HealthLog/CLAUDE.md

Contributor notes

Working notes for anyone (human or otherwise) editing this repository. Skim before the first PR; refer back when a convention question comes up. Pair with README.md (the public face) and CHANGELOG.md (the release history); this file is the maintainer's operating manual.

What HealthLog is

Self-hosted personal-health-tracking PWA: weight, blood pressure, pulse, body composition, glucose, sleep, mood, medication compliance. Withings + Apple Health sync, multi-provider AI Insights (BYOK or local), doctor-report PDF, native iOS client in public beta. Single docker compose up, Postgres-backed, AES-256-GCM at rest. PolyForm Noncommercial 1.0.0 (AGPL-3.0 through v1.15.18). Current line: v1.20.x.

Voice and privacy

Hard rules for every committed artefact — commit messages, CHANGELOG entries, PR bodies, code comments, GitHub release notes, docs site copy. Treat these as the project's public face.

• Voice. English. Maintainer prose: present-tense, imperative for commits, factual for prose. No marketing tone, no apology tone, no "wow what a cool feature" framing. The voice is one human writing notes for the next.
• No assistant / tooling references. Do not surface AI, agent, assistant, copilot, marathon, phase, wave, round, or session vocabulary into anything that lands on GitHub — including commit messages and trailers. Commits carry no Co-Authored-By tooling trailer; they are authored by the maintainer's git identity alone.
• No personal data. No real names (the maintainer's, a reporter's, or anyone else's). No live health figures, no live tenant identifiers, no real-account anchors. Generalise to "a self-hoster", "a user", "an operator", "an authenticated session", etc. The internal .planning/* files are gitignored and exempt; everywhere else in the repo, no.

If a draft commit message or release note would violate one of the three, rewrite it before committing. The git log is more durable than today's task.

Branch and release model

main is the single trunk and is always releasable. There is no long-lived develop branch — the former one was retired and archived as the tag archive/develop-pre-v1.5 (it carried no work absent from main; a long-lived integration branch has no role in a single-maintainer shop and only accrued back-merge debt). This is trunk-based development with release tags: short-lived branches off main, work always converges back onto main, and the immutable vX.Y.Z image built from a tag on main is the one source of truth — including for the OpenAPI contract the iOS client consumes.

• Trunk. main always builds, passes CI, and is deployable. Every commit on it is a release commit (chore(release): vX.Y.Z), a release-branch merge, or a maintenance commit (docs, gitignore, audit findings) applied directly.
• A release is built on a short-lived release/vX.Y.Z branch cut off main — built wave-by-wave, then opened as a PR release/vX.Y.Z → main with green CI, merged (merge-commit), and tagged vX.Y.Z. The tag push triggers docker-publish.yml (GHCR multi-arch + :latest). Deploy is manual (see docs/ops/deploy.md); after a deploy, verify /api/version (it returns version + buildSha + builtAt) on every target, since the :latest pull is the source of truth, not the queued deploy status. Delete the release branch after merge.
• Small standalone changes (a single fix, a docs touch) can go through a short-lived fix/X / feat/X branch + PR, or directly onto main when the maintainer chooses — main is the target either way.
• Hotfixes branch from main and merge straight back to main. There is no second long-lived line to forward-port to, so the old back-merge debt cannot recur by construction.
• Never force-push main or any release branch. Never skip hooks (--no-verify). Never --no-gpg-sign unless explicitly asked.

Semver

Prefer patch bumps. A release dominated by bug fixes plus additive features without breaking changes ships as vX.Y.Z+1, not vX.Y+1.0. Bumping minor is reserved for breaking changes, removed flags, deprecated routes, or multi-feature milestones framed as such (e.g. v1.5 = native iOS client + Apple Health integration). Pre-existing example: a v1.5.0 cut was rerouted to v1.4.14 mid-flight when the diff turned out to be bugfix-dominated.

Tech stack at a glance

Layer	Tech	Notes
Runtime	Node 22 (Alpine) + pnpm 10.31	Node version fixed only by the Dockerfile base image; no .nvmrc or engines.
Framework	Next.js 16.2.6 — App Router, output: "standalone"	SWC strips console.* in prod except error/warn.
Language	TypeScript 6, strict: true, moduleResolution: "bundler"	Path alias @/* → ./src/*. scripts/ excluded from typecheck.
UI	React 19 (exact pin), Tailwind 4, shadcn/ui (new-york style, zinc base), Radix, Lucide	Recharts 3 for charts — stays; replacement requires explicit approval.
Persistence	PostgreSQL 16 + Prisma 7.8 — 80 models	Generated client at src/generated/prisma. Production image ships a separate /opt/prisma-cli install + /opt/pg-boss runtime install (see Dockerfile:93-100).
Queue	pg-boss 12.18	Cron + retry semantics live in Postgres tables; workers under src/lib/jobs/.
Auth	@simplewebauthn/server 13, @node-rs/argon2 2	Passkey + Argon2id password, server-side sessions in Postgres.
Notifications	@parse/node-apn 8 (APNs), web-push 3 (VAPID), raw fetch for Telegram + ntfy	Per-channel recordPushAttempt row, hard-reject classification.
Forms / validation	react-hook-form 7 + zod 4 + @hookform/resolvers + zod-openapi 5	The Zod registry is the source of truth for docs/api/openapi.yaml.
Testing	Vitest 4 (unit + integration), Playwright 1.60 (e2e), @axe-core/playwright	Integration runs against a testcontainers/postgresql Postgres 16.
Container	Multi-stage Alpine Dockerfile, GHCR multi-arch (amd64 + arm64)	pull_policy: always in docker-compose.yml is load-bearing — without it Docker re-uses the stale :latest digest.

More detail in .planning/codebase/tech.md, generated as part of the v1.5.2 codebase audit.

How a request flows

client
  │ HTTP
  ▼
src/proxy.ts                         renamed from middleware.ts. Public-path allowlist,
  │                                  demo-mode mutation block, server-side onboarding
  │                                  redirect, worker-only refusal, request-id + nonce
  │                                  generation, every security header.
  ▼
src/app/<route>/route.ts             every API route wraps in `apiHandler(...)`
  │
  ▼
src/lib/api-handler.ts               WideEventBuilder + AsyncLocalStorage, auth resolver
  │                                  (cookie OR Bearer), idempotency, error envelope,
  │                                  GlitchTip forwarder. Cookie path can elevate to
  │                                  admin via requireAdmin(); Bearer never can.
  ▼
handler body                         Zod parse (`safeParse` + `returnAllZodIssues`),
  │                                  business logic, `annotate({ action, meta })`,
  │                                  `auditLog()` for sensitive ops.
  ▼
src/lib/api-response.ts              `apiSuccess(data, status?)` → `{ data, error: null }`;
  │                                  `apiError(msg, status, meta?)` threads `meta` on the
  │                                  error path only — `{ data: null, error, meta? }`.
  ▼
src/proxy.ts                         security headers attach, request-id echoes.
  ▼
client

The architecture map in .planning/codebase/arch.md walks each layer with file:line citations.

Code conventions

• UI work follows the design standards. .planning/audits/2026-07-05-fable/UI-STANDARDS.md is the binding design rulebook (card anatomy via TileHeader, spacing scale, text-colour rules — foreground for content, muted for meta only —, token discipline, primitive mapping). Read it before touching any surface; deviations need a written reason in the PR. Where the standards conflict with older in-file comments, the standards win.
• RSC by default. Server components are the default; add "use client" only when a hook, state, or browser API actually needs it.
• Every API route wraps in apiHandler, with three documented exceptions. The MCP OAuth routes (mcp/oauth/{authorize,token,register}) use withBackgroundEvent instead, because OAuth requires RFC-format error bodies that the standard envelope cannot express. They carry the same protections by hand — rate limit, body cap, kill switch, mandatory PKCE-S256, redirect-URI allowlist. Every other route wraps. Every body-accepting route runs Zod safeParse and returns 422 via returnAllZodIssues (multi-issue envelope sanitised against echoed input through sanitiseZodIssues).
• userId is always narrowed from session or Bearer. No route accepts userId as a body field — it comes from requireAuth() and feeds the Prisma where. The batch endpoints (/api/measurements/batch, /api/mood-entries/bulk, /api/medications/intake/bulk, /api/workouts/batch) don't even declare a userId field in their Zod schemas.
• No mass assignment. Every prisma.X.{create,update}({ data: ... }) builds its data object field-by-field from parsed.data, never by spreading the parsed object whole. tokens.create builds permissions from a hardcoded literal, never from request input.
• A two-ended change carries both ends. Adding a column, a payload field, or a user preference without its consumer is the failure mode this repo keeps rediscovering: the column ships with the schema change, the reader is "the follow-up", and nothing in the gate notices because every other check proves one end. So the consumer lands in the same release branch, or the schema comment says why it cannot: /// @internal: <reason> for something deliberately never surfaced, /// @pending-consumer(#issue) for a consumer that is genuinely still coming. pnpm dlx tsx scripts/audit-column-readers.ts sweeps for unannotated write-only columns and re-lists every @pending-consumer marker so a follow-up that never happened surfaces at the next release audit. Run it in the deep-audit step; it is a review tool with a grep-shaped matcher, deliberately not a gate. The two questions that can be answered exactly are gates instead — account-payload-consumer-guard.test.ts (every /api/auth/me field has a client reader) and measurement-backup-completeness.test.ts (every Measurement column reaches the backup).
• Bearer scope is fail-closed. requireAuth() with no argument admits a cookie session or a wildcard (["*"]) token only — a narrow-scope token is refused with 403 and an undeclared_scope audit row. A route that means to accept a narrow token names the scope: requireAuth(FHIR_READ_SCOPE). Adding a route therefore cannot silently widen an existing token's reach, because the default arm denies. Only the login / passkey / refresh paths mint ["*"]; every user-facing mint is narrow, and narrow now means narrow. Two surfaces resolve a Bearer token outside requireAuth — /api/ingest/medication and /mcp — and that set is frozen by a structural test (src/__tests__/bearer-scope-enforcement-guard.test.ts).
• requireAdmin() is cookie-only. Bearer tokens — even with ["*"] scope — cannot reach admin endpoints. This is a structural boundary in requireAdmin() (src/lib/api-handler.ts), not a runtime check that future code can soften.
• Raw SQL is parameter-bound or whitelist-spliced. Every $queryRaw uses tagged-template parameters. Every $queryRawUnsafe / $executeRawUnsafe either passes positional $N placeholders with an argument array OR splices a value already asserted against a closed enum + regex (see the whitelist-splice block in src/lib/rollups/measurement-rollups.ts, around the $queryRawUnsafe calls). Inline comments document the whitelist at the splice point.
• TanStack Query keys live in the centralised factory. src/lib/query-keys/ (16 modules, index.ts barrel) is the only legal source of queryKey / mutationKey arrays. The in-repo ESLint rule healthlog/queryKey-factory (set to error) flags any bare array. Same-key + different queryFn shape silently poisons the cache; the factory prevents it. Every read unwraps (await res.json()).data from the envelope.
• annotate() on every interesting code path. Wide-event observability. Action names follow <surface>.<noun>.<verb> (coach.budget.exceeded, measurement.batch.ingest). Don't free-text in meta — pin the shape so dashboards stay stable.
• i18n keys exist for every t() call. i18n-call-site-coverage.test.ts walks every .ts(x) under src/, extracts every t("ns.key") literal, and asserts each key resolves in messages/en.json. i18n-locale-integrity.test.ts propagates the EN guarantee across de / en / es / fr / it / pl. If a guard fails, fix the bundle, don't suppress the test.
• OpenAPI registry stays in sync. Zod schemas carry .meta() annotations under src/lib/openapi/; pnpm openapi:generate emits docs/api/openapi.yaml. CI fails on drift. Re-run the generator after touching a request / response schema and commit the YAML alongside the Zod change.
• File naming. Components and lib files: kebab-case (daily-briefing.tsx, secure-cookie.ts). Hooks: use- prefix kebab-case (use-coach-prefs.ts). React component exports stay PascalCase regardless of filename.

Tests and commands

• pnpm typecheck — tsc --noEmit. Required before every commit.
• pnpm lint — ESLint flat config with eslint-config-next + the project's healthlog/queryKey-factory rule. One harmless warning in withings/resume/__tests__/route.test.ts is allowed; everything else should be clean.
• pnpm test — Vitest 4 unit + component suite. Required before pushing a fix; full suite is fast (~30 s).
• pnpm test:integration — Vitest against a testcontainers/postgresql Postgres 16. Needs Docker / OrbStack running. Slower but pins the contracts the unit-mocks can't.
• pnpm e2e — Playwright against pnpm exec next build + Postgres. Heavy; CI runs it, locally only when touching UI flows.
• pnpm openapi:generate — regenerates docs/api/openapi.yaml from the Zod registry. Run after any request / response schema change. CI's openapi:check fails the build on drift.
• pnpm check-env — validates that .env.production.example covers every required variable. Wired into CI as env-check.yml.
• pnpm bundle-report / ANALYZE=1 pnpm build — bundle inspection. Use when a feature adds material weight.
• One-shot scripts live in scripts/. Run them via pnpm dlx tsx scripts/<file>.ts — the production standalone image strips tsx and the bare pnpm tsx ... invocation fails inside the container. Recurring tasks belong on pg-boss, not on a CLI script.

Critical-files map

Concern	File	What it owns
HTTP edge	src/proxy.ts	Public-path allowlist, demo-mode block, onboarding redirect, request-id + CSP nonce, every security header, worker-only refusal.
API kit	src/lib/api-handler.ts	apiHandler wrapper, requireAuth / requireAdmin, idempotency plumbing, GlitchTip forwarder.
Response envelope	src/lib/api-response.ts	apiSuccess / apiError, safeJson (now with opt-in maxBytes), trusted-proxy IP resolver, returnAllZodIssues + sanitiseZodIssues.
Crypto at rest	src/lib/crypto.ts	AES-256-GCM with versioned key ids, extractKeyId, fail-closed loader, rotation primitives. Rotation CLI: scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts.
Session	src/lib/auth/session.ts + src/lib/auth/secure-cookie.ts	Postgres-backed sessions, sliding 30-day expiry, shouldEmitSecureCookie() the one source of truth for the Secure flag (every cookie setter routes through it).
Refresh tokens	src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts	Per-device one-time-use rotation with reuse-detection that revokes the device's token family.
Bearer tokens	src/lib/auth/hmac.ts + src/lib/auth/issue-token.ts	HMAC-SHA256 hashing under API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY; no plaintext path; lastUsedAt updated fire-and-forget.
Rollup tier	src/lib/rollups/	DAY / WEEK / MONTH / YEAR pre-aggregations. Read-swap pattern: try the rollup, fall back to live SQL only on coverage miss. Boot-time rollup-full-backfill queue handles new accounts.
Compliance	src/lib/analytics/compliance.ts	Cadence-aware medication compliance — daysOfWeek + intervalWeeks honoured across the eight call sites that surface a rate (Coach prompt, BP-status gate, dashboard pillar, …).
AI providers	src/lib/ai/provider.ts (resolveProvider) + src/lib/ai/provider-chain.ts (PROVIDER_CHAIN_TYPES) + src/lib/ai/{openai,anthropic,local,codex,mock}-client.ts	Five providers, hand-rolled fetch over the documented wire (no vendor SDKs). Mock is excluded structurally by the PROVIDER_CHAIN_TYPES allowlist — production cannot reach it.
Notification dispatcher	src/lib/notifications/dispatcher.ts + src/lib/notifications/senders/	APNs → Telegram → ntfy → Web Push cascade, hard-reject classification, push_attempts ledger with 90-day retention.
Coach	src/app/api/insights/chat/route.ts + src/lib/ai/coach/	SSE stream, budget gate + per-user rate gate, refusal detector, snapshot builder, message persistence with encryptedContent Bytes column.
OpenAPI	src/lib/openapi/registry.ts + src/lib/openapi/routes/ (23 modules, index.ts barrel)	Source of truth for docs/api/openapi.yaml.
Schema	prisma/schema.prisma (80 models)	cuid() PKs, snake_case columns via @map, encrypted columns mostly under *Encrypted (search the file).
Compose	docker-compose.yml	app + db. Env-var whitelist under environment: — vars not listed never reach the container. pull_policy: always is load-bearing.

.planning/codebase/arch.md carries the full annotated walk for every section.

Security-relevant patterns

The v1.5.2 audit produced .planning/security-audit-v1.5.2.md and a stack of per-domain findings under .planning/security-audit-findings/. The patterns worth preserving on future churn:

• Encryption: fail closed everywhere. Missing keys, malformed JSON, unknown key ids — every path throws rather than silently writing plaintext. Operators rotating keys must keep the legacy entry in ENCRYPTION_KEYS until the rotation script reports zero remaining legacy rows. The script covers every *Encrypted column + CoachMessage.encryptedContent (Bytes) + IntegrationStatus.lastError.
• SSRF: input-time isPublicUrl is the floor. The helper isPublicUrl() in src/lib/validations/notifications.ts catches every IPv4 / IPv6 alt-notation class (octal / hex / decimal IPv4, IPv4-mapped IPv6, IPv6 ULA, CGNAT, link-local, loopback, metadata). Use it for every outbound URL that comes from a user / admin input. DNS rebinding and the redirect-follow gap remain as architectural follow-ups (issues #217 + #218). Until those land, every NEW outbound fetch() that touches a user-controlled host must pin redirect: "manual" and an AbortSignal.timeout.
• Outbound egress goes through safeFetch. src/lib/safe-fetch.ts is the one documented egress entry (redirect: "manual" + AbortSignal.timeout(15_000) defaults; opt into the connect-time DNS-rebinding pin with requirePublicHost: true for any operator- or user-supplied host). The in-repo ESLint rule healthlog/safe-fetch-required (set to error) bans raw fetch( under src/lib/ + src/app/ outside the wrapper internals and test files; same-origin relative-path (/api/…) client fetches are exempt by construction.
• Rate limits live in Postgres. src/lib/rate-limit.ts uses a single atomic SQL upsert returning {count, reset_at}. Multi-instance correctness is structural. Bucket-key convention: <surface>:${identifier} where identifier is userId for authenticated routes and the trusted-proxy IP for anonymous. Anonymous auth surfaces use checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit(...) so a trust-violation collapses every anonymous caller into a single tight bucket rather than a free-for-all under the unknown-IP bucket.
• Webhooks: shared-secret + timingSafeEqual + per-source rate limit BEFORE secret verification. Withings, Telegram, the Coolify deploy webhook, and the CSP report endpoint all follow this exact pattern. The Withings path-segment secret is scrubbed from http.path / http.route by redactSecrets() via the PATH_SECRET_PATHS registry in src/lib/logging/redact.ts:40.
• Idempotency keys are user-scoped, length-bounded, and refuse to cache secret-shaped responses. src/lib/idempotency.ts. A client cannot replay another user's idempotency key (composite unique index by userId_key_method_path). The cache helper refuses to persist a response body containing hlk_ / hlr_ / sk- patterns even if a future caller wraps an auth endpoint by mistake.
• CSP: strict, per-request nonce, surgical connect-src. Production CSP gates third-party hosts to the routes that need them — AI hosts only on /settings/ai/*, wbsapi.withings.net only on /settings/integrations/withings/* + /api/withings/*. Exactly one dangerouslySetInnerHTML in the tree (the theme bootstrap in src/app/layout.tsx, nonce-bound, file-literal content). No markdown library installed anywhere; Coach / briefing / insights render as plain React text children. Don't add one without a security review of the renderer's HTML-allow defaults.
• No CORS headers anywhere. Same-origin-only by construction. Adding Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * anywhere would silently open every authenticated endpoint to cross-origin POST; webhook routes accept cross-origin POSTs but they authenticate by header secret, not cookie.
• Redaction at the egress boundary, not at the call site. redactSecrets() + redactSensitiveFields() + redactOptional() are applied centrally in WideEventBuilder and reportToGlitchtip. Don't add new redactor calls in handler bodies — extend the central denylists in src/lib/observability/redact-payload.ts and src/lib/logging/redact.ts.

Self-hosting gotchas

These keep tripping operators; they're worth knowing before you push something that breaks them.

• SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE controls the Secure flag on every cookie the app issues. Unset → flag tracks NODE_ENV === "production". Set to false for LAN / Tailscale / VPN-only HTTP self-hosts where the operator deliberately serves plain HTTP. Set to true to force the flag even in dev. The compose environment: block must list it explicitly — vars not on the whitelist don't reach the container even when .env has them. v1.5.2 closed the missing-whitelist regression.
• pull_policy: always in docker-compose.yml is load-bearing. Without it Docker keeps a stale :latest digest cached and silently skips the registry round-trip on compose up.
• ENCRYPTION_KEYS map vs legacy ENCRYPTION_KEY. The map ({"v1":"<hex>","v2":"<hex>"} + ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID=v2) is the modern path. The legacy single-key env var stays accepted as v1. Rotation playbook lives at docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md; do NOT drop a key from the map before the rotation script reports zero remaining rows on that key.
• GeoLite2 databases. Operators run scripts/fetch-geolite2.sh with a MaxMind licence key before docker build; the image bakes the MMDBs into /opt/geolite2/. Without them the resolver falls back to online ipwho.is and the admin login overview surfaces "unknown" for offline lookups.
• APNs .p8 key. v1.4.47.x established APNS_KEY_B64 as the env-var contract — pasting the PEM body verbatim through Coolify's env_file mangled the literal newlines. The key must be scoped "Sandbox & Production" in the Apple Developer Portal; a Sandbox-only key fails with BadEnvironmentKeyInToken on production builds.

iOS handoff

The native SwiftUI client lives in a separate repository and rides public beta via TestFlight. Backend contract the iOS app speaks against is locked in docs/api/openapi.yaml and has been continuously validated since v1.4.23. Coordination notes worth knowing on the backend side:

• POST /api/measurements/batch recognises externalId values starting with stats: (e.g. stats:HKQuantityTypeIdentifierStepCount:YYYY-MM-DD) as overwrites — a re-post replaces the row's value / unit / measuredAt / externalSourceVersion / deviceType / sleepStage. Every other externalId prefix (uuid-*, opaque HK identifiers) keeps the first-write-wins immutable contract because each sample is a canonical reading. Per-entry status field carries "updated" for an overwrite vs "inserted" for a fresh row.
• Refresh-token rotation is per-device; reuse-detection revokes the family scoped to that device.
• requireAdmin() is cookie-only by construction — a Bearer token, even with ["*"] scope, cannot reach /api/admin/*. The iOS app is not an admin client.
• The clientManaged opt-in on PATCH /api/auth/me/notification-prefs suppresses server-side MEDICATION_REMINDER APNs for clients that manage their own local reminders. The cron skips dose-due APNs when the flag is true and emits a medication_reminder.suppressed_client_managed wide-event annotation per skip.
• push_attempts table holds the last 90 days of APNS / Web-Push / Telegram / NTFY delivery attempts (channel + eventType + result + reason + createdAt). The admin diagnostic endpoint at /api/admin/notifications/diagnostic surfaces masked device tokens + channel state + last 20 attempts for the calling user.
• Any request / response schema change must regen docs/api/openapi.yaml and commit the result. CI fails on drift.
• The iOS app signs in via the native OIDC SSO handoff or password/passkey. The native SSO leg: the app opens GET /api/auth/oidc/login?client=native&code_challenge=<S256> in an ASWebAuthenticationSession, the callback returns to the fixed compiled-in scheme healthlog://oidc-callback with a one-time code=hlh_… (or an mfa_ticket when the account has a second factor), and the app exchanges the code at POST /api/auth/oidc/native/token for the standard native bundle (src/lib/auth/oidc-native-handoff.ts). The healthlog:// scheme is a compile-time constant — no redirect_uri param, no env allowlist (the open-redirect class is removed by construction). The token pair NEVER rides a URL; only the opaque handoff code / MFA ticket do. The SSO login can never satisfy requireFreshMfa step-up — the native transport is Bearer and requireFreshMfa is cookie-only, and even the web path sets mfaVerifiedAt only from the app's own factor. OIDC_ONLY=true is now supported for iOS but requires the app build that ships this flow; an older password/passkey-only build is locked out. The MFA-verify and /api/auth/refresh routes that complete/rotate an OIDC login are deliberately not OIDC-only-blocked.

DO-NOTs

• No --no-verify on commits. If a pre-commit hook fails, fix the cause; never bypass.
• No --no-gpg-sign unless explicitly asked.
• No force-push to main (or to release branches, by extension).
• No destructive git operations as shortcuts. git reset --hard, git clean -fd, git checkout . etc. only when the maintainer asked or the state is unambiguously local-only.
• No assistant / planning vocabulary in any committed artefact — see Voice and privacy above.
• No personal names — the maintainer's, a reporter's, or anyone else's — in any committed artefact, including code comments referring to "the user who reported issue #X".
• No secret-shaped strings in .env.example or git history. Pre-existing scan shows clean.
• No markdown library in dependencies. Coach + briefing + insights render as React text children for XSS reasons; adding one is a security decision, not a UX one.
• No Access-Control-Allow-Origin headers anywhere except the documented webhook surfaces — and those authenticate via header secret, not cookie.
• No pnpm tsx scripts/foo.ts in production. The standalone image strips tsx. One-shot scripts run via pnpm dlx tsx; recurring tasks belong on pg-boss.
• No backwards-compatibility shims for hypothetical callers. When a change is clean, make it cleanly; do not leave dead branches "in case" something we don't ship needs them.

Pointers

What	Where
Public face	README.md
Release history	CHANGELOG.md
Codebase audit (v1.5.2)	.planning/codebase/{tech,arch,quality,concerns}.md
Security audit (v1.5.2)	.planning/security-audit-v1.5.2.md + .planning/security-audit-findings/*
Operator runbooks	docs/ops/ (deploy, encryption-key-rotation, env-check, backup-restore, migrations)
Self-hosting guide	docs/self-hosting/
Public API contract	docs/api/openapi.yaml
Architecture diagrams	docs/diagrams/ (rendered through docs.healthlog.dev)
iOS coordination notes	.planning/ios-coord/
Maintainer working notes	.planning/PROJECT.md, .planning/ROADMAP.md, .planning/STATE.md (gitignored release scratch lives alongside; the patterns are in .gitignore)
Personal preferences + collaboration memory	~/.claude/projects/-Users-marc-Projects-HealthLog/memory/MEMORY.md (local to the maintainer's working copy; not in the repo)

Agent context hygiene (ECONNRESET / oversized-request prevention)

• NEVER read src/generated/** — Prisma-generated client (~9 MB, 83 files incl. a 224 KB+ inline schema). Reading/grepping it explodes the request context → 10-min "cogitations" + ECONNRESETon large turns. Regenerate viapnpm prisma generateif needed; never open it. (Enforced via.claude/settings.local.json Read-deny.)
• Avoid bulk-reading other large artifacts: pnpm-lock.yaml, CHANGELOG.md, messages/*.json, docs/api/openapi.yaml — grep narrowly instead of full reads.
• For very large multi-agent actions: cap concurrent sub-agents (many simultaneous streaming requests + big context is the worst combo for connection resets). When on a VPN (Tailscale MTU 1280 / iCloud Private Relay), large requests can hit MTU black-holes — disable the tunnel for heavy sessions.