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Marc-André Bombeck
8617f809f0
A guardian with a fresh second factor mints a one-time handover link (hlp_ token, HMAC hash stored only, 1/7/14 days, at most one open per profile, withdrawable) with a proposed access level per guardian: end, view only or manage, view only by default. The link is shown once with a copy button and a QR code; nothing is mailed. The panel sits at the end of each managed-profile row and hints when the person is under 16. The person opens /claim/<token>, sees a minimal preview (name, expiry, who keeps which access, no health data) and chooses a username, a required email and a password under the registration policy. The claim is one transaction under the managed-profile lock: the token is consumed, the credentials are set, the marker is cleared, every pending invitation the record offered is withdrawn, each guardian's access is set to its proposal, the disclaimer, onboarding and AI consent are reset, and every step is audited on the record and on each guardian's own account. A failure anywhere leaves the profile managed and the link unused. Each guardian is notified on their own channels. The new owner then sees each guardian's access on the first screen after signing in and decides finally; until then the proposal holds, and the decision waits at the top of Shared access. A guardian whose access moved since the claim is left alone. The same screen points the owner at their own notification channels, since reminders no longer reach the guardians. Both anonymous routes refuse a single-sign-on-only instance, refuse a live session before spending the per-address rate limit, check the link before probing names, and answer one 404 for every unusable token. The token travels in request bodies only; hlp_ joins the redaction and secret-shape rules and /claim/ the path-secret registry. Usernames starting with managed- are reserved. The session-surface and acting- account guards list the new surfaces with their reasons.
26 lines
1.2 KiB
TypeScript
26 lines
1.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* One definition of "this text carries a credential HealthLog or a common
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* AI provider mints", shared by every surface that refuses to store or echo
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* such text.
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*
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* `hlk_` access tokens, `hlr_` refresh tokens, `hls_` clinician share-link
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* tokens and session secrets, `hlv_` registration invite tokens, `hlp_`
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* managed-profile handover tokens (v1.42), `hle_`
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* elevation tokens, `hlh_` native sign-in handoff codes, and the MCP OAuth
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* artifacts `hlac_` (authorization code), `hlrt_` (refresh token) and `hlc_`
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* (client id);
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* `sk-…` / `sk-ant-…` OpenAI and Anthropic keys, in the full token form
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* only: a bare `sk-` substring ("task-id", "risk-management") is not a key,
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* and matching it would refuse benign text.
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*
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* It is a shape test, not a secret detector. A credential without one of
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* these prefixes (a relay's own app token, a password) passes, so a caller
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* that knows the secrets in play must also refuse text containing them.
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*/
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const SECRET_SHAPED =
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/(?:\b(?:hlk_|hlr_|hls_|hlv_|hlp_|hle_|hlh_|hlac_|hlrt_|hlc_)[A-Za-z0-9_-]+|\bsk-(?:ant-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,})/;
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export function looksSecretShaped(text: string): boolean {
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return SECRET_SHAPED.test(text);
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}
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