mirror of
https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog.git
synced 2026-11-09 04:50:59 +00:00
Marc-André Bombeck
e3342dc19e
The inbound-document store encrypts the raw upload (`inbound_documents.content_encrypted`) because it is sensitive clinical data, but the per-fact staging columns persisted the same class of data in the clear: `extracted_facts.data_json` held the transcribed clinical values (diagnosis text, lab values, medication names, stated codes) and `provenance_json` held the verbatim source span (up to 2000 chars copied straight out of the report). The at-rest guarantee was defeated for staged facts, which persist through PENDING and are retained after the decision. Convert both columns to the AES-256-GCM `*_encrypted` BYTEA convention shared with the note columns, going through the same Bytes codec. The upload and fact-edit paths encrypt on write; the confirm path decrypts at commit time to write into the normal structured stores, so the review-then-confirm flow is unchanged. Reads are fail-closed (a bad key id throws). Register both columns in the encrypted-columns registry and the key-rotation script so a dropped legacy key cannot strand them (the guard test enforces both). Migration 0220 swaps the plaintext JSONB columns for the encrypted BYTEA columns; pre-confirm staged rows are ephemeral and cannot be re-encrypted in SQL, so any left by a pre-release build are dropped rather than retained as plaintext (their parent document keeps its encrypted original).
195 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
195 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Canonical registry of every database column that holds AES-256-GCM
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* ciphertext (via `src/lib/crypto.ts`).
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*
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* This is the single source of truth for the key-rotation script
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* (`scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts`): the script MUST re-encrypt every
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* column listed here, and the guard test
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* (`encrypted-columns.test.ts`) asserts three invariants:
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*
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* 1. Every encrypted column in `prisma/schema.prisma` (any `*Encrypted`
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* column, plus the small set of historically-named encrypted columns
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* enumerated below) appears in this registry.
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* 2. The rotation script references every column in this registry.
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* 3. No registry entry is missing a kind / duplicated.
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*
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* Adding a new encrypted column WITHOUT adding it here fails CI; adding it
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* here without wiring the rotation script also fails CI. Together this makes
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* "a new encrypted column silently skipped on rotation" structurally
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* impossible — dropping a legacy key would otherwise make those rows
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* permanently undecryptable (decrypt is fail-closed).
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*
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* `kind` distinguishes the storage shape the rotation script must use:
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* - "string" — the ciphertext is stored as a `String` column; the script
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* reads/writes the value directly.
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* - "bytes" — the ciphertext is stored as a `Bytes` column; the script
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* goes through a UTF-8 Buffer round-trip (matching the persistence layer).
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*/
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export type EncryptedColumnKind = "string" | "bytes";
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export interface EncryptedColumn {
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/** Prisma model name (PascalCase, as declared in schema.prisma). */
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readonly model: string;
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/** Prisma field name (camelCase, as declared in schema.prisma). */
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readonly field: string;
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readonly kind: EncryptedColumnKind;
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}
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/**
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* Every reversibly-encrypted column. HMAC-hashed columns (`*Hash`,
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* `tokenHash`) and the `refresh_token`-convention columns are deliberately
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* EXCLUDED — they are one-way and have no rotation path.
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*/
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export const ENCRYPTED_COLUMNS: readonly EncryptedColumn[] = [
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// ───── User — integration credentials + AI keys + KVNR ─────
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{ model: "User", field: "codexAccessTokenEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "codexRefreshTokenEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "telegramBotToken", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "moodLogWebhookSecret", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "moodLogUrlEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "moodLogApiKeyEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "withingsClientIdEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "withingsClientSecretEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "whoopClientIdEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "whoopClientSecretEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "fitbitClientIdEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "fitbitClientSecretEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "nightscoutUrlEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "nightscoutTokenEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "polarAccessTokenEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "polarUserIdEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "polarClientIdEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "polarClientSecretEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "ouraAccessTokenEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "ouraRefreshTokenEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "ouraClientIdEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "ouraClientSecretEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "aiAnthropicKeyEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "aiLocalKeyEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "aiOpenaiKeyEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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// v1.22 (#90) — dedicated document-scan (Lab-OCR) provider key.
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{ model: "User", field: "aiOcrKeyEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "User", field: "insuranceNumberEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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// v1.23 — TOTP shared secret (second factor). String ciphertext like the
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// other User credential columns.
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{ model: "User", field: "totpSecretEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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// ───── OAuth token tables (`*_token`-convention columns) ─────
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{ model: "WithingsConnection", field: "accessToken", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "WithingsConnection", field: "refreshToken", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "WhoopConnection", field: "accessToken", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "WhoopConnection", field: "refreshToken", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "FitbitConnection", field: "accessToken", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "FitbitConnection", field: "refreshToken", kind: "string" },
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// ───── AppSettings — operator credentials ─────
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{ model: "AppSettings", field: "adminAiKeyEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{
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model: "AppSettings",
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field: "webPushVapidPrivateKeyEncrypted",
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kind: "string",
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},
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// ───── Custom labels (mood + cycle) ─────
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{ model: "MoodTag", field: "labelEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "MoodTagCategory", field: "labelEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "CycleSymptom", field: "labelEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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// ───── Notification + push secrets ─────
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{ model: "NotificationChannel", field: "config", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "PushSubscription", field: "p256dh", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "PushSubscription", field: "auth", kind: "string" },
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// ───── Integration status error payloads ─────
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{ model: "IntegrationStatus", field: "lastError", kind: "string" },
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// ───── Cycle day-log sensitive payloads (String?) ─────
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{ model: "CycleDayLog", field: "sensitiveEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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{ model: "CycleDayLog", field: "notesEncrypted", kind: "string" },
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// ───── Coach (Bytes columns) ─────
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{ model: "CoachMessage", field: "encryptedContent", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "CoachConversation", field: "summaryEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "CoachFact", field: "factEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// v1.21.3 (B1) — Coach goal / if-then plan free-text columns.
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{ model: "CoachPlan", field: "ifCueEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "CoachPlan", field: "thenActionEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "CoachPlan", field: "targetEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// v1.22 (W9, C2) — n-of-1 experiment outcome read-back prose.
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{ model: "CoachPlan", field: "outcomeEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// v1.22 (B2/B6) — Coach episodic reminder free-text note.
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{ model: "CoachReminder", field: "noteEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// ───── User health profile (Bytes columns) ─────
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{ model: "UserHealthProfile", field: "aboutMeEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "UserHealthProfile", field: "conditionsEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "UserHealthProfile", field: "allergiesEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "UserHealthProfile", field: "coachFocusEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{
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model: "UserHealthProfile",
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field: "pendingQuestionsEncrypted",
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kind: "bytes",
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},
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// ───── Insight narratives (Bytes column) ─────
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{ model: "InsightNarrative", field: "encryptedContent", kind: "bytes" },
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// ───── v1.18.1 clinical-spine notes (Bytes columns) ─────
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{ model: "LabResult", field: "noteEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "Biomarker", field: "contextEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "IllnessEpisode", field: "noteEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "IllnessDayLog", field: "noteEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// ───── v1.19.0 ECG waveform (Bytes column) ─────
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{ model: "EcgRecording", field: "waveformEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// ───── v1.23 free-text health notes (Bytes columns) ─────
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// Free-text mood diary + per-measurement notes. Same class as the
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// IllnessDayLog / LabResult note columns above; Bytes via the shared codec.
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{ model: "MoodEntry", field: "noteEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "Measurement", field: "notesEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// ───── v1.25 medication free-text notes (Bytes columns) ─────
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// Side-effect log note, dose-change titration note, and inventory-item
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// note — the last plaintext PHI columns left after the v1.23 rollout.
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{ model: "MedicationSideEffect", field: "notesEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "MedicationDoseChange", field: "noteEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "MedicationInventoryItem", field: "notesEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// ───── v1.25 mental-health screener item answers (Bytes column) ─────
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// The PHQ-9 / GAD-7 per-item responses (incl. the safety-critical item 9)
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// ride a single AES-256-GCM blob. The most sensitive payload in the wave;
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// never indexed, never logged, never in wide-event meta.
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{
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model: "MentalHealthAssessment",
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field: "responsesEncrypted",
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kind: "bytes",
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},
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// ───── v1.25 structured health records (Bytes columns) ─────
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// Allergy free-text reaction + note, and the family-history note. The
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// structured enum/label columns stay queryable plaintext; only the
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// sensitive free-text fields are encrypted.
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{ model: "Allergy", field: "reactionEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "Allergy", field: "notesEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "FamilyHistoryEntry", field: "notesEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// ───── v1.25 (W-DOCS-IN) inbound clinical document (Bytes column) ─────
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// The raw uploaded doctor report / discharge letter, base64-of-binary →
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// AES-256-GCM string → UTF-8 bytes. The most sensitive blob in the wave
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// (a full clinical document); never logged, never in wide-event meta.
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{ model: "InboundDocument", field: "contentEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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// The staged extracted-fact payloads: the FHIR-staged clinical values
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// (diagnosis text / lab values / medication names / stated codes) and the
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// verbatim source-span provenance. Both are PHI transcribed from the source
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// document, so the staging rows carry the same at-rest guarantee as the
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// document itself rather than persisting as plaintext JSONB.
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{ model: "ExtractedFact", field: "dataEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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{ model: "ExtractedFact", field: "provenanceEncrypted", kind: "bytes" },
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] as const;
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/** Stable `Model.field` key for a registry entry. */
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export function encryptedColumnKey(c: EncryptedColumn): string {
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return `${c.model}.${c.field}`;
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}
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