Files
HealthLog/src/app/api/share-links/route.ts
T
Marc-André Bombeck 844dc8457d feat(share-links): attach documents and serve them through the share token
P3-1-T2/T4/T5. Extend createShareLinkSchema with an optional, bounded
documentIds set; validate each id as the caller's own live document and create
the membership rows in the same transaction (frozen write-once). Summary DTOs
gain documentCount (never ids, never bytes).

Add the public share-scoped serve route /c/<token>/d/<id>: token-resolved
(never requireAuth), passphrase-gated via the token-scoped unlock cookie,
revocation/expiry re-checked before any decrypt, confined to the link's frozen
document set (foreign/deleted id → flat 404), fail-closed decrypt, identical
serving-class posture as the owner route (inline Class A / attachment Class B,
nosniff, no-store), EXIF-stripped for raster images on egress, per-link rate
limit.

Carve the serve path out of the proxy's blanket DENY posture with the same
document CSP as the owner route (default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'),
anchored to exactly two dynamic segments so no lookalike over-matches.
2026-07-07 18:43:13 +02:00

233 lines
8.3 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* /api/share-links — owner clinician-share-link lifecycle (Epic C, C4).
*
* POST → create a link. Mints an `hls_<48 hex>` token (192-bit), stores
* ONLY its HMAC hash, returns the raw token EXACTLY ONCE. Every
* scope column is frozen write-once at creation.
* GET → list the caller's own links (never the raw token — it is
* unrecoverable after the create response).
*
* Auth: cookie session OR Bearer (`requireAuth`). `userId` is always narrowed
* from the auth context; there is no `userId` body field. Rate-limited.
* This is the OWNER lifecycle only — the public resolver / view (C3/C5) is a
* separate surface.
*/
import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import { apiHandler, requireAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
import { hashToken } from "@/lib/auth/hmac";
import {
apiError,
apiSuccess,
getClientIp,
returnAllZodIssues,
safeJson,
} from "@/lib/api-response";
import { checkRateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import { createShareLinkSchema } from "@/lib/validations/clinician-share-link";
import {
generatePassphrase,
hashPassphrase,
normalisePassphrase,
PASSPHRASE_FRAGMENT_KEY,
} from "@/lib/clinician-share/passphrase";
import type { Prisma } from "@/generated/prisma/client";
/**
* The absolute origin to build the public share URL from. Prefers the
* forwarded host/proto a reverse proxy sets (the documented self-hosting path
* fronts the app with Caddy/Traefik/Nginx), falling back to the request URL's
* own origin. The QR payload carries the passphrase in the FRAGMENT only.
*/
function resolveOrigin(request: NextRequest): string {
const proto =
request.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto")?.split(",")[0]?.trim() ||
new URL(request.url).protocol.replace(":", "");
const host =
request.headers.get("x-forwarded-host")?.split(",")[0]?.trim() ||
request.headers.get("host") ||
new URL(request.url).host;
return `${proto}://${host}`;
}
/**
* The row selection every owner-facing projection reads. `_count.documents`
* surfaces the size of the frozen document set without ever loading the ids
* (let alone the blobs) — the metadata-only discipline (P3-D5).
*/
const shareLinkSummarySelect = {
id: true,
label: true,
rangeStart: true,
rangeEnd: true,
resourceTypes: true,
allowFhirApi: true,
passphraseHash: true,
expiresAt: true,
createdAt: true,
revokedAt: true,
lastAccessAt: true,
accessCount: true,
_count: { select: { documents: true } },
} as const;
/** Project a stored row to the safe owner-facing shape (never the token). */
function toSummary(row: {
id: string;
label: string;
rangeStart: Date;
rangeEnd: Date | null;
resourceTypes: string[];
allowFhirApi: boolean;
passphraseHash: string | null;
expiresAt: Date;
createdAt: Date;
revokedAt: Date | null;
lastAccessAt: Date | null;
accessCount: number;
_count: { documents: number };
}) {
return {
id: row.id,
label: row.label,
rangeStart: row.rangeStart.toISOString(),
rangeEnd: row.rangeEnd ? row.rangeEnd.toISOString() : null,
resourceTypes: row.resourceTypes,
allowFhirApi: row.allowFhirApi,
// v1.18.7 — surface only WHETHER a passphrase guards the link, never the
// hash itself. Legacy (null-hash) links read `false` and stay ungated.
protected: row.passphraseHash !== null,
// v1.28 — how many documents this share carries (never the ids, never the
// bytes; the serve route is the only decrypt path).
documentCount: row._count.documents,
expiresAt: row.expiresAt.toISOString(),
createdAt: row.createdAt.toISOString(),
revokedAt: row.revokedAt ? row.revokedAt.toISOString() : null,
lastAccessAt: row.lastAccessAt ? row.lastAccessAt.toISOString() : null,
accessCount: row.accessCount,
// Status the UI can render without re-deriving expiry/revocation.
active: row.revokedAt === null && row.expiresAt.getTime() > Date.now(),
};
}
export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
const { user } = await requireAuth();
annotate({ action: { name: "share-link.create" } });
const rl = await checkRateLimit(`share-link:${user.id}`, 20, 60 * 60 * 1000);
if (!rl.allowed) {
return apiError("Maximum 20 share-link operations per hour", 429);
}
const { data: body, error: jsonError } = await safeJson(request, {
maxBytes: 16 * 1024,
});
if (jsonError) return jsonError;
const parsed = createShareLinkSchema.safeParse(body);
if (!parsed.success) {
return returnAllZodIssues(parsed.error);
}
const input = parsed.data;
// Mint the 192-bit raw token, store only its HMAC hash.
const rawToken = `hls_${randomBytes(24).toString("hex")}`;
const tokenHash = hashToken(rawToken);
// v1.18.7 — always mint a passphrase second factor; store only its HMAC
// hash. The raw passphrase is returned exactly once below. `normalisePassphrase`
// is the canonical store form so the grouped (`XXXX-XXXX-…`) display and the
// bare fragment value collide to one hash.
const rawPassphrase = generatePassphrase();
const passphraseHash = hashPassphrase(normalisePassphrase(rawPassphrase)!);
// v1.28 — resolve the frozen document set. The ids are deduped (a client
// could repeat one, which the unique membership index would otherwise
// reject) and then validated as the caller's OWN live documents. A single
// foreign / deleted / unknown id seals the whole create as 422 — no share is
// ever minted with a document the caller does not own (B5). The rows are
// created in the SAME transaction as the link (nested create), so the
// membership is frozen write-once atomically with the scope columns.
const documentIds = Array.from(new Set(input.documentIds ?? []));
if (documentIds.length > 0) {
const owned = await prisma.inboundDocument.findMany({
where: { id: { in: documentIds }, userId: user.id, deletedAt: null },
select: { id: true },
});
if (owned.length !== documentIds.length) {
return apiError("One or more documents are not available to share", 422, {
errorCode: "share-link.documents.invalid",
});
}
}
// Field-by-field build — no mass assignment. Scope columns are written
// exactly once here and never updated.
const created = await prisma.clinicianShareLink.create({
data: {
userId: user.id,
tokenHash,
passphraseHash,
label: input.label,
rangeStart: new Date(input.rangeStart),
rangeEnd: input.rangeEnd ? new Date(input.rangeEnd) : null,
sectionsJson: (input.sections ?? {}) as Prisma.InputJsonValue,
resourceTypes: input.resourceTypes ?? [],
allowFhirApi: input.allowFhirApi ?? false,
expiresAt: new Date(input.expiresAt),
documents:
documentIds.length > 0
? { create: documentIds.map((documentId) => ({ documentId })) }
: undefined,
},
select: shareLinkSummarySelect,
});
await auditLog("share-link.create", {
userId: user.id,
ipAddress: getClientIp(request),
details: {
shareLinkId: created.id,
resourceTypes: created.resourceTypes,
allowFhirApi: created.allowFhirApi,
documentCount: created._count.documents,
expiresAt: created.expiresAt.toISOString(),
},
});
// The raw token AND raw passphrase are returned exactly once; both are
// unrecoverable thereafter. The QR/deep-link payload carries the passphrase
// in the URL FRAGMENT (`#k=`) — never the path or query — so it is never
// sent to the server, kept out of logs, referrers, and the access record.
const origin = resolveOrigin(request);
const shareUrl = `${origin}/c/${rawToken}`;
const qrUrl = `${shareUrl}#${PASSPHRASE_FRAGMENT_KEY}=${rawPassphrase}`;
return apiSuccess(
{
...toSummary(created),
token: rawToken,
passphrase: rawPassphrase,
shareUrl,
qrUrl,
},
201,
);
});
export const GET = apiHandler(async () => {
const { user } = await requireAuth();
annotate({ action: { name: "share-link.list" } });
const rows = await prisma.clinicianShareLink.findMany({
where: { userId: user.id },
orderBy: { createdAt: "desc" },
select: shareLinkSummarySelect,
});
return apiSuccess({ shareLinks: rows.map(toSummary) });
});