HealthLog/docs/ops/backup-restore.md

Off-host backup & restore

HealthLog ships with an optional daily off-host backup that ships every user's JSON dump, encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY), to any S3-compatible bucket — Cloudflare R2, AWS S3, Backblaze B2, MinIO, etc.

The backup runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin every day from the worker container (queue data-backup-offhost). Object key layout:

<bucket>/YYYY-MM-DD/user-<userId>.json.enc

Wire format (binary)

magic   = "HLBK"           (4 bytes, ASCII)
version = 0x04             (1 byte)
keyIdLen, keyId            (1 byte + 12 ASCII hex: the first 12 hex digits of SHA-256(key))
iv      = 12 random bytes  (AES-GCM nonce)
ciphertext = N bytes       (AES-256-GCM over gzip(JSON dump), key = BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
                            associated data = "healthlog/offhost-backup/v4|<object key>")
authTag = 16 bytes         (AES-GCM tag, trailing)

Version 0x04 (from v1.39.3) adds two things. The key id says which off-host key an object needs, so a reader holding a retired key as well finds the right one. The associated data is the object's own key in the bucket, YYYY-MM-DD/user-<id>.json.enc: an object copied to another account's name or another date does not decrypt, where before it opened as if it belonged there. The restore script passes the key it downloaded, so nothing changes for an operator.

Four versions exist in the wild and all four restore. 0x01 encrypted the JSON directly and 0x02 gzipped it first; both carry the tag in FRONT of the ciphertext, which is what made them impossible to write a piece at a time — GCM only produces the tag once the last block is in, so a leading tag means the whole object has to exist before its first byte can be sent. 0x03 moves the tag to the end and changes nothing else: it still covers every ciphertext byte, and the reader still verifies it before returning a single byte of plaintext. Objects already in your bucket stay readable, and the restore script needs no flag to tell them apart.

Required env vars

Var	Required	Notes
BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY	yes	64 hex chars or 32-byte base64. Different from ENCRYPTION_KEY.
BACKUP_S3_ENDPOINT	yes	e.g. https://<account>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com
BACKUP_S3_BUCKET	yes
BACKUP_S3_ACCESS_KEY	yes
BACKUP_S3_SECRET_KEY	yes
BACKUP_S3_REGION	no	defaults to auto (Cloudflare R2)
BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS	no	not read by the app; the number for your bucket's lifecycle rule
BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_KEYS	no	retired off-host keys, comma-separated, read only (see "Rotating the off-host key")

Bucket permissions

The worker needs PutObject, GetObject, ListBucket, DeleteObject and AbortMultipartUpload. On Cloudflare R2 the Object Read & Write token covers all of them.

DeleteObject is needed because the app deletes objects in two cases, and only those:

• An account is deleted, or its data is wiped. Deleting an account, deleting a managed profile and "Delete all data" each write a deletion request in the same transaction as the deletion. The offhost-backup-purge job lists the bucket, deletes every YYYY-MM-DD/user-<id>.json.enc of that account and removes the request once nothing of the account is left. It runs right after the deletion and again every night at 03:40. A copy the nightly upload was writing while the account was deleted is removed by the upload itself.
• The connection test deletes its own _healthcheck/<ts>.bin.

The admin wipe of every account deletes nothing in the bucket. It is you clearing your own host, the bucket is yours, and its copies are the way back from a wipe pressed by mistake. If you are handing the host on, empty the bucket yourself.

Earlier versions of this page said the worker never deletes an object. That was the design until v1.39.3, and it meant a deleted account's copies stayed in the bucket for as long as the lifecycle rule kept them, or forever without one. If the bucket refuses the delete (a credential without DeleteObject), the request stays, the job retries it every night, and Admin → Backups → Off-host shows how many deletions are outstanding and the bucket's answer.

AbortMultipartUpload only reaches an upload the same worker started and is what clears the parts of a run that failed halfway. Without it, a failed upload leaves parts that are billed and do not show in a bucket listing.

Bucket lifecycle (required for retention)

The app does not expire objects by age, and nothing in the app reads BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS. Expiry is the storage provider's lifecycle rule, set to match the number you wrote there. Without one, every nightly copy of every account is kept forever. Admin → Backups → Off-host reads the bucket's lifecycle configuration and says so when there is none, or when the credential may not read it (grant GetLifecycleConfiguration to let it check):

Filter: "" (all objects)
Action: Expire after 30 days

For Cloudflare R2 add this from the bucket's Settings → Lifecycle.

Smoke test

After deploying, hit POST /api/admin/backup/test (admin-only). It performs a 1-byte PUT + GET round-trip and returns:

{
  "data": {
    "endpoint": "https://...r2.cloudflarestorage.com",
    "bucket": "healthlog-backups",
    "region": "auto",
    "putLatencyMs": 142,
    "getLatencyMs": 38,
    "ok": true
  },
  "error": null
}

The credentials are never returned.

Restore

Pick a key (e.g. 2026-05-08/user-clx123.json.enc) from the bucket and run the restore script with the same backup credentials and encryption key the backup was written under — a freshly generated BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY cannot decrypt any existing object:

BACKUP_S3_ENDPOINT=https://...r2.cloudflarestorage.com       \
BACKUP_S3_BUCKET=healthlog-backups                           \
BACKUP_S3_ACCESS_KEY=...                                     \
BACKUP_S3_SECRET_KEY=...                                     \
BACKUP_S3_REGION=auto                                        \
BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<the key the backup was written under> \
pnpm dlx tsx scripts/restore-backup.ts \
  2026-05-08/user-clx123.json.enc \
  /tmp/restored.json

Run this command from a source checkout with the production backup variables exported. The script imports the full application dependency graph, which the minimal production image does not expose as an operator scripting environment.

The script downloads the object, decrypts it, and writes the JSON dump to disk. Importing the JSON back into a HealthLog instance is left to the operator (use prisma db seed or a custom script).

Restoring is not streamed and does not need to be. It holds the whole document, because the next thing anyone does with a backup is parse it as one JSON object, and handing back plaintext the auth tag has not yet covered would trade the authentication for memory. It runs on your machine rather than in the container, so give it room: a record of several hundred thousand measurements decompresses to a few hundred megabytes, and NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=2048 in front of the command is enough for a 445 000-measurement account.

Restoring from the backups console

An admin can restore a stored snapshot from the browser instead of the shell. /admin/backups lists one row per account and per backup type: Backup now enqueues the data-backup pass for every account on the instance, Download decrypts one snapshot and hands back the JSON, and Restore opens a dialog that first shows what the file carries and then requires the word RESTORE to be typed before it will run. The restore targets the account the snapshot was taken for, never the admin running it, and it refuses a file whose declared owner does not match the stored row. Instance-wide settings ride along only when you tick Also restore instance settings in the dialog; leave it clear to restore the account alone.

A stored copy this instance can no longer open — the key that wrote it dropped from ENCRYPTION_KEYS one rotation too early, or bytes that are not the ones written — is refused by all three buttons with 422 and meta.errorCode = backup.payload.undecryptable, before anything is read back.

What a backup deliberately does not carry

Every credential-shaped row is left out, and this is not an oversight to fix: API tokens, trusted devices, step-up elevations, known devices, clinician share links, and the account grants behind shared record access. Restoring data is rolling a record back to a known state. Restoring an authorization is different in kind, because a grant the owner revoked on Tuesday would come back alive out of Monday's file with nobody deciding it and neither person told.

What this means in practice depends on where you restore to.

Onto the same instance. Nothing changes. The restore replaces the account's data tables and does not touch grants, tokens or devices, so shared access carries on exactly as it was. Somebody who had read access before the restore still has it afterwards, now looking at the restored data.

Onto a fresh instance. None of it comes with the file. Nobody has access to anybody's record, every API token has to be reissued, every device re-trusted, and both people have to invite and accept again before sharing works. That is the fail-safe direction — access lost, never access resumed — and re-consenting is the right amount of ceremony for handing someone your health record a second time. Plan for it rather than discovering it.

The full per-model reasoning lives in src/lib/export/backup-plan.ts, where every excluded model carries a written verdict and a structural test refuses to let a new model land without one.

Container memory (the nightly off-host job)

This is the part that bites, and it bit the nightly job a release after it bit the weekly one. The job runs inside the app process, so V8's heap limit is the app's heap limit. Node sizes it from the container's memory cap: 1 GB gives a 524 MB old-space limit, the compose default of 1536m (since 1.40.1) gives 792 MB. A long-lived Next.js server is already holding a large share of that before the job starts.

The uploader used to build the whole backup JSON as one string, gzipped that whole string, ran a whole-buffer cipher pass over the result and handed the finished buffer to a single PutObject — four full copies of the record alive at once. On an account of 445 000 measurements the JSON alone is 242 MB, and the first configured run took the container down seventeen seconds in with FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit. Because the job shares the app process, one account's size restarted the instance for everybody on it.

It streams now. The JSON is produced a page at a time, gzip and the cipher consume it as it arrives, and the object goes up as a multipart upload that holds two 8 MB parts. What the process holds is fixed by that pipeline's shape rather than by the size of the record going through it: measured on the same 445 000-measurement account under --max-old-space-size=450, the old path died and the new one finished holding tens of megabytes, writing a 9.1 MB object that restores to the identical record.

One ceiling remains, and it is structural rather than a memory bound: a multipart upload carries 10 000 parts, so 80 GB is the largest object one account can produce. Past it the account's backup fails with a clear refusal, is counted in the run's offhost_backup_oversized meta, and the pass carries on with everybody else.

Reading a failed run

A nightly run that could not upload for anybody now fails the pg-boss job instead of reporting success. This is the case wrong credentials, a missing bucket and an unreachable endpoint all land in, and the target's own sentence rides out as the failure cause — The request signature we calculated does not match the signature you provided, The specified bucket does not exist, connect ECONNREFUSED. Check offhost_backup_uploaded against offhost_backup_total_users: before this change a run where every single upload failed still read ok: true, so a bucket could stay empty while the jobs page looked healthy.

A run where SOME account got a copy still succeeds, with the rest counted in offhost_backup_failed. Failing the whole queue over one account's object would re-upload everybody's on every retry.

A run the process died under

Both backup jobs carry a pg-boss heartbeat of five minutes. While a run is alive the worker refreshes it; a run whose process died (a restart, or a container killed for memory) stops refreshing, and pg-boss fails the job with job heartbeat timeout within minutes instead of leaving it active until its two- or four-hour expiry. The retries the queue already allows then pick it up.

Each pass also notes when it started and when it got past every account (backup_pass_attempts). An account whose last attempt started and never finished is the one the process died under, and the next run takes it last, so one record too large for the container cannot keep every account after it from a copy. Admin console → Backups shows when the run in progress started and names such an account under both the weekly and the off-host card. Seeing the same account there twice means it needs more memory than the container has.

Which account has no copy

The counts above say how many accounts were uploaded, never which. An account whose object has failed every night for a month reads as 99 uploaded, 1 failed each time, which looks like weather.

Admin console → Backups → Off-host copies answers it per account: when this host last put that account's encrypted copy in the bucket, how big it was, and how that compares with the nightly schedule. Fresh is inside one run, due means one run produced nothing for that account, stale means two did not, never means a run walked the account and no object has ever landed for it, and no record yet means no run has recorded the account at all. On a host without BACKUP_S3_* the card says off-host backup is not configured and stops there.

The ledger starts empty on the release that adds it, so on a host that has been uploading nightly for months every account reads no record yet until the first run after the upgrade. That is the ledger having no history, not the bucket being empty — which is why it is a separate word from never, and why the row says so rather than claiming nothing has ever reached the bucket.

Each verdict carries six hours of slack on top of the schedule's own 24, and that slack is load-bearing on two nights. The cron runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, so on the DST fall-back Sunday two consecutive runs are 25 hours apart; and the timestamp is when that account's object landed, so on a cohort walked one account at a time an account reached later tonight than last night drifts by hours. Without the slack a healthy host would paint its whole cohort due once a year.

The verdicts come from a ledger the worker writes when the object lands (offhost_backup_state), not from a listing of the bucket. Keep the worker's grant as documented — PutObject, GetObject, AbortMultipartUpload — and the card still tells the truth. A row that goes stale while the run reports success is that account's object being refused, and the reason is in the run's offhost_backup_failures meta.

The weekly in-database backup (data-backup)

Separate from the off-host job above, and easy to confuse with it. A second pg-boss job writes one WEEKLY_AUTO copy per user into the database, the same JSON document, gzipped and then encrypted under ENCRYPTION_KEY / ENCRYPTION_KEYS, staying inside the instance. It is what /api/admin/backups/<id>/restore reads, and an uploaded backup file is stored the same way.

How a copy is stored

From v1.39.2 a copy is kept as ordered pieces of about a megabyte in data_backup_chunks, with the list of pieces on its data_backups row. The writer produces the JSON a page at a time, gzips it as it goes and seals each megabyte of gzip output on its own with AES-256-GCM. Reading it back (restore, preview, download) takes the pieces one at a time. Nothing on either path holds the whole copy, so the size of a copy has nothing to do with the app's memory. Measured on an account of 2.6 million readings in a 1 GB container, with the web server and the worker in one process: the backup took 87 seconds and stored 97 MB in 96 pieces, the preview 20 seconds, the download of the 1.4 GB file 25 seconds, and the restore 264 seconds, which gave back every reading exactly. The container peaked at 567 MB and did not restart. What the backup, preview and download hold on top of the running app stays at a few tens of megabytes and does not grow with the account. A 512 MB container is too small for the app itself: its heap limit is 259 MB and a backup of any account, even one with 130 000 readings, runs it out of heap.

Each piece carries, inside its encryption, which copy it belongs to, its position, and whether it is the last. Before a restore deletes anything, every piece is checked: a piece that is missing, moved, altered, taken from another copy, or a copy that stops short of its last piece is refused with backup.payload.undecryptable, and the account is left as it was.

The write is one transaction. Until the new copy is complete the previous one stays in place and readable; a run that fails halfway leaves it untouched. A second backup of the same account started while one is running (a manual run during the weekly one, say) waits for the first to finish and then replaces its copy; neither leaves a partial copy behind.

While a restore of an account's copy is queued or running, the weekly and manual backup leave that account's copy alone and back up everyone else. The run's users_skipped_restoring meta counts such accounts; the next run replaces the copy as usual. If a copy is replaced anyway while it is being read (a download or preview in progress when the weekly run finishes), the reader answers 409 with backup_changed and "The backup was replaced by a newer one while it was being read", not the undecryptable error, and a restore rolls back with nothing changed. Start it again to use the new copy. A download already sending when this happens stops partway; download again.

Copies written before v1.39.2 are a single value in data_backups.data and still restore, preview and download as they did. The next weekly run replaces the weekly copy in the new form, and a key rotation (below) converts every remaining one, including uploaded copies. Until then those older copies are read as one value, as before, which needs the memory they needed when they were written.

Migration 0352 cannot be undone by going back to v1.39.1. That release reads only the single value, so it finds a copy in pieces empty, and if it writes a weekly copy into a row that has pieces, the row holds both forms. v1.39.2 then refuses to read that row, because nothing says which of the two is current ("This backup holds both a single stored value and pieces ..."); the next weekly backup replaces it. If you must go back, restore the database backup you took before upgrading.

The size limit

The one limit left is on storage: a copy of one account may take at most BACKUP_MAX_STORED_MB megabytes (default 2048). It exists so a runaway copy fails with a message instead of filling the database volume, which holds the old and the new copy side by side while a backup runs. An account past it fails for that account alone, is counted in the run's users_failed and records_oversized meta, and keeps its previous copy; the pass carries on with everybody else. The message names the setting. Raise it in .env, recreate the app container, and make sure the database volume has room for two copies of that size.

Before v1.39.2 the limit was a fifth of the app's heap, 105 MB in a 1 GB container, because the copy had to pass through the app as one value. An account with 1.75 million readings was past it, and the only way round was more memory. That is no longer the case: records_oversized means the storage limit, never memory.

The writer deliberately reads no heap gauge. A version that did shipped in v1.38.6 and compared the whole process's live usage, garbage included, against 80 % of the limit. A Next.js server that has been up for a week sits at 400 MB of largely collectable heap, so the weekly pass aborted every account on the first chunk, including one whose whole stored copy is 1.2 MB, and reported success while doing it. If you are on v1.38.6, a data-backup run that finishes in seconds having backed up nothing is that defect and not your record.

Key rotation

Rotation reaches a stored backup's envelope and nothing inside it. The content of a disaster-recovery backup is the database's ciphertext, carried as it is stored, and a restore writes it back verbatim: a note, a document or a coach message inside a copy taken before a rotation still needs the key the rotation retired. The same holds for every copy in the off-host bucket and for every file an operator has downloaded. So the rule is: keep a retired ENCRYPTION_KEYS entry until no backup you may still restore needs it. Admin → Encryption → Keys the backups still need lists, per key id, the stored copies that need it with the oldest date, and when the last off-host copy needing it expires under the bucket's lifecycle rule. Copies written before v1.39.3 did not record their keys and are listed as such.

Every restore, the restore preview, the admin upload and the monthly drill check this before anything is changed: a file whose content needs a key this server does not have (or an id whose key material differs) is refused with the key id named, and the account is left as it was.

Re-encrypting the content of stored backups during rotation was considered and not done: it would mean decrypting, parsing, re-encrypting and re-writing every copy in full, and it still could not reach the off-host copies or downloaded files, so the rule above would be needed regardless.

scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts and the rotation in the admin console re-seal every piece under the active key, in small batches, without reading the backup inside. The link between a piece, its copy and its position is inside the encryption, so it comes through rotation unchanged.

A copy still in the older single-value form (any of them, including the ~hlgcm1. form v1.38.6 to v1.39.1 wrote) is not re-sealed in place, which would need the whole copy in memory several times over. Rotation converts it into pieces under the active key instead, one copy at a time, reading the stored value a few megabytes at a time; the copy keeps its date. The conversion of a copy is one transaction, so a copy that fails its check is left exactly as it was and counted as an error. Rotation up to v1.39.1 counted every ~hlgcm1. copy as an error; run it again after updating before retiring the old key.

What a restore replaces

A restore replaces the account's data tables; it does not merge into them. Every row the file carries is written back under its original id, and every row the account gained after the snapshot was taken — readings, doses, mood entries, documents — is deleted with the rest of the class before the file is read back. Restoring Monday's copy on Wednesday therefore costs the account everything it recorded on Tuesday. If the current state is worth keeping, take a fresh snapshot from the backups console before restoring the old one.

Rotating the off-host key

BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY is the key new objects are written under. To rotate it, set the new key there and move the old one into BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_KEYS (comma-separated if there are several), then restart. New objects are written under the new key; older objects stay readable because every version-4 object names its key and older objects are tried against each key in turn. Remove the old key once the lifecycle rule has retired every object written under it, that is BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS after the restart.

Monthly restore drill (automatic)

Since v1.16.4 a pg-boss job (data-restore-drill, cron 11 4 1 * * — 04:11 on the 1st of each month) exercises the read path end-to-end: fetch every backup object of the most recent date from the bucket (one per account), decrypt each under the current BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, JSON-parse it, and sanity-check the payload shape. It performs no database restore — it validates the artefacts, not the import path. Each account is checked and reported on its own: one object that fails is named, and the others are still read.

Outcomes:

• Success — record counts, object age, and sizes land in the wide-event meta (job.restore_drill).
• Stale chain — the newest object is older than 3 days: the nightly uploader has stalled (or the lifecycle rule is too aggressive). The drill pages via the worker error reporter (stderr + GlitchTip).
• Failure — empty bucket, fetch error, decryption failure (wrong or rotated key), malformed JSON: pages the same way, once per failing object, with the object key and how many accounts were checked. A decryption failure right after a BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY change means the new key cannot read the existing objects: put the old key into BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_KEYS (see "Rotating the off-host key").
• Content under a missing application key — the object opens, but its content was written under an ENCRYPTION_KEYS entry this server no longer has, or under an id whose key material changed. The drill decrypts the shortest value of each section under every key id it finds, and pages naming the key when none of them opens. A restore of that object would write back rows nobody can open; put the key back before restoring.
• Not configured — deployments without the BACKUP_S3_* vars skip silently (wide-event warning only).

The drill lists the bucket to find the newest object, so it needs ListBucket on top of the uploader's PutObject, GetObject and AbortMultipartUpload. Cloudflare R2's Object Read & Write token covers all four.