mirror of
https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog.git
synced 2026-11-08 20:42:43 +00:00
778 lines
28 KiB
TypeScript
778 lines
28 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* The boot encryption key check and the "Back up your encryption key" step,
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* against real Postgres.
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*
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* - a first boot writes a canary; a second boot with the same key opens it;
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* - a boot with another key under the same id refuses: the state is set,
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* every API route answers 503 `encryption.key_mismatch`, `/api/health`
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* names the reason, and nothing is written;
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* - a database written before the canary existed is probed: data that does
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* not open under the configured key refuses rather than sealing the wrong
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* key as the right one;
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* - the confirmation binds to the active key id and fingerprint, refuses a
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* stale one with 409, and is due again after a re-keyed install;
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* - "Check my copy" answers a boolean, stores nothing, and is rate limited.
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*/
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import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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import { cookieJar, headerJar } from "./mock-next-headers";
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import { getPrismaClient, truncateAllTables } from "./setup";
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vi.mock("next/headers", async () => {
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const { cookieJar, headerJar } = await import("./mock-next-headers");
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return {
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headers: vi.fn(async () => ({
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get: (name: string) => headerJar.get(name.toLowerCase()) ?? null,
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})),
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cookies: vi.fn(async () => ({
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get: (name: string) => {
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const value = cookieJar.get(name);
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return value ? { name, value } : undefined;
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},
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set: (name: string, value: string) => {
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cookieJar.set(name, value);
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},
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delete: (name: string) => {
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cookieJar.delete(name);
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},
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})),
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};
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});
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vi.mock("@/lib/db-compat", () => ({
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ensureDbCompatibility: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
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}));
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import {
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_resetCryptoCacheForTests,
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encrypt,
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encryptUnderKeyId,
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getKeyFingerprint,
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} from "@/lib/crypto";
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import { encryptToBytes } from "@/lib/ai/coach/bytes-codec";
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import { runBootKeyCheck } from "@/lib/boot/key-check";
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import {
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canaryPlaintext,
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checkEncryptionKeyCanaries,
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retireCanariesWithoutData,
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sqlColumnSampler,
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type CanaryClient,
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} from "@/lib/crypto/canary";
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import {
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getKeyMismatchWarning,
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isKeyMismatch,
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setKeyMismatchState,
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setKeyMismatchWarning,
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} from "@/lib/boot/key-mismatch-state";
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const KEY_A =
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"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
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const KEY_B =
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"fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210";
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function useKey(hex: string) {
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vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEYS", "");
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vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID", "");
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vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEY", hex);
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_resetCryptoCacheForTests();
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}
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async function seedAdmin(): Promise<string> {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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const admin = await prisma.user.create({
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data: {
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username: "key-admin",
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email: "key-admin@example.test",
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role: "ADMIN",
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},
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});
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const session = await prisma.session.create({
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data: { userId: admin.id, expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 3_600_000) },
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});
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cookieJar.set("healthlog_session", session.id);
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return admin.id;
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}
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/** The GET handlers take no parameter; `apiHandler` still reads the request. */
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type RouteFn = (request: NextRequest) => Promise<Response>;
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const asRoute = (fn: unknown) => fn as RouteFn;
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function post(path: string, body: unknown): NextRequest {
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return new NextRequest(`http://localhost${path}`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
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body: JSON.stringify(body),
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});
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}
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beforeEach(async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await truncateAllTables(prisma);
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await prisma.$executeRaw`DELETE FROM encryption_key_canaries`;
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await prisma.$executeRaw`DELETE FROM rate_limits WHERE key LIKE 'key-backup-verify:%'`;
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cookieJar.clear();
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headerJar.clear();
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useKey(KEY_A);
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setKeyMismatchState(null);
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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setKeyMismatchState(null);
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vi.unstubAllEnvs();
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_resetCryptoCacheForTests();
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});
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describe("boot encryption key check (real Postgres)", () => {
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it("writes a canary on first boot and opens it on the next", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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const rows = await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.findMany();
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expect(rows.map((r) => r.keyId)).toEqual(["v1"]);
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expect(rows[0].ciphertext.startsWith("v1.")).toBe(true);
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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expect(isKeyMismatch()).toBe(false);
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});
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it("refuses to serve when the key changed under the same id", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await runBootKeyCheck(prisma);
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const before = await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.findMany();
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useKey(KEY_B);
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const errors = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(true);
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expect(errors.mock.calls[0]?.[0]).toContain("encryption.key_mismatch");
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errors.mockRestore();
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expect(isKeyMismatch()).toBe(true);
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// Nothing re-sealed under the wrong key.
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.findMany()).toEqual(before);
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await seedAdmin();
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const { GET: keyBackupGet } =
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await import("@/app/api/admin/encryption/key-backup/route");
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const refused = await asRoute(keyBackupGet)(
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new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/admin/encryption/key-backup"),
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);
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expect(refused.status).toBe(503);
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const body = await refused.json();
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expect(body.meta).toEqual({
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requestId: expect.any(String),
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errorCode: "encryption.key_mismatch",
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});
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const { GET: healthGet } = await import("@/app/api/health/route");
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const health = await asRoute(healthGet)(
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new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/health"),
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);
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expect(health.status).toBe(503);
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const healthBody = await health.json();
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expect(healthBody.status).toBe("degraded");
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expect(healthBody.reason).toBe("encryption_key_mismatch");
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// Restoring the original key clears it on the next boot.
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useKey(KEY_A);
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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expect(isKeyMismatch()).toBe(false);
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});
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it("refuses rather than sealing the wrong key over data that predates the canary", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await prisma.user.create({
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data: {
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username: "existing",
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email: "existing@example.test",
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codexAccessTokenEncrypted: encrypt("a stored token"),
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codexRefreshTokenEncrypted: encrypt("another stored token"),
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},
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});
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useKey(KEY_B);
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const errors = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(true);
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errors.mockRestore();
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
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// With the right key the same data lets the canary be written.
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useKey(KEY_A);
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(1);
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});
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});
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describe("boot key check probe over existing data (real Postgres)", () => {
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it("one damaged row among good ones still lets the right key through", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await prisma.user.create({
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data: {
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username: "damaged",
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email: "damaged@example.test",
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codexAccessTokenEncrypted:
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"v1." + Buffer.alloc(40, 7).toString("base64"),
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codexRefreshTokenEncrypted: encrypt("a good token"),
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},
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});
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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expect(isKeyMismatch()).toBe(false);
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(1);
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});
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it("a single value that does not open neither refuses nor writes a canary", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await prisma.user.create({
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data: {
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username: "single",
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email: "single@example.test",
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codexAccessTokenEncrypted: encrypt("the only token"),
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},
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});
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useKey(KEY_B);
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const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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expect(warn.mock.calls[0]?.[0]).toContain("inconclusive");
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warn.mockRestore();
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expect(isKeyMismatch()).toBe(false);
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
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});
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});
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/** Two users, one oldest, with ciphertext in string AND Bytes columns. */
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async function seedUser(
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name: string,
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writtenAt: Date,
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seal: () => { text: string; bytes: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> },
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) {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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const a = seal();
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const b = seal();
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const user = await prisma.user.create({
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data: {
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username: name,
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email: `${name}@example.test`,
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codexAccessTokenEncrypted: a.text,
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codexRefreshTokenEncrypted: b.text,
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createdAt: writtenAt,
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updatedAt: writtenAt,
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},
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});
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await prisma.userHealthProfile.create({
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data: {
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userId: user.id,
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aboutMeEncrypted: a.bytes,
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conditionsEncrypted: b.bytes,
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createdAt: writtenAt,
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updatedAt: writtenAt,
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},
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});
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return user.id;
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}
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const sealNow = () => ({
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text: encrypt("a stored value"),
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bytes: encryptToBytes("a stored note"),
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});
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describe("boot key check: what decides, and what may seal (real Postgres)", () => {
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it("probes Bytes columns: an install whose ciphertext is only Bytes does not seal a wrong key", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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const user = await prisma.user.create({
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data: { username: "bytes-only", email: "bytes-only@example.test" },
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});
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await prisma.userHealthProfile.create({
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data: {
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userId: user.id,
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aboutMeEncrypted: encryptToBytes("about me"),
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conditionsEncrypted: encryptToBytes("conditions"),
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allergiesEncrypted: encryptToBytes("allergies"),
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},
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});
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useKey(KEY_B);
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const errors = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(true);
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errors.mockRestore();
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
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useKey(KEY_A);
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(1);
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});
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it("a probe that runs out of time seals nothing and keeps serving", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await seedUser("slow", new Date("2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
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const outcome = await checkEncryptionKeyCanaries(prisma, {
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probeBudgetMs: -1,
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});
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expect(outcome.state).toBe("ok");
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if (outcome.state !== "ok") return;
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expect(outcome.written).toEqual([]);
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expect(outcome.inconclusive.map((i) => i.keyId)).toEqual(["v1"]);
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
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});
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it("a fresh database with no ciphertext under the key id seals it", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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// Ciphertext exists, but under another key id: not evidence about v1.
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vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEYS", JSON.stringify({ v1: KEY_A, v2: KEY_B }));
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vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID", "v2");
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vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEY", "");
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_resetCryptoCacheForTests();
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await seedUser("v2-only", new Date("2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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const ids = (await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.findMany())
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.map((r) => r.keyId)
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.sort();
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expect(ids).toEqual(["v1", "v2"]);
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});
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it("rows a wrong key wrote recently never decide: old rows under A, newer under B", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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// The original data, under A.
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await seedUser("original", new Date("2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
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await seedUser("original-2", new Date("2024-02-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
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// A process holding B served for a while (no canary yet) and wrote more.
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useKey(KEY_B);
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for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
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await seedUser(
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`recent-${i}`,
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new Date(Date.UTC(2026, 8, 1 + i)),
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sealNow,
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);
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}
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const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
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const errors = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
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await runBootKeyCheck(prisma);
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warn.mockRestore();
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errors.mockRestore();
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// B is not sealed as the right key, whatever else the verdict is.
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
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const outcome = await checkEncryptionKeyCanaries(prisma);
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expect(
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outcome.state === "mismatch" ||
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(outcome.state === "ok" && outcome.written.length === 0),
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).toBe(true);
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// The key the oldest data was written with is the right one.
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useKey(KEY_A);
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setKeyMismatchState(null);
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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expect(isKeyMismatch()).toBe(false);
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(1);
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});
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it("old rows under a lost key, newer rows under the configured key: serves, warns, seals nothing", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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// Sealed under a key that is gone: the eight oldest values the probe
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// reads first (two per column, four columns).
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await seedUser("lost-1", new Date("2023-01-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
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await seedUser("lost-2", new Date("2023-02-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
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// Everything since, under the key the install runs with today.
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useKey(KEY_B);
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for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
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await seedUser(
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`current-${i}`,
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new Date(Date.UTC(2025, 0, 1 + i)),
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sealNow,
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);
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}
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const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
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const errors = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
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expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
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expect(isKeyMismatch()).toBe(false);
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expect(errors).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(warn.mock.calls[0]?.[0]).toContain("inconclusive");
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warn.mockRestore();
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errors.mockRestore();
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
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expect(await checkEncryptionKeyCanaries(prisma)).toEqual({
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state: "ok",
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written: [],
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verified: [],
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inconclusive: [{ keyId: "v1", reason: "mixed" }],
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});
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});
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it("old AND newest values that do not open still refuse", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await seedUser("a-1", new Date("2023-01-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
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await seedUser("a-2", new Date("2023-02-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
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for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
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await seedUser(`a-new-${i}`, new Date(Date.UTC(2025, 0, 1 + i)), sealNow);
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}
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useKey(KEY_B);
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expect(await checkEncryptionKeyCanaries(prisma)).toEqual({
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state: "mismatch",
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keyIds: ["v1"],
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});
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
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});
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it("a probe query held up by a lock gives up at its statement timeout: inconclusive, not a hang", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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await seedUser("locked", new Date("2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
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const outcome = await prisma.$transaction(
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async (tx) => {
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// Another session holds the table: every read of it waits.
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await tx.$executeRaw`LOCK TABLE users IN ACCESS EXCLUSIVE MODE`;
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const started = Date.now();
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const result = await checkEncryptionKeyCanaries(prisma, {
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sampler: sqlColumnSampler(prisma, { statementTimeoutMs: 200 }),
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});
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return { result, elapsed: Date.now() - started };
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},
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{ timeout: 20_000 },
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);
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expect(outcome.result).toEqual({
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state: "ok",
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written: [],
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verified: [],
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inconclusive: [{ keyId: "v1", reason: "incomplete" }],
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});
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expect(outcome.elapsed).toBeLessThan(5_000);
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expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
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});
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it("losing the first-seal race to another key is a mismatch, not ok", async () => {
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const prisma = getPrismaClient();
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// The other process, holding A, wins the insert between our probe and
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// our write.
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const sealedUnderA = encryptUnderKeyId(canaryPlaintext("v1"), "v1");
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useKey(KEY_B);
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let raced = false;
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const racing = new Proxy(prisma, {
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get(target, prop, receiver) {
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if (prop === "$executeRaw") {
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return async (q: TemplateStringsArray, ...values: unknown[]) => {
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if (!raced) {
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raced = true;
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await target.$executeRaw`INSERT INTO encryption_key_canaries (key_id, ciphertext) VALUES ('v1', ${sealedUnderA})`;
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}
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return target.$executeRaw(q, ...values);
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};
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}
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const value = Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
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return typeof value === "function" ? value.bind(target) : value;
|
|
},
|
|
}) as unknown as CanaryClient;
|
|
const outcome = await checkEncryptionKeyCanaries(racing);
|
|
expect(raced).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(outcome).toEqual({ state: "mismatch", keyIds: ["v1"] });
|
|
|
|
// The same race lost to a process holding the SAME key is fine.
|
|
await prisma.$executeRaw`DELETE FROM encryption_key_canaries`;
|
|
raced = false;
|
|
useKey(KEY_A);
|
|
const same = await checkEncryptionKeyCanaries(racing);
|
|
expect(same.state).toBe("ok");
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("ENCRYPTION_KEY_CHECK (real Postgres)", () => {
|
|
afterEach(() => setKeyMismatchWarning(null));
|
|
|
|
it("warn: a mismatch is logged and reported, never refused, never recorded", async () => {
|
|
const prisma = getPrismaClient();
|
|
await seedUser("warned", new Date("2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
|
|
useKey(KEY_B);
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEY_CHECK", "warn");
|
|
const errors = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
|
|
expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
|
|
const logged = errors.mock.calls.map((c) => String(c[0])).join("\n");
|
|
errors.mockRestore();
|
|
expect(logged).toContain("encryption.key_mismatch");
|
|
expect(logged).toContain("ENCRYPTION_KEY_CHECK=warn");
|
|
expect(isKeyMismatch()).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(getKeyMismatchWarning()?.keyIds).toEqual(["v1"]);
|
|
expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
|
|
|
|
// Requests are served, through apiHandler and outside it.
|
|
await seedAdmin();
|
|
const { GET: keyBackupGet } =
|
|
await import("@/app/api/admin/encryption/key-backup/route");
|
|
const served = await asRoute(keyBackupGet)(
|
|
new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/admin/encryption/key-backup"),
|
|
);
|
|
expect(served.status).toBe(200);
|
|
const { POST: mcp } = await import("@/app/mcp/route");
|
|
const mcpRes = await mcp(
|
|
new Request("http://localhost/mcp", { method: "POST", body: "{}" }),
|
|
);
|
|
expect(mcpRes.status).not.toBe(503);
|
|
|
|
const { GET: healthGet } = await import("@/app/api/health/route");
|
|
const healthBody = await (
|
|
await asRoute(healthGet)(new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/health"))
|
|
).json();
|
|
expect(healthBody.warning).toBe("encryption_key_mismatch");
|
|
expect(healthBody.reason).toBeUndefined();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("warn: nothing is recorded while any key id is inconclusive", async () => {
|
|
const prisma = getPrismaClient();
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEYS", JSON.stringify({ v1: KEY_A, v2: KEY_B }));
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID", "v1");
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEY", "");
|
|
_resetCryptoCacheForTests();
|
|
await prisma.user.create({
|
|
data: {
|
|
username: "lone",
|
|
email: "lone@example.test",
|
|
codexAccessTokenEncrypted: encrypt("the only value"),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
// v1 now holds a different key: its one value does not open. v2 has no
|
|
// data, which on its own would be recorded.
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEYS", JSON.stringify({ v1: KEY_B, v2: KEY_A }));
|
|
_resetCryptoCacheForTests();
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEY_CHECK", "warn");
|
|
const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
|
|
expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
|
|
warn.mockRestore();
|
|
expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
|
|
|
|
// Enforce records the proven id, as before.
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEY_CHECK", "enforce");
|
|
const warn2 = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
|
|
expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
|
|
warn2.mockRestore();
|
|
const ids = (await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.findMany()).map(
|
|
(r) => r.keyId,
|
|
);
|
|
expect(ids).toEqual(["v2"]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("enforce, set explicitly or by any other value, refuses as before", async () => {
|
|
const prisma = getPrismaClient();
|
|
await seedUser("enforced", new Date("2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"), sealNow);
|
|
useKey(KEY_B);
|
|
for (const value of ["enforce", "", "off"]) {
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEY_CHECK", value);
|
|
setKeyMismatchState(null);
|
|
const errors = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
|
|
expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(true);
|
|
errors.mockRestore();
|
|
expect(isKeyMismatch()).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(getKeyMismatchWarning()).toBeNull();
|
|
}
|
|
expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(0);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("retiring a key id after rotation (real Postgres)", () => {
|
|
it("removes the canary of a key id only once no ciphertext remains under it", async () => {
|
|
const prisma = getPrismaClient();
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEYS", JSON.stringify({ v1: KEY_A, v2: KEY_B }));
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID", "v1");
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_KEY", "");
|
|
_resetCryptoCacheForTests();
|
|
const userId = await seedUser(
|
|
"rotating",
|
|
new Date("2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
|
|
sealNow,
|
|
);
|
|
expect(await runBootKeyCheck(prisma)).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(2);
|
|
|
|
// Rotation to v2 has not finished: one Bytes value still under v1.
|
|
vi.stubEnv("ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID", "v2");
|
|
_resetCryptoCacheForTests();
|
|
await prisma.user.update({
|
|
where: { id: userId },
|
|
data: {
|
|
codexAccessTokenEncrypted: encrypt("rotated"),
|
|
codexRefreshTokenEncrypted: encrypt("rotated"),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
await prisma.userHealthProfile.update({
|
|
where: { userId },
|
|
data: { aboutMeEncrypted: encryptToBytes("rotated") },
|
|
});
|
|
const partial = await retireCanariesWithoutData(prisma);
|
|
expect(partial.removed).toEqual([]);
|
|
expect(partial.remaining).toEqual({
|
|
v1: ["UserHealthProfile.conditionsEncrypted"],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.count()).toBe(2);
|
|
|
|
await prisma.userHealthProfile.update({
|
|
where: { userId },
|
|
data: { conditionsEncrypted: encryptToBytes("rotated") },
|
|
});
|
|
const done = await retireCanariesWithoutData(prisma);
|
|
expect(done.removed).toEqual(["v1"]);
|
|
const left = await prisma.encryptionKeyCanary.findMany();
|
|
expect(left.map((r) => r.keyId)).toEqual(["v2"]);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("routes outside apiHandler refuse while the key does not match", () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
setKeyMismatchState({ keyIds: ["v1"], detectedAt: "2026-10-03T00:00:00Z" });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("/mcp answers 503 encryption.key_mismatch before auth", async () => {
|
|
const { POST } = await import("@/app/mcp/route");
|
|
const res = await POST(
|
|
new Request("http://localhost/mcp", {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: {
|
|
"content-type": "application/json",
|
|
authorization: "Bearer hlk_whatever",
|
|
},
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method: "tools/list" }),
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(503);
|
|
expect((await res.json()).meta).toEqual({
|
|
errorCode: "encryption.key_mismatch",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("the MCP OAuth endpoints refuse in their RFC shape", async () => {
|
|
const { POST: token } = await import("@/app/api/mcp/oauth/token/route");
|
|
const { POST: register } =
|
|
await import("@/app/api/mcp/oauth/register/route");
|
|
const { GET: authorizeGet, POST: authorizePost } =
|
|
await import("@/app/api/mcp/oauth/authorize/route");
|
|
const responses = [
|
|
await token(
|
|
new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/mcp/oauth/token", {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
|
|
body: "grant_type=authorization_code&code=x",
|
|
}),
|
|
),
|
|
await register(
|
|
post("/api/mcp/oauth/register", {
|
|
redirect_uris: ["https://client.example/cb"],
|
|
}),
|
|
),
|
|
await authorizeGet(
|
|
new NextRequest(
|
|
"http://localhost/api/mcp/oauth/authorize?response_type=code",
|
|
),
|
|
),
|
|
await authorizePost(
|
|
new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/mcp/oauth/authorize", {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
|
|
body: "decision=approve",
|
|
}),
|
|
),
|
|
];
|
|
for (const res of responses) {
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(503);
|
|
const body = await res.json();
|
|
expect(body.error).toBe("temporarily_unavailable");
|
|
expect(body.error_description).toContain("encryption key");
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("encryption key backup step (real Postgres)", () => {
|
|
it("is due, refuses a stale confirmation, records the right one, and is due again after a re-key", async () => {
|
|
const prisma = getPrismaClient();
|
|
const adminId = await seedAdmin();
|
|
const { GET } = await import("@/app/api/admin/encryption/key-backup/route");
|
|
const { POST: confirm } =
|
|
await import("@/app/api/admin/encryption/key-backup/confirm/route");
|
|
const status = async () =>
|
|
(
|
|
await (
|
|
await asRoute(GET)(
|
|
new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/admin/encryption/key-backup"),
|
|
)
|
|
).json()
|
|
).data;
|
|
|
|
const first = await status();
|
|
expect(first.due).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(first.activeKeyId).toBe("v1");
|
|
expect(first.fingerprint).toBe(getKeyFingerprint("v1"));
|
|
expect(first.platformHint).toBe("compose");
|
|
expect(JSON.stringify(first)).not.toContain(KEY_A);
|
|
|
|
const stale = await confirm(
|
|
post("/api/admin/encryption/key-backup/confirm", {
|
|
keyId: "v1",
|
|
fingerprint: "000000000000",
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
expect(stale.status).toBe(409);
|
|
expect((await stale.json()).meta.errorCode).toBe(
|
|
"encryption.keyBackup.stale",
|
|
);
|
|
expect(
|
|
(await prisma.appSettings.findUnique({ where: { id: "singleton" } }))
|
|
?.encryptionKeyBackupConfirmedAt ?? null,
|
|
).toBeNull();
|
|
|
|
const ok = await confirm(
|
|
post("/api/admin/encryption/key-backup/confirm", {
|
|
keyId: "v1",
|
|
fingerprint: first.fingerprint,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
|
|
const confirmed = (await ok.json()).data;
|
|
expect(confirmed.due).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(confirmed.confirmedBy).toEqual({
|
|
id: adminId,
|
|
email: "key-admin@example.test",
|
|
});
|
|
const audit = await prisma.auditLog.findFirst({
|
|
where: { action: "encryption.keyBackup.confirmed" },
|
|
});
|
|
expect(audit).not.toBeNull();
|
|
|
|
vi.stubEnv("HEALTHLOG_PLATFORM", "truenas");
|
|
useKey(KEY_B);
|
|
const after = await status();
|
|
expect(after.due).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(after.confirmedKeyId).toBe("v1");
|
|
expect(after.platformHint).toBe("truenas");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("checks a copy without storing it, and limits the checks", async () => {
|
|
const prisma = getPrismaClient();
|
|
await seedAdmin();
|
|
const { POST: verify } =
|
|
await import("@/app/api/admin/encryption/key-backup/verify/route");
|
|
const check = (encryptionKey: string) =>
|
|
verify(
|
|
post("/api/admin/encryption/key-backup/verify", { encryptionKey }),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
const good = await check(`${KEY_A}\n`);
|
|
expect(good.status).toBe(200);
|
|
expect((await good.json()).data).toEqual({ matches: true, keyId: "v1" });
|
|
|
|
const bad = await check(KEY_B);
|
|
expect((await bad.json()).data.matches).toBe(false);
|
|
|
|
const invalid = await verify(
|
|
post("/api/admin/encryption/key-backup/verify", { encryptionKey: "" }),
|
|
);
|
|
expect(invalid.status).toBe(422);
|
|
expect(JSON.stringify(await invalid.json())).not.toContain("issues");
|
|
|
|
// Nothing of the candidate is stored anywhere a row could hold it.
|
|
const audits = await prisma.auditLog.findMany();
|
|
expect(JSON.stringify(audits)).not.toContain(KEY_A);
|
|
expect(JSON.stringify(audits)).not.toContain(KEY_B);
|
|
expect(
|
|
(await prisma.appSettings.findUnique({ where: { id: "singleton" } }))
|
|
?.encryptionKeyBackupConfirmedAt ?? null,
|
|
).toBeNull();
|
|
|
|
await check(KEY_B);
|
|
await check(KEY_B);
|
|
const limited = await check(KEY_A);
|
|
expect(limited.status).toBe(429);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|