mirror of
https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog.git
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* feat(crypto): G2 — encryption-key versioning + rotation CLI
Adds backwards-compatible support for ENCRYPTION_KEYS (JSON map of
{ "id": "<key>" }) plus ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID. Ciphertext format is now
"<keyId>.<base64payload>"; legacy bare-base64 ciphertext still decrypts
under the synthetic "v1" id derived from the existing ENCRYPTION_KEY.
scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts re-encrypts every encrypted column on
User / WithingsConnection / AppSettings with the active key. Idempotent —
rows already on the active id are skipped.
Why: enables zero-downtime rotation when a key is suspected leaked,
without forcing every encrypted row through a single big-bang rewrite.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): G4 — native-Bearer UA gating + rotating refresh tokens
Web callers (UA contains 'Mozilla/') keep the legacy 90d Bearer when they
explicitly opt in via X-Client-Type: native. Native callers (HealthLog-iOS,
HealthLog-iPad, n8n, Health-Connect, unrecognised UAs) now receive a 24h
access token plus a 60d rotating refresh token in the login response.
New /api/auth/refresh endpoint atomically validates + rotates the refresh
token (one-time-use), revokes the previously paired access token, and
audit-logs every refresh + revoke. Reuse of an already-consumed refresh
token revokes the entire family for the user/device — defence against a
stolen refresh token.
Migration 0025_refresh_tokens adds the table; the only DDL is CREATE
TABLE so it is forward-compatible. Down migration documented at
docs/ops/migrations/0025-down.sql.
Why: the V3 audit (still-V2-A) flagged that 90d tokens are too long for
native callers when refresh-token rotation is now table-stakes for mobile
apps. Web flows are unchanged so existing browser sessions keep working.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(infra): G3 — web/worker container split via HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE
Adds a tiny startup gate (src/lib/process-type.ts) so the same Docker image
can run as web-only, worker-only, or 'all' (default — single-container,
backwards compatible). assertSubsystemEnabled() refuses to boot the
reminder worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web, preventing accidental
double-cron when an operator splits the deployment.
docker-compose.yml ships the optional app-worker service block commented
out so 'docker compose up' keeps working out of the box; uncommenting it
+ flipping app to HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web is the only change to scale
HTTP horizontally. Healthchecks are isolated per service so neither
startup deadlocks the other; both wait on db: service_healthy.
docs/self-hosting/scaling.md walks through when + how to split.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(jobs): G1 — daily off-host encrypted backup to S3-compatible storage
New pg-boss queue 'data-backup-offhost' runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, dumps
each user's measurements + medications + intake events + mood entries,
encrypts the JSON under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, isolated
from the application ENCRYPTION_KEY), and uploads to any S3-compatible
target via @aws-sdk/client-s3.
Wire format documented in docs/ops/backup-restore.md:
magic "HLBK" || version 0x01 || iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext
The worker prunes objects older than BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30);
operators are encouraged to also configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule.
Admin endpoint POST /api/admin/backup/test issues a 1-byte PUT+GET
roundtrip and returns endpoint + bucket + per-call latency. Credentials
are never returned.
scripts/restore-backup.ts downloads + decrypts a single object so
operators can verify the chain end-to-end without standing up a separate
restore harness.
Why: GDPR Art. 32 + V3 audit "data durability" — without an off-host copy
the only line of defence against a Postgres volume loss is the in-DB
DataBackup model on the same host. Separate-key isolation means a leak of
the application encryption key does not also expose every user's archive.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(multi-tenant): address review findings — rotation coverage, hard decrypt errors, web/worker gates
Multi-agent review on PR #135 caught several CRITICAL + HIGH issues that
would have shipped silent data corruption or weakened the threat model:
Encryption + rotation
- scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts: stop selecting `bugReportTokenEncrypted`
(column doesn't exist in the schema; the script crashed on the AppSettings
step). Add the three encrypted columns it was missing —
NotificationChannel.config, PushSubscription.p256dh, PushSubscription.auth
— so rotating to a new key actually re-encrypts every encrypted row.
Without this, dropping the old key id from ENCRYPTION_KEYS would leave
notification channels and web-push subscriptions permanently
undecryptable.
- src/lib/crypto.ts: refuse to silently fall back to the active key when a
legacy bare-base64 row is decrypted but no v1 entry is configured. Throws
a clear "Restore ENCRYPTION_KEY (or add a v1 entry to ENCRYPTION_KEYS)
and run scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts before removing it" so an
operator who pulled the v1 too early notices immediately instead of
hitting opaque GCM tag errors.
- docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md: full step-by-step + rollback note +
troubleshooting section. Spells out that rotation is a forward-only
operation and what to do if the rollback path is needed.
Web / worker split (G3)
- src/proxy.ts: refuse HTTP traffic with a 503 +
X-HealthLog-Process-Type: worker header when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=worker.
The worker container (which still runs `node server.js` for now) no
longer accepts requests, so a misrouted client gets a clear hint instead
of a partially-served response.
- src/instrumentation.ts: short-circuit before importing the reminder
worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web — avoids the noisy
"[instrumentation] CRITICAL" stderr line we emitted on every web boot.
- /api/version added to PUBLIC_PATHS so the compose healthcheck doesn't
silently 302-redirect through the auth gate (the prior wget treated the
login page as a 200 success and would never notice an unhealthy backend).
Refresh-token rotation (G4)
- src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts: reuse-detection now revokes ALL active
refresh tokens for the user, not only those scoped to the same deviceId.
An attacker who rotated without an X-Device-Id header would otherwise
keep their family alive on the no-device branch. Defence-in-depth.
- revokeRefreshToken() also revokes the paired access token so a leaked
access token cannot outlive the refresh-token sibling that the caller
just killed (logout-on-device).
Off-host backup (G1)
- src/lib/jobs/offhost-backup.ts: drop the worker-side DeleteObject path.
Retention is the bucket's lifecycle-policy job; the worker keeps a
PutObject + GetObject grant only. A compromised worker can no longer
wipe the backup history. Per-user errors are now surfaced as Wide
Event warnings + a structured failures[] array on the report so an
operator can tell which user failed and why.
- scripts/restore-backup.ts: schema-validate the decrypted payload before
writing to disk, plus an optional --user-id=<id> flag that refuses to
proceed unless the dump's userId matches. Prevents silent
cross-tenant restores when an operator points the script at the wrong
S3 key.
Idempotency
- src/lib/idempotency.ts: the leak-guard already blocked `hlk_`
(access-token prefix); also block `hlr_` so a future caller wrapping
the new /api/auth/refresh endpoint with withIdempotency() can't
accidentally cache a freshly-issued refresh token.
Migration / schema
- prisma/migrations/0025_refresh_tokens/migration.sql: wrap in a single
transaction; switch to CREATE { TABLE | INDEX } IF NOT EXISTS so a
partial-deploy retry is a no-op instead of "relation already exists";
guard the FK ADD with information_schema lookup for the same reason.
- Schema replaces the single-column `@@index([deviceId])` with a
composite `@@index([userId, deviceId])` (every lookup also filters on
userId; the old index would never have been used). Comment on
accessTokenHash corrected to HMAC-SHA-256.
Container / ops
- Dockerfile: install tzdata + ENV TZ=Europe/Berlin so the daily
pg-boss schedule (`30 2 * * *` Europe/Berlin) actually fires at 02:30
Berlin instead of silently falling back to UTC on the alpine base.
- docker-compose.yml: tighten the healthcheck to `wget --spider` (matches
the Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK style, doesn't pipe the body), pass through
BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS so a custom retention env reaches the container.
- .env.example: document every new env var added in this PR
(HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE, ENCRYPTION_KEYS, ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID,
BACKUP_S3_*, BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS) with
comments and the all-or-none semantics for the backup block.
491 tests still green, typecheck clean.
* chore: retrigger CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
320 lines
9.6 KiB
TypeScript
320 lines
9.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Off-host encrypted backup uploader (v1.4 G1).
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*
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* Each user's daily JSON dump is encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a
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* SEPARATE key (`BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) so a leak of the application
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* `ENCRYPTION_KEY` does NOT expose the off-host backups, and vice
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* versa. Ciphertext is uploaded to an S3-compatible target (Cloudflare
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* R2, AWS S3, MinIO, Backblaze B2 — anything that speaks the SigV4
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* protocol) using `@aws-sdk/client-s3`.
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*
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* Object key layout:
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* <bucket>/<YYYY-MM-DD>/user-<userId>.json.enc
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*
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* Retention: the worker NEVER calls DeleteObject on backup keys. Operators
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* MUST configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule (e.g. expire after
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* `BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS`). This keeps the IAM grant for the worker
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* limited to PutObject + GetObject, so a compromised worker cannot wipe
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* the backup history. See docs/ops/backup-restore.md.
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*/
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import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import type { PrismaClient } from "@/generated/prisma/client";
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import { getEvent } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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const ALGORITHM = "aes-256-gcm";
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const IV_LENGTH = 12;
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const TAG_LENGTH = 16;
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export interface OffhostBackupConfig {
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endpoint: string;
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bucket: string;
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accessKey: string;
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secretKey: string;
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region: string;
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encryptionKey: Buffer;
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retentionDays: number;
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}
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export class OffhostBackupNotConfiguredError extends Error {
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constructor(message: string) {
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super(message);
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this.name = "OffhostBackupNotConfiguredError";
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}
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}
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function decodeBackupKey(raw: string): Buffer {
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if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(raw)) return Buffer.from(raw, "hex");
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if (/^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$/.test(raw)) {
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const buf = Buffer.from(raw, "base64");
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if (buf.length === 32) return buf;
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}
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throw new Error(
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"BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY must be 64 hex chars or 32-byte base64",
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);
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}
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export function loadOffhostConfig(): OffhostBackupConfig | null {
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const endpoint = process.env.BACKUP_S3_ENDPOINT;
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const bucket = process.env.BACKUP_S3_BUCKET;
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const accessKey = process.env.BACKUP_S3_ACCESS_KEY;
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const secretKey = process.env.BACKUP_S3_SECRET_KEY;
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const encRaw = process.env.BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
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if (!endpoint || !bucket || !accessKey || !secretKey || !encRaw) return null;
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const retentionDays = (() => {
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const raw = process.env.BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS;
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if (!raw) return 30;
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const v = parseInt(raw, 10);
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return Number.isFinite(v) && v >= 1 ? v : 30;
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})();
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return {
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endpoint,
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bucket,
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accessKey,
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secretKey,
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region: process.env.BACKUP_S3_REGION ?? "auto",
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encryptionKey: decodeBackupKey(encRaw),
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retentionDays,
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};
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}
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/**
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* Encrypt a JSON payload with the dedicated backup key.
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*
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* Wire format (binary):
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* magic(4)="HLBK" || version(1)=0x01 || iv(12) || tag(16) || ciphertext
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*/
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export function encryptBackup(plaintext: string, key: Buffer): Buffer {
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const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
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const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
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const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
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const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
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return Buffer.concat([Buffer.from("HLBK\x01", "binary"), iv, tag, ct]);
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}
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export function decryptBackup(buf: Buffer, key: Buffer): string {
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const magic = buf.subarray(0, 4).toString("binary");
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const version = buf[4];
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if (magic !== "HLBK" || version !== 0x01) {
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throw new Error("Invalid backup envelope (bad magic or version)");
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}
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const iv = buf.subarray(5, 5 + IV_LENGTH);
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const tag = buf.subarray(5 + IV_LENGTH, 5 + IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
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const ct = buf.subarray(5 + IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
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const dec = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
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dec.setAuthTag(tag);
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return Buffer.concat([dec.update(ct), dec.final()]).toString("utf8");
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}
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interface S3Like {
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putObject(key: string, body: Buffer | Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
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getObject(key: string): Promise<Buffer>;
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headObject(key: string): Promise<boolean>;
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listObjects(
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prefix: string,
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): Promise<Array<{ key: string; lastModified?: Date }>>;
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deleteObject(key: string): Promise<void>;
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}
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export async function getS3Client(cfg: OffhostBackupConfig): Promise<S3Like> {
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// Dynamic import so unit tests + dev environments without the SDK don't fail.
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const mod = (await import("@aws-sdk/client-s3").catch((err) => {
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throw new Error(
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`@aws-sdk/client-s3 is not installed (${(err as Error).message}). ` +
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`Run: pnpm add @aws-sdk/client-s3`,
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);
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})) as typeof import("@aws-sdk/client-s3");
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const client = new mod.S3Client({
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endpoint: cfg.endpoint,
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region: cfg.region,
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forcePathStyle: true,
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credentials: { accessKeyId: cfg.accessKey, secretAccessKey: cfg.secretKey },
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});
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const collect = async (stream: unknown): Promise<Buffer> => {
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const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
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for await (const c of stream as AsyncIterable<Uint8Array>) {
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chunks.push(Buffer.from(c as Uint8Array));
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}
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return Buffer.concat(chunks);
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};
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return {
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putObject: async (key, body) => {
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await client.send(
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new mod.PutObjectCommand({
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Bucket: cfg.bucket,
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Key: key,
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Body: body,
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ContentType: "application/octet-stream",
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}),
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);
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},
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getObject: async (key) => {
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const out = await client.send(
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new mod.GetObjectCommand({ Bucket: cfg.bucket, Key: key }),
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);
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return collect(out.Body);
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},
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headObject: async (key) => {
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try {
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await client.send(
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new mod.HeadObjectCommand({ Bucket: cfg.bucket, Key: key }),
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);
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return true;
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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},
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listObjects: async (prefix) => {
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const out = await client.send(
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new mod.ListObjectsV2Command({ Bucket: cfg.bucket, Prefix: prefix }),
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);
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return (out.Contents ?? []).map((c) => ({
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key: c.Key ?? "",
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lastModified: c.LastModified,
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}));
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},
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deleteObject: async (key) => {
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await client.send(
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new mod.DeleteObjectCommand({ Bucket: cfg.bucket, Key: key }),
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);
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},
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};
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}
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interface BackupRunReport {
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config: { endpoint: string; bucket: string; region: string };
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uploaded: number;
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failed: number;
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failures: Array<{ userId: string; message: string }>;
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totalUsers: number;
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}
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export async function runOffhostBackup(
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prisma: PrismaClient,
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s3Override?: S3Like,
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now: Date = new Date(),
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): Promise<BackupRunReport> {
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const cfg = loadOffhostConfig();
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if (!cfg) {
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throw new OffhostBackupNotConfiguredError(
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"Off-host backup not configured. Set BACKUP_S3_ENDPOINT/BUCKET/ACCESS_KEY/SECRET_KEY and BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY.",
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);
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}
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const s3 = s3Override ?? (await getS3Client(cfg));
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const dateKey = now.toISOString().slice(0, 10);
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const users = await prisma.user.findMany({ select: { id: true } });
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let uploaded = 0;
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let failed = 0;
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const failures: Array<{ userId: string; message: string }> = [];
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const evt = getEvent();
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for (const user of users) {
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try {
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const [measurements, medications, intakeEvents, moodEntries] =
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await Promise.all([
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prisma.measurement.findMany({ where: { userId: user.id } }),
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prisma.medication.findMany({
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where: { userId: user.id },
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include: { schedules: true },
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}),
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prisma.medicationIntakeEvent.findMany({ where: { userId: user.id } }),
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prisma.moodEntry.findMany({ where: { userId: user.id } }),
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]);
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const payload = JSON.stringify({
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exportedAt: now.toISOString(),
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userId: user.id,
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measurements,
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medications,
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intakeEvents,
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moodEntries,
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});
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const ciphertext = encryptBackup(payload, cfg.encryptionKey);
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const key = `${dateKey}/user-${user.id}.json.enc`;
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await s3.putObject(key, ciphertext);
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uploaded++;
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} catch (err) {
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failed++;
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const message = (err as Error).message ?? "unknown";
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failures.push({ userId: user.id, message: message.slice(0, 200) });
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// Surface per-user failure detail so an operator can tell WHICH user
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// failed and WHY without scraping stdout.
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evt?.addWarning(
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`offhost-backup user ${user.id} failed: ${message.slice(0, 200)}`,
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);
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}
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}
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return {
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config: {
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endpoint: cfg.endpoint,
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bucket: cfg.bucket,
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region: cfg.region,
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},
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uploaded,
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failed,
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failures,
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totalUsers: users.length,
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};
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}
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export interface RoundtripReport {
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endpoint: string;
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bucket: string;
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region: string;
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putLatencyMs: number;
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getLatencyMs: number;
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ok: boolean;
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error?: string;
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}
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/**
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* Test-button helper: write + read a tiny object so the admin UI can
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* confirm the bucket + creds work. Never returns the credentials.
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*/
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export async function runOffhostRoundtripTest(
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s3Override?: S3Like,
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): Promise<RoundtripReport> {
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const cfg = loadOffhostConfig();
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if (!cfg) {
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throw new OffhostBackupNotConfiguredError(
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"Off-host backup is not configured.",
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);
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}
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const s3 = s3Override ?? (await getS3Client(cfg));
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const key = `_healthcheck/${Date.now()}.bin`;
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const body = Buffer.from([0x42]);
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const t0 = Date.now();
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try {
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await s3.putObject(key, body);
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const putLatencyMs = Date.now() - t0;
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const t1 = Date.now();
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const got = await s3.getObject(key);
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const getLatencyMs = Date.now() - t1;
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await s3.deleteObject(key).catch(() => {});
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return {
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endpoint: cfg.endpoint,
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bucket: cfg.bucket,
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region: cfg.region,
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putLatencyMs,
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getLatencyMs,
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ok: got.length === 1 && got[0] === 0x42,
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};
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} catch (err) {
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return {
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endpoint: cfg.endpoint,
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bucket: cfg.bucket,
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region: cfg.region,
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putLatencyMs: -1,
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getLatencyMs: -1,
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ok: false,
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error: (err as Error).message,
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};
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}
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}
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