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Marc-André Bombeck
4d3a02cc1a
Lay the account-security and data-sovereignty substrate for v1.23. No user-facing behaviour yet — schema, crypto registry, redaction, and the note-encryption data path only. Schema + migrations: - 0199 — User totp_secret_encrypted / totp_confirmed_at / mfa_enforced / passkey_upgrade_nudge_dismissed; Session mfa_verified_at / last_active_at; Passkey last_used_at. All additive, nullable / defaulted. - 0200 — mfa_challenges (single-use step-up ticket; only the ticket hash is stored, so no session or token is ever minted before the second factor), mfa_recovery_codes (Argon2id at rest), webauthn_mfa_credentials (second-factor keys, kept separate from passkeys, which remain the passwordless-primary set). - 0201 — mood_entries.note_encrypted + measurements.notes_encrypted (BYTEA), matching the existing free-text encrypted-note convention. Free-text health notes: - New writes encrypt the mood / measurement note into the *_encrypted column and null the legacy plaintext column; reads prefer the ciphertext and fall back to plaintext only for not-yet-migrated rows, via a single read/write helper. - A boot-time job migrates existing plaintext rows in an idempotent, transactional, fail-closed pass (encrypt, then null the plaintext, per row in one transaction; safe to re-run; a row with content is never left both-null). - The legacy plaintext columns are kept this release and dropped in a follow-up once the backfill reports zero remaining rows — the same boundary the key-rotation playbook uses before dropping a legacy key. Crypto coverage: - Register the three new encrypted columns and wire them into the key-rotation script so a rotation never orphans them. - Extend the observability and log redaction denylists so TOTP secrets, MFA / recovery / backup codes, and export passphrases never reach a wide event.
70 lines
3.3 KiB
SQL
70 lines
3.3 KiB
SQL
-- v1.23 — second-factor (MFA) tables.
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--
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-- Three new stores backing the TOTP / WebAuthn-second-factor / recovery-code
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-- flows later waves build on. Phase F lands the empty tables only — no
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-- behaviour yet.
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--
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-- mfa_challenges single-use step-up ticket minted after a valid
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-- password when the account has a second factor.
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-- The "password OK, awaiting factor 2" state lives
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-- here, never in a half-built session, so no
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-- session/token is issued before factor 2 passes.
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-- Only the ticket HASH is stored (ticket_hash).
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-- mfa_recovery_codes one row per single-use recovery code, Argon2id-
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-- hashed at rest; used_at burns it.
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-- webauthn_mfa_credentials second-factor security keys, kept SEPARATE from
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-- `passkeys` (the passwordless-primary store) —
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-- different semantics, ceremony, management UI.
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-- Mirrors the passkeys field encoding.
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CREATE TABLE "mfa_challenges" (
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"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"user_id" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"kind" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"ticket_hash" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"attempts" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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"expires_at" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
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"consumed_at" TIMESTAMP(3),
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"created_at" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
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CONSTRAINT "mfa_challenges_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
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);
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CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "mfa_challenges_ticket_hash_key" ON "mfa_challenges"("ticket_hash");
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CREATE INDEX "mfa_challenges_user_id_idx" ON "mfa_challenges"("user_id");
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-- The verify path and the expiry sweep both filter on expires_at.
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CREATE INDEX "mfa_challenges_expires_at_idx" ON "mfa_challenges"("expires_at");
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CREATE TABLE "mfa_recovery_codes" (
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"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"user_id" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"code_hash" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"used_at" TIMESTAMP(3),
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"created_at" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
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CONSTRAINT "mfa_recovery_codes_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
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);
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CREATE INDEX "mfa_recovery_codes_user_id_idx" ON "mfa_recovery_codes"("user_id");
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CREATE TABLE "webauthn_mfa_credentials" (
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"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"user_id" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"name" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Security key',
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"credential_id" TEXT NOT NULL,
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"credential_public_key" BYTEA NOT NULL,
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"counter" BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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"transports" TEXT[],
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"created_at" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
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"last_used_at" TIMESTAMP(3),
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CONSTRAINT "webauthn_mfa_credentials_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
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);
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CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "webauthn_mfa_credentials_credential_id_key" ON "webauthn_mfa_credentials"("credential_id");
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CREATE INDEX "webauthn_mfa_credentials_user_id_idx" ON "webauthn_mfa_credentials"("user_id");
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ALTER TABLE "mfa_challenges" ADD CONSTRAINT "mfa_challenges_user_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("user_id") REFERENCES "users"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
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ALTER TABLE "mfa_recovery_codes" ADD CONSTRAINT "mfa_recovery_codes_user_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("user_id") REFERENCES "users"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
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ALTER TABLE "webauthn_mfa_credentials" ADD CONSTRAINT "webauthn_mfa_credentials_user_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("user_id") REFERENCES "users"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
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