Files
HealthLog/src/app/api/devices/route.ts
T
Marc-André BombeckandClaude Opus 4.7 b9ade5b519 fix(api): address review findings — N+1, idempotency cache safety, device hijack guard
Three fixes from the 5-way review on PR #117:

1. Insights cards: replace per-medication N+1 query with single batched
   findMany + JS bucketing. For users with many active medications this
   collapses 10+ sequential round-trips into one.

2. Idempotency cache: only persist 2xx/3xx and validation 4xx responses.
   401/403/408/429/5xx are now skipped — a stale 401 (token expired
   mid-flight) or transient 5xx must not be replayed for 24h. Adds a
   defence-in-depth check that refuses to cache any body containing
   "hlk_" so a future caller wrapping an auth route in withIdempotency
   cannot leak a freshly-issued bearer token through the cache.

3. Devices: reject cross-user token re-registration with 409. Prior
   behaviour silently transferred ownership on findUnique-by-token,
   which would let anyone who learns/guesses an APNs token redirect
   another user's pushes. Audit-logs the denial with reason.

Tests adjusted: device-hijack test now expects 409, plus a new test
for same-user re-registration. 279/279 tests passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-03 22:08:53 +02:00

97 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* POST /api/devices
*
* APNs device registration. Native clients call this on login and on
* APNs token rotation. We upsert by `token`; sending the same token on a
* different account simply transfers ownership.
*
* No APNs send-side logic lives here — that ships in Phase 8.
*/
import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import { z } from "zod/v4";
import { apiHandler, requireAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
import { apiError, apiSuccess, safeJson } from "@/lib/api-response";
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
const deviceSchema = z.object({
token: z
.string()
.min(8)
.max(512)
.regex(/^[A-Za-z0-9+/=._:-]+$/, "Invalid token format"),
bundleId: z.string().min(1).max(128),
locale: z.string().min(2).max(16).optional(),
appVersion: z.string().min(1).max(32).optional(),
model: z.string().min(1).max(64).optional(),
});
export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
const { user } = await requireAuth();
const { data: body, error } = await safeJson(request);
if (error) return error;
const parsed = deviceSchema.safeParse(body);
if (!parsed.success) {
return apiError(parsed.error.issues[0].message, 422);
}
const { token, bundleId, locale, appVersion, model } = parsed.data;
const existing = await prisma.device.findUnique({ where: { token } });
let id: string;
if (existing) {
// Cross-user-hijack guard: a device-token belongs to exactly one user.
// Re-registering the same token under a different account is rejected
// — APNs tokens aren't a secret, so trusting the wire input would let
// anyone who learns/guesses a token redirect another user's pushes.
if (existing.userId !== user.id) {
await auditLog("device.register.denied", {
userId: user.id,
details: { reason: "token_owned_by_other_user", deviceId: existing.id },
});
return apiError("Device token already registered to another account", 409);
}
const updated = await prisma.device.update({
where: { token },
data: {
platform: "ios",
bundleId,
locale: locale ?? null,
appVersion: appVersion ?? null,
model: model ?? null,
lastSeen: new Date(),
},
select: { id: true },
});
id = updated.id;
} else {
const created = await prisma.device.create({
data: {
userId: user.id,
platform: "ios",
token,
bundleId,
locale: locale ?? null,
appVersion: appVersion ?? null,
model: model ?? null,
},
select: { id: true },
});
id = created.id;
}
await auditLog("devices.register", {
userId: user.id,
details: { deviceId: id, bundleId, model: model ?? null },
});
annotate({
action: { name: "devices.register", entity_type: "device", entity_id: id },
});
return apiSuccess({ id }, 201);
});