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371 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript
371 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* v1.4.47 W6 — end-to-end coverage for the new Withings OAuth state
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* ledger.
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*
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* The audit's L-1 recommendation was a fully-random nonce backed by a
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* `(nonce → userId)` ledger row, single-use semantics, with the
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* cookie carrying only the opaque nonce. This file pins the
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* connect → callback handshake end-to-end against real Postgres:
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*
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* 1. `withings/connect` mints a row and stamps the cookie.
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* 2. `withings/callback` resolves the user via the row's `userId`,
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* verifies it matches the session, and deletes the row.
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* 3. A second callback with the same nonce hits the "row not
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* found" branch and redirects to the error page (replay
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* protection).
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* 4. A callback whose row has expired hits the same branch.
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* 5. The connect handler refuses to start when the user has no
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* Withings credentials — no ledger row is minted.
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*
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* Sibling assertions in `withings-oauth.test.ts` already cover the
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* token-exchange happy path + the `disconnect` route; this file
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* focuses on the ledger lifecycle the audit flagged.
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*/
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import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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import { cookieJar, headerJar } from "./mock-next-headers";
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import { getPrismaClient, truncateAllTables } from "./setup";
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process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY ??=
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"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
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vi.mock("next/headers", async () => {
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const { cookieJar, headerJar } = await import("./mock-next-headers");
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return {
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headers: vi.fn(async () => ({
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get: (name: string) => headerJar.get(name.toLowerCase()) ?? null,
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})),
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cookies: vi.fn(async () => ({
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get: (name: string) => {
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const value = cookieJar.get(name);
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return value ? { name, value } : undefined;
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},
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set: (name: string, value: string) => {
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cookieJar.set(name, value);
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},
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delete: (name: string) => {
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cookieJar.delete(name);
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},
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})),
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};
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});
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vi.mock("@/lib/db-compat", () => ({
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ensureDbCompatibility: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
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}));
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const TEST_USER_ID = "user-withings-oauth-flow";
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const WITHINGS_OAUTH_URL =
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"https://account.withings.com/oauth2_user/authorize2";
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const WITHINGS_TOKEN_URL = "https://wbsapi.withings.net/v2/oauth2";
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const WITHINGS_NOTIFY_URL = "https://wbsapi.withings.net/notify";
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beforeEach(async () => {
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await truncateAllTables(getPrismaClient());
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cookieJar.clear();
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headerJar.clear();
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const { encrypt } = await import("@/lib/crypto");
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await prisma.user.create({
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data: {
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id: TEST_USER_ID,
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username: "withings-flow-user",
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email: "withings-flow@example.test",
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role: "USER",
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withingsClientIdEncrypted: encrypt("client-id-flow"),
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withingsClientSecretEncrypted: encrypt("client-secret-flow"),
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},
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});
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const session = await prisma.session.create({
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data: {
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userId: TEST_USER_ID,
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expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60 * 60 * 1000),
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},
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});
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cookieJar.set("healthlog_session", session.id);
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = "http://localhost:3000";
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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vi.restoreAllMocks();
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});
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describe("Withings OAuth nonce ledger (real Postgres)", () => {
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it("connect mints exactly one row keyed on the URL state, with `userId` + 10-min TTL", async () => {
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const { GET } = await import("@/app/api/withings/connect/route");
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const res = await (GET as unknown as (req: Request) => Promise<Response>)(
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new Request("http://localhost/api/withings/connect"),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(307);
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const location = res.headers.get("location")!;
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expect(location).toContain(WITHINGS_OAUTH_URL);
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const target = new URL(location);
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const state = target.searchParams.get("state")!;
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// 22-char base64url. The legacy `${userId}:${random16}` shape no
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// longer reaches the URL — the audit L-1 fix.
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expect(state).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22}$/);
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expect(state).not.toContain(":");
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expect(state).not.toContain(TEST_USER_ID);
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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const rows = await prisma.withingsOAuthState.findMany();
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expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(rows[0].nonce).toBe(state);
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expect(rows[0].userId).toBe(TEST_USER_ID);
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// TTL is 10 minutes; allow a generous floor so a slow CI box
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// doesn't flake on the upper bound.
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const ttlMs = rows[0].expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now();
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expect(ttlMs).toBeGreaterThan(9 * 60 * 1000);
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expect(ttlMs).toBeLessThanOrEqual(10 * 60 * 1000 + 5_000);
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// Cookie carries the same opaque nonce — no user id.
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const setCookie = res.headers.get("set-cookie")!;
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expect(setCookie).toContain(`withings_state=${state}`);
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expect(setCookie).not.toContain(TEST_USER_ID);
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});
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it("connect redirects to the settings error page (no dead-end) when the user has no Withings credentials — no ledger row minted", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await prisma.user.update({
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where: { id: TEST_USER_ID },
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data: {
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withingsClientIdEncrypted: null,
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withingsClientSecretEncrypted: null,
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},
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});
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const { GET } = await import("@/app/api/withings/connect/route");
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const res = await (GET as unknown as (req: Request) => Promise<Response>)(
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new Request("http://localhost/api/withings/connect"),
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);
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// The no-credentials branch now redirects to Settings → Integrations with
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// a toast reason instead of emitting a raw JSON 400 into a browser tab
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// (every other failure branch already redirects). The security property —
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// no OAuth-state ledger row minted — still holds.
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expect(res.status).toBe(307);
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const location = res.headers.get("location") ?? "";
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expect(location).toContain("withings=error");
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expect(location).toContain("reason=nocreds");
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const rows = await prisma.withingsOAuthState.findMany();
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expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("connect → callback consumes the row (single-use); replay of the same nonce hits the error page", async () => {
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vi.spyOn(globalThis, "fetch").mockImplementation(async (input) => {
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const url = typeof input === "string" ? input : (input as Request).url;
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if (url === WITHINGS_TOKEN_URL) {
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return new Response(
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JSON.stringify({
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status: 0,
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body: {
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userid: "withings-userid-flow",
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access_token: "access-flow",
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refresh_token: "refresh-flow",
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expires_in: 3600,
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},
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}),
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{ status: 200, headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } },
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);
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}
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if (url === WITHINGS_NOTIFY_URL) {
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return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 0 }), { status: 200 });
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}
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throw new Error(`Unexpected fetch in flow test: ${url}`);
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});
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// Leg 1 — connect
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const { GET: connect } = await import("@/app/api/withings/connect/route");
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const connectRes = await (
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connect as unknown as (req: Request) => Promise<Response>
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)(new Request("http://localhost/api/withings/connect"));
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const location = connectRes.headers.get("location")!;
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const nonce = new URL(location).searchParams.get("state")!;
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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const beforeCallback = await prisma.withingsOAuthState.findUnique({
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where: { nonce },
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});
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expect(beforeCallback).not.toBeNull();
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// Leg 2 — callback (happy path)
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const { GET: callback } = await import("@/app/api/withings/callback/route");
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const callbackReq = new NextRequest(
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`http://localhost/api/withings/callback?code=auth-code&state=${encodeURIComponent(nonce)}`,
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{
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method: "GET",
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headers: {
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cookie: `healthlog_session=${cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")}; withings_state=${nonce}`,
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},
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},
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);
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const callbackRes = await callback(callbackReq);
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expect(callbackRes.status).toBe(307);
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expect(callbackRes.headers.get("location")).toContain("withings=connected");
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const afterCallback = await prisma.withingsOAuthState.findUnique({
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where: { nonce },
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});
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expect(afterCallback).toBeNull();
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// Leg 3 — replay the same nonce. The cookie compare still passes
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// (matching strings) but the row lookup misses, so the handler
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// bounces to the error page without hitting the token endpoint
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// again.
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const fetchSpy = vi.mocked(globalThis.fetch);
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fetchSpy.mockClear();
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const replayReq = new NextRequest(
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`http://localhost/api/withings/callback?code=auth-code&state=${encodeURIComponent(nonce)}`,
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{
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method: "GET",
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headers: {
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cookie: `healthlog_session=${cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")}; withings_state=${nonce}`,
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},
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},
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);
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const replayRes = await callback(replayReq);
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expect(replayRes.status).toBe(307);
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expect(replayRes.headers.get("location")).toContain(
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"withings=error&reason=replay",
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);
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// No token-endpoint call on the replay leg.
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const replayTokenCalls = fetchSpy.mock.calls.filter(
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([input]) =>
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(typeof input === "string" ? input : (input as Request).url) ===
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WITHINGS_TOKEN_URL,
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);
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expect(replayTokenCalls).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("callback rejects an expired row, deletes it, and never reaches the token exchange", async () => {
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const fetchSpy = vi
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.spyOn(globalThis, "fetch")
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.mockResolvedValue(new Response("must not be called", { status: 500 }));
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const nonce = "expired-nonce-22charXX";
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await prisma.withingsOAuthState.create({
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data: {
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nonce,
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userId: TEST_USER_ID,
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expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000), // already expired
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},
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});
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const { GET: callback } = await import("@/app/api/withings/callback/route");
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const req = new NextRequest(
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`http://localhost/api/withings/callback?code=auth-code&state=${encodeURIComponent(nonce)}`,
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{
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method: "GET",
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headers: {
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cookie: `healthlog_session=${cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")}; withings_state=${nonce}`,
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},
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},
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);
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const res = await callback(req);
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expect(res.status).toBe(307);
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expect(res.headers.get("location")).toContain(
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"withings=error&reason=expired",
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);
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// Token endpoint never hit. Scope the assertion to the token URL so a
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// prior connection's fire-and-forget webhook subscriptions, which resolve
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// asynchronously into this spy, cannot make the check flaky.
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const tokenCalls = fetchSpy.mock.calls.filter(
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([input]) =>
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(typeof input === "string" ? input : (input as Request).url) ===
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WITHINGS_TOKEN_URL,
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);
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expect(tokenCalls).toHaveLength(0);
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// The handler stamps out the expired row so a clock-skewed replay
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// can't slip through.
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const lingering = await prisma.withingsOAuthState.findUnique({
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where: { nonce },
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});
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expect(lingering).toBeNull();
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});
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it("callback rejects a row whose userId does not match the session, deletes it, and writes no connection", async () => {
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const fetchSpy = vi
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.spyOn(globalThis, "fetch")
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.mockResolvedValue(new Response("must not be called", { status: 500 }));
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// Seed a second user + a ledger row that points to *them*. The
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// callback runs under TEST_USER_ID's session, so the row's userId
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// mismatch must trip the rejection branch.
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await prisma.user.create({
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data: {
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id: "user-other-flow",
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username: "other-user",
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email: "other@example.test",
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role: "USER",
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},
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});
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const nonce = "cross-user-noncexxxxxx";
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await prisma.withingsOAuthState.create({
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data: {
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nonce,
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userId: "user-other-flow",
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expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 10 * 60 * 1000),
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},
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});
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const { GET: callback } = await import("@/app/api/withings/callback/route");
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const req = new NextRequest(
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`http://localhost/api/withings/callback?code=auth-code&state=${encodeURIComponent(nonce)}`,
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{
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method: "GET",
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headers: {
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cookie: `healthlog_session=${cookieJar.get("healthlog_session")}; withings_state=${nonce}`,
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},
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},
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);
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const res = await callback(req);
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expect(res.status).toBe(307);
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expect(res.headers.get("location")).toContain(
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"withings=error&reason=cross_user",
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);
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// No token-endpoint call — short-circuited before exchangeCode fires.
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// (Unrelated transports may still hit `fetch` for wide-event shipping;
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// we narrow to the Withings token URL the same way the replay leg
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// above does so the assertion stays meaningful without coupling to
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// logging-transport details.)
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const crossUserTokenCalls = fetchSpy.mock.calls.filter(
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([input]) =>
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(typeof input === "string" ? input : (input as Request).url) ===
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WITHINGS_TOKEN_URL,
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);
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expect(crossUserTokenCalls).toHaveLength(0);
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// The row is stamped out — single-use + cross-user mismatch is a
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// CSRF signal, not a recoverable state, so we don't leave the
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// row around for a retry.
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const lingering = await prisma.withingsOAuthState.findUnique({
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where: { nonce },
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});
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expect(lingering).toBeNull();
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// No connection landed under EITHER user.
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expect(
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await prisma.withingsConnection.findUnique({
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where: { userId: TEST_USER_ID },
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}),
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).toBeNull();
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expect(
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await prisma.withingsConnection.findUnique({
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where: { userId: "user-other-flow" },
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}),
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).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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