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On a completed sign-in (password, second-factor, or passkey) from a device or location not seen before, send one notification through the dispatcher cascade, honouring the user's per-channel preferences via a new SECURITY_ALERT event type. Dedupe on a one-way, per-user fingerprint: a SHA-256 over the userId, the coarse User-Agent family, and a country/ASN-level geo signal, stored in the new user_known_devices ledger (migration 0203). The first sighting of a fingerprint alerts and records; later sightings only bump last-seen and stay silent. The raw User-Agent and IP are never persisted — only the salted hash and a coarse label. Registration records its device silently so a fresh account does not alert on its own first session. The whole path is fire-and-forget and never blocks or fails a sign-in.
118 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
118 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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import {
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coarseDeviceLabel,
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normaliseUserAgent,
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coarseLocationSignal,
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computeDeviceHash,
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maskIp,
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} from "../device-fingerprint";
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const FIREFOX_MAC =
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"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:120.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/120.0";
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const FIREFOX_MAC_MINOR =
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"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:121.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/121.0";
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const CHROME_WIN =
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"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36";
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describe("coarseDeviceLabel", () => {
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it("reduces a UA to family + platform", () => {
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expect(coarseDeviceLabel(FIREFOX_MAC)).toBe("Firefox on macOS");
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expect(coarseDeviceLabel(CHROME_WIN)).toBe("Chrome on Windows");
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});
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it("handles a missing UA", () => {
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expect(coarseDeviceLabel(null)).toBe("Unknown device");
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expect(coarseDeviceLabel("")).toBe("Unknown device");
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});
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});
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describe("coarseLocationSignal", () => {
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it("reduces a city string to its country token", () => {
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expect(coarseLocationSignal("Berlin, DE")).toBe("DE");
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});
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it("returns empty for no location", () => {
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expect(coarseLocationSignal(null)).toBe("");
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});
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});
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describe("computeDeviceHash", () => {
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it("is deterministic and a hex SHA-256 (no raw UA/IP leak)", () => {
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const h = computeDeviceHash({
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userId: "u1",
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userAgent: FIREFOX_MAC,
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coarseSignal: "DE",
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});
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expect(h).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
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// The hash must not embed the raw UA.
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expect(h).not.toContain("Firefox");
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expect(h).not.toContain("Mozilla");
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expect(
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computeDeviceHash({
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userId: "u1",
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userAgent: FIREFOX_MAC,
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coarseSignal: "DE",
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}),
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).toBe(h);
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});
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it("is invariant to a minor browser-version bump (no false new-device)", () => {
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const a = computeDeviceHash({
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userId: "u1",
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userAgent: FIREFOX_MAC,
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coarseSignal: "DE",
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});
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const b = computeDeviceHash({
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userId: "u1",
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userAgent: FIREFOX_MAC_MINOR,
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coarseSignal: "DE",
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});
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expect(a).toBe(b);
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});
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it("is salted per user — same browser, different account ⇒ different hash", () => {
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const a = computeDeviceHash({
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userId: "u1",
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userAgent: FIREFOX_MAC,
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coarseSignal: "DE",
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});
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const b = computeDeviceHash({
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userId: "u2",
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userAgent: FIREFOX_MAC,
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coarseSignal: "DE",
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});
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expect(a).not.toBe(b);
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});
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it("treats a different country as a new device", () => {
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const a = computeDeviceHash({
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userId: "u1",
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userAgent: FIREFOX_MAC,
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coarseSignal: "DE",
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});
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const b = computeDeviceHash({
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userId: "u1",
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userAgent: FIREFOX_MAC,
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coarseSignal: "US",
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});
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expect(a).not.toBe(b);
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});
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});
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describe("normaliseUserAgent", () => {
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it("matches the coarse label so the hash input is stable", () => {
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expect(normaliseUserAgent(FIREFOX_MAC)).toBe("Firefox on macOS");
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});
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});
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describe("maskIp", () => {
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it("masks the host portion of an IPv4", () => {
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expect(maskIp("203.0.113.42")).toBe("203.0.x.x");
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});
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it("masks an IPv6 down to two hextets", () => {
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expect(maskIp("2001:db8:1234:5678::1")).toBe("2001:db8::");
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});
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it("returns null for a blank IP", () => {
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expect(maskIp(null)).toBeNull();
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expect(maskIp("")).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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