HealthLog/.env.production.example

# =============================================================================
# HealthLog -- production .env example
# =============================================================================
# Mirrors `scripts/env-manifest.json`. The `pnpm check-env --file
# .env.production.example` CI step (see `.github/workflows/env-check.yml`)
# enforces every variable declared `required: true` in the manifest has a
# non-empty placeholder here, so a contributor who introduces a new
# required var without updating this file fails the workflow.
#
# Placeholders are syntactic only -- replace with real secrets before
# deploying. The check-env presence rule treats any non-empty,
# non-whitespace string as "set", so the `<placeholder>` style below
# satisfies the manifest without leaking a usable credential.
#
# Generate the two crypto secrets locally with:
#   $ openssl rand -hex 32
# =============================================================================


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Core -- required for boot
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
DATABASE_URL="postgresql://healthlog:<password>@db:5432/healthlog?schema=public"
POSTGRES_PASSWORD="<openssl rand -hex 32>"
NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL="https://healthlog.example.com"
APP_URL="https://healthlog.example.com"
ENCRYPTION_KEY="<openssl rand -hex 32>"
API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY="<openssl rand -hex 32>"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Withings -- optional integration
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The Withings OAuth client id/secret are per-user: each user registers their
# own Withings developer app and pastes the pair into Settings (stored
# encrypted in the DB). There is therefore no WITHINGS_CLIENT_ID/SECRET.
# WITHINGS_WEBHOOK_SECRET=""


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WHOOP -- optional integration
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The WHOOP app client id/secret are per-user BYO-keys: each user registers
# their own WHOOP developer app and pastes the client id/secret into Settings
# (stored encrypted in the DB). There is therefore no WHOOP_CLIENT_ID/SECRET.
#
# WHOOP_WEBHOOK_SECRET is the instance-level secret carried as the trailing
# path segment of the webhook URL AND used to verify the WHOOP HMAC body
# signature. WHOOP_REDIRECT_URI overrides the derived
# `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/whoop/callback` when the public URL differs.
# WHOOP_WEBHOOK_SECRET="<openssl rand -hex 32>"
# WHOOP_REDIRECT_URI=""

# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fitbit -- optional integration (classic Web API, per-user BYO-keys)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Each user registers their own app at https://dev.fitbit.com (self-serve, no
# brand verification) and pastes the OAuth Client ID + Client Secret into
# Settings (stored encrypted in the DB). There is therefore no
# FITBIT_CLIENT_ID/SECRET here. The OAuth flow uses Authorization Code + PKCE.
#
# FITBIT_REDIRECT_URI overrides the derived
# `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/fitbit/callback` when the public URL differs; it
# must exactly match the Callback URL registered in the dev.fitbit.com app.
# FITBIT_REDIRECT_URI=""

# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Polar AccessLink -- optional integration (full OAuth, shared app from env)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Register an app at https://admin.polaraccesslink.com and set its redirect URI
# to `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/polar/callback`. Both vars together enable the
# Polar connect button; set neither to leave the integration disabled. Polar
# access tokens do not expire and carry no refresh token. POLAR_REDIRECT_URI
# overrides the derived callback when the public URL differs.
# POLAR_CLIENT_ID=""
# POLAR_CLIENT_SECRET=""
# POLAR_REDIRECT_URI=""

# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Oura Cloud v2 -- optional integration (full OAuth, shared app from env)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Register an app at https://cloud.ouraring.com/oauth/applications and set its
# redirect URI to `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/oura/callback`. Both vars together
# enable the Oura connect button. Oura uses refresh tokens; the sync refreshes
# reactively on a 401. OURA_REDIRECT_URI overrides the derived callback.
# OURA_CLIENT_ID=""
# OURA_CLIENT_SECRET=""
# OURA_REDIRECT_URI=""

# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Strava -- optional integration (full OAuth, shared app from env)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Register an app at https://www.strava.com/settings/api and set its
# "Authorization Callback Domain" to your instance host. Both vars together
# enable the Strava connect button; set neither to leave the integration
# disabled. Per-user BYO client id/secret in Settings take precedence over these
# shared env values. Strava caps every new app at single-player mode (athlete
# capacity 1) until you request a capacity increase — fine for a personal
# self-host. Strava rotates its refresh token on every refresh; the sync
# refreshes reactively on a 401. STRAVA_REDIRECT_URI overrides the derived
# `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/strava/callback`.
# STRAVA_CLIENT_ID=""
# STRAVA_CLIENT_SECRET=""
# STRAVA_REDIRECT_URI=""

# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OIDC SSO login -- optional (self-hosted identity provider)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Register a confidential OIDC client for your IdP (Authentik, Keycloak,
# Authelia, Google Workspace, etc.) with redirect URI
# `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/auth/oidc/callback`. All three of ISSUER_URL/
# CLIENT_ID/CLIENT_SECRET together enable the "Sign in with SSO" button on
# the login page; set none to leave it disabled. First-time sign-in
# auto-provisions (or links, by verified email) a HealthLog account. OIDC_ONLY
# hides password/passkey login entirely once set to "true" -- but only takes
# effect when the three vars above are also fully set, so a typo can't lock
# every user out. Enforced server-side, not just a hidden button. The native
# iOS client signs in through the native OIDC SSO handoff (the app opens the
# login URL in an in-app browser and completes at a custom-scheme callback), so
# OIDC_ONLY="true" is supported for iOS -- but only on the app build that ships
# that flow. An older password/passkey-only iOS build is locked out of sign-in
# by OIDC_ONLY; confirm the app version before enabling it on a deployment with
# active iOS users.
# Serve the issuer over HTTPS wherever possible: sign-in material (the
# authorization code, the token-endpoint response carrying the ID token)
# crosses this connection. Plain HTTP is defensible only on a fully trusted
# private network (IdP and app on the same box, a Tailscale mesh, a VPN).
# OIDC_ISSUER_URL=""
# OIDC_CLIENT_ID=""
# OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=""
# OIDC_SCOPES="openid email profile"
# OIDC_BUTTON_LABEL="Single Sign-On"
# OIDC_ONLY="false"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Web Push -- VAPID keys (optional; the admin panel is the easier path)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Web Push needs NO Apple account and no paid service -- just a VAPID keypair.
# The EASIEST path is the admin panel: /admin -> Web Push VAPID -> "Generate
# keys" mints and stores the pair for you (private key encrypted at rest). Use
# these env vars only if you prefer env-config over the DB. The loader reads
# DB first, then env (src/lib/notifications/vapid-config.ts). NOTE: these are
# NOT in docker-compose.yml's `environment:` whitelist -- if you go the env
# route under compose, add them there too or the values never reach the
# container (see docs/self-hosting/getting-started.md Troubleshooting).
# VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY=""
# VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY=""
# VAPID_SUBJECT="mailto:you@example.com"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# APNs -- iOS push (optional, all-or-none)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Only the native iOS app uses APNs, and it needs a paid Apple Developer
# Program membership. Web Push (above) needs NO Apple account -- it covers
# every browser and the installed PWA on iPhone. Leave this whole block unset
# unless you ship the native app. Key-source precedence when more than one is
# set: APNS_KEY_B64 > APNS_KEY > APNS_KEY_FILE.
# APNS_KEY_ID=""
# APNS_TEAM_ID=""
# APNS_BUNDLE_ID=""
# APNS_KEY_B64=""    # PEM body base64-encoded -- recommended (escapes newlines)
# APNS_KEY=""        # OR APNS_KEY (raw PEM) OR APNS_KEY_FILE -- one satisfies the manifest
# APNS_KEY_FILE=""
# APNS_CRITICAL_ENTITLEMENT=""  # "true" only if your build has Apple's Critical Alerts entitlement; else urgent = time-sensitive


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SMTP -- email notification channel (optional, all-or-none)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Operator SMTP transport for the email channel. SMTP_HOST + SMTP_PORT +
# SMTP_FROM together enable it; SMTP_USER/SMTP_PASS are optional (omit for an
# unauthenticated relay). SMTP_SECURE=true uses implicit TLS (port 465);
# unset/false uses STARTTLS (port 587). Per-user recipient address is set in
# Settings -> Notifications, not here. Missing the core trio disables the
# channel silently. Listed in docker-compose.yml's environment whitelist so
# these reach the container.
# SMTP_HOST=""
# SMTP_PORT="587"
# SMTP_FROM="HealthLog <noreply@example.com>"
# SMTP_USER=""
# SMTP_PASS=""
# SMTP_SECURE="false"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Session cookie Secure flag -- the most common self-host snag
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Unset, the flag tracks NODE_ENV, so a production image sets `Secure` and a
# browser on plain HTTP silently drops the session cookie: login appears to
# succeed and every following request is anonymous. Set it to false ONLY on a
# LAN, Tailscale or VPN-only host that deliberately serves HTTP. Behind a TLS
# reverse proxy, leave it alone.
# SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE="false"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Deploy webhook -- Coolify -> HealthLog auto-deploy feedback
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DEPLOY_WEBHOOK_SECRET=""
# Optional: deployment-dashboard URL (e.g. the Coolify UI) linked in
# deploy-failure notifications. When unset the notification omits the link.
# DEPLOY_LOGS_URL=""
# Optional replay hardening: require a fresh X-Deploy-Webhook-Timestamp
# header (unix seconds / ms or ISO-8601, +/- 5 minutes) on every webhook
# call. Leave unset for Coolify's stock sender (it attaches no
# timestamp); see docs/ops/deploy.md.
# DEPLOY_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_TIMESTAMP="false"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TLS leaf pin monitor -- alarm when the pinned leaf certificate rotates
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The native client SPKI-pins the served TLS leaf. Set this to the
# known-good leaf pin(s) so the monitor can alarm on a rotation. The value
# is base64(sha256(DER subjectPublicKeyInfo)); comma-separate to hold both
# the current and the next pin during a dual-pin renewal window. See
# docs/ops/tls-cert-pin.md for extraction + the re-pin runbook.
# TLS_LEAF_SPKI_PINS=""

# Local-AI SSRF opt-in (optional). The local AI provider rejects private/
# internal hosts by default. Set to an exact host allowlist (comma-separated,
# e.g. "ollama.lan,10.0.0.5") or "true" for any private host — intended for a
# self-hosted Ollama / LM Studio endpoint. See docs/integrations/ai-providers.md.
# ALLOW_LOCAL_AI_PRIVATE_HOSTS=""

# Daily-briefing output-token ceiling (optional). Default 2500, clamped to
# 500-8000. Raise it when a verbose model's briefing JSON gets cut off
# ("AI response was cut off"). See docs/integrations/ai-providers.md.
# INSIGHTS_MAX_TOKENS=""

# Per-user hourly ceiling for POST /api/insights/generate (optional).
# Default 10. Lower it on a tight LLM budget; the 24h cache already
# short-circuits read traffic. See docs/integrations/ai-providers.md.
# INSIGHTS_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR=""

# Per-user hourly ceiling for the document-AI actions (optional). Read/index,
# extract, suggest and summarise share one bucket per user. Default 6,
# clamped to 1-1000. Raise it when users batch-read many documents against a
# generous provider budget; lower it on a tight one. See
# docs/integrations/ai-providers.md.
# DOCUMENT_AI_LIMIT_PER_HOUR=""


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Off-host backups -- all-or-none
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# BACKUP_S3_ENDPOINT=""
# BACKUP_S3_BUCKET=""
# BACKUP_S3_ACCESS_KEY=""
# BACKUP_S3_SECRET_KEY=""
# BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY=""


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Audit-trail retention -- optional
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# How long rows in `audit_logs` survive, in days. Default 365. The floor is 7:
# a smaller value is ignored rather than obeyed, so a window entered in seconds
# by mistake cannot empty a fresh table. A daily job does the pruning.
#
# This number is shown to users, not just enforced. Settings -> Shared access
# prints the window under the activity list, and the dialog that ends somebody
# else's access states how long "who entered what" stays answerable. Both take
# the value the server resolved from this variable, so an instance running 90
# says 90 on both surfaces.
# AUDIT_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS="365"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# FHIR health-record export -- optional
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Per-export ceiling on the number of MedicationAdministration rows in the
# FHIR Bundle. The report window already scopes the set; this is a coarse
# safety ceiling on the serialised Bundle size. Bounded 1..50000; any unset
# or out-of-range value falls back to the default of 5000. Raise it only for
# an unusual multi-year, many-medication workload.
# FHIR_MAX_MEDICATION_ADMINISTRATIONS="5000"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard snapshot -- BUILD-TIME toggle (default ON)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The dashboard hydrates every above-the-fold tile from the single
# `GET /api/dashboard/snapshot` cell so the whole strip shares one
# completion moment. This is the default and the desired behaviour.
#
# `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` vars are inlined into the client bundle at BUILD time,
# not read at runtime -- so this has NO effect on the prebuilt GHCR
# image and is intentionally absent from the `docker-compose.yml`
# runtime `environment:` whitelist. To fall back to the legacy
# four-cell path you must rebuild the image with the var set to "false":
#
#   $ NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_SNAPSHOT=false pnpm build   # or a Dockerfile ARG
#
# NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_SNAPSHOT="false"


# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Client-IP resolution -- optional (required behind Cloudflare)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# When the stack sits behind Cloudflare, the real visitor IP arrives in the
# `cf-connecting-ip` header; the X-Forwarded-For chain otherwise yields the
# Cloudflare edge IP, so the audit-log overview stores the CF datacentre
# address and the geo lookup resolves the wrong location. Set this to "1"
# ONLY when Cloudflare is in front -- a direct-exposed self-host must leave
# it unset, or an attacker could forge the header. Off by default.
# TRUST_CF_CONNECTING_IP="1"

# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IP geolocation lookup -- optional
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The admin login/audit overview enriches auth events with a coarse
# "City, CC" location + carrier. The default online provider is ipwho.is
# (free, no key, HTTPS). Override the base URL to point at a different
# provider; the response must match either the ipwho.is shape (`success` +
# `country_code`) or the ip-api.com shape (`status` + `countryCode`). The
# `/<ip>` segment is appended automatically.
# IP_GEO_LOOKUP_URL="https://ipwho.is"
#
# By default a non-HTTPS URL is refused (audit-event IPs must never egress over
# plaintext HTTP). The free ip-api.com endpoint is HTTP-only (its HTTPS form
# needs a paid key) but is often more accurate. To use it, set BOTH the HTTP
# URL and the explicit opt-in below -- the looked-up IP then travels in clear
# over your server's own egress; this is your call to make.
# IP_GEO_LOOKUP_URL="http://ip-api.com/json"
# IP_GEO_ALLOW_INSECURE="true"
#
# Set to "1" to disable all third-party IP egress (GDPR Art. 44). With egress
# off the resolver uses only the offline GeoLite2 MMDB tier, if present.
# IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED="1"

# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Offline GeoLite2 databases -- optional
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Where the runtime looks for GeoLite2-City.mmdb and GeoLite2-ASN.mmdb.
# Unset it reads /opt/geolite2, the path the published image bakes its own
# copy into -- but only if the image build had a MaxMind licence key, so on
# a stock `:latest` the directory is usually empty and every login IP goes
# to the online provider instead.
#
# Three ways to get the databases:
#
#   1. RUNTIME FETCH (issue #659) -- set MAXMIND_LICENSE_KEY below and the
#      worker downloads both databases into GEOLITE2_DIR itself on the next
#      boot and monthly thereafter. No image rebuild, no manual mount. This is
#      the way for a stock `:latest` pull.
#   2. Bring your own -- create a free MaxMind account, pull both databases
#      with `geoipupdate`, mount the directory into the container read-only
#      (the commented `volumes:` block in docker-compose.yml shows the line),
#      and point GEOLITE2_DIR at the container path. Refreshing the files on
#      the host is enough -- the reader picks them up on the next restart.
#   3. Bake them at build time (build your own image with a licence key).
#
# Pair any of them with IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED="1" above for zero IP egress.
# See docs/self-hosting/geolite2.md.
# GEOLITE2_DIR="/var/lib/geolite2"
#
# MaxMind licence key for the runtime fetch (option 1 above). Free: sign up at
# https://www.maxmind.com/en/geolite2/signup, then My Account -> Manage
# License Keys. Unset, nothing is fetched and the online provider answers.
# MAXMIND_LICENSE_KEY="your-maxmind-licence-key"

# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Environmental-context module (Open-Meteo) -- optional
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The opt-in Environment module fetches daily weather / daylight for the user's
# coarse home (or a travel override) from Open-Meteo. The hosted endpoints are
# keyless and free for non-commercial use; data is CC BY 4.0. Both URLs are
# optional -- unset uses the hosted defaults below. A privacy-maximalist or
# commercial self-hoster can run their own Open-Meteo instance and point these
# at it (a private/LAN host is allowed -- the fetch is server-side and does NOT
# force the public-host guard, so an internal instance is not blocked).
# OPENMETEO_BASE_URL="https://archive-api.open-meteo.com"
# OPENMETEO_GEOCODING_URL="https://geocoding-api.open-meteo.com"

# ── Native canvas renderer (document thumbnails, scanned-PDF rasterization) ──
# The bundled renderer's x64 build uses AVX2 CPU instructions. On x86-64 hosts
# WITHOUT AVX2 (Celeron/Atom-class NAS CPUs) it is disabled automatically and
# those features degrade cleanly (no thumbnails; scanned PDFs read as text
# only). Override only if auto-detection misfires:
#   off — force-disable the renderer
#   on  — force-enable (crashes the container if the CPU truly lacks AVX2)
# NATIVE_CANVAS="off"