diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index dcc00fa68..8903e3142 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -24,6 +24,22 @@ stays in the language you read the app in.
 
 ### Fixed
 
+- **An account with two-factor can be deleted from the app.** Deleting
+  the account, and erasing the record while keeping the account, both demand a
+  fresh second-factor proof once a factor is enrolled. That proof lived on the
+  session row, which a native client does not have, so anyone who had turned on
+  TOTP or registered a security key was refused on both endpoints from the app
+  no matter what they sent — the only way through was a browser. The app can
+  now re-prove a factor the same way it already does for second-factor
+  management: mint a single-use elevation at `POST /api/auth/step-up` with a
+  TOTP code, security key, or passkey, and send it back in the `X-Step-Up`
+  header alongside the deletion. The web path is untouched, a token on its own
+  still gets nowhere, a password-proved elevation is refused for erasure just as
+  a password login never satisfied the gate on the web, and the proof is spent
+  only when the erasure is about to run, so a mistyped confirmation does not
+  burn it. One thing to know when erasing the record over a token: API tokens
+  are part of what that request deletes, so the app signs itself out and has to
+  sign in again.
 - **Anthropic keys work again on current Claude models.** Every JSON surface
   on the Anthropic provider (the daily briefing, the status cards, lab and
   document extraction, anything that asks the model for a JSON object) had
diff --git a/docs/api/openapi.yaml b/docs/api/openapi.yaml
index db213bb8f..0c3981f36 100644
--- a/docs/api/openapi.yaml
+++ b/docs/api/openapi.yaml
@@ -1989,8 +1989,15 @@ paths:
         Accepting routes (the complete set): POST /api/auth/me/mfa/totp/setup; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/totp/confirm; POST
         /api/auth/me/mfa/disable; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/recovery-codes/regenerate; POST
         /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/options; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/verify; PATCH and DELETE
-        /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/{id}. The last three of those and disable require a fresh-factor proof. GET
-        /api/auth/me/mfa needs no elevation at all. Nothing else accepts one — admin endpoints stay cookie-only.
+        /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/{id}; DELETE /api/settings/account; DELETE /api/settings/data. The last three MFA
+        routes, disable, and both erasure routes require a fresh-factor proof. GET /api/auth/me/mfa needs no elevation
+        at all. Nothing else accepts one — admin endpoints stay cookie-only.
+
+
+        The two erasure routes joined the set so an account with a second factor can be deleted from a native app: their
+        gate was cookie-only, which left an enrolled user unable to delete their own account from the app at all. They
+        take the elevation the same way as the rest — fresh factor required, spent only when the erasure is about to
+        run.
       requestBody:
         required: true
         content:
@@ -11965,10 +11972,19 @@ paths:
 
 
         Two gates, and they compose. The body must carry the typed confirmation. And for an account with a second factor
-        enrolled — a confirmed TOTP secret OR a registered security key — the session must additionally carry a fresh
-        factor proof, which is cookie-only by construction: a Bearer transport carries no `mfaVerifiedAt` and therefore
-        cannot satisfy it at any scope. An account with NO second factor keeps the typed-confirmation-only contract on
-        either transport, deliberately, because a user who never enrolled has no ceremony to complete.
+        enrolled — a confirmed TOTP secret OR a registered security key — the caller must additionally present a fresh
+        factor proof. An account with NO second factor keeps the typed-confirmation-only contract on either transport,
+        deliberately, because a user who never enrolled has no ceremony to complete.
+
+
+        How the fresh proof is presented depends on the transport. A cookie session carries it on the session row:
+        complete the second factor within the last five minutes and retry. A Bearer caller presents a single-use
+        elevation from `POST /api/auth/step-up` in the `X-Step-Up` header, minted against a `totp`, `webauthn`, or
+        `passkey` proof — a `password`-proved elevation is refused here exactly as a password login never satisfies
+        step-up on the web. The elevation is bound to the token that minted it, valid five minutes, and spent only when
+        the deletion is about to run, so a rejected confirmation does not burn it. A recovery code is not accepted on
+        the Bearer path: the mint does not take one, so an account that has lost its authenticator deletes itself from
+        the web.
 
 
         Two refusals are not about the caller's credentials at all. The last remaining admin cannot delete themselves,
@@ -11993,9 +12009,20 @@ paths:
               schema:
                 $ref: "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
         "401":
-          description: Not authenticated — or the account has a second factor and the session carries no proof of it fresh enough
-            for a destructive action (`meta.errorCode` = `auth.stepup.required`, or `auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`).
-            Re-verify the factor on the web and retry; a Bearer token cannot clear this arm.
+          description: Not authenticated — or the account has a second factor and the caller carries no proof of it fresh enough
+            for a destructive action (`meta.errorCode` = `auth.stepup.required`, or `auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`). On
+            a cookie session, re-verify the factor and retry; on a Bearer token, mint an elevation at `POST
+            /api/auth/step-up` with a `totp`, `webauthn`, or `passkey` proof and resend with `X-Step-Up`. The same code
+            covers an elevation that is unknown, expired, already spent, minted for a different token, or minted from
+            too weak a factor — the refusals are deliberately indistinguishable on the wire, and the real reason is
+            audited.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                $ref: "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+        "403":
+          description: The Bearer token carries a narrow scope. Erasure needs a cookie session or a full-access token; the refusal
+            happens before any second-factor proof is looked at.
           content:
             application/json:
               schema:
@@ -12181,13 +12208,19 @@ paths:
         data.
 
 
-        Gated like account deletion: the typed confirmation, plus a fresh factor proof for an MFA-enrolled account,
-        which is cookie-only by construction. The confirmation string is `DELETE`, NOT the `DELETE_ACCOUNT` that route
-        wants.
+        Gated like account deletion: the typed confirmation, plus a fresh factor proof for an MFA-enrolled account — on
+        a cookie session the second factor completed within the last five minutes, on a Bearer token a single-use
+        `X-Step-Up` elevation minted at `POST /api/auth/step-up` against a `totp`, `webauthn`, or `passkey` proof. The
+        confirmation string is `DELETE`, NOT the `DELETE_ACCOUNT` that route wants.
 
 
         One audit row survives the wipe that clears the rest of the audit history: it is written after the transaction
         commits, as the receipt for the erasure the person asked for.
+
+
+        A Bearer client should expect to be signed out by its own request: API tokens are on the wipe list, so the token
+        that called this — and any step-up elevation minted from it — is removed along with the record. Sign in again
+        rather than retrying with the same credential.
       requestBody:
         required: true
         content:
@@ -12202,9 +12235,17 @@ paths:
               schema:
                 $ref: "#/components/schemas/DataWipeEnvelope"
         "401":
-          description: Not authenticated — or the account has a second factor and the session carries no proof of it fresh enough
+          description: Not authenticated — or the account has a second factor and the caller carries no proof of it fresh enough
             for a destructive action (`meta.errorCode` = `auth.stepup.required`, or `auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`). A
-            Bearer token cannot clear this arm.
+            Bearer caller clears it with an `X-Step-Up` elevation from `POST /api/auth/step-up`; the same code covers an
+            elevation that is unknown, expired, already spent, bound to another token, or minted from too weak a factor.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                $ref: "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+        "403":
+          description: The Bearer token carries a narrow scope. Erasure needs a cookie session or a full-access token; the refusal
+            happens before any second-factor proof is looked at.
           content:
             application/json:
               schema:
diff --git a/src/__tests__/step-up-elevation-guard.test.ts b/src/__tests__/step-up-elevation-guard.test.ts
index 16589e1d1..1b8bb5fdd 100644
--- a/src/__tests__/step-up-elevation-guard.test.ts
+++ b/src/__tests__/step-up-elevation-guard.test.ts
@@ -118,11 +118,15 @@ function callers(exportName: string, moduleRe: RegExp): string[] {
  *     consult this mechanism at all;
  *   - the trusted-device routes. "Remember this browser" is a browser concept
  *     with no native equivalent to manage;
- *   - `requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled`'s callers (password change, account deletion,
- *     data reset, encrypted export, encryption-key rotation). Those are
+ *   - `requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled`'s callers (password change, encrypted
+ *     export, encryption-key rotation, the sharing invite). Those are
  *     destructive account actions, not second-factor management, and letting an
  *     elevation satisfy them would be exactly the silent widening this file
  *     exists to prevent.
+ *
+ * Account deletion and the record wipe used to sit in that last bullet. They
+ * left it deliberately, and through a different gate: see `ERASURE_ROUTES`
+ * below. The widening is written down there, which is what this file is for.
  */
 const ELEVATION_ROUTES = [
   "app/api/auth/passkeys/[id]/route.ts",
@@ -135,6 +139,28 @@ const ELEVATION_ROUTES = [
   "app/api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/verify/route.ts",
 ].sort();
 
+/**
+ * The two erasure routes that accept a FRESH-FACTOR elevation over Bearer.
+ *
+ * App Store guideline 5.1.1(v) requires that an account created in the app can
+ * be deleted from the app. Both routes gated an MFA-enrolled account on a
+ * cookie-side fresh factor and a Bearer transport had no way to present one,
+ * so a native-app user with a second factor could not delete their account at
+ * all. They now resolve through `requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled`, the
+ * sibling of `requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled` whose cookie arm is unchanged and
+ * whose Bearer arm runs the same elevation validation the MFA-management
+ * routes use, with `freshFactor` pinned on — so a password-proved elevation
+ * cannot erase an account, exactly as a password login cannot on the web.
+ *
+ * The set is two routes and must stay two. Password change, the encrypted
+ * export, key rotation and the sharing invite keep the cookie-only sibling;
+ * moving one of them here is a visible edit to this list, not a drive-by.
+ */
+const ERASURE_ROUTES = [
+  "app/api/settings/account/route.ts",
+  "app/api/settings/data/route.ts",
+].sort();
+
 describe("S1 — the elevation-accepting route set is frozen", () => {
   // A sweep that finds nothing agrees with every allowlist, so the size of
   // the tree being read is asserted before anything is concluded from it.
@@ -200,6 +226,45 @@ describe("S1 — the elevation-accepting route set is frozen", () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe("S6 — the erasure routes accept a fresh-factor elevation", () => {
+  it("only the two erasure routes call the erasure gate", () => {
+    const found = callers(
+      "requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled",
+      API_HANDLER,
+    ).filter((rel) => rel !== "lib/api-handler.ts");
+    expect(found).toEqual(ERASURE_ROUTES);
+  });
+
+  it("neither erasure route still carries the cookie-only sibling", () => {
+    for (const rel of ERASURE_ROUTES) {
+      expect(importedAs(rel, "requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled", API_HANDLER)).toEqual(
+        [],
+      );
+      expect(importedAs(rel, "requireFreshMfa", API_HANDLER)).toEqual([]);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("every erasure route spends its elevation", () => {
+    for (const rel of ERASURE_ROUTES) {
+      expect(read(rel)).toMatch(/\.commitElevation\(\)/);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("the erasure gate pins the fresh-factor arm and never reads a body factor", () => {
+    // A password-proved elevation must not erase an account, and the gate
+    // must not grow a second, inline factor check beside the elevation: one
+    // mint surface, one redemption path.
+    const src = read("lib/api-handler.ts");
+    const start = src.indexOf(
+      "export async function requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(",
+    );
+    expect(start).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
+    const body = src.slice(start, src.indexOf("\nexport ", start + 1));
+    expect(body).toMatch(/freshFactor:\s*true/);
+    expect(body).not.toMatch(/verifyMfaFactor|verifyTotp|recoveryCode/);
+  });
+});
+
 describe("S2 — mint and redeem happen in exactly one place each", () => {
   it("only the gate claims an elevation", () => {
     const found = callers("claimStepUpElevation", STEP_UP_MODULE).filter(
diff --git a/src/app/api/settings/account/route.ts b/src/app/api/settings/account/route.ts
index d976062ab..4f863defc 100644
--- a/src/app/api/settings/account/route.ts
+++ b/src/app/api/settings/account/route.ts
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { apiSuccess, apiError, getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response";
 import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
 import {
   apiHandler,
-  requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled,
+  requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled,
   MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
 } from "@/lib/api-handler";
 import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
@@ -23,9 +23,20 @@ export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
  * step-up (within MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS) in addition to the typed
  * confirmation, so a hijacked live session cannot erase the record. Accounts
  * without MFA are unaffected and keep the typed-confirmation-only contract.
+ *
+ * Over Bearer the fresh step-up is a single-use elevation from
+ * `POST /api/auth/step-up` in the `X-Step-Up` header, minted against a TOTP,
+ * security-key, or passkey proof — a password proof is refused. App Store
+ * guideline 5.1.1(v) requires in-app deletion, and until this arm existed an
+ * MFA-enrolled account could not delete itself from the native app at all.
+ * The elevation is spent immediately before the erasure, after every cheap
+ * refusal, so a bad confirmation does not burn it.
  */
 export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
-  const { user } = await requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
+  const auth = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
+    MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+  );
+  const { user } = auth;
 
   let confirm = "";
   try {
@@ -57,6 +68,17 @@ export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
   const userId = user.id;
   const username = user.username;
 
+  // Every refusal that costs nothing has passed; spend the Bearer elevation
+  // now (a no-op on the cookie path). A lost claim throws the same 401 as a
+  // missing one, so a concurrent redemption still has exactly one winner.
+  //
+  // One refusal can still land after this: the last-Guardian 409, which is
+  // decided under the record lock inside the lifecycle transaction and has no
+  // cheap pre-check. That caller spends a proof on a refusal and has to mint
+  // another. Moving the spend past the transaction would be the worse trade —
+  // the elevation would stay redeemable while the erasure was already running.
+  await auth.commitElevation();
+
   try {
     await deleteGuardianAccountWithLifecycle(userId, async (tx) => {
       // The invariant has now passed, so this success event cannot survive a
diff --git a/src/app/api/settings/data/route.ts b/src/app/api/settings/data/route.ts
index eac7a533f..409320ccc 100644
--- a/src/app/api/settings/data/route.ts
+++ b/src/app/api/settings/data/route.ts
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { apiSuccess, apiError, getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response";
 import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
 import {
   apiHandler,
-  requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled,
+  requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled,
   MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
 } from "@/lib/api-handler";
 import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
@@ -47,10 +47,15 @@ const WIPE_TRANSACTION_MAX_WAIT_MS = 15_000;
  *
  * v1.23 — gated by a fresh step-up for MFA-enrolled accounts (see the account
  * deletion route); single-factor accounts keep the typed-confirmation-only
- * contract.
+ * contract. Over Bearer the step-up is a fresh-factor elevation in the
+ * `X-Step-Up` header, spent right before the transaction — the same arm the
+ * account deletion route carries, for the same App Store reason.
  */
 export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
-  const { user } = await requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
+  const auth = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
+    MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+  );
+  const { user } = auth;
 
   let confirm = "";
   try {
@@ -70,6 +75,10 @@ export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
 
   const userId = user.id;
 
+  // The confirmation has passed; spend the Bearer elevation before the wipe
+  // (a no-op on the cookie path).
+  await auth.commitElevation();
+
   let counts: Record<string, number>;
   try {
     counts = await prisma.$transaction(
diff --git a/src/lib/__tests__/require-fresh-mfa-or-elevation-if-enrolled.test.ts b/src/lib/__tests__/require-fresh-mfa-or-elevation-if-enrolled.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e065570ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/__tests__/require-fresh-mfa-or-elevation-if-enrolled.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+/**
+ * `requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled` — the erasure gate that a native
+ * client can clear.
+ *
+ * The cookie arm is `requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled` byte for byte; the cases here
+ * that cover it exist so a later edit to the sibling cannot quietly change what
+ * a browser session gets. The Bearer arm is the new part: an MFA-enrolled
+ * account presenting a fresh-factor step-up elevation passes, everything else
+ * on Bearer is refused with the same 401 the MFA-management routes emit.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
+
+vi.mock("@/lib/db", () => ({
+  prisma: {
+    session: { findUnique: vi.fn() },
+    apiToken: { findUnique: vi.fn(), update: vi.fn() },
+    user: { findUnique: vi.fn() },
+    webauthnMfaCredential: { count: vi.fn() },
+    stepUpElevation: { findUnique: vi.fn() },
+    $queryRaw: vi.fn(),
+  },
+}));
+
+vi.mock("@/lib/auth/session", () => ({ getSession: vi.fn() }));
+vi.mock("@/lib/auth/hmac", () => ({ hashToken: vi.fn(() => "hash") }));
+vi.mock("@/lib/auth/audit", () => ({
+  auditLog: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+}));
+vi.mock("@/lib/logging/transports", () => ({ emitIfSampled: vi.fn() }));
+
+const headersGet = vi.fn<(name: string) => string | null>();
+vi.mock("next/headers", () => ({
+  headers: vi.fn(async () => ({ get: headersGet })),
+  cookies: vi.fn(async () => ({
+    get: () => undefined,
+    set: () => {},
+    delete: () => {},
+  })),
+}));
+
+import {
+  requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled,
+  StepUpRequiredError,
+  HttpError,
+  MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+} from "../api-handler";
+import { getSession } from "@/lib/auth/session";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { headers } from "next/headers";
+import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
+
+const MFA_USER = {
+  id: "user-1",
+  role: "USER" as const,
+  username: "u",
+  totpConfirmedAt: new Date("2020-01-01"),
+};
+const PLAIN_USER = { ...MFA_USER, totpConfirmedAt: null };
+
+const ELEVATION = `hle_${"a".repeat(64)}`;
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.resetAllMocks();
+  headersGet.mockReturnValue(null);
+  vi.mocked(headers).mockImplementation(
+    async () => ({ get: headersGet }) as never,
+  );
+  vi.mocked(auditLog).mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+  vi.mocked(prisma.webauthnMfaCredential.count).mockResolvedValue(0 as never);
+});
+
+function mockCookieSession(user: unknown) {
+  vi.mocked(getSession).mockResolvedValue({
+    session: { id: "sess-1", expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 1e6) },
+    user,
+  } as never);
+}
+
+/** A wildcard (or narrow) Bearer caller, optionally presenting an elevation. */
+function mockBearer(opts: {
+  user: unknown;
+  permissions?: string[];
+  elevation?: string | null;
+}) {
+  vi.mocked(getSession).mockResolvedValue(null as never);
+  headersGet.mockImplementation((n) => {
+    const name = n.toLowerCase();
+    if (name === "authorization") return "Bearer hlk_xyz";
+    if (name === "x-step-up") return opts.elevation ?? null;
+    return null;
+  });
+  vi.mocked(prisma.apiToken.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
+    id: "tok-1",
+    userId: "user-1",
+    permissions: opts.permissions ?? ["*"],
+    revoked: false,
+    expiresAt: null,
+  } as never);
+  vi.mocked(prisma.user.findUnique).mockResolvedValue(opts.user as never);
+  vi.mocked(prisma.apiToken.update).mockResolvedValue({} as never);
+}
+
+/** A stored elevation row as `validateStepUpElevation` reads it. */
+function mockElevationRow(method: string, overrides: object = {}) {
+  vi.mocked(prisma.stepUpElevation.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
+    userId: "user-1",
+    apiTokenId: "tok-1",
+    consumedAt: null,
+    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000),
+    method,
+    ...overrides,
+  } as never);
+}
+
+async function rejectedWith(
+  promise: Promise<unknown>,
+): Promise<StepUpRequiredError> {
+  let caught: unknown;
+  try {
+    await promise;
+  } catch (err) {
+    caught = err;
+  }
+  expect(caught).toBeInstanceOf(StepUpRequiredError);
+  return caught as StepUpRequiredError;
+}
+
+describe("requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled — cookie arm is unchanged", () => {
+  it("passes a non-MFA user straight through without a freshness read", async () => {
+    mockCookieSession(PLAIN_USER);
+    const ctx = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
+      MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+    );
+    expect(ctx.user.id).toBe("user-1");
+    expect(ctx.authMethod).toBe("cookie");
+    expect(prisma.session.findUnique).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    await expect(ctx.commitElevation()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("passes an MFA user with a fresh verification", async () => {
+    mockCookieSession(MFA_USER);
+    vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
+      mfaVerifiedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000),
+    } as never);
+    const ctx = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
+      MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+    );
+    expect(ctx.user.id).toBe("user-1");
+    // The session stamp is not consumable, so committing is a no-op and the
+    // elevation store is never touched on the cookie arm.
+    await ctx.commitElevation();
+    expect(prisma.$queryRaw).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(prisma.stepUpElevation.findUnique).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("blocks an MFA user without a fresh verification", async () => {
+    mockCookieSession(MFA_USER);
+    vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
+      mfaVerifiedAt: null,
+    } as never);
+    const err = await rejectedWith(
+      requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS),
+    );
+    expect(err.errorCode).toBe("auth.stepup.required");
+  });
+
+  it("ignores an elevation header when a cookie session is present", async () => {
+    mockCookieSession(MFA_USER);
+    headersGet.mockImplementation((n) =>
+      n.toLowerCase() === "x-step-up" ? ELEVATION : null,
+    );
+    vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValue({
+      mfaVerifiedAt: null,
+    } as never);
+    await rejectedWith(
+      requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS),
+    );
+    expect(prisma.stepUpElevation.findUnique).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled — Bearer arm", () => {
+  it("passes a non-MFA wildcard token through with no elevation, as before", async () => {
+    mockBearer({ user: PLAIN_USER });
+    const ctx = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
+      MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+    );
+    expect(ctx.authMethod).toBe("bearer");
+    expect(prisma.stepUpElevation.findUnique).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    await expect(ctx.commitElevation()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a narrow-scope token before any elevation is read", async () => {
+    mockBearer({
+      user: MFA_USER,
+      permissions: ["fhir:read"],
+      elevation: ELEVATION,
+    });
+    let caught: unknown;
+    try {
+      await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
+    } catch (err) {
+      caught = err;
+    }
+    expect(caught).toBeInstanceOf(HttpError);
+    expect(caught).not.toBeInstanceOf(StepUpRequiredError);
+    expect((caught as HttpError).statusCode).toBe(403);
+    expect(prisma.stepUpElevation.findUnique).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an MFA-enrolled token with no elevation as auth.stepup.required", async () => {
+    mockBearer({ user: MFA_USER, elevation: null });
+    const err = await rejectedWith(
+      requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS),
+    );
+    expect(err.statusCode).toBe(401);
+    expect(err.errorCode).toBe("auth.stepup.required");
+    expect(prisma.stepUpElevation.findUnique).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an unknown elevation and audits the reason", async () => {
+    mockBearer({ user: MFA_USER, elevation: ELEVATION });
+    vi.mocked(prisma.stepUpElevation.findUnique).mockResolvedValue(
+      null as never,
+    );
+    const err = await rejectedWith(
+      requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS),
+    );
+    expect(err.errorCode).toBe("auth.stepup.required");
+    expect(auditLog).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      "auth.stepup.elevation.rejected",
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        userId: "user-1",
+        details: expect.objectContaining({ reason: "unknown" }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a password-proved elevation: the factor is too weak for erasure", async () => {
+    mockBearer({ user: MFA_USER, elevation: ELEVATION });
+    mockElevationRow("password");
+    const err = await rejectedWith(
+      requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS),
+    );
+    expect(err.errorCode).toBe("auth.stepup.required");
+    expect(auditLog).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      "auth.stepup.elevation.rejected",
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        details: expect.objectContaining({ reason: "insufficient_factor" }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an elevation minted for another token", async () => {
+    mockBearer({ user: MFA_USER, elevation: ELEVATION });
+    mockElevationRow("totp", { apiTokenId: "tok-other" });
+    await rejectedWith(
+      requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS),
+    );
+    expect(auditLog).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      "auth.stepup.elevation.rejected",
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        details: expect.objectContaining({ reason: "wrong_token" }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("admits a TOTP-proved elevation and spends it on commit", async () => {
+    mockBearer({ user: MFA_USER, elevation: ELEVATION });
+    mockElevationRow("totp");
+    vi.mocked(prisma.$queryRaw).mockResolvedValue([
+      { method: "totp" },
+    ] as never);
+
+    const ctx = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
+      MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+    );
+    expect(ctx.user.id).toBe("user-1");
+    expect(ctx.authMethod).toBe("bearer");
+    // Validation does not spend: the claim runs only when the route commits.
+    expect(prisma.$queryRaw).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    await ctx.commitElevation();
+    expect(prisma.$queryRaw).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("admits a security-key-only account on a webauthn-proved elevation", async () => {
+    mockBearer({ user: PLAIN_USER, elevation: ELEVATION });
+    vi.mocked(prisma.webauthnMfaCredential.count).mockResolvedValue(1 as never);
+    mockElevationRow("webauthn");
+    const ctx = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
+      MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+    );
+    expect(ctx.user.id).toBe("user-1");
+  });
+
+  it("throws at commit when the claim is lost, so a race has one winner", async () => {
+    mockBearer({ user: MFA_USER, elevation: ELEVATION });
+    mockElevationRow("totp");
+    const ctx = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
+      MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+    );
+    // Between validation and commit the elevation was spent elsewhere.
+    vi.mocked(prisma.$queryRaw).mockResolvedValue([] as never);
+    mockElevationRow("totp", { consumedAt: new Date() });
+    await rejectedWith(ctx.commitElevation());
+    expect(auditLog).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      "auth.stepup.elevation.rejected",
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        details: expect.objectContaining({ reason: "consumed" }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+});
diff --git a/src/lib/api-handler.ts b/src/lib/api-handler.ts
index 796c42e42..63f6cdf28 100644
--- a/src/lib/api-handler.ts
+++ b/src/lib/api-handler.ts
@@ -1243,6 +1243,78 @@ export async function requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled(
   return auth;
 }
 
+/**
+ * What an erasure route received: the caller, plus the hook that spends a
+ * Bearer elevation. See `MfaManagementContext.commitElevation` for the
+ * contract — call it immediately before the mutation, after every cheap
+ * refusal (a bad confirmation, the last-admin check) has passed, so a 422
+ * does not burn a proof the user then has to mint again.
+ */
+export type ErasureAuthContext = AuthContext & {
+  commitElevation: () => Promise<void>;
+};
+
+/**
+ * The sibling of `requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled` for the two erasure routes —
+ * account deletion and the record wipe — and only those.
+ *
+ * WHY IT EXISTS. App Store guideline 5.1.1(v) requires that an account created
+ * in the app can be deleted from the app. `requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled` gates an
+ * MFA-enrolled account on `requireFreshMfa`, which is cookie-only by
+ * construction, so a native-app user with a second factor could not delete
+ * their account from the app at all: the Bearer transport had no way to
+ * present a fresh factor and the route answered 401 "Not authenticated" to a
+ * perfectly valid token. This helper adds the Bearer arm without touching
+ * `requireFreshMfa`, which stays cookie-only.
+ *
+ * THE THREE ARMS.
+ *
+ *   No second factor enrolled — pass through on either transport, exactly as
+ *   the sibling does. A user who never enrolled has no ceremony to complete.
+ *
+ *   Cookie + enrolled — `requireFreshMfa`, unchanged: `Session.mfaVerifiedAt`
+ *   within the window. A browser session cannot tell the two helpers apart.
+ *
+ *   Bearer + enrolled — a step-up elevation in the `X-Step-Up` header, minted
+ *   by `POST /api/auth/step-up` against a re-proved factor, validated by the
+ *   same code the MFA-management routes use and with `freshFactor` pinned ON:
+ *   a `totp`, `webauthn`, or `passkey` proof passes; a password proof is
+ *   refused with the same generic 401, because a password login has never
+ *   satisfied step-up on the web and must not start here. The elevation is
+ *   token-bound, single-use, and five minutes wide — the cookie window.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT DO. Scope is `requireAuth()`'s fail-closed default, so a
+ * narrow token is refused 403 before the header is read. A recovery code is
+ * not accepted on Bearer — the mint does not take one, and `FRESH_FACTOR_METHODS`
+ * says why; an account that has lost its authenticator erases itself on the
+ * web, where `/api/auth/mfa/verify` accepts the code and stamps the session.
+ * And the gate takes no factor in the BODY: there is one mint surface and one
+ * redemption path, which is what `step-up-elevation-guard.test.ts` freezes.
+ */
+export async function requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
+  maxAgeSeconds: number,
+): Promise<ErasureAuthContext> {
+  const auth = await requireAuth();
+  const noop = async () => {};
+
+  if (!(await hasSecondFactorEnrolled(auth.user))) {
+    return { ...auth, commitElevation: noop };
+  }
+
+  if (auth.authMethod === "cookie") {
+    await requireFreshMfa(maxAgeSeconds);
+    return { ...auth, commitElevation: noop };
+  }
+
+  // On the Bearer path `requireAuth` puts the resolved `ApiToken` row id in
+  // `session.id` — the binding the elevation was minted against.
+  const commitElevation = await resolveBearerElevation(
+    { user: auth.user, apiTokenId: auth.session.id },
+    { freshFactor: true, proofSource: "second-factor" },
+  );
+  return { ...auth, commitElevation };
+}
+
 /**
  * Does this account have a SECOND FACTOR at all?
  *
@@ -1457,6 +1529,37 @@ export async function requireMfaManagementAuth(
   // Bearer path. Resolution first: an unknown, revoked, expired, or narrow-scope
   // token is refused here and never gets as far as presenting an elevation.
   const auth = await requireBearerAuth();
+  const commitElevation = await resolveBearerElevation(
+    { user: auth.user, apiTokenId: auth.apiTokenId },
+    { freshFactor, proofSource },
+  );
+
+  return {
+    transport: "bearer",
+    user: auth.user,
+    apiTokenId: auth.apiTokenId,
+    accessTokenHash: auth.accessTokenHash,
+    commitElevation,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The Bearer elevation arm, shared by `requireMfaManagementAuth` and
+ * `requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled` so there is exactly one place that
+ * reads the header, validates, refuses, and claims.
+ *
+ * Takes an ALREADY-RESOLVED Bearer caller: the token's own validity and scope
+ * were decided before this runs, and nothing here can widen that decision. It
+ * returns the commit closure — the atomic single-use claim — and throws
+ * `StepUpRequiredError` for a missing, unknown, foreign, spent, expired, or
+ * too-weak elevation, with the real reason in the audit row and none of it on
+ * the wire.
+ */
+async function resolveBearerElevation(
+  auth: { user: User; apiTokenId: string },
+  options: { freshFactor: boolean; proofSource: FreshFactorProofSource },
+): Promise<() => Promise<void>> {
+  const { freshFactor, proofSource } = options;
 
   let raw: string | null = null;
   try {
@@ -1473,6 +1576,7 @@ export async function requireMfaManagementAuth(
     });
     throw new StepUpRequiredError();
   }
+  const rawToken = raw;
 
   const refusal = (reason: string): StepUpRequiredError => {
     // One audit row with the machine reason, one generic refusal on the wire.
@@ -1495,7 +1599,7 @@ export async function requireMfaManagementAuth(
   // Validate WITHOUT consuming. The route runs its own cheap checks next and
   // spends the elevation only when it is about to act.
   const validated = await validateStepUpElevation({
-    rawToken: raw,
+    rawToken,
     userId: auth.user.id,
     apiTokenId: auth.apiTokenId,
     requireFreshFactor: freshFactor,
@@ -1511,24 +1615,18 @@ export async function requireMfaManagementAuth(
     throw new StepUpRequiredError("auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled");
   }
 
-  return {
-    transport: "bearer",
-    user: auth.user,
-    apiTokenId: auth.apiTokenId,
-    accessTokenHash: auth.accessTokenHash,
-    commitElevation: async () => {
-      const claimed = await claimStepUpElevation({
-        rawToken: raw,
-        userId: auth.user.id,
-        apiTokenId: auth.apiTokenId,
-        requireFreshFactor: freshFactor,
-      });
-      if (!claimed.ok) throw refusal(claimed.reason);
-      annotate({
-        action: { name: "auth.stepup.elevation.accepted" },
-        meta: { method: claimed.method, freshFactor },
-      });
-    },
+  return async () => {
+    const claimed = await claimStepUpElevation({
+      rawToken,
+      userId: auth.user.id,
+      apiTokenId: auth.apiTokenId,
+      requireFreshFactor: freshFactor,
+    });
+    if (!claimed.ok) throw refusal(claimed.reason);
+    annotate({
+      action: { name: "auth.stepup.elevation.accepted" },
+      meta: { method: claimed.method, freshFactor },
+    });
   };
 }
 
diff --git a/src/lib/openapi/routes/auth.ts b/src/lib/openapi/routes/auth.ts
index 265690f28..96d5efdd9 100644
--- a/src/lib/openapi/routes/auth.ts
+++ b/src/lib/openapi/routes/auth.ts
@@ -840,7 +840,8 @@ export const authPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
         "WHICH factor you re-prove decides WHAT the elevation reaches. `password` reaches the same routes a plain cookie session reaches. `totp`, `webauthn`, and `passkey` additionally satisfy the fresh-factor routes — MFA disable, recovery-code regeneration, security-key removal — which is precisely the set of ceremonies for which the web marks a session second-factor-verified. The response carries `satisfiesFreshFactor` so a client can choose the right ceremony up front rather than discovering the refusal after spending a proof. A recovery code is NOT accepted here; an account that has lost its authenticator manages its second factor on the web.\n\n" +
         "The elevation is bound to the exact token that minted it (another token, including the same account's, cannot redeem it), single-use, and valid for five minutes — the same window the cookie path uses. Present it as `X-Step-Up: hle_…` alongside the normal `Authorization: Bearer` header. It is spent only when the target route is about to act, so a 429, a 422, or a wrong code does not burn it.\n\n" +
         "Presenting the token alone mints nothing: the body must carry a fresh factor proof. Every failure — wrong password, no password set on an SSO-provisioned account, an assertion for another account, a stale challenge, a replayed TOTP step — returns the same 401 with the same prose, and is audited server-side. Rate-limited per account (5 / 15 min) and per source address.\n\n" +
-        "Accepting routes (the complete set): POST /api/auth/me/mfa/totp/setup; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/totp/confirm; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/disable; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/recovery-codes/regenerate; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/options; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/verify; PATCH and DELETE /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/{id}. The last three of those and disable require a fresh-factor proof. GET /api/auth/me/mfa needs no elevation at all. Nothing else accepts one — admin endpoints stay cookie-only.",
+        "Accepting routes (the complete set): POST /api/auth/me/mfa/totp/setup; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/totp/confirm; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/disable; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/recovery-codes/regenerate; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/options; POST /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/register/verify; PATCH and DELETE /api/auth/me/mfa/webauthn/{id}; DELETE /api/settings/account; DELETE /api/settings/data. The last three MFA routes, disable, and both erasure routes require a fresh-factor proof. GET /api/auth/me/mfa needs no elevation at all. Nothing else accepts one — admin endpoints stay cookie-only.\n\n" +
+        "The two erasure routes joined the set so an account with a second factor can be deleted from a native app: their gate was cookie-only, which left an enrolled user unable to delete their own account from the app at all. They take the elevation the same way as the rest — fresh factor required, spent only when the erasure is about to run.",
       requestBody: {
         required: true,
         content: { "application/json": { schema: stepUpMintSchema } },
diff --git a/src/lib/openapi/routes/settings.ts b/src/lib/openapi/routes/settings.ts
index 600af5e49..085fee9ab 100644
--- a/src/lib/openapi/routes/settings.ts
+++ b/src/lib/openapi/routes/settings.ts
@@ -562,7 +562,8 @@ export const settingsPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
       summary: "Permanently delete the account and everything in it",
       description:
         "Erasure, not deactivation: the user row goes, every related row cascades with it, and the account's own audit history — IP addresses, login geo — is purged inside the same transaction rather than being left orphaned. There is no undo and no grace period.\n\n" +
-        "Two gates, and they compose. The body must carry the typed confirmation. And for an account with a second factor enrolled — a confirmed TOTP secret OR a registered security key — the session must additionally carry a fresh factor proof, which is cookie-only by construction: a Bearer transport carries no `mfaVerifiedAt` and therefore cannot satisfy it at any scope. An account with NO second factor keeps the typed-confirmation-only contract on either transport, deliberately, because a user who never enrolled has no ceremony to complete.\n\n" +
+        "Two gates, and they compose. The body must carry the typed confirmation. And for an account with a second factor enrolled — a confirmed TOTP secret OR a registered security key — the caller must additionally present a fresh factor proof. An account with NO second factor keeps the typed-confirmation-only contract on either transport, deliberately, because a user who never enrolled has no ceremony to complete.\n\n" +
+        "How the fresh proof is presented depends on the transport. A cookie session carries it on the session row: complete the second factor within the last five minutes and retry. A Bearer caller presents a single-use elevation from `POST /api/auth/step-up` in the `X-Step-Up` header, minted against a `totp`, `webauthn`, or `passkey` proof — a `password`-proved elevation is refused here exactly as a password login never satisfies step-up on the web. The elevation is bound to the token that minted it, valid five minutes, and spent only when the deletion is about to run, so a rejected confirmation does not burn it. A recovery code is not accepted on the Bearer path: the mint does not take one, so an account that has lost its authenticator deletes itself from the web.\n\n" +
         "Two refusals are not about the caller's credentials at all. The last remaining admin cannot delete themselves, and the last Guardian of a managed profile cannot leave that profile unattended.",
       requestBody: {
         required: true,
@@ -597,7 +598,12 @@ export const settingsPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
         ...stdResponses,
         "401": {
           description:
-            "Not authenticated — or the account has a second factor and the session carries no proof of it fresh enough for a destructive action (`meta.errorCode` = `auth.stepup.required`, or `auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`). Re-verify the factor on the web and retry; a Bearer token cannot clear this arm.",
+            "Not authenticated — or the account has a second factor and the caller carries no proof of it fresh enough for a destructive action (`meta.errorCode` = `auth.stepup.required`, or `auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`). On a cookie session, re-verify the factor and retry; on a Bearer token, mint an elevation at `POST /api/auth/step-up` with a `totp`, `webauthn`, or `passkey` proof and resend with `X-Step-Up`. The same code covers an elevation that is unknown, expired, already spent, minted for a different token, or minted from too weak a factor — the refusals are deliberately indistinguishable on the wire, and the real reason is audited.",
+          content: { "application/json": { schema: errorEnvelope } },
+        },
+        "403": {
+          description:
+            "The Bearer token carries a narrow scope. Erasure needs a cookie session or a full-access token; the refusal happens before any second-factor proof is looked at.",
           content: { "application/json": { schema: errorEnvelope } },
         },
       },
@@ -749,8 +755,9 @@ export const settingsPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
         "The other half of account deletion: this removes what the account HAS and keeps what signs into it. Ninety-nine models are hard-deleted for this user — measurements and every derived rollup, medications and their intake history, mood, labs, documents, cycle, workouts, nutrients, notification channels, Coach conversations, consent receipts, audit history — with no `deletedAt` filter, so soft-deleted tombstones go too. The account row survives with its personal columns reset: body and identity fields, home location, cached AI output. What is deliberately kept is the credential set (password hash, SSO binding, second-factor secret and enrolment, trusted-device state) and the interface preferences (timezone, locale, units, time and date format, glucose unit), because those are about the account rather than the record.\n\n" +
         "The model list is not written at the route. It is declared once in the wipe plan and held against the Prisma schema by a completeness test, which exists because this endpoint once deleted thirteen tables out of eighty-odd while telling people it had deleted everything.\n\n" +
         "One transaction, with a two-minute budget: a half-applied wipe is worse than none, because the person is told it succeeded either way. Every cached payload for the account is evicted afterwards so no surface serves pre-wipe data.\n\n" +
-        "Gated like account deletion: the typed confirmation, plus a fresh factor proof for an MFA-enrolled account, which is cookie-only by construction. The confirmation string is `DELETE`, NOT the `DELETE_ACCOUNT` that route wants.\n\n" +
-        "One audit row survives the wipe that clears the rest of the audit history: it is written after the transaction commits, as the receipt for the erasure the person asked for.",
+        "Gated like account deletion: the typed confirmation, plus a fresh factor proof for an MFA-enrolled account — on a cookie session the second factor completed within the last five minutes, on a Bearer token a single-use `X-Step-Up` elevation minted at `POST /api/auth/step-up` against a `totp`, `webauthn`, or `passkey` proof. The confirmation string is `DELETE`, NOT the `DELETE_ACCOUNT` that route wants.\n\n" +
+        "One audit row survives the wipe that clears the rest of the audit history: it is written after the transaction commits, as the receipt for the erasure the person asked for.\n\n" +
+        "A Bearer client should expect to be signed out by its own request: API tokens are on the wipe list, so the token that called this — and any step-up elevation minted from it — is removed along with the record. Sign in again rather than retrying with the same credential.",
       requestBody: {
         required: true,
         content: { "application/json": { schema: dataWipeRequest } },
@@ -777,7 +784,12 @@ export const settingsPaths: NonNullable<ZodOpenApiObject["paths"]> = {
         ...stdResponses,
         "401": {
           description:
-            "Not authenticated — or the account has a second factor and the session carries no proof of it fresh enough for a destructive action (`meta.errorCode` = `auth.stepup.required`, or `auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`). A Bearer token cannot clear this arm.",
+            "Not authenticated — or the account has a second factor and the caller carries no proof of it fresh enough for a destructive action (`meta.errorCode` = `auth.stepup.required`, or `auth.stepup.mfa_not_enrolled`). A Bearer caller clears it with an `X-Step-Up` elevation from `POST /api/auth/step-up`; the same code covers an elevation that is unknown, expired, already spent, bound to another token, or minted from too weak a factor.",
+          content: { "application/json": { schema: errorEnvelope } },
+        },
+        "403": {
+          description:
+            "The Bearer token carries a narrow scope. Erasure needs a cookie session or a full-access token; the refusal happens before any second-factor proof is looked at.",
           content: { "application/json": { schema: errorEnvelope } },
         },
       },
diff --git a/tests/integration/settings-erasure-bearer-step-up.test.ts b/tests/integration/settings-erasure-bearer-step-up.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a9cb80e69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/integration/settings-erasure-bearer-step-up.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+/**
+ * Account deletion and the record wipe over Bearer, for an account with a
+ * second factor — against a real Postgres, the real mint, and the real gate.
+ *
+ * App Store guideline 5.1.1(v) requires that an account created in the app can
+ * be deleted from the app. Until now an MFA-enrolled account could not: both
+ * erasure routes demanded a cookie-side fresh factor and a Bearer transport had
+ * no way to present one. The cases below pin that a native client CAN now
+ * clear the gate, and only by re-proving a second factor through
+ * `POST /api/auth/step-up` — a token alone, a password proof, another token's
+ * elevation, and a narrow-scope token all still fail closed.
+ */
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
+import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
+
+import { cookieJar, headerJar } from "./mock-next-headers";
+import { getPrismaClient, truncateAllTables } from "./setup";
+
+process.env.API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY ??=
+  "test-hmac-key-erasure-step-up-32-bytes-minimum-1234567890";
+
+const { hashToken } = await import("@/lib/auth/hmac");
+const { hashPassword } = await import("@/lib/auth/password");
+
+const USER_ID = "user-erasure-step-up";
+const PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple 42";
+
+vi.mock("next/headers", async () => {
+  const { cookieJar, headerJar } = await import("./mock-next-headers");
+  return {
+    headers: vi.fn(async () => ({
+      get: (name: string) => headerJar.get(name.toLowerCase()) ?? null,
+    })),
+    cookies: vi.fn(async () => ({
+      get: (name: string) => {
+        const value = cookieJar.get(name);
+        return value ? { name, value } : undefined;
+      },
+      set: (name: string, value: string) => {
+        cookieJar.set(name, value);
+      },
+      delete: (name: string) => {
+        cookieJar.delete(name);
+      },
+    })),
+  };
+});
+
+vi.mock("@/lib/db-compat", () => ({
+  ensureDbCompatibility: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+}));
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  await truncateAllTables(getPrismaClient());
+  cookieJar.clear();
+  headerJar.clear();
+  await getPrismaClient().user.create({
+    data: {
+      id: USER_ID,
+      username: "erasure",
+      email: "erasure@example.test",
+      timezone: "UTC",
+      passwordHash: await hashPassword(PASSWORD),
+    },
+  });
+});
+
+async function mintToken(
+  label: string,
+  permissions: string[] = ["*"],
+): Promise<{ raw: string; id: string }> {
+  const raw = `hlk_${label}${"0".repeat(64 - label.length)}`;
+  const row = await getPrismaClient().apiToken.create({
+    data: {
+      userId: USER_ID,
+      name: label,
+      tokenHash: hashToken(raw),
+      permissions,
+    },
+    select: { id: true },
+  });
+  return { raw, id: row.id };
+}
+
+function useToken(raw: string): void {
+  headerJar.set("authorization", `Bearer ${raw}`);
+}
+
+function useElevation(raw: string | null): void {
+  if (raw === null) headerJar.delete("x-step-up");
+  else headerJar.set("x-step-up", raw);
+}
+
+function req(path: string, method: string, body?: unknown): NextRequest {
+  const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
+  const auth = headerJar.get("authorization");
+  if (auth) headers.authorization = auth;
+  const init: RequestInit = { method, headers };
+  if (body !== undefined) {
+    headers["content-type"] = "application/json";
+    init.body = JSON.stringify(body);
+  }
+  return new NextRequest(`https://health.example${path}`, init as never);
+}
+
+async function enrolTotp(): Promise<string> {
+  const { generateTotpSecret } = await import("@/lib/auth/mfa/totp");
+  const { encrypt } = await import("@/lib/crypto");
+  const secret = generateTotpSecret();
+  await getPrismaClient().user.update({
+    where: { id: USER_ID },
+    data: {
+      totpSecretEncrypted: encrypt(secret),
+      totpConfirmedAt: new Date(),
+      totpLastStep: null,
+    },
+  });
+  return secret;
+}
+
+function currentTotpCode(secretBase32: string): string {
+  const totp = new OTPAuth.TOTP({
+    issuer: "HealthLog",
+    label: "HealthLog",
+    algorithm: "SHA1",
+    digits: 6,
+    period: 30,
+    secret: OTPAuth.Secret.fromBase32(secretBase32),
+  });
+  return totp.generate({ timestamp: Date.now() });
+}
+
+async function mint(body: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<string> {
+  const { POST } = await import("@/app/api/auth/step-up/route");
+  const res = await POST(req("/api/auth/step-up", "POST", body));
+  expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  const json = (await res.json()) as { data: { elevation: string } };
+  return json.data.elevation;
+}
+
+async function deleteAccount(): Promise<Response> {
+  const { DELETE } = await import("@/app/api/settings/account/route");
+  return DELETE(
+    req("/api/settings/account", "DELETE", { confirm: "DELETE_ACCOUNT" }),
+  );
+}
+
+async function wipeData(): Promise<Response> {
+  const { DELETE } = await import("@/app/api/settings/data/route");
+  return DELETE(req("/api/settings/data", "DELETE", { confirm: "DELETE" }));
+}
+
+async function errorCodeOf(res: Response): Promise<string | undefined> {
+  const json = (await res.json()) as { meta?: { errorCode?: string } };
+  return json.meta?.errorCode;
+}
+
+async function userExists(): Promise<boolean> {
+  return (
+    (await getPrismaClient().user.findUnique({ where: { id: USER_ID } })) !==
+    null
+  );
+}
+
+async function auditReasons(action: string): Promise<string[]> {
+  const rows = await getPrismaClient().auditLog.findMany({
+    where: { action },
+    orderBy: { createdAt: "asc" },
+  });
+  return rows.map(
+    (r) => (JSON.parse(r.details ?? "{}") as { reason?: string }).reason ?? "",
+  );
+}
+
+async function expectAuditReason(
+  action: string,
+  reason: string,
+  timeoutMs = 5_000,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+  let seen: string[] = [];
+  while (Date.now() < deadline) {
+    seen = await auditReasons(action);
+    if (seen.includes(reason)) return;
+    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 25));
+  }
+  expect(seen).toContain(reason);
+}
+
+describe("DELETE /api/settings/account over Bearer with a second factor", () => {
+  it("refuses a token alone with auth.stepup.required and deletes nothing", async () => {
+    await enrolTotp();
+    useToken((await mintToken("acc-none")).raw);
+    useElevation(null);
+
+    const res = await deleteAccount();
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(await errorCodeOf(res)).toBe("auth.stepup.required");
+    expect(await userExists()).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a password-proved elevation and keeps it unspent", async () => {
+    await enrolTotp();
+    useToken((await mintToken("acc-pw")).raw);
+    const elevation = await mint({ method: "password", password: PASSWORD });
+    useElevation(elevation);
+
+    const res = await deleteAccount();
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(await errorCodeOf(res)).toBe("auth.stepup.required");
+    expect(await userExists()).toBe(true);
+    await expectAuditReason(
+      "auth.stepup.elevation.rejected",
+      "insufficient_factor",
+    );
+    const row = await getPrismaClient().stepUpElevation.findFirst();
+    expect(row?.consumedAt).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a narrow-scope token before any elevation is looked at", async () => {
+    await enrolTotp();
+    useToken((await mintToken("acc-narrow", ["fhir:read"])).raw);
+    useElevation(`hle_${"f".repeat(64)}`);
+
+    const res = await deleteAccount();
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await userExists()).toBe(true);
+    expect(await auditReasons("auth.stepup.elevation.rejected")).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an elevation minted by another token of the same account", async () => {
+    const secret = await enrolTotp();
+    const minter = await mintToken("acc-minter");
+    const redeemer = await mintToken("acc-redeemer");
+    useToken(minter.raw);
+    const elevation = await mint({
+      method: "totp",
+      code: currentTotpCode(secret),
+    });
+    useToken(redeemer.raw);
+    useElevation(elevation);
+
+    const res = await deleteAccount();
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(await userExists()).toBe(true);
+    await expectAuditReason("auth.stepup.elevation.rejected", "wrong_token");
+  });
+
+  it("deletes the account end to end on a TOTP-proved elevation", async () => {
+    const secret = await enrolTotp();
+    const token = await mintToken("acc-totp");
+    useToken(token.raw);
+    const elevation = await mint({
+      method: "totp",
+      code: currentTotpCode(secret),
+    });
+    useElevation(elevation);
+
+    const res = await deleteAccount();
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await res.json()).toEqual({ data: { deleted: true }, error: null });
+    expect(await userExists()).toBe(false);
+    // The token and its elevation went with the account.
+    expect(await getPrismaClient().apiToken.count()).toBe(0);
+    expect(await getPrismaClient().stepUpElevation.count()).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it("still deletes a single-factor account on a bare wildcard token", async () => {
+    useToken((await mintToken("acc-plain")).raw);
+    useElevation(null);
+
+    const res = await deleteAccount();
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await userExists()).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("does not spend the elevation on a refused confirmation", async () => {
+    const secret = await enrolTotp();
+    useToken((await mintToken("acc-422")).raw);
+    const elevation = await mint({
+      method: "totp",
+      code: currentTotpCode(secret),
+    });
+    useElevation(elevation);
+
+    const { DELETE } = await import("@/app/api/settings/account/route");
+    const res = await DELETE(
+      req("/api/settings/account", "DELETE", { confirm: "nope" }),
+    );
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(422);
+    expect(await userExists()).toBe(true);
+    const row = await getPrismaClient().stepUpElevation.findFirst();
+    expect(row?.consumedAt).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("DELETE /api/settings/data over Bearer with a second factor", () => {
+  it("refuses a token alone with auth.stepup.required", async () => {
+    await enrolTotp();
+    useToken((await mintToken("data-none")).raw);
+    useElevation(null);
+
+    const res = await wipeData();
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(await errorCodeOf(res)).toBe("auth.stepup.required");
+  });
+
+  it("wipes on a TOTP-proved elevation and spends it exactly once", async () => {
+    const secret = await enrolTotp();
+    useToken((await mintToken("data-totp")).raw);
+    await getPrismaClient().measurement.create({
+      data: {
+        userId: USER_ID,
+        type: "WEIGHT",
+        value: 80,
+        unit: "kg",
+        measuredAt: new Date(),
+      },
+    });
+    const elevation = await mint({
+      method: "totp",
+      code: currentTotpCode(secret),
+    });
+    useElevation(elevation);
+
+    const first = await wipeData();
+
+    expect(first.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(
+      await getPrismaClient().measurement.count({ where: { userId: USER_ID } }),
+    ).toBe(0);
+    // The account and its second factor survive a record wipe.
+    const user = await getPrismaClient().user.findUnique({
+      where: { id: USER_ID },
+      select: { totpConfirmedAt: true },
+    });
+    expect(user?.totpConfirmedAt).not.toBeNull();
+
+    // The wipe's own model list carries `ApiToken` and `StepUpElevation`, so
+    // the caller's credential goes with the record it erased. That is
+    // pre-existing behaviour rather than anything this gate introduced — a
+    // single-factor Bearer caller has always lost its token here — and it is
+    // asserted rather than assumed, because a native client has to sign in
+    // again afterwards.
+    expect(
+      await getPrismaClient().apiToken.count({ where: { userId: USER_ID } }),
+    ).toBe(0);
+    expect(await getPrismaClient().stepUpElevation.count()).toBe(0);
+
+    // Which means a replay of the very same request is refused outright.
+    const second = await wipeData();
+    expect(second.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+});