mirror of
https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog.git
synced 2026-11-18 16:12:11 +00:00
POST /api/auth/claim/sso checks the handover link and the username and seals the link id, the username and a per-start binding into an hl_claim cookie. GET /api/auth/oidc/login?intent=claim carries the binding into the encrypted OIDC state, and the callback binds the provider subject to the profile in the claim transaction, refusing a subject or verified email another account holds, a link that is no longer usable, and a live session. The handover status and the claim preview name the redemption methods; a single-sign-on-only server hands over through the identity provider, and only the password claim stays refused there.
122 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
122 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
|
|
* v1.42 (#959) — the refusals the anonymous claim routes give before they look
|
|
* at a token, in one place so the preview and the claims cannot disagree.
|
|
*
|
|
* Order matters and is the register route's order:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. What this server cannot do at all. The password claim sets a password,
|
|
* so a single-sign-on-only instance refuses it outright; the
|
|
* single-sign-on claim (v1.43) needs an identity provider, and answers
|
|
* 404 `profile_claim.sso_unavailable` without one. The preview is
|
|
* refused by neither: it is what tells the page which way is open.
|
|
* 2. A signed-in caller is refused with 409. Claiming creates a session for
|
|
* the new owner, and a Guardian testing their own link would otherwise be
|
|
* signed out of their account and into the person's. Refused before the
|
|
* rate limit: it is a state, not an attempt, and spending the bucket on it
|
|
* would lock out the person the link is for, who may share the address.
|
|
* 3. The per-address rate limit, the anonymous auth-surface pattern: a
|
|
* misconfigured proxy trust chain collapses every caller into one tight
|
|
* bucket rather than one free-for-all. Both claims share one bucket, so
|
|
* switching between them buys no extra attempts.
|
|
*/
|
|
import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
|
|
|
|
import { apiError } from "@/lib/api-response";
|
|
import { getOidcConfig, isOidcConfigured, isOidcOnly } from "@/lib/auth/oidc";
|
|
import type { HandoverMethod } from "@/lib/validations/claim-sso";
|
|
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
|
|
import { checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit, rateLimitHeaders } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
|
|
|
|
/** The one answer for every unusable link. Not an oracle. */
|
|
export function claimInvalid() {
|
|
return apiError("This link is invalid, expired or already used", 404, {
|
|
errorCode: "profile_claim.invalid",
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* v1.43 (#959) — how a handover link can be redeemed on this server: with a
|
|
* password unless the server allows single sign-on only, and through the
|
|
* identity provider whenever one is configured. Never empty in practice
|
|
* (`OIDC_ONLY` only takes effect with a configured provider), but the Guardian
|
|
* side refuses on an empty list rather than assuming it.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function handoverMethods(): HandoverMethod[] {
|
|
const methods: HandoverMethod[] = [];
|
|
if (!isOidcOnly()) methods.push("password");
|
|
if (isOidcConfigured()) methods.push("sso");
|
|
return methods;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The provider's name for the "Continue with …" button, or null. */
|
|
export function ssoProviderName(): string | null {
|
|
return getOidcConfig()?.buttonLabel ?? null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export async function claimGate(
|
|
request: Request,
|
|
surface: "preview" | "claim" | "sso",
|
|
/**
|
|
* Whether the request carries a live session. Resolved by the ROUTE with
|
|
* `getSession()` and handed in, rather than resolved here: a session read
|
|
* inside a `lib/` wrapper would take both routes off the direct
|
|
* session-resolution list in `session-surface-guard.test.ts`, which is
|
|
* exactly the disappearance that guard exists to catch.
|
|
*/
|
|
signedIn: boolean,
|
|
): Promise<{ refusal: Response } | { refusal: null; ip: string | null }> {
|
|
if (surface === "claim" && isOidcOnly()) {
|
|
return {
|
|
refusal: apiError(
|
|
"This server allows single sign-on only; take the profile over through the identity provider",
|
|
403,
|
|
{ errorCode: "profile_claim.oidc_only_unsupported" },
|
|
),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
if (surface === "sso" && !isOidcConfigured()) {
|
|
return {
|
|
refusal: apiError(
|
|
"Single sign-on is not configured on this server",
|
|
404,
|
|
{ errorCode: "profile_claim.sso_unavailable" },
|
|
),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (signedIn) {
|
|
annotate({
|
|
action: { name: `profile_claim.${surface}.refused_authenticated` },
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
refusal: apiError("Already signed in — sign out first", 409, {
|
|
errorCode: "auth.already_authenticated",
|
|
}),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const rl =
|
|
surface === "preview"
|
|
? await checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit(
|
|
request,
|
|
"auth:claim-preview",
|
|
20,
|
|
15 * 60 * 1000,
|
|
)
|
|
: await checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit(
|
|
request,
|
|
"auth:claim",
|
|
5,
|
|
15 * 60 * 1000,
|
|
);
|
|
if (!rl.allowed) {
|
|
return {
|
|
refusal: NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ data: null, error: "Too many attempts. Please try again later." },
|
|
{ status: 429, headers: rateLimitHeaders(rl) },
|
|
),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
return { refusal: null, ip: rl.ip };
|
|
}
|