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https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog.git
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Marc-André Bombeck
7b5bc130d8
A browser session on its own could start TOTP enrollment or register a security key. Combined with a pending secret counting as a factor, that let a stolen session give itself a second factor, register a passkey with it, and keep access after the owner changed the password. TOTP setup and security-key registration now pass on the cookie path only when the session signed in or completed a second factor in the last five minutes, or when the body carries a proof in the step-up shape (password, a confirmed authenticator code, or a passkey or security-key assertion). The settings cards ask for that proof when the server answers auth.reproof.required and retry the same call with it. The Bearer path is unchanged: its elevation already is the proof. Every route that checks a password or a factor as a re-proof now uses one verifier and one per-account budget of five attempts per fifteen minutes, shared with the step-up mint, and records each refused proof as auth.mfa.failed. Passkey enrollment and password change had neither the limit (passkey enrollment) nor the audit row (both). A structural test freezes the set of credential-verifying routes and requires a throttle and an audit call in each.
70 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
70 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Request schemas for the step-up elevation surface. Single-sourced here so the
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* runtime `safeParse` and the OpenAPI registry describe the identical wire
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* contract.
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*/
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import { z } from "zod/v4";
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import { webauthnCredentialSchema } from "@/lib/validations/mfa";
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/**
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* Re-prove a factor to mint an elevation. Four accepted proofs, discriminated on
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* `method`, and the choice is an AUTHORISATION input rather than a preference:
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*
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* - `password` — the account password. Reaches exactly what a plain cookie
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* session reaches. Unavailable on an account provisioned through OIDC SSO
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* that never set one.
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* - `totp` — a current code from the enrolled authenticator.
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* - `webauthn` — an assertion from a registered second-factor security key,
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* begun at `/api/auth/step-up/options` with `method: "webauthn"`.
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* - `passkey` — an assertion from a primary passkey, begun at the same
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* endpoint with `method: "passkey"`.
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*
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* Only the last three satisfy the fresh-factor routes, mirroring the web, where
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* a password login never stamps a session second-factor-verified.
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*
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* The password is length-bounded so a body cap is not the only thing standing
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* between a caller and an unbounded Argon2id verify.
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*/
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export const stepUpMintSchema = z
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.discriminatedUnion("method", [
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z.object({
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method: z.literal("password"),
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password: z.string().min(1).max(512),
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}),
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z.object({
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method: z.literal("totp"),
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code: z
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.string()
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.trim()
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.regex(/^\d{6}$/, "Enter the 6-digit code from your authenticator app"),
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}),
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z.object({
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method: z.literal("webauthn"),
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challengeId: z.string().min(1),
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credential: webauthnCredentialSchema,
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}),
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z.object({
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method: z.literal("passkey"),
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challengeId: z.string().min(1),
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credential: webauthnCredentialSchema,
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}),
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])
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.meta({
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id: "StepUpMintRequest",
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description:
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"Re-prove a factor to mint a single-use, token-bound step-up elevation. `password` reaches the same routes a plain cookie session reaches; `totp`, `webauthn`, and `passkey` additionally satisfy the fresh-factor routes (disable, recovery-code rotation, security-key removal), matching exactly the ceremonies for which the web stamps a session second-factor-verified.",
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});
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export type StepUpMintRequest = z.infer<typeof stepUpMintSchema>;
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/** Which assertion ceremony to begin at `POST /api/auth/step-up/options`. */
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export const stepUpOptionsSchema = z
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.object({
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method: z
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.enum(["passkey", "webauthn"])
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.describe(
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"`passkey` begins an assertion against the account's primary passkeys; `webauthn` against its registered second-factor security keys.",
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),
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})
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.meta({ id: "StepUpOptionsRequest" });
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