mirror of
https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog.git
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Marc-André Bombeck
a43f704690
The Coolify-fronted HealthLog stack sits behind Cloudflare, which strips and re-sets `cf-connecting-ip` on every request that lands on its edge. Without consulting this header, `getClientIp` reads the Caddy loopback IP off the `X-Forwarded-For` chain and the admin sign-in geo lookup ends up with a null IP for every visitor — Marc's "Standort" column rendered a literal "—" on every row of the sign-in overview even after v1.4.36 closed the missing-ASN fallback. The new branch prefers `cf-connecting-ip` ahead of the XFF / x-real-ip chain, but only when the operator opts in via `TRUST_CF_CONNECTING_IP=1`. A self-hosted deployment without Cloudflare in front MUST leave the flag off — an attacker can set the header directly on the public internet, and the downstream geo resolver would happily report a forged location. The trust-violation accounting in `getClientIpOrTrustWarning` skips when the CF header satisfies the lookup because Cloudflare re-sets the value on every edge request — there is no chain to violate. The existing XFF + x-real-ip semantics are unchanged for every deployment that leaves the flag unset. `.env.example` documents the flag in a dedicated "Reverse-proxy trust" block right above the process-split section so the operator finds it next to the existing infra-trust controls.
196 lines
9.9 KiB
Bash
196 lines
9.9 KiB
Bash
# =============================================================================
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# HealthLog — Environment Configuration
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# =============================================================================
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# Copy this file to .env and fill in the values.
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# $ cp .env.example .env
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#
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# Required variables: DATABASE_URL or POSTGRES_PASSWORD,
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# ENCRYPTION_KEY, API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY
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#
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# Generate the two secrets with:
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# $ openssl rand -hex 32 # any UNIX shell
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# $ node -e 'console.log(require("crypto").randomBytes(32).toString("hex"))'
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#
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# All secrets must be 64-character hex strings (= 32 bytes).
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# =============================================================================
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Database
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# When using docker-compose.yml: the app container reaches Postgres via the
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# service name "db", so the hostname is "db" — NOT "localhost".
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# When developing without Docker (`pnpm dev` against a host-installed Postgres):
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# change the hostname to "localhost" and adjust the credentials.
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DATABASE_URL="postgresql://healthlog:CHANGE-ME@db:5432/healthlog?schema=public"
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# Postgres password — used both by the db service AND by DATABASE_URL above.
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# Pick a strong random password, e.g. `openssl rand -base64 24`.
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD="CHANGE-ME"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# App URL
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The public URL where users reach the app. Behind a reverse proxy with TLS,
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# this looks like https://healthlog.example.com. For local dev, leave default.
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NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL="http://localhost:3000"
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APP_URL="http://localhost:3000"
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# Node environment: "development" for `pnpm dev`, "production" for Docker.
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NODE_ENV="development"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Required Secrets — generate with `openssl rand -hex 32`
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# AES-256-GCM key for encrypting Withings tokens, GitHub PATs, AI provider
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# keys, and VAPID private keys at rest. Rotate carefully — old ciphertexts
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# need re-encryption.
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ENCRYPTION_KEY="REPLACE-WITH-OUTPUT-OF-openssl-rand-hex-32"
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# HMAC-SHA256 key for hashing external-API Bearer tokens before storing them
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# in the database. Rotating it invalidates all issued tokens.
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API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY="REPLACE-WITH-OUTPUT-OF-openssl-rand-hex-32"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Withings OAuth (optional — for automatic scale/BP/activity sync)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Register an app at https://developer.withings.com/ and paste the credentials
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# here. Per-user OAuth credentials can also be configured in Settings.
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# WITHINGS_CLIENT_ID=""
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# WITHINGS_CLIENT_SECRET=""
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# WITHINGS_REDIRECT_URI="https://healthlog.example.com/api/withings/callback"
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# WITHINGS_WEBHOOK_SECRET="" # any random string — used to harden the webhook URL
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Telegram (optional — webhook hardening)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Set to verify incoming Telegram updates. The bot token itself is configured
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# per-user in Settings (encrypted at rest).
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# TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET=""
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# AI Provider (optional)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Users bring their own API keys via Settings. No server-side key needed by
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# default. The admin can configure a fallback key in the Admin Panel.
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# Maximum number of comprehensive-insight generations a single user can
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# trigger per hour (POST /api/insights/generate). Default 10. The 24h
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# DB cache short-circuits this for read traffic; only force=true and
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# expired-cache regenerations consume tokens. Lower this when running
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# on a tight LLM budget.
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# INSIGHTS_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR="10"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Structured Logging — Wide Events (optional, sensible defaults)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Levels: debug | info | warn | error
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# LOG_LEVEL="info"
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# Sample rate for successful requests (0.0 = sample nothing, 1.0 = log all).
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# Errors and slow requests are ALWAYS logged regardless of this setting.
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# LOG_SAMPLE_RATE="1.0"
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# Slow-request threshold in milliseconds — anything slower is always kept.
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# LOG_SLOW_THRESHOLD_MS="3000"
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# Include stack traces on error events. Disable in environments where logs
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# leave the host unencrypted.
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# LOG_INCLUDE_STACK="true"
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# Optional: ship Wide Events to Loki. Leave blank for stdout-only logging.
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# LOKI_ENDPOINT="http://loki:3100"
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# LOKI_USERNAME=""
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# LOKI_PASSWORD=""
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Reverse-proxy trust (optional, defaults match a single-proxy stack)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# When HealthLog sits behind Cloudflare (Tunnel, Workers, classic proxy),
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# the visitor IP arrives in the `CF-Connecting-IP` header — the upstream
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# `X-Forwarded-For` chain stops at the Coolify / Caddy loopback and the
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# admin sign-in geo lookup has no signal to resolve from.
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#
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# Set this to "1" ONLY when every public request goes through Cloudflare.
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# A deployment without Cloudflare in front MUST leave this off — an
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# attacker can set the header directly on the public internet and the geo
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# resolver would happily report a forged location.
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# TRUST_CF_CONNECTING_IP=""
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Process split (optional, single-container deploys ignore this)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# `all` — single container runs HTTP + reminder worker (default, legacy).
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# `web` — HTTP only; pair with a separate `app-worker` service.
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# `worker`— pg-boss only; rejects HTTP traffic with a 503.
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# See docs/self-hosting/scaling.md for the split-stack guide.
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# HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE="all"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Encryption-key versioning (optional — for at-rest key rotation)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# JSON map of key id → 64-hex-char or base64 32-byte key. When set, it
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# supersedes ENCRYPTION_KEY for new writes; old rows continue to decrypt under
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# their original id. ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID picks which entry encrypt() uses.
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# Run `pnpm tsx scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts <new-id>` to re-encrypt every
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# existing row under the new key. See docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md.
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# ENCRYPTION_KEYS='{"v1":"<old-key>","v2":"<new-key>"}'
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# ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID="v2"
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Off-host backup (optional — daily encrypted dumps to an S3-compatible bucket)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Required ALL-OR-NONE: setting any of these without setting the rest disables
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# the backup silently. The backup runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin via pg-boss cron.
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# Restore with `pnpm tsx scripts/restore-backup.ts <userId> <YYYY-MM-DD>`.
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# See docs/ops/backup-restore.md for the format spec + step-by-step.
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# BACKUP_S3_ENDPOINT="https://<account>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com"
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# BACKUP_S3_BUCKET="healthlog-backups"
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# BACKUP_S3_ACCESS_KEY=""
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# BACKUP_S3_SECRET_KEY=""
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# BACKUP_S3_REGION="auto" # "auto" for Cloudflare R2; real region for AWS S3
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# BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS="30" # objects older than this are pruned (best-effort; prefer a bucket lifecycle rule)
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# BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY="" # 64-hex-char or base64 32-byte; SEPARATE from ENCRYPTION_KEY
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# APNs — Apple Push Notification service (v1.4.23+, optional)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# All four core APNS_* vars must be set together for APNs to fan out to iOS
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# devices. Leaving them unset disables the channel silently — the dispatcher
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# falls back to Telegram → ntfy → Web Push as before.
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#
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# Provision an APNs auth key (.p8) at https://developer.apple.com/account/
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# under Certificates, Identifiers & Profiles → Keys → APNs.
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#
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# APNS_KEY (preferred for 12-factor / Coolify env-block) and APNS_KEY_FILE
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# (filesystem path) are mutually exclusive — pick one. APNS_KEY accepts the
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# multi-line PEM body with literal newlines OR `\n` escapes.
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# APNS_KEY_ID="" # 10-char Key ID from Apple Developer (e.g. ABCDE12345)
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# APNS_TEAM_ID="" # 10-char Team ID from Apple Developer
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# APNS_BUNDLE_ID="" # iOS app bundle id (e.g. dev.healthlog.ios)
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# APNS_KEY="" # APNs auth key as PEM body (multi-line OK with \n escapes); preferred over APNS_KEY_FILE
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# APNS_KEY_FILE="" # Alternate: filesystem path to .p8 file
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# APNS_PRODUCTION="" # "true" to force the production gateway; default = mirror Device.apnsEnvironment
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Auto-deploy webhook (v1.4.15 — phase C2)
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Coolify (or any CI) pings POST /api/internal/deploy-webhook after a deploy
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# attempt with success/failure. We verify the request via this shared secret
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# carried in the `X-Deploy-Webhook-Secret` header (timing-safe compare).
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# Generate with `openssl rand -hex 32`. Configure the SAME value in Coolify's
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# Notifications → Webhook custom-headers panel. See docs/audit/v1415-auto-deploy.md.
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# DEPLOY_WEBHOOK_SECRET=""
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