Files
HealthLog/src/lib/rate-limit.ts
T
Marc-André Bombeck d324d5162b feat(rate-limit): tighten anonymous bucket on trust-chain misconfig
v1.4.43 W13 M-4 — every IP-keyed auth surface (login, register,
passkey/login-options, passkey/login-verify, refresh, check-user)
falls back to a literal `{prefix}:unknown` rate-limit bucket when
`getClientIp` returns null. A misconfigured `TRUST_PROXY_HOPS`
silently degrades precision for the rest of the process lifetime
(the warning fires once); one attacker exhausting the
`auth:login:unknown` bucket then locks every other anonymous
caller out of the surface.

The `checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit` wrapper consults
`getClientIpOrTrustWarning`: clean chain → existing per-IP
semantics, byte-equivalent; `trustViolation === true` → routes
to a single global `auth:anon:trust-violation` bucket capped at
100/15min across every auth surface. The blast radius caps while
the operator fixes the proxy chain.

Auth-surface routes converted to the wrapper:
- /api/auth/login (5/15min per IP, 100/15min global on violation)
- /api/auth/register (5/15min)
- /api/auth/passkey/login-options (10/15min)
- /api/auth/passkey/login-verify (10/15min)
- /api/auth/refresh (60/15min)
- /api/auth/check-user (30/15min)

/api/auth/password is keyed by `user.id` (already authenticated)
so it stays on `checkRateLimit` directly.
2026-05-21 22:19:57 +02:00

128 lines
4.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* PostgreSQL-based sliding window rate limiter.
* Uses atomic upsert via raw SQL for correctness across multiple instances.
*/
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import { getClientIpOrTrustWarning } from "@/lib/api-response";
export interface RateLimitResult {
allowed: boolean;
remaining: number;
resetAt: number;
}
/**
* Check rate limit for a given key.
* Uses a single atomic SQL upsert — safe for concurrent requests.
* @param key Unique identifier (e.g., "auth:login:1.2.3.4")
* @param limit Max requests per window
* @param windowMs Window duration in milliseconds
*/
export async function checkRateLimit(
key: string,
limit: number,
windowMs: number,
): Promise<RateLimitResult> {
const windowInterval = `${windowMs} milliseconds`;
const rows = await prisma.$queryRaw<{ count: number; reset_at: Date }[]>`
INSERT INTO rate_limits (key, count, reset_at)
VALUES (${key}, 1, NOW() + ${windowInterval}::interval)
ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE SET
count = CASE
WHEN rate_limits.reset_at < NOW() THEN 1
ELSE rate_limits.count + 1
END,
reset_at = CASE
WHEN rate_limits.reset_at < NOW() THEN NOW() + ${windowInterval}::interval
ELSE rate_limits.reset_at
END
RETURNING count, reset_at
`;
const row = rows[0];
const resetAt = row.reset_at.getTime();
const count = Number(row.count);
return {
allowed: count <= limit,
remaining: Math.max(0, limit - count),
resetAt,
};
}
/**
* Rate limit response headers.
*/
export function rateLimitHeaders(
result: RateLimitResult,
): Record<string, string> {
return {
"X-RateLimit-Remaining": String(result.remaining),
"X-RateLimit-Reset": new Date(result.resetAt).toISOString(),
};
}
/**
* v1.4.43 W13 M-4 — anonymous/trust-violation bucket key shared by every
* caller of `checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit`. When `TRUST_PROXY_HOPS` and the
* actual proxy chain don't agree, `getClientIp` returns null and every
* caller falls back to a literal `"unknown"` rate-limit bucket. Any
* attacker can then exhaust the `auth:login:unknown` bucket and lock
* every other legitimate anonymous caller out of the surface.
*
* The tighter bucket is shared across every auth surface — a misconfigured
* deployment with the trust chain broken accepts at most this many
* anonymous attempts across login + register + passkey-verify + … per
* window. Operators see the once-per-process `console.warn` from
* `getClientIpOrTrustWarning` and fix the proxy chain; the tight bucket
* caps the blast radius while they do.
*/
const TIGHT_ANON_KEY = "auth:anon:trust-violation";
const TIGHT_ANON_LIMIT = 100;
const TIGHT_ANON_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
/**
* Rate-limit helper for anonymous auth surfaces (login, register,
* passkey-login-{options,verify}, refresh, check-user).
*
* Per-IP path: when the trust chain resolves cleanly, route the request
* to a bucket keyed by `{prefix}:{ip ?? "unknown"}` with the caller's
* supplied limit + window. Existing semantics, byte-for-byte.
*
* Tightened path: when `getClientIpOrTrustWarning` reports
* `trustViolation === true`, the configured proxy hops and the actual
* chain length don't match. Every anonymous caller already shares a
* single `"unknown"` bucket on the per-IP path; this helper instead
* routes them to a fixed global bucket with a strict 100/15min cap.
* One attacker can no longer exhaust the per-surface bucket — they hit
* the global cap first, and every other anonymous caller on any auth
* surface shares the same cap.
*
* The returned shape matches `checkRateLimit` so call sites can attach
* `rateLimitHeaders(rl)` unchanged.
*/
export async function checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit(
request: Request,
prefix: string,
perIpLimit: number,
windowMs: number,
): Promise<RateLimitResult & { ip: string | null }> {
const { ip, trustViolation } = getClientIpOrTrustWarning(request);
if (trustViolation) {
const result = await checkRateLimit(
TIGHT_ANON_KEY,
TIGHT_ANON_LIMIT,
TIGHT_ANON_WINDOW_MS,
);
return { ...result, ip };
}
const result = await checkRateLimit(
`${prefix}:${ip ?? "unknown"}`,
perIpLimit,
windowMs,
);
return { ...result, ip };
}