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* feat(crypto): G2 — encryption-key versioning + rotation CLI
Adds backwards-compatible support for ENCRYPTION_KEYS (JSON map of
{ "id": "<key>" }) plus ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID. Ciphertext format is now
"<keyId>.<base64payload>"; legacy bare-base64 ciphertext still decrypts
under the synthetic "v1" id derived from the existing ENCRYPTION_KEY.
scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts re-encrypts every encrypted column on
User / WithingsConnection / AppSettings with the active key. Idempotent —
rows already on the active id are skipped.
Why: enables zero-downtime rotation when a key is suspected leaked,
without forcing every encrypted row through a single big-bang rewrite.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): G4 — native-Bearer UA gating + rotating refresh tokens
Web callers (UA contains 'Mozilla/') keep the legacy 90d Bearer when they
explicitly opt in via X-Client-Type: native. Native callers (HealthLog-iOS,
HealthLog-iPad, n8n, Health-Connect, unrecognised UAs) now receive a 24h
access token plus a 60d rotating refresh token in the login response.
New /api/auth/refresh endpoint atomically validates + rotates the refresh
token (one-time-use), revokes the previously paired access token, and
audit-logs every refresh + revoke. Reuse of an already-consumed refresh
token revokes the entire family for the user/device — defence against a
stolen refresh token.
Migration 0025_refresh_tokens adds the table; the only DDL is CREATE
TABLE so it is forward-compatible. Down migration documented at
docs/ops/migrations/0025-down.sql.
Why: the V3 audit (still-V2-A) flagged that 90d tokens are too long for
native callers when refresh-token rotation is now table-stakes for mobile
apps. Web flows are unchanged so existing browser sessions keep working.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(infra): G3 — web/worker container split via HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE
Adds a tiny startup gate (src/lib/process-type.ts) so the same Docker image
can run as web-only, worker-only, or 'all' (default — single-container,
backwards compatible). assertSubsystemEnabled() refuses to boot the
reminder worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web, preventing accidental
double-cron when an operator splits the deployment.
docker-compose.yml ships the optional app-worker service block commented
out so 'docker compose up' keeps working out of the box; uncommenting it
+ flipping app to HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web is the only change to scale
HTTP horizontally. Healthchecks are isolated per service so neither
startup deadlocks the other; both wait on db: service_healthy.
docs/self-hosting/scaling.md walks through when + how to split.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(jobs): G1 — daily off-host encrypted backup to S3-compatible storage
New pg-boss queue 'data-backup-offhost' runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, dumps
each user's measurements + medications + intake events + mood entries,
encrypts the JSON under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, isolated
from the application ENCRYPTION_KEY), and uploads to any S3-compatible
target via @aws-sdk/client-s3.
Wire format documented in docs/ops/backup-restore.md:
magic "HLBK" || version 0x01 || iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext
The worker prunes objects older than BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30);
operators are encouraged to also configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule.
Admin endpoint POST /api/admin/backup/test issues a 1-byte PUT+GET
roundtrip and returns endpoint + bucket + per-call latency. Credentials
are never returned.
scripts/restore-backup.ts downloads + decrypts a single object so
operators can verify the chain end-to-end without standing up a separate
restore harness.
Why: GDPR Art. 32 + V3 audit "data durability" — without an off-host copy
the only line of defence against a Postgres volume loss is the in-DB
DataBackup model on the same host. Separate-key isolation means a leak of
the application encryption key does not also expose every user's archive.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(multi-tenant): address review findings — rotation coverage, hard decrypt errors, web/worker gates
Multi-agent review on PR #135 caught several CRITICAL + HIGH issues that
would have shipped silent data corruption or weakened the threat model:
Encryption + rotation
- scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts: stop selecting `bugReportTokenEncrypted`
(column doesn't exist in the schema; the script crashed on the AppSettings
step). Add the three encrypted columns it was missing —
NotificationChannel.config, PushSubscription.p256dh, PushSubscription.auth
— so rotating to a new key actually re-encrypts every encrypted row.
Without this, dropping the old key id from ENCRYPTION_KEYS would leave
notification channels and web-push subscriptions permanently
undecryptable.
- src/lib/crypto.ts: refuse to silently fall back to the active key when a
legacy bare-base64 row is decrypted but no v1 entry is configured. Throws
a clear "Restore ENCRYPTION_KEY (or add a v1 entry to ENCRYPTION_KEYS)
and run scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts before removing it" so an
operator who pulled the v1 too early notices immediately instead of
hitting opaque GCM tag errors.
- docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md: full step-by-step + rollback note +
troubleshooting section. Spells out that rotation is a forward-only
operation and what to do if the rollback path is needed.
Web / worker split (G3)
- src/proxy.ts: refuse HTTP traffic with a 503 +
X-HealthLog-Process-Type: worker header when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=worker.
The worker container (which still runs `node server.js` for now) no
longer accepts requests, so a misrouted client gets a clear hint instead
of a partially-served response.
- src/instrumentation.ts: short-circuit before importing the reminder
worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web — avoids the noisy
"[instrumentation] CRITICAL" stderr line we emitted on every web boot.
- /api/version added to PUBLIC_PATHS so the compose healthcheck doesn't
silently 302-redirect through the auth gate (the prior wget treated the
login page as a 200 success and would never notice an unhealthy backend).
Refresh-token rotation (G4)
- src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts: reuse-detection now revokes ALL active
refresh tokens for the user, not only those scoped to the same deviceId.
An attacker who rotated without an X-Device-Id header would otherwise
keep their family alive on the no-device branch. Defence-in-depth.
- revokeRefreshToken() also revokes the paired access token so a leaked
access token cannot outlive the refresh-token sibling that the caller
just killed (logout-on-device).
Off-host backup (G1)
- src/lib/jobs/offhost-backup.ts: drop the worker-side DeleteObject path.
Retention is the bucket's lifecycle-policy job; the worker keeps a
PutObject + GetObject grant only. A compromised worker can no longer
wipe the backup history. Per-user errors are now surfaced as Wide
Event warnings + a structured failures[] array on the report so an
operator can tell which user failed and why.
- scripts/restore-backup.ts: schema-validate the decrypted payload before
writing to disk, plus an optional --user-id=<id> flag that refuses to
proceed unless the dump's userId matches. Prevents silent
cross-tenant restores when an operator points the script at the wrong
S3 key.
Idempotency
- src/lib/idempotency.ts: the leak-guard already blocked `hlk_`
(access-token prefix); also block `hlr_` so a future caller wrapping
the new /api/auth/refresh endpoint with withIdempotency() can't
accidentally cache a freshly-issued refresh token.
Migration / schema
- prisma/migrations/0025_refresh_tokens/migration.sql: wrap in a single
transaction; switch to CREATE { TABLE | INDEX } IF NOT EXISTS so a
partial-deploy retry is a no-op instead of "relation already exists";
guard the FK ADD with information_schema lookup for the same reason.
- Schema replaces the single-column `@@index([deviceId])` with a
composite `@@index([userId, deviceId])` (every lookup also filters on
userId; the old index would never have been used). Comment on
accessTokenHash corrected to HMAC-SHA-256.
Container / ops
- Dockerfile: install tzdata + ENV TZ=Europe/Berlin so the daily
pg-boss schedule (`30 2 * * *` Europe/Berlin) actually fires at 02:30
Berlin instead of silently falling back to UTC on the alpine base.
- docker-compose.yml: tighten the healthcheck to `wget --spider` (matches
the Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK style, doesn't pipe the body), pass through
BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS so a custom retention env reaches the container.
- .env.example: document every new env var added in this PR
(HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE, ENCRYPTION_KEYS, ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID,
BACKUP_S3_*, BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS) with
comments and the all-or-none semantics for the backup block.
491 tests still green, typecheck clean.
* chore: retrigger CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
145 lines
6.9 KiB
Bash
145 lines
6.9 KiB
Bash
# =============================================================================
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# HealthLog — Environment Configuration
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# =============================================================================
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# Copy this file to .env and fill in the values.
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# $ cp .env.example .env
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#
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# Required variables: DATABASE_URL or POSTGRES_PASSWORD, SESSION_SECRET,
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# ENCRYPTION_KEY, API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY
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#
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# Generate the three secrets with:
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# $ openssl rand -hex 32 # any UNIX shell
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# $ node -e 'console.log(require("crypto").randomBytes(32).toString("hex"))'
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#
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# All secrets must be 64-character hex strings (= 32 bytes).
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# =============================================================================
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Database
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# When using docker-compose.yml: the app container reaches Postgres via the
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# service name "db", so the hostname is "db" — NOT "localhost".
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# When developing without Docker (`pnpm dev` against a host-installed Postgres):
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# change the hostname to "localhost" and adjust the credentials.
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DATABASE_URL="postgresql://healthlog:CHANGE-ME@db:5432/healthlog?schema=public"
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# Postgres password — used both by the db service AND by DATABASE_URL above.
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# Pick a strong random password, e.g. `openssl rand -base64 24`.
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD="CHANGE-ME"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# App URL
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The public URL where users reach the app. Behind a reverse proxy with TLS,
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# this looks like https://healthlog.example.com. For local dev, leave default.
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NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL="http://localhost:3000"
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APP_URL="http://localhost:3000"
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# Node environment: "development" for `pnpm dev`, "production" for Docker.
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NODE_ENV="development"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Required Secrets — generate with `openssl rand -hex 32`
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Signs session cookies. Rotating it logs out everyone.
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SESSION_SECRET="REPLACE-WITH-OUTPUT-OF-openssl-rand-hex-32"
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# AES-256-GCM key for encrypting Withings tokens, GitHub PATs, AI provider
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# keys, and VAPID private keys at rest. Rotate carefully — old ciphertexts
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# need re-encryption.
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ENCRYPTION_KEY="REPLACE-WITH-OUTPUT-OF-openssl-rand-hex-32"
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# HMAC-SHA256 key for hashing external-API Bearer tokens before storing them
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# in the database. Rotating it invalidates all issued tokens.
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API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY="REPLACE-WITH-OUTPUT-OF-openssl-rand-hex-32"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Withings OAuth (optional — for automatic scale/BP/activity sync)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Register an app at https://developer.withings.com/ and paste the credentials
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# here. Per-user OAuth credentials can also be configured in Settings.
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# WITHINGS_CLIENT_ID=""
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# WITHINGS_CLIENT_SECRET=""
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# WITHINGS_REDIRECT_URI="https://healthlog.example.com/api/withings/callback"
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# WITHINGS_WEBHOOK_SECRET="" # any random string — used to harden the webhook URL
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Telegram (optional — webhook hardening)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Set to verify incoming Telegram updates. The bot token itself is configured
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# per-user in Settings (encrypted at rest).
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# TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET=""
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# AI Provider (optional)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Users bring their own API keys via Settings. No server-side key needed by
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# default. The admin can configure a fallback key in the Admin Panel.
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Structured Logging — Wide Events (optional, sensible defaults)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Levels: debug | info | warn | error
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# LOG_LEVEL="info"
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# Sample rate for successful requests (0.0 = sample nothing, 1.0 = log all).
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# Errors and slow requests are ALWAYS logged regardless of this setting.
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# LOG_SAMPLE_RATE="1.0"
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# Slow-request threshold in milliseconds — anything slower is always kept.
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# LOG_SLOW_THRESHOLD_MS="3000"
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# Include stack traces on error events. Disable in environments where logs
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# leave the host unencrypted.
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# LOG_INCLUDE_STACK="true"
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# Optional: ship Wide Events to Loki. Leave blank for stdout-only logging.
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# LOKI_ENDPOINT="http://loki:3100"
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# LOKI_USERNAME=""
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# LOKI_PASSWORD=""
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Process split (optional, single-container deploys ignore this)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# `all` — single container runs HTTP + reminder worker (default, legacy).
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# `web` — HTTP only; pair with a separate `app-worker` service.
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# `worker`— pg-boss only; rejects HTTP traffic with a 503.
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# See docs/self-hosting/scaling.md for the split-stack guide.
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# HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE="all"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Encryption-key versioning (optional — for at-rest key rotation)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# JSON map of key id → 64-hex-char or base64 32-byte key. When set, it
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# supersedes ENCRYPTION_KEY for new writes; old rows continue to decrypt under
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# their original id. ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID picks which entry encrypt() uses.
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# Run `pnpm tsx scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts <new-id>` to re-encrypt every
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# existing row under the new key. See docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md.
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# ENCRYPTION_KEYS='{"v1":"<old-key>","v2":"<new-key>"}'
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# ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID="v2"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Off-host backup (optional — daily encrypted dumps to an S3-compatible bucket)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Required ALL-OR-NONE: setting any of these without setting the rest disables
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# the backup silently. The backup runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin via pg-boss cron.
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# Restore with `pnpm tsx scripts/restore-backup.ts <userId> <YYYY-MM-DD>`.
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# See docs/ops/backup-restore.md for the format spec + step-by-step.
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# BACKUP_S3_ENDPOINT="https://<account>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com"
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# BACKUP_S3_BUCKET="healthlog-backups"
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# BACKUP_S3_ACCESS_KEY=""
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# BACKUP_S3_SECRET_KEY=""
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# BACKUP_S3_REGION="auto" # "auto" for Cloudflare R2; real region for AWS S3
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# BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS="30" # objects older than this are pruned (best-effort; prefer a bucket lifecycle rule)
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# BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY="" # 64-hex-char or base64 32-byte; SEPARATE from ENCRYPTION_KEY
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