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Five senders (APNs, Web Push, webhook, ntfy, email) each carried their own single-pass replace(/<[^>]*>/g, "") — the shape CodeQL flags as incomplete multi-character sanitization, because a removal can re-form the pattern it removed. Whether one particular regex happens to be idempotent is an argument about that regex; five copies of the argument is how the next edit quietly breaks one of them. The shared stripHtml re-applies the strip until the string stops changing, with an iteration cap and a bracket-dropping fallback so no tag-shaped sequence can survive any input. Plain text passes through unchanged, same as before. Unit tests pin the nested-tag bypass shapes and the no-surviving-tag invariant. Resolves CodeQL alerts 38-42.
129 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
129 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
import type {
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WebhookChannelConfig,
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NotificationPayload,
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} from "@/lib/notifications/types";
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import type { SendOutcome } from "@/lib/notifications/retry-policy";
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import { classifyHttpStatus } from "@/lib/notifications/retry-policy";
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import { getEvent } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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import { recordPushAttemptForPayload } from "@/lib/notifications/senders/push-attempt-record";
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import { safeFetch } from "@/lib/safe-fetch";
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import { plainPushText } from "@/lib/notifications/strip-emoji";
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import { stripHtml } from "@/lib/notifications/strip-html";
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/**
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* Send a notification via a generic outbound webhook (v1.17.1).
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*
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* The user supplies a public URL (and optionally one custom header — e.g.
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* `Authorization: Bearer <token>` for Gotify). We POST a small JSON envelope
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* that Gotify / Discord / Slack / Matrix-bridge / Home Assistant / any homelab
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* relay can consume. The body is plain text (no markdown — hard rule); the
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* `title`/`message` fields are stripped of HTML + decorative emoji on routine
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* reminders exactly like the ntfy sender.
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*
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* Outbound goes through `safeFetch({ requirePublicHost: true })`: the SSRF
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* floor plus the connect-time DNS-rebinding pin apply because the host is
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* user-supplied. The optional shared-secret header would otherwise leak on a
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* rebinding flip to a private address.
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*
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* Returns a `SendOutcome` so the dispatcher can distinguish hard rejects
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* (404/410 endpoint gone, 401/403 secret wrong) from soft errors (5xx, 429,
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* network timeout) and apply the right retry / auto-disable policy.
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*/
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export async function sendViaWebhook(
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config: WebhookChannelConfig,
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payload: NotificationPayload,
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): Promise<SendOutcome> {
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const userId = payload.recipientUserId ?? payload.userId;
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const start = performance.now();
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try {
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const headers: Record<string, string> = {
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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};
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if (config.headerName && config.headerValue) {
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headers[config.headerName] = config.headerValue;
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}
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// Plain-text envelope. The `title` field doubles as Gotify's `title` and
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// Discord/Slack ignore unknown keys, so a single shape covers the common
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// relays. Discreet mode (cycle privacy) is honoured by the title/body
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// already being masked upstream; we also send a generic `eventType` tag so
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// a relay rule can route without leaking the cycle event name.
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const body = JSON.stringify({
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title: plainPushText(payload.title, payload.eventType),
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message: plainPushText(stripHtml(payload.message), payload.eventType),
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eventType: payload.discreet ? "reminder" : payload.eventType,
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// v1.18.4 — an explicitly urgent event maps to `urgent` so a relay
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// rule (Gotify priority, Discord mention, Home Assistant automation)
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// can escalate; MEDICATION_REMINDER keeps `high`; the rest `default`.
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priority:
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payload.urgent === true
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? "urgent"
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: payload.eventType === "MEDICATION_REMINDER"
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? "high"
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: "default",
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});
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const res = await safeFetch(
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config.url,
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{
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method: "POST",
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headers,
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body,
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},
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{ timeoutMs: 5_000, requirePublicHost: true },
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);
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getEvent()?.addExternalCall({
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service: "webhook",
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method: "sendNotification",
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duration_ms: Math.round(performance.now() - start),
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status: res.status,
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});
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if (res.ok) {
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recordPushAttemptForPayload(payload, userId, {
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userId: payload.userId,
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channel: "WEBHOOK",
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eventType: payload.eventType,
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result: "ok",
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});
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return { ok: true, statusCode: res.status };
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}
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const classified = classifyHttpStatus(res.status, "webhook");
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recordPushAttemptForPayload(payload, userId, {
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userId: payload.userId,
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channel: "WEBHOOK",
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eventType: payload.eventType,
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result: "error",
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reason: classified.reason,
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});
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return {
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ok: false,
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statusCode: res.status,
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hardReject: classified.hardReject,
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reason: classified.reason,
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};
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} catch (err) {
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const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : "request_failed";
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getEvent()?.addExternalCall({
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service: "webhook",
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method: "sendNotification",
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duration_ms: Math.round(performance.now() - start),
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error: message,
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});
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recordPushAttemptForPayload(payload, userId, {
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userId: payload.userId,
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channel: "WEBHOOK",
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eventType: payload.eventType,
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result: "error",
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reason: "webhook_network_error",
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});
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return {
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ok: false,
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hardReject: false,
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reason: "webhook_network_error",
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message,
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};
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}
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}
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