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HealthLog/.env.production.example
T
Marc-André Bombeck e51c6dc2ad feat(geo): allow an opt-in plain-HTTP location provider
A self-hoster can set IP_GEO_ALLOW_INSECURE=true alongside an http:// URL to
use a free HTTP-only provider — the free ip-api.com endpoint is HTTP-only (its
HTTPS form needs a paid key) but its geolocation is often more accurate and it
carries the ISP. The default stays HTTPS-only with ipwho.is; plain HTTP is
refused unless the operator explicitly opts in, since the looked-up IP then
travels unencrypted over the server's own egress. Whitelisted in compose and
documented in the env example.
2026-06-29 20:38:04 +02:00

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# =============================================================================
# HealthLog -- production .env example
# =============================================================================
# Mirrors `scripts/env-manifest.json`. The `pnpm check-env --file
# .env.production.example` CI step (see `.github/workflows/env-check.yml`)
# enforces every variable declared `required: true` in the manifest has a
# non-empty placeholder here, so a contributor who introduces a new
# required var without updating this file fails the workflow.
#
# Placeholders are syntactic only -- replace with real secrets before
# deploying. The check-env presence rule treats any non-empty,
# non-whitespace string as "set", so the `<placeholder>` style below
# satisfies the manifest without leaking a usable credential.
#
# Generate the two crypto secrets locally with:
# $ openssl rand -hex 32
# =============================================================================
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Core -- required for boot
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
DATABASE_URL="postgresql://healthlog:<password>@db:5432/healthlog?schema=public"
POSTGRES_PASSWORD="<openssl rand -hex 32>"
NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL="https://healthlog.example.com"
APP_URL="https://healthlog.example.com"
ENCRYPTION_KEY="<openssl rand -hex 32>"
API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY="<openssl rand -hex 32>"
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Withings OAuth -- optional integration
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WITHINGS_CLIENT_ID=""
# WITHINGS_CLIENT_SECRET=""
# WITHINGS_WEBHOOK_SECRET=""
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# WHOOP -- optional integration
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The WHOOP app client id/secret are per-user BYO-keys: each user registers
# their own WHOOP developer app and pastes the client id/secret into Settings
# (stored encrypted in the DB). There is therefore no WHOOP_CLIENT_ID/SECRET.
#
# WHOOP_WEBHOOK_SECRET is the instance-level secret carried as the trailing
# path segment of the webhook URL AND used to verify the WHOOP HMAC body
# signature. WHOOP_REDIRECT_URI overrides the derived
# `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/whoop/callback` when the public URL differs.
# WHOOP_WEBHOOK_SECRET="<openssl rand -hex 32>"
# WHOOP_REDIRECT_URI=""
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fitbit -- optional integration (classic Web API, per-user BYO-keys)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Each user registers their own app at https://dev.fitbit.com (self-serve, no
# brand verification) and pastes the OAuth Client ID + Client Secret into
# Settings (stored encrypted in the DB). There is therefore no
# FITBIT_CLIENT_ID/SECRET here. The OAuth flow uses Authorization Code + PKCE.
#
# FITBIT_REDIRECT_URI overrides the derived
# `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/fitbit/callback` when the public URL differs; it
# must exactly match the Callback URL registered in the dev.fitbit.com app.
# FITBIT_REDIRECT_URI=""
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Polar AccessLink -- optional integration (full OAuth, shared app from env)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Register an app at https://admin.polaraccesslink.com and set its redirect URI
# to `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/polar/callback`. Both vars together enable the
# Polar connect button; set neither to leave the integration disabled. Polar
# access tokens do not expire and carry no refresh token. POLAR_REDIRECT_URI
# overrides the derived callback when the public URL differs.
# POLAR_CLIENT_ID=""
# POLAR_CLIENT_SECRET=""
# POLAR_REDIRECT_URI=""
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Oura Cloud v2 -- optional integration (full OAuth, shared app from env)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Register an app at https://cloud.ouraring.com/oauth/applications and set its
# redirect URI to `${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/oura/callback`. Both vars together
# enable the Oura connect button. Oura uses refresh tokens; the sync refreshes
# reactively on a 401. OURA_REDIRECT_URI overrides the derived callback.
# OURA_CLIENT_ID=""
# OURA_CLIENT_SECRET=""
# OURA_REDIRECT_URI=""
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Web Push -- VAPID keys (optional; the admin panel is the easier path)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Web Push needs NO Apple account and no paid service -- just a VAPID keypair.
# The EASIEST path is the admin panel: /admin -> Web Push VAPID -> "Generate
# keys" mints and stores the pair for you (private key encrypted at rest). Use
# these env vars only if you prefer env-config over the DB. The loader reads
# DB first, then env (src/lib/notifications/vapid-config.ts). NOTE: these are
# NOT in docker-compose.yml's `environment:` whitelist -- if you go the env
# route under compose, add them there too or the values never reach the
# container (see docs/self-hosting/getting-started.md Troubleshooting).
# VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY=""
# VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY=""
# VAPID_SUBJECT="mailto:you@example.com"
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# APNs -- iOS push (optional, all-or-none)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Only the native iOS app uses APNs, and it needs a paid Apple Developer
# Program membership. Web Push (above) needs NO Apple account -- it covers
# every browser and the installed PWA on iPhone. Leave this whole block unset
# unless you ship the native app. Key-source precedence when more than one is
# set: APNS_KEY_B64 > APNS_KEY > APNS_KEY_FILE.
# APNS_KEY_ID=""
# APNS_TEAM_ID=""
# APNS_BUNDLE_ID=""
# APNS_KEY_B64="" # PEM body base64-encoded -- recommended (escapes newlines)
# APNS_KEY="" # OR APNS_KEY (raw PEM) OR APNS_KEY_FILE -- one satisfies the manifest
# APNS_KEY_FILE=""
# APNS_CRITICAL_ENTITLEMENT="" # "true" only if your build has Apple's Critical Alerts entitlement; else urgent = time-sensitive
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SMTP -- email notification channel (optional, all-or-none)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Operator SMTP transport for the email channel. SMTP_HOST + SMTP_PORT +
# SMTP_FROM together enable it; SMTP_USER/SMTP_PASS are optional (omit for an
# unauthenticated relay). SMTP_SECURE=true uses implicit TLS (port 465);
# unset/false uses STARTTLS (port 587). Per-user recipient address is set in
# Settings -> Notifications, not here. Missing the core trio disables the
# channel silently. Listed in docker-compose.yml's environment whitelist so
# these reach the container.
# SMTP_HOST=""
# SMTP_PORT="587"
# SMTP_FROM="HealthLog <noreply@example.com>"
# SMTP_USER=""
# SMTP_PASS=""
# SMTP_SECURE="false"
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Deploy webhook -- Coolify -> HealthLog auto-deploy feedback
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DEPLOY_WEBHOOK_SECRET=""
# Optional: deployment-dashboard URL (e.g. the Coolify UI) linked in
# deploy-failure notifications. When unset the notification omits the link.
# DEPLOY_LOGS_URL=""
# Optional replay hardening: require a fresh X-Deploy-Webhook-Timestamp
# header (unix seconds / ms or ISO-8601, +/- 5 minutes) on every webhook
# call. Leave unset for Coolify's stock sender (it attaches no
# timestamp); see docs/ops/deploy.md.
# DEPLOY_WEBHOOK_REQUIRE_TIMESTAMP="false"
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TLS leaf pin monitor -- alarm when the pinned leaf certificate rotates
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The native client SPKI-pins the served TLS leaf. Set this to the
# known-good leaf pin(s) so the monitor can alarm on a rotation. The value
# is base64(sha256(DER subjectPublicKeyInfo)); comma-separate to hold both
# the current and the next pin during a dual-pin renewal window. See
# docs/ops/tls-cert-pin.md for extraction + the re-pin runbook.
# TLS_LEAF_SPKI_PINS=""
# Local-AI SSRF opt-in (optional). The local AI provider rejects private/
# internal hosts by default. Set to an exact host allowlist (comma-separated,
# e.g. "ollama.lan,10.0.0.5") or "true" for any private host — intended for a
# self-hosted Ollama / LM Studio endpoint. See docs/integrations/ai-providers.md.
# ALLOW_LOCAL_AI_PRIVATE_HOSTS=""
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Off-host backups -- all-or-none
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# BACKUP_S3_ENDPOINT=""
# BACKUP_S3_BUCKET=""
# BACKUP_S3_ACCESS_KEY=""
# BACKUP_S3_SECRET_KEY=""
# BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY=""
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# FHIR health-record export -- optional
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Per-export ceiling on the number of MedicationAdministration rows in the
# FHIR Bundle. The report window already scopes the set; this is a coarse
# safety ceiling on the serialised Bundle size. Bounded 1..50000; any unset
# or out-of-range value falls back to the default of 5000. Raise it only for
# an unusual multi-year, many-medication workload.
# FHIR_MAX_MEDICATION_ADMINISTRATIONS="5000"
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard snapshot -- BUILD-TIME toggle (default ON)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The dashboard hydrates every above-the-fold tile from the single
# `GET /api/dashboard/snapshot` cell so the whole strip shares one
# completion moment. This is the default and the desired behaviour.
#
# `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` vars are inlined into the client bundle at BUILD time,
# not read at runtime -- so this has NO effect on the prebuilt GHCR
# image and is intentionally absent from the `docker-compose.yml`
# runtime `environment:` whitelist. To fall back to the legacy
# four-cell path you must rebuild the image with the var set to "false":
#
# $ NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_SNAPSHOT=false pnpm build # or a Dockerfile ARG
#
# NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_SNAPSHOT="false"
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Client-IP resolution -- optional (required behind Cloudflare)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# When the stack sits behind Cloudflare, the real visitor IP arrives in the
# `cf-connecting-ip` header; the X-Forwarded-For chain otherwise yields the
# Cloudflare edge IP, so the audit-log overview stores the CF datacentre
# address and the geo lookup resolves the wrong location. Set this to "1"
# ONLY when Cloudflare is in front -- a direct-exposed self-host must leave
# it unset, or an attacker could forge the header. Off by default.
# TRUST_CF_CONNECTING_IP="1"
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IP geolocation lookup -- optional
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The admin login/audit overview enriches auth events with a coarse
# "City, CC" location + carrier. The default online provider is ipwho.is
# (free, no key, HTTPS). Override the base URL to point at a different
# provider; the response must match either the ipwho.is shape (`success` +
# `country_code`) or the ip-api.com shape (`status` + `countryCode`). The
# `/<ip>` segment is appended automatically.
# IP_GEO_LOOKUP_URL="https://ipwho.is"
#
# By default a non-HTTPS URL is refused (audit-event IPs must never egress over
# plaintext HTTP). The free ip-api.com endpoint is HTTP-only (its HTTPS form
# needs a paid key) but is often more accurate. To use it, set BOTH the HTTP
# URL and the explicit opt-in below -- the looked-up IP then travels in clear
# over your server's own egress; this is your call to make.
# IP_GEO_LOOKUP_URL="http://ip-api.com/json"
# IP_GEO_ALLOW_INSECURE="true"
#
# Set to "1" to disable all third-party IP egress (GDPR Art. 44). With egress
# off the resolver uses only the offline GeoLite2 MMDB tier, if present.
# IP_GEO_LOOKUP_DISABLED="1"
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Environmental-context module (Open-Meteo) -- optional
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The opt-in Environment module fetches daily weather / daylight for the user's
# coarse home (or a travel override) from Open-Meteo. The hosted endpoints are
# keyless and free for non-commercial use; data is CC BY 4.0. Both URLs are
# optional -- unset uses the hosted defaults below. A privacy-maximalist or
# commercial self-hoster can run their own Open-Meteo instance and point these
# at it (a private/LAN host is allowed -- the fetch is server-side and does NOT
# force the public-host guard, so an internal instance is not blocked).
# OPENMETEO_BASE_URL="https://archive-api.open-meteo.com"
# OPENMETEO_GEOCODING_URL="https://geocoding-api.open-meteo.com"