={`managed-profile-edit-dob-${profile.id}`}>
{t("recordSharing.managed.dobLabel")}
</Label>
<DateField
id={`managed-profile-edit-dob-${profile.id}`}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-dob"
value={dateOfBirth}
onChange={setDateOfBirth}
/>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor={`managed-profile-edit-locale-${profile.id}`}>
{t("recordSharing.managed.localeLabel")}
</Label>
<NativeSelect
id={`managed-profile-edit-locale-${profile.id}`}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-locale"
className="w-full"
value={locale}
onChange={(e) => setLocale(e.target.value as Locale)}
>
{locales.map((option) => (
<option key={option} value={option}>
{localeLabels[option]}
</option>
))}
</NativeSelect>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor={`managed-profile-edit-locale-${profile.id}`}>
{t("recordSharing.managed.localeLabel")}
</Label>
<NativeSelect
id={`managed-profile-edit-locale-${profile.id}`}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-locale"
className="w-full"
value={locale}
onChange={(e) => setLocale(e.target.value as Locale)}
>
{locales.map((option) => (
<option key={option} value={option}>
{localeLabels[option]}
</option>
))}
</NativeSelect>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor={`managed-profile-edit-gender-${profile.id}`}>
{t("recordSharing.managed.genderLabel")}
</Label>
<NativeSelect
id={`managed-profile-edit-gender-${profile.id}`}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-gender"
className="w-full"
value={gender ?? ""}
onChange={(e) => setGender(genderFromSelect(e.target.value))}
>
{MANAGED_PROFILE_GENDER_OPTIONS.map((option) => (
<option key={option.value} value={option.value}>
{t(option.labelKey)}
</option>
))}
</NativeSelect>
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">
{t("recordSharing.managed.genderHint")}
</p>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<Label htmlFor={`managed-profile-edit-gender-${profile.id}`}>
{t("recordSharing.managed.genderLabel")}
</Label>
<NativeSelect
id={`managed-profile-edit-gender-${profile.id}`}
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-gender"
className="w-full"
value={gender ?? ""}
onChange={(e) => setGender(genderFromSelect(e.target.value))}
>
{MANAGED_PROFILE_GENDER_OPTIONS.map((option) => (
<option key={option.value} value={option.value}>
{t(option.labelKey)}
</option>
))}
</NativeSelect>
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-xs">
{t("recordSharing.managed.genderHint")}
</p>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<TimezonePicker
id={`managed-profile-edit-timezone-${profile.id}`}
value={timezone}
onChange={(next) => {
setTimezone(next);
setError(null);
}}
hint={t("recordSharing.managed.timezoneHint")}
/>
<FieldGuidance
slot="managed-profile-edit-timezone"
error={timezoneIssue === null ? null : t(timezoneIssue)}
/>
</div>
<div className="space-y-1.5">
<TimezonePicker
id={`managed-profile-edit-timezone-${profile.id}`}
value={timezone}
onChange={(next) => {
setTimezone(next);
setError(null);
}}
hint={t("recordSharing.managed.timezoneHint")}
/>
<FieldGuidance
slot="managed-profile-edit-timezone"
error={timezoneIssue === null ? null : t(timezoneIssue)}
/>
</div>
{/* Above the action row, per UI-STANDARDS §12: nothing follows it. */}
{error && (
<p
role="alert"
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-error"
className="text-destructive text-sm"
>
{error}
</p>
)}
{/* Above the action row, per UI-STANDARDS §12: nothing follows it. */}
{error && (
<p
role="alert"
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-error"
className="text-destructive text-sm"
>
{error}
</p>
)}
<SettingsCardActions>
<Button
type="button"
variant="outline"
size="sm"
className="min-h-11 sm:min-h-9"
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-cancel"
onClick={onDone}
>
{t("common.cancel")}
</Button>
<Button
type="submit"
size="sm"
className="min-h-11 sm:min-h-9"
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-submit"
disabled={blocked || update.isPending}
>
{update.isPending
? t("recordSharing.managed.editSaving")
: t("recordSharing.managed.editSave")}
</Button>
</SettingsCardActions>
</form>
<SettingsCardActions>
<Button
type="button"
variant="outline"
size="sm"
className="min-h-11 sm:min-h-9"
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-cancel"
onClick={onDone}
>
{t("common.cancel")}
</Button>
<Button
type="submit"
size="sm"
className="min-h-11 sm:min-h-9"
data-slot="managed-profile-edit-submit"
disabled={blocked || update.isPending}
>
{update.isPending
? t("recordSharing.managed.editSaving")
: t("recordSharing.managed.editSave")}
</Button>
</SettingsCardActions>
</form>
</>
);
}
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ import {
stepUpErrorKey,
} from "@/components/settings/access/grant-action-error";
import { endOfDayIso } from "@/components/settings/access/grant-invite-card";
import {
ReproofCancelledError,
useRecentProof,
} from "@/components/settings/security-section/use-recent-proof";
import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
import { ConfirmButton } from "@/components/ui/confirm-button";
import { DateField } from "@/components/ui/date-field";
@@ -80,8 +84,14 @@ export function ManagedProfileGuardians({
const { t } = useTranslations();
const fmt = useFormatters();
const { user } = useAuth();
const invite = useInviteManagedProfileGuardian();
const remove = useRemoveManagedProfileGuardian();
// Both acts are gated on a fresh second factor; the dialog collects it and
// the request goes out once more. A closed dialog changed nothing and says
// nothing.
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const invite = useInviteManagedProfileGuardian(recentProof.run);
const remove = useRemoveManagedProfileGuardian(recentProof.run);
const [identifier, setIdentifier] = useState("");
const [expiresOn, setExpiresOn] = useState("");
@@ -116,6 +126,7 @@ export function ManagedProfileGuardians({
return (
<div data-slot="managed-profile-guardians" className="space-y-3">
{recentProof.dialog}
<h3 className="text-sm font-medium">
{t("recordSharing.managed.guardiansTitle", { name: profileName })}
</h3>
@@ -129,7 +140,9 @@ export function ManagedProfileGuardians({
// one is the caller's own — which the route refuses anyway.
const removable = !isSelf;
const failed =
remove.isError && remove.variables?.grantId === guardian.grantId;
remove.isError &&
!(remove.error instanceof ReproofCancelledError) &&
remove.variables?.grantId === guardian.grantId;
return (
<li
key={guardian.grantId}
@@ -269,7 +282,7 @@ export function ManagedProfileGuardians({
? t("recordSharing.managed.guardianInviting")
: t("recordSharing.managed.guardianInvite")}
</Button>
{invite.isError && (
{invite.isError && !(invite.error instanceof ReproofCancelledError) && (
<p
role="alert"
data-slot="managed-profile-guardian-error"
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ import { showErrorToast } from "@/lib/errors/error-toast";
import { toastWrittenOutcome } from "@/components/outcome/outcome-toast";
import { stepUpErrorKey } from "@/components/settings/access/grant-action-error";
import { SettingsCardActions } from "@/components/settings/_card-actions";
import {
ReproofCancelledError,
useRecentProof,
} from "@/components/settings/security-section/use-recent-proof";
import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
import { Input } from "@/components/ui/input";
import { Label } from "@/components/ui/label";
@@ -65,7 +69,14 @@ export function ManagedProfileHandover({
const { t } = useTranslations();
const fmt = useFormatters();
const status = useManagedProfileHandover(profileId);
const create = useCreateManagedProfileHandover();
// Minting the link is gated on a fresh second factor. The dialog asks for it
// when the server says so and the mint is sent again, so a Guardian who
// signed in more than five minutes ago is not left with a sentence telling
// them to confirm a factor somewhere this panel does not offer.
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const create = useCreateManagedProfileHandover(recentProof.run);
const revoke = useRevokeManagedProfileHandover();
const [replacing, setReplacing] = useState(false);
@@ -105,6 +116,7 @@ export function ManagedProfileHandover({
})}
className="space-y-4 rounded-lg border p-3"
>
{recentProof.dialog}
<p className="text-sm">
{t("recordSharing.managed.handover.description", {
name: profileName,
@@ -359,7 +371,7 @@ function HandoverProposalForm({
{replacing && <p>{t("recordSharing.managed.handover.replaceNote")}</p>}
</div>
{create.isError && (
{create.isError && !(create.error instanceof ReproofCancelledError) && (
<p
role="alert"
data-slot="managed-profile-handover-error"
+51 -15
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@ import { SettingsCard } from "@/components/settings/settings-card";
import { SettingsCardHeader } from "@/components/settings/_card-header";
import { useTranslations } from "@/lib/i18n/context";
import { apiFetchRaw } from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import {
recentProofErrorMessage,
throwIfReproofRequired,
useRecentProof,
} from "@/components/settings/security-section/use-recent-proof";
import { loadDocument } from "@/lib/navigation/load-document";
/**
@@ -57,6 +62,9 @@ export function AdvancedSection() {
function DataResetCard() {
const { t } = useTranslations();
const queryClient = useQueryClient();
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const [deleting, setDeleting] = useState(false);
const [confirmOpen, setConfirmOpen] = useState(false);
const [msg, setMsg] = useState<string | null>(null);
@@ -68,11 +76,18 @@ function DataResetCard() {
setMsg(null);
setMsgType(null);
try {
const res = await apiFetchRaw("/api/settings/data", {
method: "DELETE",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ confirm: "DELETE" }),
});
// An account with a second factor wipes its record only with that
// factor proved within five minutes; the shared dialog collects it when
// the server asks and the wipe is sent again.
const res = await recentProof.run(async () =>
throwIfReproofRequired(
await apiFetchRaw("/api/settings/data", {
method: "DELETE",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ confirm: "DELETE" }),
}),
),
);
const json = await res.json();
if (!res.ok) {
setMsg(json.error || t("settings.dangerZoneDeleteFailed"));
@@ -84,8 +99,13 @@ function DataResetCard() {
setMsg(t("settings.dangerZoneSuccess"));
setMsgType("success");
setConfirmOpen(false);
} catch {
setMsg(t("settings.dangerZoneDeleteFailed"));
} catch (err) {
const message = recentProofErrorMessage(
err,
t("settings.dangerZoneDeleteFailed"),
);
if (message === null) return;
setMsg(message);
setMsgType("error");
} finally {
setDeleting(false);
@@ -94,6 +114,7 @@ function DataResetCard() {
return (
<SettingsCard data-slot="settings-data-reset-card">
{recentProof.dialog}
{/* v1.4.43 QoL (L5) — dropped the `AlertTriangle` icon and
neutralised the title colour so the danger-zone shaping is
GitHub-style (red CTA only) rather than red-on-red-on-red.
@@ -193,6 +214,9 @@ function DataResetCard() {
*/
function AccountDeleteCard() {
const { t } = useTranslations();
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const [deleting, setDeleting] = useState(false);
const [confirmOpen, setConfirmOpen] = useState(false);
const [msg, setMsg] = useState<string | null>(null);
@@ -204,11 +228,17 @@ function AccountDeleteCard() {
setMsg(null);
setMsgType(null);
try {
const res = await apiFetchRaw("/api/settings/account", {
method: "DELETE",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ confirm: "DELETE_ACCOUNT" }),
});
// Same gate as the wipe: a second factor proved within five minutes on
// an account that has one, collected by the shared dialog.
const res = await recentProof.run(async () =>
throwIfReproofRequired(
await apiFetchRaw("/api/settings/account", {
method: "DELETE",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ confirm: "DELETE_ACCOUNT" }),
}),
),
);
if (!res.ok) {
try {
const json = await res.json();
@@ -229,15 +259,21 @@ function AccountDeleteCard() {
setTimeout(() => {
loadDocument("/auth/login");
}, 1_500);
} catch {
setMsg(t("settings.deleteAccountFailed"));
setMsgType("error");
} catch (err) {
setDeleting(false);
const message = recentProofErrorMessage(
err,
t("settings.deleteAccountFailed"),
);
if (message === null) return;
setMsg(message);
setMsgType("error");
}
}
return (
<SettingsCard data-slot="settings-account-delete-card">
{recentProof.dialog}
<SettingsCardHeader
anchor="delete-account"
icon={Trash2}
+29 -10
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ import {
} from "@/components/settings/account-section/account-section-utils";
import { useTranslations } from "@/lib/i18n/context";
import { apiFetchRaw } from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import {
recentProofErrorMessage,
throwIfReproofRequired,
useRecentProof,
} from "@/components/settings/security-section/use-recent-proof";
/**
* Change-password card.
@@ -40,6 +45,9 @@ export function PasswordCard() {
const [msg, setMsg] = useState<StatusMessage | null>(null);
const [msgType, setMsgType] = useState<"success" | "error" | null>(null);
const [dialogOpen, setDialogOpen] = useState(false);
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
async function handleChangePassword(e: React.FormEvent) {
e.preventDefault();
@@ -55,15 +63,23 @@ export function PasswordCard() {
}
try {
const res = await apiFetchRaw("/api/auth/password", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({
currentPassword,
newPassword,
confirmPassword,
}),
// An account with a second factor changes its password only with that
// factor proved within five minutes; the shared dialog collects it when
// the server asks and the change is sent again.
const body = JSON.stringify({
currentPassword,
newPassword,
confirmPassword,
});
const res = await recentProof.run(async () =>
throwIfReproofRequired(
await apiFetchRaw("/api/auth/password", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body,
}),
),
);
const json = await res.json();
if (!res.ok) {
@@ -79,8 +95,10 @@ export function PasswordCard() {
setCurrentPassword("");
setNewPassword("");
setConfirmPassword("");
} catch {
setMsg({ key: "common.networkError" });
} catch (err) {
const message = recentProofErrorMessage(err, "");
if (message === null) return;
setMsg(message ? { text: message } : { key: "common.networkError" });
setMsgType("error");
} finally {
setSaving(false);
@@ -89,6 +107,7 @@ export function PasswordCard() {
return (
<>
{recentProof.dialog}
{/* The action is this card's only one, so it sits in the card's action
row like every other primary. It stays full-width under `sm` — the
German "Passwort ändern" is long enough that a right-hugging button
@@ -15,11 +15,12 @@
* 3. an ordinary failure still shows its own message rather than being
* swallowed by the step-up sentence,
* 4. the sentence resolves in more than one locale,
* 5. the sentence names the recovery the web actually has. The mint endpoint
* is Bearer-only by design, so there is no in-page re-proof dialog for a
* cookie session; signing in again is the recovery, and a passkey login
* stamps `mfaVerifiedAt`. If that ever changes, this assertion is the
* reminder that the copy has to change with it.
* 5. the sentence names a recovery that always exists. A refusal that names
* its proofs (`meta.methods`) opens the re-proof dialog instead and never
* reaches this sentence (`useRecentProof`, pinned by
* `step-up-web-caller-guard.test.ts`); what is left is a refusal the
* dialog cannot take up, and signing in again is the recovery there — a
* passkey login stamps `mfaVerifiedAt`.
*
* Mutation check: return `err.message` from the removal's `onError` and cases 1,
* 2 and 4 go red; narrow `describeStepUp` to the exact `auth.stepup.required`
@@ -85,9 +86,9 @@ describe("passkey removal — the step-up refusal a person sees", () => {
});
it("names the recovery the web actually has", () => {
// Not "verify to continue": there is no in-page re-proof for a cookie
// session, because the elevation mint is Bearer-only by design. Signing in
// again is the recovery, and a passkey login stamps the session.
// The dialog handles every refusal that names its proofs; this sentence
// is for the rest, where signing in again is the recovery and a passkey
// login stamps the session.
expect(STEP_UP_SENTENCE.toLowerCase()).toContain("sign in again");
});
@@ -56,6 +56,22 @@ const REAUTH_METHODS: readonly ReauthMethod[] = [
* none. On an account with a second factor the server leaves the password out,
* so the dialog does not offer a choice that can only be refused.
*/
/**
* The refusal says the account holds nothing it could re-prove here: an
* account that signs in through an identity provider only, with no password,
* passkey or second factor. A dialog would only offer it a password it does
* not have, so the callers say "sign in again" instead — a fresh sign-in is
* the proof such an account can give (`Session.createdAt` within five
* minutes).
*/
export function nothingToReprove(err: unknown): boolean {
return (
err instanceof ApiError &&
Array.isArray(err.meta?.methods) &&
err.meta.methods.length === 0
);
}
export function offeredReauthMethods(err: unknown): ReauthMethod[] | null {
if (!(err instanceof ApiError)) return null;
const raw = err.meta?.methods;
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ import {
} from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import { describePasskeyError } from "@/lib/passkey-errors";
import { describeStepUp } from "./security-keys-card";
import { ReproofCancelledError, useRecentProof } from "./use-recent-proof";
interface PasskeyInfo {
id: string;
@@ -164,22 +165,30 @@ export function PasskeyListSection({
onError: (err: Error) => setMsg(err.message),
});
// Removal is step-up gated: a second factor, or on a passkey-only account a
// passkey, proved within five minutes. The server names what clears it and
// the shared dialog collects that, then the removal runs again.
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const remove = useMutation({
mutationFn: async (id: string) => {
await apiDelete(`/api/auth/passkeys/${id}`);
await recentProof.run(() => apiDelete(`/api/auth/passkeys/${id}`));
},
onSuccess: () => {
setMsg(null);
queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: queryKeys.passkeys() });
},
// Removal is step-up gated. The server's own prose says "second-factor",
// which is wrong for the passkey-only account this card mostly serves — the
// credential to re-prove is the passkey — so the refusal gets its own
// sentence naming the recovery that exists on the web: sign in again.
onError: (err: Error) =>
// A refusal the dialog could not take up keeps its own sentence. The
// server's prose says "second-factor", which is wrong for the passkey-only
// account this card mostly serves, so it names the recovery that always
// exists on the web: sign in again.
onError: (err: Error) => {
if (err instanceof ReproofCancelledError) return;
setMsg(
describeStepUp(err, err.message, t("settings.passkeyStepUpRequired")),
),
);
},
});
const DEVICE_TYPE_LABELS: Record<string, string> = {
@@ -189,6 +198,7 @@ export function PasskeyListSection({
return (
<SettingsCard>
{recentProof.dialog}
<SettingsCardHeader
anchor="passkeys"
icon={Fingerprint}
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
import { ApiError } from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import {
isReproofRequired,
type ExistingFactorProof,
type ReauthMethod,
} from "./existing-factor-reauth-dialog";
/**
* The re-proof flow without React: catch the refusal, ask for a proof, post
* it, run the action once more. `useRecentProof` binds it to component state
* and the dialog; the unit suite drives it directly, because this repository's
* component tests run without a browser DOM and the flow is what matters.
*/
const KNOWN_METHODS: readonly ReauthMethod[] = [
"password",
"totp",
"webauthn",
"passkey",
];
/** The proofs a refusal says this account can give. */
function methodsFrom(err: ApiError): ReauthMethod[] {
const raw = err.meta?.methods;
if (!Array.isArray(raw)) return [];
return raw.filter((m): m is ReauthMethod =>
KNOWN_METHODS.includes(m as ReauthMethod),
);
}
/**
* A refusal the re-proof dialog can clear.
*
* Two gates answer this way. The recent-proof gate (`auth.reproof.required`)
* in front of exports, share links, tokens, invitations and the admin data
* actions; and the fresh-factor gate (`auth.stepup.required`, from
* `requireFreshMfa`) in front of the managed-profile acts, the second-factor
* changes, passkey removal, the password change, account deletion, the data
* wipe and the key rotation. The second one names the proofs it would take in
* `meta.methods` on a browser session, and a `POST /api/auth/reproof` with one
* of them stamps the session the way signing in with the factor does, so the
* same dialog clears both. A fresh-factor refusal without `methods` (an
* account with no factor at all says `auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled` instead)
* is not something a dialog can answer, and stays with the caller's own
* message.
*/
export function isProofRefusal(err: unknown): boolean {
if (isReproofRequired(err)) return true;
return (
err instanceof ApiError &&
err.status === 401 &&
err.meta?.errorCode === "auth.stepup.required" &&
methodsFrom(err).length > 0
);
}
/** The person closed the re-proof dialog. Nothing ran; show nothing. */
export class ReproofCancelledError extends Error {
constructor() {
super("Re-proof cancelled");
this.name = "ReproofCancelledError";
}
}
export interface RecentProofFlowView {
/** Open the dialog offering these proofs, or close it with `null`. */
setMethods: (methods: ReauthMethod[] | null) => void;
setPending: (pending: boolean) => void;
setError: (error: string | null) => void;
}
export interface RecentProofFlow {
run: <T>(action: () => Promise<T>) => Promise<T>;
/** The dialog collected a proof: post it and release the waiting action. */
prove: (proof: ExistingFactorProof) => Promise<void>;
/** The dialog was closed without a proof. */
cancel: () => void;
}
export function createRecentProofFlow(deps: {
view: RecentProofFlowView;
/** Posts the proof to `/api/auth/reproof`. */
submit: (proof: ExistingFactorProof) => Promise<unknown>;
/** Read at the moment they are needed, so a locale switch is honoured. */
messages: () => { signInAgain: string; failed: string };
}): RecentProofFlow {
let waiter: { resolve: () => void; reject: () => void } | null = null;
const run = async <T>(action: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> => {
try {
return await action();
} catch (err) {
if (!isProofRefusal(err)) throw err;
const offered = methodsFrom(err as ApiError);
// Nothing to re-prove in place: an account that signs in through an
// identity provider only. A fresh sign-in is the proof it can give.
if (offered.length === 0) {
throw new ApiError(deps.messages().signInAgain, 401, {
errorCode: "auth.reproof.sign_in_again",
});
}
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
waiter = {
resolve,
reject: () => reject(new ReproofCancelledError()),
};
deps.view.setError(null);
deps.view.setMethods(offered);
});
// Once. A second refusal is the answer, not a reason to ask again.
return action();
}
};
const prove = async (proof: ExistingFactorProof): Promise<void> => {
deps.view.setPending(true);
deps.view.setError(null);
try {
await deps.submit(proof);
deps.view.setMethods(null);
const w = waiter;
waiter = null;
w?.resolve();
} catch (err) {
deps.view.setError(
err instanceof ApiError && err.status === 429
? err.message
: deps.messages().failed,
);
} finally {
deps.view.setPending(false);
}
};
const cancel = () => {
deps.view.setMethods(null);
deps.view.setError(null);
const w = waiter;
waiter = null;
w?.reject();
};
return { run, prove, cancel };
}
@@ -37,10 +37,12 @@ import { formatDate } from "@/lib/format";
import {
ExistingFactorReauthDialog,
isReproofRequired,
nothingToReprove,
offeredReauthMethods,
type ExistingFactorProof,
type ReauthMethod,
} from "./existing-factor-reauth-dialog";
import { ReproofCancelledError, useRecentProof } from "./use-recent-proof";
export interface WebauthnKeyInfo {
id: string;
@@ -133,6 +135,11 @@ export function SecurityKeysCard({
queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: queryKeys.mfaStatus() });
},
onError: (err, proof) => {
if (isReproofRequired(err) && nothingToReprove(err)) {
setReauthOpen(false);
setError(t("settings.reproof.signInAgain"));
return;
}
if (isReproofRequired(err)) {
setOfferedMethods(offeredReauthMethods(err));
setError(null);
@@ -172,26 +179,35 @@ export function SecurityKeysCard({
),
});
// Removing a key needs the second factor proved within five minutes; the
// shared dialog collects it when the server asks, then the removal runs
// again.
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
const remove = useMutation({
mutationFn: async (id: string) => {
await apiDelete(`/api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/${id}`);
await recentProof.run(() => apiDelete(`/api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/${id}`));
},
onSuccess: () => {
setError(null);
queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: queryKeys.mfaStatus() });
},
onError: (err) =>
onError: (err) => {
if (err instanceof ReproofCancelledError) return;
setError(
describeStepUp(
err,
t("settings.security.keys.removeFailed"),
t("settings.security.stepUpRequired"),
),
),
);
},
});
return (
<SettingsCard>
{recentProof.dialog}
<SettingsCardHeader
anchor="security-keys"
icon={Usb}
@@ -31,11 +31,17 @@ import { SettingsCard } from "@/components/settings/settings-card";
import { SettingsCardHeader } from "@/components/settings/_card-header";
import { useTranslations } from "@/lib/i18n/context";
import { queryKeys } from "@/lib/query-keys";
import { ApiError, apiPost } from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import { ApiError, apiGet, apiPost } from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import { RecoveryCodesPanel } from "./recovery-codes-panel";
import {
ReproofCancelledError,
recentProofErrorMessage,
useRecentProof,
} from "./use-recent-proof";
import {
ExistingFactorReauthDialog,
isReproofRequired,
nothingToReprove,
offeredReauthMethods,
type ExistingFactorProof,
type ReauthMethod,
@@ -117,6 +123,33 @@ export function TotpCard({
const [regenerateOpen, setRegenerateOpen] = useState(false);
const [disableOpen, setDisableOpen] = useState(false);
// Disabling the factor and rotating the recovery codes both need the second
// factor proved within five minutes. When it is older, the server names the
// proofs that clear it and the shared dialog collects one, then the action
// runs again.
const recentProof = useRecentProof({
description: t("settings.reproof.descriptionChange"),
});
// Disabling is asked BEFORE the confirmation opens, not after its code was
// typed: the route checks the session's proof before it reads the code, and
// a code typed first and then spent on the re-proof would be refused as a
// replay when the disable is sent again.
async function openDisable() {
setError(null);
try {
await recentProof.run(() => apiGet("/api/auth/reproof"));
} catch (err) {
const message = recentProofErrorMessage(
err,
t("settings.security.totp.disableFailed"),
);
if (message) setError(message);
return;
}
setDisableOpen(true);
}
function resetWizard() {
setSetup(null);
setQrDataUrl(null);
@@ -154,6 +187,11 @@ export function TotpCard({
}
},
onError: (err, proof) => {
if (isReproofRequired(err) && nothingToReprove(err)) {
setReauthOpen(false);
setError(t("settings.reproof.signInAgain"));
return;
}
if (isReproofRequired(err)) {
const offered = offeredReauthMethods(err);
if (offered) setReauthMethods(offered);
@@ -194,31 +232,37 @@ export function TotpCard({
const disable = useMutation({
mutationFn: async () => {
await apiPost("/api/auth/me/mfa/disable", {
code: disableCode,
method: disableMethod,
});
await recentProof.run(() =>
apiPost("/api/auth/me/mfa/disable", {
code: disableCode,
method: disableMethod,
}),
);
},
onSuccess: () => {
setDisableCode("");
setFreshCodes(null);
queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: queryKeys.mfaStatus() });
},
onError: (err) =>
onError: (err) => {
if (err instanceof ReproofCancelledError) return;
setError(
describeError(
err,
t("settings.security.totp.disableFailed"),
t("settings.security.stepUpRequired"),
),
),
);
},
onSettled: () => setDisableOpen(false),
});
const regenerate = useMutation({
mutationFn: async () => {
return apiPost<{ recoveryCodes: string[] }>(
"/api/auth/me/mfa/recovery-codes/regenerate",
return recentProof.run(() =>
apiPost<{ recoveryCodes: string[] }>(
"/api/auth/me/mfa/recovery-codes/regenerate",
),
);
},
onSuccess: (data) => {
@@ -226,14 +270,16 @@ export function TotpCard({
setFreshCodes(data.recoveryCodes);
queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: queryKeys.mfaStatus() });
},
onError: (err) =>
onError: (err) => {
if (err instanceof ReproofCancelledError) return;
setError(
describeError(
err,
t("settings.security.recovery.regenFailed"),
t("settings.security.stepUpRequired"),
),
),
);
},
onSettled: () => setRegenerateOpen(false),
});
@@ -250,6 +296,7 @@ export function TotpCard({
return (
<SettingsCard data-testid="totp-card">
{recentProof.dialog}
<SettingsCardHeader
anchor="two-factor"
icon={Smartphone}
@@ -471,7 +518,13 @@ export function TotpCard({
</AlertDialogContent>
</AlertDialog>
<AlertDialog open={disableOpen} onOpenChange={setDisableOpen}>
<AlertDialog
open={disableOpen}
onOpenChange={(open) => {
if (open) void openDisable();
else setDisableOpen(false);
}}
>
<AlertDialogTrigger asChild>
<Button
type="button"
@@ -1,39 +1,20 @@
"use client";
import { useCallback, useRef, useState, type ReactNode } from "react";
import { useMemo, useState, type ReactNode } from "react";
import { useTranslations } from "@/lib/i18n/context";
import { ApiError, apiPost } from "@/lib/api/api-fetch";
import {
ExistingFactorReauthDialog,
isReproofRequired,
type ExistingFactorProof,
type ReauthMethod,
} from "./existing-factor-reauth-dialog";
import {
ReproofCancelledError,
createRecentProofFlow,
isProofRefusal,
} from "./recent-proof-flow";
const KNOWN_METHODS: readonly ReauthMethod[] = [
"password",
"totp",
"webauthn",
"passkey",
];
/** The proofs a `auth.reproof.required` refusal says this account can give. */
function methodsFrom(err: ApiError): ReauthMethod[] {
const raw = err.meta?.methods;
if (!Array.isArray(raw)) return [];
return raw.filter((m): m is ReauthMethod =>
KNOWN_METHODS.includes(m as ReauthMethod),
);
}
/** The person closed the re-proof dialog. Nothing ran; show nothing. */
export class ReproofCancelledError extends Error {
constructor() {
super("Re-proof cancelled");
this.name = "ReproofCancelledError";
}
}
export { ReproofCancelledError };
/**
* The sentence to show for an error `run` rejected with, or null when there is
@@ -76,7 +57,7 @@ export async function throwIfReproofRequired(res: Response): Promise<Response> {
401,
meta,
);
if (isReproofRequired(err)) throw err;
if (isProofRefusal(err)) throw err;
return res;
}
@@ -85,8 +66,10 @@ export async function throwIfReproofRequired(res: Response): Promise<Response> {
*
* Exports of the whole record, share links, token minting and the admin data
* actions answer 401 `auth.reproof.required` with `meta.methods` when the
* session has not signed in or re-proved within five minutes. `run` catches
* exactly that refusal, opens the re-proof dialog with the listed methods,
* session has not signed in or re-proved within five minutes; the
* fresh-factor routes answer 401 `auth.stepup.required` with `meta.methods`
* when the second factor is older than that (`isProofRefusal`). `run` catches
* exactly those refusals, opens the re-proof dialog with the listed methods,
* posts the proof to `/api/auth/reproof` and runs the action once more. Every
* other error rejects as usual; a cancelled dialog rejects with
* `ReproofCancelledError`. `recentProofErrorMessage` maps both for display.
@@ -95,7 +78,16 @@ export async function throwIfReproofRequired(res: Response): Promise<Response> {
* sign-on only) gets no dialog: the refusal is rethrown with a message asking
* to sign in again.
*/
export function useRecentProof(): {
export function useRecentProof(
options: {
/**
* The dialog's one line on why it asks. Defaults to the sentence for
* sharing and exporting; the fresh-factor acts (changing who looks after a
* record, a second factor, the account itself) pass their own.
*/
description?: string;
} = {},
): {
run: <T>(action: () => Promise<T>) => Promise<T>;
dialog: ReactNode;
} {
@@ -103,57 +95,18 @@ export function useRecentProof(): {
const [methods, setMethods] = useState<ReauthMethod[] | null>(null);
const [pending, setPending] = useState(false);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const waiter = useRef<{
resolve: () => void;
reject: () => void;
} | null>(null);
const run = useCallback(
async <T,>(action: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> => {
try {
return await action();
} catch (err) {
if (!isReproofRequired(err)) throw err;
const offered = methodsFrom(err as ApiError);
if (offered.length === 0) {
throw new ApiError(t("settings.reproof.signInAgain"), 401, {
errorCode: "auth.reproof.sign_in_again",
});
}
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
waiter.current = {
resolve,
reject: () => reject(new ReproofCancelledError()),
};
setError(null);
setMethods(offered);
});
return action();
}
},
[t],
);
const onProof = useCallback(
async (proof: ExistingFactorProof) => {
setPending(true);
setError(null);
try {
await apiPost("/api/auth/reproof", proof);
setMethods(null);
const w = waiter.current;
waiter.current = null;
w?.resolve();
} catch (err) {
setError(
err instanceof ApiError && err.status === 429
? err.message
: t("settings.reproof.failed"),
);
} finally {
setPending(false);
}
},
// One flow per locale, as the callbacks it replaces were (`[t]`): it holds
// the waiting action, so it is not rebuilt on every render.
const { run, prove, cancel } = useMemo(
() =>
createRecentProofFlow({
view: { setMethods, setPending, setError },
submit: (proof) => apiPost("/api/auth/reproof", proof),
messages: () => ({
signInAgain: t("settings.reproof.signInAgain"),
failed: t("settings.reproof.failed"),
}),
}),
[t],
);
@@ -162,18 +115,13 @@ export function useRecentProof(): {
key={methods?.join(",") ?? "closed"}
open={methods !== null}
onOpenChange={(open) => {
if (open) return;
setMethods(null);
setError(null);
const w = waiter.current;
waiter.current = null;
w?.reject();
if (!open) cancel();
}}
methods={methods ?? ["password"]}
pending={pending}
error={error}
onProof={(proof) => void onProof(proof)}
description={t("settings.reproof.description")}
onProof={(proof) => void prove(proof)}
description={options.description ?? t("settings.reproof.description")}
/>
);
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/db", () => ({
apiToken: { findUnique: vi.fn(), update: vi.fn() },
user: { findUnique: vi.fn() },
webauthnMfaCredential: { count: vi.fn() },
// The stale refusal names the proofs the account holds, passkeys among them.
passkey: { count: vi.fn() },
},
}));
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/db", () => ({
apiToken: { findUnique: vi.fn(), update: vi.fn() },
user: { findUnique: vi.fn() },
webauthnMfaCredential: { count: vi.fn() },
// The stale refusal names the proofs the account holds, passkeys among them.
passkey: { count: vi.fn() },
stepUpElevation: { findUnique: vi.fn() },
$queryRaw: vi.fn(),
},
@@ -82,6 +82,46 @@ describe("requireFreshMfa", () => {
});
});
/**
* The stale refusal names what clears it, so the browser can open the
* re-proof dialog instead of printing a sentence (#959): the possession
* proofs the account holds, never a password, which stamps `reproofAt` only
* and would leave this gate shut.
*/
it("names the possession proofs on a stale refusal", async () => {
mockSession({ ...MFA_USER, passwordHash: "argon2-hash" });
vi.mocked(prisma.webauthnMfaCredential.count).mockResolvedValue(1 as never);
vi.mocked(prisma.passkey.count).mockResolvedValue(1 as never);
vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
mfaVerifiedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 10 * 60_000),
} as never);
await expect(requireFreshMfa(5 * 60)).rejects.toMatchObject({
errorCode: "auth.stepup.required",
extraMeta: { methods: ["totp", "webauthn", "passkey"] },
});
});
it("offers a passkey-only account its passkey, not its password", async () => {
mockSession({
...MFA_USER,
totpConfirmedAt: null,
passwordHash: "argon2-hash",
});
vi.mocked(prisma.webauthnMfaCredential.count).mockResolvedValue(0 as never);
vi.mocked(prisma.passkey.count).mockResolvedValue(1 as never);
vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
mfaVerifiedAt: null,
} as never);
await expect(
requireFreshMfa(5 * 60, "any-possession"),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
errorCode: "auth.stepup.required",
extraMeta: { methods: ["passkey"] },
});
});
it("rejects an absent verification stamp", async () => {
mockSession(MFA_USER);
vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
+14 -1
View File
@@ -1321,7 +1321,20 @@ export async function requireFreshMfa(
});
const verifiedAt = row?.mfaVerifiedAt ?? null;
if (!verifiedAt || verifiedAt.getTime() < Date.now() - maxAgeSeconds * 1000) {
throw new StepUpRequiredError();
// Name the proofs that clear this gate, the way the recent-proof gate
// does, so the browser can open the re-proof dialog instead of printing a
// sentence with nowhere to act on it. Only the possession proofs: a
// `POST /api/auth/reproof` with one of them stamps `mfaVerifiedAt`, a
// password stamps `reproofAt` only and would leave this gate shut.
const methods = (await recentProofMethods(sessionData.user)).filter(
(method) => method !== "password",
);
annotate({ meta: { step_up_methods: methods.join(",") } });
throw new StepUpRequiredError(
"auth.stepup.required",
"Recent second-factor verification required",
{ methods },
);
}
return { ...sessionData, authMethod: "cookie", mfaVerifiedAt: verifiedAt };
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ export const accountSharingPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
},
"401": {
description:
"No fresh second-factor proof (`meta.errorCode: auth.stepup.required`), or none enrolled at all (`meta.errorCode: auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`) — this gate is unconditional, so an account without a second factor cannot create a managed profile until it enrols one. The ordinary unauthenticated 401 arrives here too, including for a Bearer caller, whose transport this gate does not read.",
"No fresh second-factor proof (`meta.errorCode: auth.stepup.required`, with `meta.methods` naming the proofs that clear it at POST /api/auth/reproof), or none enrolled at all (`meta.errorCode: auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`) — this gate is unconditional, so an account without a second factor cannot create a managed profile until it enrols one. The ordinary unauthenticated 401 arrives here too, including for a Bearer caller, whose transport this gate does not read.",
content: { "application/json": { schema: errorEnvelope } },
},
"429": {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ export const authPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
tags: ["Auth"],
summary: "Re-prove a credential on a browser session (cookie only)",
description:
"Stamps the calling browser session as recently re-proved, so for the next five minutes it may run the actions that ask for a fresh proof: GET /api/export/full-backup, POST /api/export/encrypted, POST /api/share-links, POST /api/mcp/tokens, POST /api/tokens/measurements, POST /api/tokens/workouts, POST /api/tokens/documents, and the admin backup download, upload and restore, the admin data wipe and the admin password reset. Those answer 401 `auth.reproof.required` with `meta.methods` (the proofs this account can give) when the session signed in or re-proved more than five minutes ago.\n\n" +
"Stamps the calling browser session as recently re-proved, so for the next five minutes it may run the actions that ask for a fresh proof: GET /api/export/full-backup, POST /api/export/encrypted, POST /api/share-links, POST /api/mcp/tokens, POST /api/tokens/measurements, POST /api/tokens/workouts, POST /api/tokens/documents, and the admin backup download, upload and restore, the admin data wipe and the admin password reset. Those answer 401 `auth.reproof.required` with `meta.methods` (the proofs this account can give) when the session signed in or re-proved more than five minutes ago. A `totp`, `webauthn` or `passkey` proof here also clears the routes that ask for a fresh second factor (the managed-profile acts, the second-factor and passkey changes, the password change, account deletion, the data wipe and key rotation): on a browser session those answer 401 `auth.stepup.required` with `meta.methods` naming the possession proofs the account holds, and the web re-proves here and retries.\n\n" +
'The body takes the same shapes as POST /api/auth/step-up. On an account with a second factor only `totp`, `webauthn` (a security key) or `passkey` are accepted, because a password has never stood in for the second factor; on one without, `password` or `passkey`. A method the account cannot use here is refused with 422 `auth.reproof.too_weak` and `meta.methods`, before any guess is spent. A second-factor or passkey proof also refreshes the session\'s second-factor stamp, exactly as signing in again would. Assertions begin at POST /api/auth/passkey/register-options with `{ method: "passkey" | "webauthn" }`.\n\n' +
"Proofs draw on the account's shared re-proof budget (five per fifteen minutes, 429 once spent). A proof that does not verify is 401 `auth.reproof.failed` and is audited. Bearer callers use POST /api/auth/step-up instead.",
requestBody: {
@@ -116,7 +116,9 @@ describe("what a managed-profile change refreshes", () => {
describe("the creation hook, driven for real", () => {
it("posts the four fields the strict schema accepts, and no others", async () => {
const options = useCreateManagedProfile() as unknown as {
const options = useCreateManagedProfile((action) =>
action(),
) as unknown as {
mutationFn: (input: unknown) => Promise<unknown>;
onSuccess: () => void;
};
@@ -147,7 +149,9 @@ describe("the creation hook, driven for real", () => {
});
it("puts the new profile in the switcher by refreshing the payload", () => {
const options = useCreateManagedProfile() as unknown as {
const options = useCreateManagedProfile((action) =>
action(),
) as unknown as {
onSuccess: () => void;
};
options.onSuccess();
+48 -23
View File
@@ -108,21 +108,34 @@ function useInvalidateManagedProfiles() {
return () => invalidateManagedProfileReads(queryClient);
}
/**
* Runs a request that the server may hold back for a fresh proof — in a
* component, `useRecentProof().run`.
*
* Every write in this family resolves `requireFreshMfa`, whose 401
* `auth.stepup.required` names the proofs that clear it in `meta.methods`.
* The guard opens the re-proof dialog on that answer, posts the proof and
* sends the request once more, so the mutation settles with the real outcome
* instead of a sentence telling somebody to confirm a factor with nowhere to
* do it. The argument is required rather than defaulted: a caller that forgot
* it would compile, render the refusal as text, and be the defect again.
*/
export type ProofGuard = <T>(action: () => Promise<T>) => Promise<T>;
/**
* Create a record somebody looks after.
*
* `requireFreshMfa` guards the route, so a 401 carrying
* `meta.errorCode: auth.stepup.required` is the EXPECTED first answer for
* anybody who has a second factor and has not proved it recently. The form
* routes that into the app's re-verification path rather than into a generic
* failure — see `managed-profile-create-form.tsx`.
* anybody who has a second factor and has not proved it recently. `guard`
* turns it into the re-proof dialog and a second attempt.
*/
export function useCreateManagedProfile() {
export function useCreateManagedProfile(guard: ProofGuard) {
const invalidate = useInvalidateManagedProfiles();
return useMutation({
mutationKey: queryKeys.managedProfileCreate(),
mutationFn: (input: CreateManagedProfileInput) =>
apiPost<ManagedProfileView>("/api/managed-profiles", input),
guard(() => apiPost<ManagedProfileView>("/api/managed-profiles", input)),
onSuccess: invalidate,
});
}
@@ -151,21 +164,23 @@ export function useManagedProfile(profileId: string, enabled = true) {
*
* Guarded by `requireFreshMfa` like every other act in this family, so a 401
* carrying `meta.errorCode: auth.stepup.required` is the expected first answer
* rather than a failure — the form routes it into the re-verification path.
* rather than a failure — `guard` routes it into the re-proof dialog.
*
* The whole family is invalidated on success because the display name is what
* the switcher, the record banner and this card all identify the record by, and
* the record's own identity read is dropped alongside so a second edit opens
* from the server's version rather than from the one that was just replaced.
*/
export function useUpdateManagedProfile() {
export function useUpdateManagedProfile(guard: ProofGuard) {
const queryClient = useQueryClient();
return useMutation({
mutationKey: queryKeys.managedProfileUpdate(),
mutationFn: (input: UpdateManagedProfileInput) =>
apiPatch<ManagedProfileView>(
`/api/managed-profiles/${input.profileId}`,
managedProfileEditBody(input),
guard(() =>
apiPatch<ManagedProfileView>(
`/api/managed-profiles/${input.profileId}`,
managedProfileEditBody(input),
),
),
onSuccess: (_result, input) => {
invalidateManagedProfileReads(queryClient);
@@ -250,12 +265,14 @@ export function useManagedProfileGuardians(profileId: string, enabled = true) {
* floor. A Guardian may not strand a record with nobody looking after it, but
* they may end the record.
*/
export function useDeleteManagedProfile() {
export function useDeleteManagedProfile(guard: ProofGuard) {
const invalidate = useInvalidateManagedProfiles();
return useMutation({
mutationKey: queryKeys.managedProfileDelete(),
mutationFn: (profileId: string) =>
apiDelete<{ deleted: true }>(`/api/managed-profiles/${profileId}`),
guard(() =>
apiDelete<{ deleted: true }>(`/api/managed-profiles/${profileId}`),
),
onSuccess: invalidate,
});
}
@@ -285,14 +302,16 @@ export interface InviteManagedProfileGuardianInput {
* here accepts on their behalf, and until they accept they do not count toward
* the last-Guardian floor.
*/
export function useInviteManagedProfileGuardian() {
export function useInviteManagedProfileGuardian(guard: ProofGuard) {
const invalidate = useInvalidateManagedProfiles();
return useMutation({
mutationKey: queryKeys.managedProfileGuardianInvite(),
mutationFn: (input: InviteManagedProfileGuardianInput) =>
apiPost(
`/api/managed-profiles/${input.profileId}/guardians`,
guardianInviteBody(input),
guard(() =>
apiPost(
`/api/managed-profiles/${input.profileId}/guardians`,
guardianInviteBody(input),
),
),
onSuccess: invalidate,
});
@@ -328,7 +347,7 @@ export function guardianInviteBody(input: InviteManagedProfileGuardianInput): {
* `variables` carries both ids so a refusal can be rendered on the guardian row
* it belongs to rather than on the panel.
*/
export function useRemoveManagedProfileGuardian() {
export function useRemoveManagedProfileGuardian(guard: ProofGuard) {
const invalidate = useInvalidateManagedProfiles();
return useMutation({
mutationKey: queryKeys.managedProfileGuardianRemove(),
@@ -338,7 +357,10 @@ export function useRemoveManagedProfileGuardian() {
}: {
profileId: string;
grantId: string;
}) => apiDelete(`/api/managed-profiles/${profileId}/guardians/${grantId}`),
}) =>
guard(() =>
apiDelete(`/api/managed-profiles/${profileId}/guardians/${grantId}`),
),
onSuccess: invalidate,
});
}
@@ -409,19 +431,22 @@ export function useManagedProfileHandover(profileId: string, enabled = true) {
/**
* Mint the handover link. Step-up gated like every act in this family, so a
* 401 carrying `auth.stepup.required` is the expected first answer.
* 401 carrying `auth.stepup.required` is the expected first answer, and
* `guard` turns it into the re-proof dialog and a second attempt.
*
* The link lives in the mutation's `data` and nowhere else: it is shown once
* and never cached under a query key.
*/
export function useCreateManagedProfileHandover() {
export function useCreateManagedProfileHandover(guard: ProofGuard) {
const queryClient = useQueryClient();
return useMutation({
mutationKey: queryKeys.managedProfileHandoverCreate(),
mutationFn: async (input: CreateManagedProfileHandoverInput) => {
const link = await apiPost<ManagedProfileHandoverLink>(
`/api/managed-profiles/${input.profileId}/handover`,
handoverCreateBody(input),
const link = await guard(() =>
apiPost<ManagedProfileHandoverLink>(
`/api/managed-profiles/${input.profileId}/handover`,
handoverCreateBody(input),
),
);
// Lazy chunk, as the admin invite and the share link do: the QR encoder
// is needed here, at mint time, and nowhere else.
@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
/**
* #959 — a Guardian who signs in through an identity provider, with a second
* factor enrolled in the app, hands a managed profile over after the
* five-minute window has passed. The report: "I get the error message that I
* need to confirm my second factor, but there is nowhere to do so."
*
* Driven end to end against real Postgres and a mock identity provider that
* speaks the wire (discovery, JWKS, a PKCE-checking token endpoint, ES256 ID
* tokens), the same harness as `managed-profile-handover-sso.test.ts`:
*
* 1. the real OIDC login and callback, which puts an account with a second
* factor through the app's own MFA challenge;
* 2. the real `/api/auth/mfa/verify`, which stamps the session;
* 3. ten minutes later the handover refuses with `auth.stepup.required` AND
* names the proofs that clear it, which is what lets the browser open the
* re-proof dialog instead of printing a sentence;
* 4. `/api/auth/reproof` with the second factor, exactly what the dialog
* posts, and the handover goes through.
*
* And the other half of the question: a Guardian whose only factor is the one
* the identity provider asked for. The app cannot see that factor, so the gate
* asks for one of its own (`mfa_not_enrolled`), and the way through is
* reachable: enrolling right after a sign-in needs no further proof, and the
* confirmation stamps the session, so the handover follows.
*/
import { createServer, type Server } from "node:http";
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
import type { AddressInfo } from "node:net";
import { exportJWK, generateKeyPair, SignJWT, type CryptoKey } from "jose";
import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import {
afterAll,
afterEach,
beforeAll,
beforeEach,
describe,
expect,
it,
vi,
} from "vitest";
import { cookieJar, headerJar } from "./mock-next-headers";
import { getPrismaClient, truncateAllTables } from "./setup";
import { createManagedProfile } from "@/lib/managed-profiles/create";
import { _resetOidcCacheForTests } from "@/lib/auth/oidc";
import { handoverCreateBody } from "@/lib/queries/use-managed-profiles";
process.env.API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY ??=
"test-hmac-key-handover-stepup-sso-32-bytes-minimum-123456";
vi.mock("next/headers", async () => {
const { cookieJar, headerJar } = await import("./mock-next-headers");
return {
headers: vi.fn(async () => ({
get: (name: string) => headerJar.get(name.toLowerCase()) ?? null,
})),
cookies: vi.fn(async () => ({
get: (name: string) => {
const value = cookieJar.get(name);
return value ? { name, value } : undefined;
},
set: (name: string, value: string) => cookieJar.set(name, value),
delete: (name: string) => cookieJar.delete(name),
})),
};
});
vi.mock("@/lib/db-compat", () => ({
ensureDbCompatibility: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
}));
vi.mock("@/lib/notifications/dispatch-localised", () => ({
dispatchLocalisedNotification: vi.fn(async () => {}),
}));
const APP = "http://localhost:3000";
const CLIENT_ID = "healthlog-test";
const CLIENT_SECRET = "client-secret-for-the-mock-idp";
const MINUTE = 60 * 1000;
// ── The mock identity provider ──────────────────────────────────────────────
interface Grant {
sub: string;
email: string;
nonce: string;
codeChallenge: string;
}
let idp: Server;
let ISSUER = "";
let privateKey: CryptoKey;
let publicJwk: Record<string, unknown>;
const grants = new Map<string, Grant>();
function s256(verifier: string): string {
return createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest("base64url");
}
beforeAll(async () => {
const pair = await generateKeyPair("ES256");
privateKey = pair.privateKey;
publicJwk = { ...(await exportJWK(pair.publicKey)), kid: "k1", alg: "ES256" };
idp = createServer(async (req, res) => {
const json = (status: number, body: unknown) => {
res.writeHead(status, { "content-type": "application/json" });
res.end(JSON.stringify(body));
};
const path = new URL(req.url ?? "/", ISSUER).pathname;
if (path === "/.well-known/openid-configuration") {
return json(200, {
issuer: ISSUER,
authorization_endpoint: `${ISSUER}/authorize`,
token_endpoint: `${ISSUER}/token`,
jwks_uri: `${ISSUER}/jwks`,
});
}
if (path === "/jwks") return json(200, { keys: [publicJwk] });
if (path === "/token" && req.method === "POST") {
let raw = "";
for await (const chunk of req) raw += chunk;
const form = new URLSearchParams(raw);
const grant = grants.get(form.get("code") ?? "");
if (
!grant ||
form.get("client_id") !== CLIENT_ID ||
form.get("client_secret") !== CLIENT_SECRET ||
s256(form.get("code_verifier") ?? "") !== grant.codeChallenge
) {
return json(400, { error: "invalid_grant" });
}
grants.delete(form.get("code") ?? "");
const idToken = await new SignJWT({
nonce: grant.nonce,
email: grant.email,
email_verified: true,
})
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "ES256", kid: "k1" })
.setIssuer(ISSUER)
.setAudience(CLIENT_ID)
.setSubject(grant.sub)
.setIssuedAt()
.setExpirationTime("5m")
.sign(privateKey);
return json(200, { id_token: idToken, token_type: "Bearer" });
}
json(404, { error: "not_found" });
});
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => idp.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
ISSUER = `http://127.0.0.1:${(idp.address() as AddressInfo).port}`;
});
afterAll(async () => {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => idp.close(() => resolve()));
});
// ── Signing in through the provider ─────────────────────────────────────────
type NextResponseLike = Response & {
cookies?: { get(name: string): { value: string } | undefined };
};
function setCookie(response: Response, name: string): string | undefined {
return (response as NextResponseLike).cookies?.get(name)?.value || undefined;
}
let sequence = 0;
/**
* The browser's trip: the login route, the provider, the callback. Returns the
* callback's answer; the session (when one is minted) lands in the cookie jar.
*/
async function signInThroughProvider(identity: {
sub: string;
email: string;
}): Promise<Response> {
const { GET: login } = await import("@/app/api/auth/oidc/login/route");
const started = await login(new NextRequest(`${APP}/api/auth/oidc/login`));
const location = new URL(started.headers.get("location") ?? "");
expect(location.origin + location.pathname).toBe(`${ISSUER}/authorize`);
const stateCookie = setCookie(started, "oidc_auth_state");
expect(stateCookie).toBeDefined();
const code = `code-${sequence++}`;
grants.set(code, {
...identity,
nonce: location.searchParams.get("nonce") ?? "",
codeChallenge: location.searchParams.get("code_challenge") ?? "",
});
const state = location.searchParams.get("state") ?? "";
const { GET: callback } = await import("@/app/api/auth/oidc/callback/route");
return callback(
new NextRequest(
`${APP}/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=${code}&state=${encodeURIComponent(state)}`,
{ headers: { cookie: `oidc_auth_state=${stateCookie}` } },
),
);
}
function post(path: string, body?: unknown): NextRequest {
return new NextRequest(`${APP}${path}`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify(body ?? {}),
});
}
type RouteFn = (request: NextRequest) => Promise<Response>;
async function mfaVerify(mfaTicket: string, code: string) {
const { POST } = await import("@/app/api/auth/mfa/verify/route");
return (POST as unknown as RouteFn)(
post("/api/auth/mfa/verify", { mfaTicket, method: "totp", code }),
);
}
async function reproof(body: unknown) {
const { POST } = await import("@/app/api/auth/reproof/route");
return (POST as unknown as RouteFn)(post("/api/auth/reproof", body));
}
async function handover(profileId: string) {
const { POST } =
await import("@/app/api/managed-profiles/[id]/handover/route");
return POST(
post(
`/api/managed-profiles/${profileId}/handover`,
handoverCreateBody({ profileId, expiresInDays: 7, proposals: [] }),
),
{ params: Promise.resolve({ id: profileId }) },
);
}
async function totpSetup() {
const { POST } = await import("@/app/api/auth/me/mfa/totp/setup/route");
return (POST as unknown as RouteFn)(post("/api/auth/me/mfa/totp/setup"));
}
async function totpConfirm(code: string) {
const { POST } = await import("@/app/api/auth/me/mfa/totp/confirm/route");
return (POST as unknown as RouteFn)(
post("/api/auth/me/mfa/totp/confirm", { code }),
);
}
async function meta(res: Response) {
return (
(await res.json()) as {
meta?: { errorCode?: string; methods?: string[] };
}
).meta;
}
function codeFor(secret: string): string {
return new OTPAuth.TOTP({
issuer: "HealthLog",
label: "HealthLog",
algorithm: "SHA1",
digits: 6,
period: 30,
secret: OTPAuth.Secret.fromBase32(secret),
}).generate({ timestamp: Date.now() });
}
// ── The household ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** A Guardian bound to the provider's subject, and the profile they look after. */
async function guardianWithProfile(withTotp: boolean) {
const prisma = getPrismaClient();
const suffix = sequence++;
let secret: string | null = null;
let totp = {};
if (withTotp) {
const { generateTotpSecret } = await import("@/lib/auth/mfa/totp");
const { encrypt } = await import("@/lib/crypto");
secret = generateTotpSecret();
totp = {
totpSecretEncrypted: encrypt(secret),
totpConfirmedAt: new Date(),
totpLastStep: null,
};
}
const guardian = await prisma.user.create({
data: {
username: `guardian-${suffix}`,
email: `guardian-${suffix}@example.test`,
oidcIssuer: ISSUER,
oidcSub: `subject-guardian-${suffix}`,
onboardingCompletedAt: new Date(),
...totp,
},
});
const { profile } = await createManagedProfile({
creatorId: guardian.id,
displayName: "Robin",
dateOfBirth: null,
locale: "en",
timezone: "UTC",
});
return {
guardian,
profileId: profile.id,
secret,
identity: { sub: guardian.oidcSub!, email: guardian.email! },
};
}
// ── Lifecycle ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
let clock = 0;
/** Move the wall clock the app reads, as time passing would. */
function advance(ms: number) {
clock += ms;
vi.setSystemTime(clock);
}
beforeEach(async () => {
await truncateAllTables(getPrismaClient());
cookieJar.clear();
headerJar.clear();
grants.clear();
_resetOidcCacheForTests();
process.env.APP_URL = APP;
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = APP;
process.env.OIDC_ISSUER_URL = ISSUER;
process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_ID = CLIENT_ID;
process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET = CLIENT_SECRET;
process.env.OIDC_BUTTON_LABEL = "Example ID";
// Single sign-on only: the report came from such a server, and it is the
// strictest case (no password to fall back on anywhere).
process.env.OIDC_ONLY = "true";
// Only `Date` is faked: the provider round trip and Postgres keep real
// timers, and the codes generated below follow the moved clock.
vi.useFakeTimers({ toFake: ["Date"] });
clock = Date.now();
vi.setSystemTime(clock);
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.useRealTimers();
for (const key of [
"OIDC_ISSUER_URL",
"OIDC_CLIENT_ID",
"OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET",
"OIDC_BUTTON_LABEL",
"OIDC_ONLY",
]) {
delete process.env[key];
}
});
// ── The tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("a Guardian signed in through SSO with a second factor in the app", () => {
it("confirms the factor when asked, then hands the profile over", async () => {
const { guardian, profileId, secret, identity } =
await guardianWithProfile(true);
// The callback puts the account through the app's own challenge.
const cb = await signInThroughProvider(identity);
expect([302, 303, 307]).toContain(cb.status);
const handoff = setCookie(cb, "oidc_mfa_handoff");
expect(handoff).toBeDefined();
const { ticket, methods } = JSON.parse(decodeURIComponent(handoff!)) as {
ticket: string;
methods: string[];
};
expect(methods).toContain("totp");
expect(cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")).toBeUndefined();
const verified = await mfaVerify(ticket, codeFor(secret!));
expect(verified.status).toBe(200);
const sessionId = cookieJar.get("healthlog_session");
expect(sessionId).toBeDefined();
const session = await getPrismaClient().session.findFirstOrThrow({
where: { userId: guardian.id },
select: { mfaVerifiedAt: true },
});
expect(session.mfaVerifiedAt).not.toBeNull();
// Ten minutes on, the factor is stale. The refusal is the gate, and it
// names what clears it: the TOTP factor this account holds.
advance(10 * MINUTE);
const refused = await handover(profileId);
expect(refused.status).toBe(401);
expect(await meta(refused)).toMatchObject({
errorCode: "auth.stepup.required",
methods: ["totp"],
});
expect(
await getPrismaClient().managedProfileHandover.count({
where: { profileId },
}),
).toBe(0);
// What the dialog posts.
const proved = await reproof({ method: "totp", code: codeFor(secret!) });
expect(proved.status).toBe(200);
// And the request is sent once more.
const minted = await handover(profileId);
expect(minted.status).toBe(201);
const link = (await minted.json()).data as { url: string };
expect(link.url).toContain("/claim");
expect(
await getPrismaClient().managedProfileHandover.count({
where: { profileId },
}),
).toBe(1);
});
it("does not let the provider's sign-in stand in for the factor", async () => {
// The re-proof dialog never offers "sign in again" to this account: it
// holds a factor, and the gate names it. A fresh SSO sign-in still goes
// through the factor, so it is no shortcut either.
const { profileId, secret, identity } = await guardianWithProfile(true);
const cb = await signInThroughProvider(identity);
const { ticket } = JSON.parse(
decodeURIComponent(setCookie(cb, "oidc_mfa_handoff")!),
) as { ticket: string };
expect((await mfaVerify(ticket, codeFor(secret!))).status).toBe(200);
advance(10 * MINUTE);
const wrong = await reproof({ method: "totp", code: "000000" });
expect(wrong.status).toBe(401);
expect((await handover(profileId)).status).toBe(401);
});
});
describe("a Guardian whose only second factor is the identity provider's", () => {
it("is asked for an app factor, can enrol one at once, and then hands over", async () => {
const { guardian, profileId, identity } = await guardianWithProfile(false);
const cb = await signInThroughProvider(identity);
expect([302, 303, 307]).toContain(cb.status);
expect(cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")).toBeDefined();
// The app cannot see the provider's factor, so the gate asks for one of
// its own — and says so with its own code, which the web turns into
// "set one up under Settings → Security" rather than a dialog.
const refused = await handover(profileId);
expect(refused.status).toBe(401);
expect((await meta(refused))?.errorCode).toBe(
"auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled",
);
// Right after signing in, enrolment needs no further proof.
const setup = await totpSetup();
expect(setup.status).toBe(200);
const { totpSecret } = (await setup.json()).data as { totpSecret: string };
const confirmed = await totpConfirm(codeFor(totpSecret));
expect(confirmed.status).toBe(200);
// The confirmation stamped the session, so the handover goes through.
const minted = await handover(profileId);
expect(minted.status).toBe(201);
const row = await getPrismaClient().user.findUniqueOrThrow({
where: { id: guardian.id },
select: { totpConfirmedAt: true },
});
expect(row.totpConfirmedAt).not.toBeNull();
});
it("is told to sign in again when the sign-in is too old to enrol from", async () => {
const { identity } = await guardianWithProfile(false);
await signInThroughProvider(identity);
advance(10 * MINUTE);
// Nothing to re-prove in place: no password, no passkey, no factor. The
// empty list is what makes the web say "sign in again" instead of
// offering a password this account does not have.
const refused = await totpSetup();
expect(refused.status).toBe(401);
expect(await meta(refused)).toMatchObject({
errorCode: "auth.reproof.required",
methods: [],
});
// And signing in again is a way through.
cookieJar.clear();
await signInThroughProvider(identity);
expect((await totpSetup()).status).toBe(200);
});
});