Files
HealthLog/src/app/api/auth/oidc/reproof/route.ts
T
Marc-André Bombeck bbef4eea99 feat(auth): let a single-sign-on account confirm it is you at its provider
An account created through OIDC holds no password, passkey or second
factor, so the recent-proof gate in front of token minting, MCP
connections, exports and the admin reset had nothing to ask it for and
the web could only say "sign in again" (#1296).

GET /api/auth/oidc/reproof sends the browser back to the configured
provider with prompt=login and max_age=0, its own state, nonce and PKCE
verifier, and the signed-in account and session sealed into the state
cookie. The shared callback branches on that intent: it refuses unless
the browser still carries the bound session (checked before the code is
redeemed), the ID token names the account's linked issuer and subject,
and auth_time lies inside the gate's five-minute window. It then stamps
Session.reproofAt exactly as a password re-proof does, creates no
session, and returns to the page it left with ?reproof=done|failed.

recentProofMethods offers "oidc" only to an account without a second
factor whose identity is linked while a provider is configured, and the
fresh-factor gate never lists it. GET /api/auth/me/mfa publishes the
list as proofMethods, so the passkey card offers what the account can
actually give, and register-options takes { method: "oidc" } on a fresh
provider re-proof, so such an account can add a passkey as a second way
to confirm. Both re-proof dialogs offer the provider and a toast reports
the outcome on return.

The callback's missing-state branch and the passkey card's enrollment
flow move into their own functions to keep both handlers under the size
ratchet.
2026-10-29 08:56:51 +01:00

119 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript

import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
import { apiHandler, requireCookieAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
import { getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response";
import { annotate, getEvent } from "@/lib/logging/context";
import { encrypt } from "@/lib/crypto";
import { shouldEmitSecureCookie } from "@/lib/auth/secure-cookie";
import { s256Challenge } from "@/lib/mcp/oauth/pkce";
import { recentProofMethods } from "@/lib/auth/second-factor";
import { throttleReproof } from "@/lib/auth/existing-factor-proof";
import {
buildAuthorizationUrl,
discoverOidcMetadata,
getOidcConfig,
getOidcRedirectUri,
sanitizeOidcNextPath,
} from "@/lib/auth/oidc";
import {
OIDC_STATE_COOKIE,
OIDC_STATE_COOKIE_PATH,
OIDC_STATE_TTL_MS,
} from "@/lib/auth/oidc-cookie";
import { OIDC_REPROOF_STAGE, reproofReturnUrl } from "@/lib/auth/oidc-reproof";
export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
/**
* Start confirming it is you at the identity provider (#1296).
*
* A top-level navigation from the re-proof dialog, cookie session only: a
* Bearer token never re-proves this way, because a stamp on a session row
* means nothing to a token (`requireCookieAuth` reads the session cookie and
* nothing else). Offered only where `recentProofMethods` lists `oidc`, which
* is an account without a second factor whose identity is linked while a
* provider is configured; anything else goes straight back with
* `reproof=failed`.
*
* The round trip asks for a fresh authentication (`prompt=login`,
* `max_age=0`) with its own state, nonce and PKCE verifier, sealed into the
* same single-use cookie the sign-in uses, together with the account and the
* session it confirms. The callback stamps that session's `reproofAt` and
* returns to `next` (a same-origin path) with `reproof=done`. It never mints
* a session.
*
* Draws on the account's shared re-proof budget, like every other proof.
*/
export const GET = apiHandler(async (req: NextRequest) => {
annotate({ action: { name: "auth.oidc.reproof.start" } });
const { user, session } = await requireCookieAuth();
const next = sanitizeOidcNextPath(
req.nextUrl.searchParams.get("next"),
req.url,
);
const back = (reason: string): NextResponse => {
annotate({ meta: { reason } });
return NextResponse.redirect(reproofReturnUrl(next, "failed"));
};
const config = getOidcConfig();
if (!config) return back("oidc_disabled");
const methods = await recentProofMethods(user);
if (!methods.includes("oidc")) return back("not_offered");
const limited = await throttleReproof(
user.id,
getClientIp(req),
OIDC_REPROOF_STAGE,
);
if (limited) return back("rate_limited");
let metadata;
try {
metadata = await discoverOidcMetadata(config);
} catch (err) {
getEvent()?.setError(err);
return back("oidc_failed");
}
const state = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
const nonce = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
const codeVerifier = randomBytes(64).toString("base64url");
const response = NextResponse.redirect(
buildAuthorizationUrl({
metadata,
config,
state,
nonce,
codeChallenge: s256Challenge(codeVerifier),
redirectUri: getOidcRedirectUri(),
reauthenticate: true,
}),
);
response.cookies.set(
OIDC_STATE_COOKIE,
encrypt(
JSON.stringify({
state,
nonce,
codeVerifier,
next,
intent: "reproof" as const,
reproofUserId: user.id,
reproofSessionId: session.id,
}),
),
{
httpOnly: true,
secure: shouldEmitSecureCookie(),
sameSite: "lax",
maxAge: Math.floor(OIDC_STATE_TTL_MS / 1000),
path: OIDC_STATE_COOKIE_PATH,
},
);
return response;
});