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feat(withings): random-nonce OAuth state with single-use ledger row
The legacy OAuth state shape `${user.id}:${random16}` (v1.4.42-) put
the user id on both the URL state param and the `withings_state`
cookie. httpOnly + Secure + sameSite:lax shut the XSS exfiltration
surface, but the user id still leaked into any request-log entry
where the cookie is not redacted and into network-traffic captures
of the redirect. Cosmetic today; a future refactor flipping the
cookie to non-httpOnly would silently expose it.
The v1.4.43 security audit (L-1) recommended switching the state to
a fully-random nonce backed by a short-lived `(nonce -> userId)`
ledger row, with the callback resolving the user via the row rather
than parsing it out of the cookie. This change lands the migration
end-to-end:
- New `WithingsOAuthState` table (migration `0076`): nonce PK, userId
FK with cascade, createdAt default-now, expiresAt + index for the
cleanup sweep.
- `withings/connect` mints a 22-char base64url nonce
(`randomBytes(16).toString("base64url")` — 128 bits, OAuth 2.0
§10.10 recommended threshold), persists the row with a 10-minute
TTL, and sets the cookie to JUST the nonce (no user id).
- `withings/callback` verifies the cookie/URL pair byte-for-byte
(timing-safe), then looks up the row, asserts `expiresAt > now()`
AND `row.userId === session.user.id` (defence-in-depth — the audit
rec was to resolve user identity from the row; cross-checking it
against the session covers a stolen-cookie + cross-user scenario),
and deletes the row on every exit branch (single-use semantics, so
a replay of the same nonce fails the second time).
- Daily cleanup cron at 03:20 Europe/Berlin slots between the
audit-log cleanup (:15) and the mood-reminder cleanup (:25); the
helper module mirrors the audit-log-cleanup shape so the worker
contract is symmetric.
Tests:
- 3 unit cases pin the cleanup helper contract (deleteMany shape,
default-now branch, idempotent re-run).
- 2 unit cases pin the mint helper + constants (22-char base64url,
10-minute TTL, cookie name preserved across the deploy window).
- 5 integration cases pin the connect -> callback ledger lifecycle
end-to-end against real Postgres: row mint, no-credentials short-
circuit, single-use consumption + replay rejection, expired-row
rejection, cross-user mismatch rejection.
- The existing `withings-oauth.test.ts` integration cases updated to
reflect the new state shape; the legacy `${user.id}:${random32}`
assertion was the only test relying on the old contract.
Files: 12. Tests: 5076 -> 5108 (+32 unit; integration adds 5 cases
plus 2 case updates on the existing file).
This commit is contained in:
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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
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import { encrypt } from "@/lib/crypto";
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import { exchangeCode, WITHINGS_OAUTH_SCOPE } from "@/lib/withings/client";
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import { getUserWithingsCredentials } from "@/lib/withings/credentials";
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import { WITHINGS_OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE } from "@/lib/withings/oauth-state";
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import { setupWebhook } from "@/lib/withings/sync";
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import { markReconnected } from "@/lib/integrations/status";
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import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
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@@ -12,6 +13,20 @@ import { timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
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/**
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* OAuth callback from Withings. Exchanges code for tokens and stores them.
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*
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* v1.4.47 W6 — `state` is now a fully-random 22-character base64url
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* nonce keyed against the `WithingsOAuthState` ledger, rather than the
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* legacy `${user.id}:${random16}` shape. The user identity bound to
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* the in-flight handshake is resolved via the ledger's `userId`
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* column (no longer parsed from the cookie value) and cross-checked
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* against the session — both must agree before the token exchange
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* runs. The row is consumed (deleted) on every exit branch so a
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* replay of the same nonce fails the second time.
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*
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* Closes the v1.4.43 security audit L-1 finding: the cookie now
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* carries only the opaque nonce, so a future refactor flipping it to
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* non-httpOnly cannot leak the user id into request logs / network
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* captures.
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*/
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export const GET = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
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const { user } = await requireAuth();
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@@ -20,9 +35,11 @@ export const GET = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
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const { searchParams } = new URL(request.url);
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const code = searchParams.get("code");
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const state = searchParams.get("state");
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const storedState = request.cookies.get("withings_state")?.value;
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const storedState = request.cookies.get(WITHINGS_OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE)?.value;
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// CSRF check (timing-safe comparison to prevent timing attacks)
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// CSRF check, leg 1: URL state must match the cookie state byte-for-byte.
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// Timing-safe comparison so a probe can't recover the cookie bytes via
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// response-time analysis.
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if (
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!state ||
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!storedState ||
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@@ -37,18 +54,42 @@ export const GET = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
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);
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}
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// Verify state contains current user's ID
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const [stateUserId] = state.split(":");
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if (stateUserId !== user.id) {
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// CSRF check, leg 2: the nonce must resolve to a live, unexpired
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// ledger row whose `userId` matches the authenticated session.
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// Resolving the user from the row (rather than parsing the cookie
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// value) is the v1.4.43 audit recommendation — a future refactor
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// flipping the cookie to non-httpOnly cannot leak the user id this
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// way.
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const stateRow = await prisma.withingsOAuthState.findUnique({
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where: { nonce: state },
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});
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if (
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!stateRow ||
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stateRow.expiresAt <= new Date() ||
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stateRow.userId !== user.id
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) {
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// Single-use: stamp out the row whether the expiry tripped, the
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// user mismatched, or we found nothing. The user will retry from
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// `withings/connect` with a fresh nonce.
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if (stateRow) {
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await prisma.withingsOAuthState
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.delete({ where: { nonce: state } })
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.catch(() => {});
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}
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return NextResponse.redirect(
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new URL(
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"/settings/integrations?withings=error&reason=user",
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"/settings/integrations?withings=error&reason=state",
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL!,
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),
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);
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}
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if (!code) {
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// Consume the row even on the no-code path so the nonce can't
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// be replayed by an attacker who scraped the redirect URL.
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await prisma.withingsOAuthState
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.delete({ where: { nonce: state } })
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.catch(() => {});
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return NextResponse.redirect(
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new URL(
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"/settings/integrations?withings=error&reason=nocode",
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@@ -60,6 +101,9 @@ export const GET = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
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try {
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const creds = await getUserWithingsCredentials(user.id);
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if (!creds) {
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await prisma.withingsOAuthState
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.delete({ where: { nonce: state } })
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.catch(() => {});
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return NextResponse.redirect(
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new URL(
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"/settings/integrations?withings=error&reason=nocreds",
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@@ -112,16 +156,29 @@ export const GET = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
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// don't write a fresh success-time — that's the next sync's job.
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await markReconnected(user.id, "withings");
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// Consume the ledger row — single-use semantics. From this point
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// on a replay of the same `state` lands on the not-found branch
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// above and redirects to the error page.
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await prisma.withingsOAuthState
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.delete({ where: { nonce: state } })
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.catch(() => {});
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const response = NextResponse.redirect(
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new URL(
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"/settings/integrations?withings=connected",
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL!,
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),
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);
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response.cookies.delete("withings_state");
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response.cookies.delete(WITHINGS_OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE);
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return response;
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} catch (err) {
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getEvent()?.setError(err);
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// Consume the row on the failure path too — the user is going to
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// retry from `withings/connect` which mints a fresh nonce, and a
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// stranded row buys us nothing.
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await prisma.withingsOAuthState
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.delete({ where: { nonce: state } })
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.catch(() => {});
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return NextResponse.redirect(
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new URL(
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"/settings/integrations?withings=error&reason=token",
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@@ -1,14 +1,26 @@
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import { apiHandler, requireAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
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import { apiError } from "@/lib/api-response";
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import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
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import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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import { getAuthorizationUrl } from "@/lib/withings/client";
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import { getUserWithingsCredentials } from "@/lib/withings/credentials";
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import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import {
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WITHINGS_OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE,
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WITHINGS_OAUTH_STATE_TTL_MS,
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mintWithingsOAuthStateNonce,
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} from "@/lib/withings/oauth-state";
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import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
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/**
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* Redirects the user to Withings OAuth authorization page.
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* State param = userId:random for CSRF protection.
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*
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* v1.4.47 W6 — state is now a fully-random 22-character base64url
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* nonce backed by a 10-minute `WithingsOAuthState` row, rather than
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* the legacy `${user.id}:${random16}` shape. The cookie carries JUST
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* the nonce (no user id), the OAuth state URL param carries JUST the
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* nonce, and the callback resolves the user via the row's `userId`
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* column. Closes the v1.4.43 security audit L-1 finding where the
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* user id was recoverable from log entries / network captures.
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*/
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export const GET = apiHandler(async () => {
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const { user } = await requireAuth();
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@@ -22,17 +34,23 @@ export const GET = apiHandler(async () => {
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);
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}
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const stateNonce = randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
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const state = `${user.id}:${stateNonce}`;
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const nonce = mintWithingsOAuthStateNonce();
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await prisma.withingsOAuthState.create({
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data: {
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nonce,
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userId: user.id,
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expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + WITHINGS_OAUTH_STATE_TTL_MS),
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},
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});
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const url = getAuthorizationUrl(state, creds);
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const url = getAuthorizationUrl(nonce, creds);
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const response = NextResponse.redirect(url);
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response.cookies.set("withings_state", state, {
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response.cookies.set(WITHINGS_OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE, nonce, {
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
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sameSite: "lax",
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maxAge: 600,
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maxAge: Math.floor(WITHINGS_OAUTH_STATE_TTL_MS / 1000),
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path: "/",
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});
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