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Marc-André Bombeck
4d3a02cc1a
Lay the account-security and data-sovereignty substrate for v1.23. No user-facing behaviour yet — schema, crypto registry, redaction, and the note-encryption data path only. Schema + migrations: - 0199 — User totp_secret_encrypted / totp_confirmed_at / mfa_enforced / passkey_upgrade_nudge_dismissed; Session mfa_verified_at / last_active_at; Passkey last_used_at. All additive, nullable / defaulted. - 0200 — mfa_challenges (single-use step-up ticket; only the ticket hash is stored, so no session or token is ever minted before the second factor), mfa_recovery_codes (Argon2id at rest), webauthn_mfa_credentials (second-factor keys, kept separate from passkeys, which remain the passwordless-primary set). - 0201 — mood_entries.note_encrypted + measurements.notes_encrypted (BYTEA), matching the existing free-text encrypted-note convention. Free-text health notes: - New writes encrypt the mood / measurement note into the *_encrypted column and null the legacy plaintext column; reads prefer the ciphertext and fall back to plaintext only for not-yet-migrated rows, via a single read/write helper. - A boot-time job migrates existing plaintext rows in an idempotent, transactional, fail-closed pass (encrypt, then null the plaintext, per row in one transaction; safe to re-run; a row with content is never left both-null). - The legacy plaintext columns are kept this release and dropped in a follow-up once the backfill reports zero remaining rows — the same boundary the key-rotation playbook uses before dropping a legacy key. Crypto coverage: - Register the three new encrypted columns and wire them into the key-rotation script so a rotation never orphans them. - Extend the observability and log redaction denylists so TOTP secrets, MFA / recovery / backup codes, and export passphrases never reach a wide event.
29 lines
1.6 KiB
SQL
29 lines
1.6 KiB
SQL
-- v1.23 — encrypt free-text health notes at rest.
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--
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-- Adds the AES-256-GCM ciphertext columns for the two free-text health-note
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-- fields that were still plaintext (`mood_entries.note`, `measurements.notes`).
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--
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-- STORAGE CONVENTION: Bytes (`bytea`), matching the dominant free-text
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-- encrypted-note convention already in the schema — illness_day_logs.note_
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-- encrypted, cycle_day_logs.notes_encrypted (string-kind), labs.note_encrypted,
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-- coach_*.{...}_encrypted are all the shared-codec shape (the `encrypt()`
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-- ciphertext string stored UTF-8 as `bytea`). `bytea` is chosen here because
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-- the comparable note columns (IllnessDayLog / LabResult) use it and the
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-- rotation script's `rotateBytesColumn` already covers that shape with least
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-- friction. Both columns are registered in ENCRYPTED_COLUMNS + the rotation
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-- script in the same change.
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--
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-- This migration is ADDITIVE ONLY. The legacy plaintext columns
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-- (`mood_entries.note`, `measurements.notes`) are intentionally NOT dropped
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-- here: an idempotent, transactional, fail-closed boot-time job encrypts the
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-- existing rows (plaintext -> ciphertext, then nulls the plaintext) so the
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-- read path can fall back to plaintext for not-yet-migrated rows. Dropping the
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-- plaintext columns is a deliberate FOLLOW-UP release, once the backfill
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-- reports zero remaining plaintext-but-no-ciphertext rows — the same boundary
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-- the encryption-key-rotation playbook uses before dropping a legacy key.
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ALTER TABLE "mood_entries"
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ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS "note_encrypted" BYTEA;
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ALTER TABLE "measurements"
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ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS "notes_encrypted" BYTEA;
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