Files
HealthLog/src/lib/idempotency.ts
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Marc-André BombeckandMarc-André Bombeck d7778c1085 feat(v1.4): multi-tenant prep — off-host backup, encryption-key versioning, worker/web split, native-Bearer UA gating (#135)
* feat(crypto): G2 — encryption-key versioning + rotation CLI

Adds backwards-compatible support for ENCRYPTION_KEYS (JSON map of
{ "id": "<key>" }) plus ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID. Ciphertext format is now
"<keyId>.<base64payload>"; legacy bare-base64 ciphertext still decrypts
under the synthetic "v1" id derived from the existing ENCRYPTION_KEY.

scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts re-encrypts every encrypted column on
User / WithingsConnection / AppSettings with the active key. Idempotent —
rows already on the active id are skipped.

Why: enables zero-downtime rotation when a key is suspected leaked,
without forcing every encrypted row through a single big-bang rewrite.

Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): G4 — native-Bearer UA gating + rotating refresh tokens

Web callers (UA contains 'Mozilla/') keep the legacy 90d Bearer when they
explicitly opt in via X-Client-Type: native. Native callers (HealthLog-iOS,
HealthLog-iPad, n8n, Health-Connect, unrecognised UAs) now receive a 24h
access token plus a 60d rotating refresh token in the login response.

New /api/auth/refresh endpoint atomically validates + rotates the refresh
token (one-time-use), revokes the previously paired access token, and
audit-logs every refresh + revoke. Reuse of an already-consumed refresh
token revokes the entire family for the user/device — defence against a
stolen refresh token.

Migration 0025_refresh_tokens adds the table; the only DDL is CREATE
TABLE so it is forward-compatible. Down migration documented at
docs/ops/migrations/0025-down.sql.

Why: the V3 audit (still-V2-A) flagged that 90d tokens are too long for
native callers when refresh-token rotation is now table-stakes for mobile
apps. Web flows are unchanged so existing browser sessions keep working.

Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(infra): G3 — web/worker container split via HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE

Adds a tiny startup gate (src/lib/process-type.ts) so the same Docker image
can run as web-only, worker-only, or 'all' (default — single-container,
backwards compatible). assertSubsystemEnabled() refuses to boot the
reminder worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web, preventing accidental
double-cron when an operator splits the deployment.

docker-compose.yml ships the optional app-worker service block commented
out so 'docker compose up' keeps working out of the box; uncommenting it
+ flipping app to HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web is the only change to scale
HTTP horizontally. Healthchecks are isolated per service so neither
startup deadlocks the other; both wait on db: service_healthy.

docs/self-hosting/scaling.md walks through when + how to split.

Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(jobs): G1 — daily off-host encrypted backup to S3-compatible storage

New pg-boss queue 'data-backup-offhost' runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, dumps
each user's measurements + medications + intake events + mood entries,
encrypts the JSON under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, isolated
from the application ENCRYPTION_KEY), and uploads to any S3-compatible
target via @aws-sdk/client-s3.

Wire format documented in docs/ops/backup-restore.md:
  magic "HLBK" || version 0x01 || iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext

The worker prunes objects older than BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30);
operators are encouraged to also configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule.

Admin endpoint POST /api/admin/backup/test issues a 1-byte PUT+GET
roundtrip and returns endpoint + bucket + per-call latency. Credentials
are never returned.

scripts/restore-backup.ts downloads + decrypts a single object so
operators can verify the chain end-to-end without standing up a separate
restore harness.

Why: GDPR Art. 32 + V3 audit "data durability" — without an off-host copy
the only line of defence against a Postgres volume loss is the in-DB
DataBackup model on the same host. Separate-key isolation means a leak of
the application encryption key does not also expose every user's archive.

Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(multi-tenant): address review findings — rotation coverage, hard decrypt errors, web/worker gates

Multi-agent review on PR #135 caught several CRITICAL + HIGH issues that
would have shipped silent data corruption or weakened the threat model:

Encryption + rotation
- scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts: stop selecting `bugReportTokenEncrypted`
  (column doesn't exist in the schema; the script crashed on the AppSettings
  step). Add the three encrypted columns it was missing —
  NotificationChannel.config, PushSubscription.p256dh, PushSubscription.auth
  — so rotating to a new key actually re-encrypts every encrypted row.
  Without this, dropping the old key id from ENCRYPTION_KEYS would leave
  notification channels and web-push subscriptions permanently
  undecryptable.
- src/lib/crypto.ts: refuse to silently fall back to the active key when a
  legacy bare-base64 row is decrypted but no v1 entry is configured. Throws
  a clear "Restore ENCRYPTION_KEY (or add a v1 entry to ENCRYPTION_KEYS)
  and run scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts before removing it" so an
  operator who pulled the v1 too early notices immediately instead of
  hitting opaque GCM tag errors.
- docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md: full step-by-step + rollback note +
  troubleshooting section. Spells out that rotation is a forward-only
  operation and what to do if the rollback path is needed.

Web / worker split (G3)
- src/proxy.ts: refuse HTTP traffic with a 503 +
  X-HealthLog-Process-Type: worker header when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=worker.
  The worker container (which still runs `node server.js` for now) no
  longer accepts requests, so a misrouted client gets a clear hint instead
  of a partially-served response.
- src/instrumentation.ts: short-circuit before importing the reminder
  worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web — avoids the noisy
  "[instrumentation] CRITICAL" stderr line we emitted on every web boot.
- /api/version added to PUBLIC_PATHS so the compose healthcheck doesn't
  silently 302-redirect through the auth gate (the prior wget treated the
  login page as a 200 success and would never notice an unhealthy backend).

Refresh-token rotation (G4)
- src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts: reuse-detection now revokes ALL active
  refresh tokens for the user, not only those scoped to the same deviceId.
  An attacker who rotated without an X-Device-Id header would otherwise
  keep their family alive on the no-device branch. Defence-in-depth.
- revokeRefreshToken() also revokes the paired access token so a leaked
  access token cannot outlive the refresh-token sibling that the caller
  just killed (logout-on-device).

Off-host backup (G1)
- src/lib/jobs/offhost-backup.ts: drop the worker-side DeleteObject path.
  Retention is the bucket's lifecycle-policy job; the worker keeps a
  PutObject + GetObject grant only. A compromised worker can no longer
  wipe the backup history. Per-user errors are now surfaced as Wide
  Event warnings + a structured failures[] array on the report so an
  operator can tell which user failed and why.
- scripts/restore-backup.ts: schema-validate the decrypted payload before
  writing to disk, plus an optional --user-id=<id> flag that refuses to
  proceed unless the dump's userId matches. Prevents silent
  cross-tenant restores when an operator points the script at the wrong
  S3 key.

Idempotency
- src/lib/idempotency.ts: the leak-guard already blocked `hlk_`
  (access-token prefix); also block `hlr_` so a future caller wrapping
  the new /api/auth/refresh endpoint with withIdempotency() can't
  accidentally cache a freshly-issued refresh token.

Migration / schema
- prisma/migrations/0025_refresh_tokens/migration.sql: wrap in a single
  transaction; switch to CREATE { TABLE | INDEX } IF NOT EXISTS so a
  partial-deploy retry is a no-op instead of "relation already exists";
  guard the FK ADD with information_schema lookup for the same reason.
- Schema replaces the single-column `@@index([deviceId])` with a
  composite `@@index([userId, deviceId])` (every lookup also filters on
  userId; the old index would never have been used). Comment on
  accessTokenHash corrected to HMAC-SHA-256.

Container / ops
- Dockerfile: install tzdata + ENV TZ=Europe/Berlin so the daily
  pg-boss schedule (`30 2 * * *` Europe/Berlin) actually fires at 02:30
  Berlin instead of silently falling back to UTC on the alpine base.
- docker-compose.yml: tighten the healthcheck to `wget --spider` (matches
  the Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK style, doesn't pipe the body), pass through
  BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS so a custom retention env reaches the container.
- .env.example: document every new env var added in this PR
  (HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE, ENCRYPTION_KEYS, ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID,
  BACKUP_S3_*, BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS) with
  comments and the all-or-none semantics for the backup block.

491 tests still green, typecheck clean.

* chore: retrigger CI

---------

Co-authored-by: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 14:33:39 +02:00

235 lines
7.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Idempotency-Key support for write endpoints (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE).
*
* Mobile clients send `Idempotency-Key: <uuid>`. The first request runs
* the handler normally and the response (status + body) is cached. Any
* retry within the TTL (24h) for the same `(userId, key, method, path)`
* tuple returns the cached envelope as a 200 (carrying the original
* status inside the JSON if needed) — no second side-effect.
*/
import type { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import { headers } from "next/headers";
import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import { getSession } from "@/lib/auth/session";
import { hashToken } from "@/lib/auth/hmac";
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
const TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
const SUPPORTED_METHODS = new Set(["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]);
const KEY_REGEX = /^[A-Za-z0-9_\-:.]{8,128}$/;
export interface IdempotencyContext {
userId: string;
key: string;
method: string;
path: string;
}
function getIdempotencyKey(request: Request | NextRequest): string | null {
const raw = request.headers.get("idempotency-key");
if (!raw) return null;
const trimmed = raw.trim();
if (!KEY_REGEX.test(trimmed)) return null;
return trimmed;
}
/**
* Look up a cached response for a (userId, key, method, path) tuple.
* Returns the cached NextResponse or null.
*/
async function findCached(
ctx: IdempotencyContext,
): Promise<NextResponse | null> {
const row = await prisma.idempotencyKey.findUnique({
where: {
userId_key_method_path: {
userId: ctx.userId,
key: ctx.key,
method: ctx.method,
path: ctx.path,
},
},
});
if (!row) return null;
if (row.expiresAt <= new Date()) {
// Stale — purge and fall through.
await prisma.idempotencyKey
.delete({ where: { id: row.id } })
.catch(() => {});
return null;
}
let parsed: unknown = null;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(row.responseBody);
} catch {
parsed = null;
}
annotate({
action: { name: "idempotency.replay" },
meta: { method: ctx.method, path: ctx.path },
});
// Replay original status to keep client behaviour byte-identical.
return NextResponse.json(parsed, {
status: row.responseStatus,
headers: {
"X-Idempotent-Replay": "true",
},
});
}
async function persistCached(
ctx: IdempotencyContext,
response: Response,
preReadBody?: string,
): Promise<void> {
const body =
preReadBody ??
(await response
.clone()
.text()
.catch(() => ""));
await prisma.idempotencyKey
.create({
data: {
userId: ctx.userId,
key: ctx.key,
method: ctx.method,
path: ctx.path,
responseStatus: response.status,
responseBody: body,
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + TTL_MS),
},
})
.catch(() => {
// Concurrent insert with the same key — the other writer wins.
// Ignore because a future replay will hit their cached value.
});
}
/**
* Whether a response with the given HTTP status should be cached for
* idempotent replay.
*
* Cached: any 2xx/3xx, plus 4xx-validation (so the same broken request
* doesn't re-execute side-effects). Specifically NOT cached:
* 401 — token may have expired between the original call and the retry
* 403 — likewise authorization can change
* 408 — caller timed out, retry deserves a fresh attempt
* 429 — caller hit a rate-limit, retry deserves a fresh window check
* 5xx — server fault, retry must not be locked into a bogus result
*
* Exported so the do-not-cache contract is unit-tested independently of
* the database-backed wrapper.
*/
export function isCachableStatus(status: number): boolean {
if (status < 400) return true;
if (status >= 500) return false;
if (status === 401 || status === 403 || status === 408 || status === 429) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Default resolver: cookie session first, then Bearer token. The Bearer
* fallback is what makes idempotency actually fire for native iOS / n8n
* /external clients — without it, every Bearer-authed retry was running
* the handler again and creating duplicate measurements (audit C-4).
*
* Exported for unit testing; production callers should let
* `withIdempotency()` pick this up automatically via its default arg.
*/
export async function defaultUserIdResolver(): Promise<string | null> {
const session = await getSession().catch(() => null);
if (session) return session.user.id;
let authHeader: string | null = null;
try {
const headerList = await headers();
authHeader = headerList.get("authorization");
} catch {
authHeader = null;
}
if (!authHeader?.startsWith("Bearer ")) return null;
const tokenHashValue = hashToken(authHeader.slice(7));
const apiToken = await prisma.apiToken
.findUnique({
where: { tokenHash: tokenHashValue },
select: { userId: true, revoked: true, expiresAt: true },
})
.catch(() => null);
if (!apiToken || apiToken.revoked) return null;
if (apiToken.expiresAt && apiToken.expiresAt <= new Date()) return null;
return apiToken.userId;
}
/**
* Wrap a write handler so a repeat call with the same `Idempotency-Key`
* (and same userId/method/path) returns the originally cached response.
*
* The wrapped handler is responsible for authentication itself — this
* helper only triggers for methods in {POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE} and only
* once `userIdResolver` returns a non-null value. The default resolver
* supports both cookie sessions and Bearer-token clients; pass a custom
* resolver only for routes that authenticate via something exotic.
*
* No-op when the header is missing or the value is malformed.
*/
export function withIdempotency<
Args extends [Request | NextRequest, ...unknown[]],
>(
handler: (...args: Args) => Promise<Response>,
userIdResolver: (
...args: Args
) => Promise<string | null> = defaultUserIdResolver,
): (...args: Args) => Promise<Response> {
return async (...args: Args): Promise<Response> => {
const request = args[0];
if (!SUPPORTED_METHODS.has(request.method)) {
return handler(...args);
}
const key = getIdempotencyKey(request);
if (!key) return handler(...args);
const userId = await userIdResolver(...args);
if (!userId) return handler(...args);
const url = new URL(request.url);
const ctx: IdempotencyContext = {
userId,
key,
method: request.method,
path: url.pathname,
};
const cached = await findCached(ctx);
if (cached) return cached;
const response = await handler(...args);
if (isCachableStatus(response.status)) {
// Defence-in-depth: never persist a body that carries a freshly-issued
// bearer or refresh token. Auth routes shouldn't be wrapped in
// withIdempotency to begin with, but if a future caller forgets we
// refuse to leak. `hlk_` = access tokens, `hlr_` = refresh tokens.
const cloned = response.clone();
const text = await cloned.text();
if (!text.includes("hlk_") && !text.includes("hlr_")) {
await persistCached(ctx, response, text);
}
}
return response;
};
}