Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/source-priority-labels

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Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-09-02 12:09:58 +02:00
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@@ -118,11 +118,15 @@ function callers(exportName: string, moduleRe: RegExp): string[] {
* consult this mechanism at all;
* - the trusted-device routes. "Remember this browser" is a browser concept
* with no native equivalent to manage;
* - `requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled`'s callers (password change, account deletion,
* data reset, encrypted export, encryption-key rotation). Those are
* - `requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled`'s callers (password change, encrypted
* export, encryption-key rotation, the sharing invite). Those are
* destructive account actions, not second-factor management, and letting an
* elevation satisfy them would be exactly the silent widening this file
* exists to prevent.
*
* Account deletion and the record wipe used to sit in that last bullet. They
* left it deliberately, and through a different gate: see `ERASURE_ROUTES`
* below. The widening is written down there, which is what this file is for.
*/
const ELEVATION_ROUTES = [
"app/api/auth/passkeys/[id]/route.ts",
@@ -135,6 +139,28 @@ const ELEVATION_ROUTES = [
"app/api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/verify/route.ts",
].sort();
/**
* The two erasure routes that accept a FRESH-FACTOR elevation over Bearer.
*
* App Store guideline 5.1.1(v) requires that an account created in the app can
* be deleted from the app. Both routes gated an MFA-enrolled account on a
* cookie-side fresh factor and a Bearer transport had no way to present one,
* so a native-app user with a second factor could not delete their account at
* all. They now resolve through `requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled`, the
* sibling of `requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled` whose cookie arm is unchanged and
* whose Bearer arm runs the same elevation validation the MFA-management
* routes use, with `freshFactor` pinned on — so a password-proved elevation
* cannot erase an account, exactly as a password login cannot on the web.
*
* The set is two routes and must stay two. Password change, the encrypted
* export, key rotation and the sharing invite keep the cookie-only sibling;
* moving one of them here is a visible edit to this list, not a drive-by.
*/
const ERASURE_ROUTES = [
"app/api/settings/account/route.ts",
"app/api/settings/data/route.ts",
].sort();
describe("S1 — the elevation-accepting route set is frozen", () => {
// A sweep that finds nothing agrees with every allowlist, so the size of
// the tree being read is asserted before anything is concluded from it.
@@ -200,6 +226,45 @@ describe("S1 — the elevation-accepting route set is frozen", () => {
});
});
describe("S6 — the erasure routes accept a fresh-factor elevation", () => {
it("only the two erasure routes call the erasure gate", () => {
const found = callers(
"requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled",
API_HANDLER,
).filter((rel) => rel !== "lib/api-handler.ts");
expect(found).toEqual(ERASURE_ROUTES);
});
it("neither erasure route still carries the cookie-only sibling", () => {
for (const rel of ERASURE_ROUTES) {
expect(importedAs(rel, "requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled", API_HANDLER)).toEqual(
[],
);
expect(importedAs(rel, "requireFreshMfa", API_HANDLER)).toEqual([]);
}
});
it("every erasure route spends its elevation", () => {
for (const rel of ERASURE_ROUTES) {
expect(read(rel)).toMatch(/\.commitElevation\(\)/);
}
});
it("the erasure gate pins the fresh-factor arm and never reads a body factor", () => {
// A password-proved elevation must not erase an account, and the gate
// must not grow a second, inline factor check beside the elevation: one
// mint surface, one redemption path.
const src = read("lib/api-handler.ts");
const start = src.indexOf(
"export async function requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(",
);
expect(start).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
const body = src.slice(start, src.indexOf("\nexport ", start + 1));
expect(body).toMatch(/freshFactor:\s*true/);
expect(body).not.toMatch(/verifyMfaFactor|verifyTotp|recoveryCode/);
});
});
describe("S2 — mint and redeem happen in exactly one place each", () => {
it("only the gate claims an elevation", () => {
const found = callers("claimStepUpElevation", STEP_UP_MODULE).filter(